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JEFFERSON 

AND  THE  EMBARGO 


BY 

LOUIS  MARTIN  SEARS,  Ph.D. 

Professor  of  History  in  Purdue  University 


DUKE  UNIVERSITY  PRESS 

DURHAM,  NORTH  CAROLINA 


COPYRIGHT  IN  1927 
BY  DUKE  UNIVERSITY  PRESS 


9 


PRINTED  BY 

THE  SEEM  AN  PRESS,  INC. 
DURHAM,  N.  C. 


1,1)0 


TO  THE  MEMORY  OF 


LOUISE  HAWLEY  MARTIN 


WHOSE  BEAUTIFUL  LIFE  OF  DEVOTION  TO  DUTY 
WAS  AN  INSPIRATION  TO  ALL  WHO  KNEW  HER 
THIS  BOOK  IS  DEDICATED  WITH  THE 
COMPLETE  AFFECTION  OF 
HER  GRANDSON 


I  « 


i  v 


$T 


I 


PREFACE 


Some  years  ago,  the  author  prepared  for  the  Chicago 
Literary  Club  a  study  of  Jefferson  as  a  pacifist.  In  the 
course  of  his  work,  he  became  so  interested  in  the  philosophy 
of  Jefferson  that  he  set  himself  the  larger  task  of  indicating 
the  practical  working  out  of  the  pacific  theories  which  Jeffer¬ 
son  so  inspiringly  enunciated.  This  carried  him  through 
Jefferson’s  contribution  to  the  foreign  policy  of  Washing¬ 
ton  and  the  theories  of  international  law  which  governed 
his  own  administration,  to  a  review  of  the  embargo  as  the 
practical  culmination  of  Jeffersonian  pacifism,  and  led  him 
to  certain  conclusions,  which,  while  not  revolutionary  in 
their  character,  seem  to  indicate  a  somewhat  different  Jeffer¬ 
son  from  the  model  so  ably  set  by  Henry  Adams. 

First,  it  would  seem  that  in  urging  the  embargo  Jeffer¬ 
son  was  pursuing  not  a  hasty  opportunism,  but  rather  the  [ 
logic  of  his  entire  philosophy  of  life.  Secondly,  the  exigen-* 
cies  of  the  situation  revealed  Jefferson  as  an  administrator 
of  a  high  order,  a  phase  of  Jefferson’s  ability  which  has  been 
generally  slighted,  perhaps  from  an  instinctive  assumption 
that  philosophers  and  practical  men  do  not  inhabit  the 
same  body. 

A  fresh  examination  of  the  Jefferson  Papers,  especially 
of  the  letters  to  Jefferson,  reveals  a  more  generous  support 
for  the  embargo  than  it  has  been  customary  to  represent,! 
and  shows,  besides,  in  certain  localities  a  remarkable  pros¬ 
perity,  fostered  by  the  opportunity  of  a  closed  market,  and 
inviting  the  investment  of  capital  formerly  tied  up  in^ 
shipping.  In  its  aggressive  aspect,  the  embargo  must  be 
judged  by  its  material  and  moral  effect  upon  Great  Britain 
and  France.  And  the  present  study  suggests  with  respect  to 
Great  Britain  what  the  elaborate  examination  by  Dr.  Frank 


viii  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 

Edgar  Melvin  of  “Napoleon’s  Continental  System”  confirms 
for  France,  that  the  actual  pressure  was  severe,  and  came 
far  nearer  to  producing  the  desired  result  than  the  enemies 
of  Jefferson,  or  even  his  friends,  perceived.  Like  many  a 
more  martial  conflict,  this  warfare  of  self-denial  brought 
success  much  nearer  to  the  vanquished  than  was  comfortable 
for  the  victors. 

To  the  members  of  the  staff  of  the  Division  of  Manu¬ 
scripts  in  the  Library  of  Congress,  as  well  as  to  Dr.  C. 
O.  Paullin  of  the  Carnegie  Institution  in  Washington,  I 
desire  to  express  my  thanks  for  many  courtesies  in  the 
prosecution  of  my  researches.  To  the  editors  of  The  Ameri¬ 
can  Political  Science  Review,  The  Quarterly  Journal  of 
Economics,  The  South  Atlantic  Quarterly,  and  the  Ameri¬ 
can  Historical  Association,  Annual  Reports,  are  due  my 
grateful  acknowledgment  of  their  kind  permission  to  reprint 
chapters  and  parts  of  chapters  which  originally  appeared 
under  their  auspices.  Chapter  II,  Jefferson  and  the  Law 
of  Nations,  appeared  originally  in  the  American  Political 
Science  Review  for  August,  1919,  and  has  subsequently 
been  translated  into  Spanish  for  Inter- America.  Chapter 
VII,  The  Middle  States  and  the  Embargo,  appeared  in 
part  under  that  title  in  the  South  Atlantic  Quarterly  for 
April,  1922.  Other  portions  of  this  chapter  may  be  found 
in  the  Quarterly  Journal  of  Economics,  February,  1921, 
under  notes  on  Philadelphia  and  the  Embargo  of  1808. 
Some  of  this  same  material  is  covered  also  in  the  Annual 
Report  of  the  American  Historical  Association  for  1920, 
under  the  same  caption  as  above.  Chapter  VIII,  The  South 
and  the  Embargo,  appeared  originally  in  the  South  Atlantic 
Quarterly  for  July,  1921.  Chapter  X,  British  Industry  and 
the  American  Embargo  first  appeared  in  the  Quarterly  Jour¬ 
nal  of  Economics  of  November,  1919. 


PREFACE 


IX 


I  take  this  opportunity  to  express  my  gratitude  for  help¬ 
ful  criticism  to  Professor  William  E.  Dodd  of  the  Univer¬ 
sity  of  Chicago,  whose  learning  has  been  an  inspiration  and 
whose  friendship  an  encouragement  for  many  years.  To 
Professors  Andrew  Cunningham  McLaughlin  and  Conyers 
Read,  I  am  also  much  indebted  for  a  reading  of  the  manu¬ 
script,  and  for  numerous  suggestions  of  value  to  the  work 
in  its  earlier  form  as  a  doctoral  dissertation  at  the  Univer¬ 
sity  of  Chicago.  Professor  William  K.  Boyd,  and  William 
T.  Laprade,  of  Duke  University,  and  Professor  Arthur  H. 
Hirsch,  of  Ohio  Wesleyan  University,  have  placed  me  under 
deep  obligation  by  their  further  and  careful  examination  of 
the  manuscript  and  by  their  helpful  suggestions  toward  its 
progress  through  the  press. 

Also,  I  wish  to  call  attention  to  the  excellent  monograph 
on  “The  American  Embargo  1807-1809,”  by  Walter  Wilson 
Jennings,  Ph.D.,  in  the  “University  of  Iowa  Studies  in  the 
Social  Sciences.” 

I  cannot  conclude  these  words  of  preface  without  tribute 
to  the  letters  of  Jefferson.  They  are  more  than  masterpieces 
of  epistolary  art.  They  are  source  material  for  what  Mr. 
Gamaliel  Bradford  calls  psychography.  They  are  the  delinea¬ 
tion  of  a  great  soul,  whose  struggles  for  the  welfare  of  man¬ 
kind  should  never  cease  to  interest  the  humanity  he  sought 
to  serve. 


L.  M.  S. 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

I.  THE  UNDERLYING  POINT  OF  VIEW  3 

II.  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  LAW  OF  NATIONS  32 

III.  THE  ADOPTION  OF  THE  EMBARGO  TO  APRIL  30,  1808  55 

IV.  SUCCESS  AND  FAILURE  73 

V.  FAILURE  AND  SUCCESS  124 

NEW  ENGLAND  AND  THE  EMBARGO  143 

VII.  THE  MIDDLE  STATES  AND  THE  EMBARGO  197 

^VIII.  THE  SOUTH  AND  THE  EMBARGO  228 

(fx)  BRITISH  POLITICS  AND  THE  AMERICAN  EMBARGO  253 

X.  BRITISH  INDUSTRY  AND  THE  AMERICAN  EMBARGO  276 

(Xp  FRANCE  AND  THE  EMBARGO  302 

^xn.  CONCLUSION  318, 

BIBLIOGRAPHY  321 

INDEX  325 


JEFFERSON  AND  THE 
EMBARGO 


CHAPTER  I 


THE  UNDERLYING  POINT  OF  VIEW 

When  Thomas  Jefferson,  in  December,  1807,  gave  execu¬ 
tive  approval  to  the  embargo  on  American  ships  and  goods, 
ne  carried  theory  into  practice  and  put  to  the  test  perhaps 
the  most  perfect  substitute  for  war  up  to  that  time  devised. 
There  was  abundant  provocation  for  war  itself.  The  Euro¬ 
pean  belligerents,  Great  Britain  and  France,  locked  in  a  death 
grapple  for  world  power,  recognized  no  neutral  right  they 
felt  bound  to  respect,  and  the  bankrupt  diplomacy  of  each 
spurned  with  utter  fatuity  a  good  will  which  should  have 
been  invaluable.  What  between  the  tightening  blockade  by 
Great  Britain  on  the  one  hand  and  the  impotent  but  exasper¬ 
ating  retaliations  of  Napoleon  on  the  other,  America,  as  the 
hief  of  neutral  carriers,  either  must  fight  the  mistress  of  the 
eas  and  the  foremost  of  land  tyrants  in  a  triangular  combi- 
ation,  or  else  she  must  submit  to  outrages  intolerable  for  a 
sovereign  state,  however  modest  its  position  in  the  world 
concert.  To  Jefferson  the  former  course  appeared  quixotic; 
the  latter,  unthinkable.  The  alternative  was  to  stay  at  home 
nd  preserve  our  flag  from  the  insults  it  was  certain  to  meet 
on  the  high  seas  or  in  French  ports.  In  the  nature  of  a  com- 
romise  measure,  the  embargo  contained  features  common  to 
oth  war  and  submission.  An  embargo,  to  he  satisfactory. 
cad  not  merely  to  safeguard  nnr  nwn  gh;pp'ng  f-;t  a1gr> 
to  awaken  European  consumers  to  the  folly  of  their  govern¬ 

ments  in  rutting  them  off  jfcom  needed  supplier,  In  this 
ifngp  ^  ptnhRT'g'Q  was  (coercive*.  a  close_  kinsman  to  the 
blockade  as  aJnrm  of  actualwarfare.  In  another  sense,  the 
mbargOAva^  submissive,  a  twin  brother  tp  surriamEr,  t'^r  Lt. 

■vas  idle  to  irnagme-ffrat  those  righD  Wprp  r1efenHed_whose_ 


JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


AC 


possessor  dared  not  even  assert  thpm  But,  as  the  world 
was  situated  in  1807,  this  intermediate  position  seemed  to  its 
sponsor  his  country’s  only  outlet  from  a  sea  of  difficulties. 
It  was  the  matured  policy  of  a  lifelong  hatred  for  waO  One 
cannot  understand  Jefferson’s  initiation  of  the  embargo  and 
his  subsequent  relation  to  its  enforcement_witfrout  examin¬ 
ing  his  point  of  view  as  it  ripened  into  pacifism.  For  the 
embargo  was  the  practical  outcome  of  a  philosophy  long  ma¬ 
turing.  It  was  the  projection  into  foreign  affairs  of  the 
peace  ideals  of  a  democracy,  the  contribution  to  interna¬ 
tional  polity  of  one  of  the  world’s  greatest  democrats. 

The  clew  to  Jefferson’s  sentiments  on  war  and  peace  alike 
is  his  democracy,  his  confidence  in  the  innate  virtue  and  in¬ 
telligence  of  mankind  and  its  potentiality  for  self-govern¬ 
ment.  He  believed  in  the  power  of  self-government  and 
education  to  uplift  the  common  man  and  waged  a  lifelong 
warfare  with  the  strait-jacket  ideal  designed  to  enthrall  and 
exploit  him.  But  the  very  intensity  of  his  democratic  convic¬ 
tion  proclaimed  Jefferson  a  thinker  rather  than  a  man  of 
,  - a  philosopher  and~theori6t  -rather-than-aa  executive. 
And  if  the  embargo  appears  more  plausible  in  theory  than 
successful  in  practice,  it  merely  shares  the  characteristics  of 
its  sponsor.  To  understand  the  measure,  one  must  needs 
know  the  man.  Only  asHusllemdcracy  and  his^aclfism  are' 
revealed  can  we  explain  the  embargo  as  their  outcome. 

Jefferson’s  early  reputation  in  Virginia  rested  upon  public 
spirit  and  reform  policies  rather  than  upon  proved  capacity 
for  leadership.  His  contribution  to  the  Revolution  was  the 
Declaration  of  Independence,  not  his  rather  helpless  career  as 
war  governor  of  the  State.  The  Federal  Union  employed 
him  to  best  advantage  as  the  messenger  of  liberty  to  its 
friends  beyond  the  sea.  His  principal  service  after  his  re¬ 
turn  was  to  organize  democratic  opposition  to  the  privileged 


THE  UNDERLYING  POINT  OF  VIEW 


5 


orders  in  eastern  cities  into  a  political  victory  in  1800,  which 
saved  the  Union  from  western  secession.  Executive  detail 
interested  him  little,  and  his  presidency  was  distinguished 
rather  by  a  grasp  of  future  needs  and  restraint  under  provo¬ 
cation  than  by  brilliancy  of  administration.  In  retirement, 
he  was  the  Sage  of  Monticello,  an  oracle,  but  chiefly  a  spec¬ 
tator,  devoting  his  last  strength  to  the  cause  of  education, 
the  foundation  stone  in  his  scheme  of  democracy.  But 
among  the  interests  of  his  long  and  varied  career,  the  cause 
of  peace  held  permanent  place. 

The  truth  of  this  appears  in  the  midst  of  the  Revolution. 
Although  one  does  not  look  to  Thomas  Jefferson  for  a  mili¬ 
tary  history  of  the  American  Revolution,  yet  his  references 
to  its  operation  are  surprisingly  few.  He  understood  that  final 
success  would  depend  largely  upon  sea  power,  and,  in  the  ab¬ 
sence  of  this  element  of  victory,  as  early  as  July,  1774,  when 
the  Boston  Port  Bill  was  agitating  the  colonies, (he  advocated 
a  non-importation  agreement  against  all  goods  subject  to 
British  entry  duties.  ^Again,  when  the  Continental  currency 
commenced  to  depreciate,  partly  for  lack  of  a  foreign  market, 
Jefferson  favored  either  free  trade,  supported  by  alliance 
with  a  strong  naval  power,2  or  else  complete  non-importa¬ 
tion.3  In  this  recommendation  of  non-importation,  Jefferson 
was  already  promulgating  the  great  pacific  formula  of  his 
presidential  term,  while  naval  power,  though  anathema  to 
his  ideals,  was,  ironically  enough,  to  claim  him  as  its  father. 
V  Of  interest,  in  the  light  of  the  recent  disposition  to  attrib¬ 
ute  French  intervention  after  Saratoga  to  the  fear  that 
Great  Britain  and  America  were  about  to  conclude  a  peace 

1  The  Works  of  Thomas  Jefferson.  Federal  Edition,  II.  42-44.  “Reso¬ 
lutions  of  Albemarle  County.” 

2  Ibid.,  II.  307.  See  also  III.  249,  Jefferson  to  DeLaLuzerne  on  the 
utility  of  sea  power. 

‘Ibid.,  II.  307.  S'ee  also  II.  491,  502,  which  foreshadow  his  later 
embargo  policy. 


6 


JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 

and  wage  joint  war  upon  the  French  West  Indies,4  is  a  letter 
from  Jefferson  to  Franklin  intimating  such  a  possibility 
unless  Franklin  exerted  himself  to  prevent  it.5  Franklin 
did  his  part,  and  France  intervened,  but  two  years  later 
(1779)  Jefferson  was  so  weary  of  war,  though  as  yet  its 
fury  had  not  touched  Virginia,  that  he  preferred  “a  ten 
years’  war  sometime  hence”  to  one  unnecessary  moment  of 
the  present.6 

Bitterly  as  he  detested  the  war,  upon  occasion  he 
could  commend  to  Washington  the  honorable  conduct  of 
the  foe.7  Nor  was  he  indifferent  to  British  prisoners  in  de¬ 
tention  camps.  His  appeal  to  Governor  Henry  not  to  sacri¬ 
fice  the  comfort  and  happiness  of  prisoners  to  petty  whims 
of  economy — a  shaft  at  his  excellency’s  principal  vice — was 
in  keeping  with  a  plan  to  encourage  Hessian  settlements 
within  the  state.  (^Toward  this  end,  during  his  own  term 
as  governor,  he  proclaimed  a  grant  of  two  cows  and  exemp¬ 
tion  from  taxes  and  militia  duty  to  such  Hessians  and  other 
foreigners  as  would  abandon  the  British  cause  and  take  up 
land  in  Virginia.  This  consideration  for  enemy  mercen¬ 
aries  is  evidence  of  Jefferson’s  broad  humanity."') 

Indeed,  fair  treatment  to  the  enemy  was  parcel  of  the 
humanitarianism  which  Jefferson  accounted  the  dignity  of 
civilized  warfare.  He  congratulated  himself  in  the  early 
days  of  the  war  that  the  refinements  of  civilization  were 
ameliorating  the  lot  of  prisoners,  “so  that  an  enemy  is  an 
object  of  vengeance,  in  arms  and  in  the  field  only.”8  But 
war  proved  less  an  exchange  of  knightly  courtesies  than  he 
had  anticipated,  and  British  atrocities  soon  led  him  to  jus¬ 
tify  American  retaliation  as  the  sole  means  of  stopping  the 

4  C.  H.  Van  Tyne,  “Influences  which  Determined  the  French  Govern¬ 
ment  to  Make  the  Treaty  with  America,  1778,”  American  Historical 
Review,  XXI.  No.  3.  April,  1916. 

’  The  Works  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  II.  307. 

•Ibid.,  II.  375. 

7  Ibid.,  III.  84. 

'Ibid.,  II.  145-146. 


THE  UNDERLYING  POINT  OF  VIEW 


7 


progress  of  human  butchery.9  In  his  role  of  casuist,  Jeffer¬ 
son  represented  a  twentieth-century  type.  But  it  was,  in 
truth,  difficult  to  preserve  generous  ideals  against  an  enemy 
like  Tarleton,  and,  in  his  term  as  governor,  Jefferson  was 
compelled  to  threaten  retaliation  against  prisoners  and  to 
justify  his  case  by  depositions  from  Virginia  captives, 
whose  tales  of  horror  influenced  their  hearer  to  an  analysis 
of  British  civilization  which  would  edify  its  most  irrecon¬ 
cilable  opponents  of  today: 

The  present  war  having  so  long  cut  off  all  communication  with 
Great  Britain,  we  are  not  able  to  make  a  fair  estimate  of  the  state 
of  science  in  that  country.  The  spirit  in  which  she  wages  war,  is 
the  only  sample  before  our  eyes,  and  that  does  not  seem  the  legiti¬ 
mate  offspring  either  of  science  or  of  civilization.  The  sun  of  her 
glory  is  fast  descending  to  the  horizon.  Her  Philosophy  has  crossed 
the  channel,  her  freedom  the  Atlantic,  and  herself  seems  passing  to 
that  awful  dissolution  whose  issue  is  not  given  human  foresight  to 
scan.10 

In  his  executive  capacity,  Jefferson  came  into  intimate 
contact  with  military  discouragements11  through  his  nomi¬ 
nal  command  of  the  militia.  He  found  it  a  poor  tool,  yet 
all  his  life  he  remained  an  advocate  of  voluntary  in  prefer¬ 
ence  to  professional  military  service.  That  the  militia  of  the 
Revolution  was  a  poor  reliance  appeared  to  Jefferson  no 
justification  for  the  curse  of  standing  armies,  and  no  excuse 
to  the  citizen  for  the  evasion  of  his  highest  duty.  His  solu¬ 
tion  was  to  improve  the  existing  system. 

It  was  in  character  that  an  individualist  and  demo¬ 
crat  should  shun  excess  of  military  discipline,  so  that  one  is 
not  surprised  to  find  that  Jefferson’s  “Draft  of  a  Bill  for 
Providing  against  Invasions  and  Insurrections”  provided  no 
heavier  military  punishment  than  degrading,  cashiering, 
drumming  out  of  the  army,  and  whipping  not  to  exceed 

8  The  Works  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  II.  147. 

10  Ibid.,  III.  461. 

u  Ibid.,  II.  487. 


8 


JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


twenty  lashes,  even  for  the  most  serious  offences.12  Yet 
even  these  rules  were  more  rigorous  than  Virginians  were 
disciplined  to  obey,13  and,  at  a  critical  juncture  in  1781,  Jef¬ 
ferson  was  under  the  humiliating  necessity  of  admitting  to 
La  Fayette  that  it  was  not  in  his  power  “to  do  any  thing 
more  than  to  represent  to  the  General  Assembly  that  unless 
they  can  provide  more  effectually  for  the  Execution  of  the 
Laws  it  will  be  vain  to  call  on  Militia.”14 

The  service  was,  in  truth,  no  object  lesson  in  efficiency. 
Jefferson  complained  that  it  was  easy  to  evade,  expensive  to 
the  public,  distressing  and  disgusting  to  individuals,15  and 
not  reliable  for  long  campaigns  or  for  use  in  distant  coun¬ 
ties.16  Militiamen  were  too  proud  to  work  on  the  fortifica¬ 
tions17  but  not  ashamed  to  steal  the  arms  and  ammunition 
which  the  state  had  provided.18 

The  whole  militia  system  threatened  to  collapse  before 
a  British  device  for  disarming  entire  regions  under  tempor¬ 
ary  occupation  by  placing  the  inhabitants  under  parole.  This 
general  parole  afforded  a  favorite  evasion  of  military  duty 
to  pusillanimous  Colonists,  who  even  courted  the  oath  as  a 
conscientious  excuse  for  shirking  their  duty  to  the  state. 
Jefferson  combatted  the  evil  in  a  circular  letter  to  the  county 
lieutenants,  urging  all  whose  consciences  forbade  their  taking 
up  arms  to  take  refuge  behind  the  British  lines.19  If,  how¬ 
ever,  any  chose  to  break  parole  and  to  aid  their  countrymen, 
Jefferson  made  it  clear  that  he  would  not  send  them  back  to 
the  British.20  He  took  the  proper  ground  of  Americanism 

u  The  Works  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  II.  301.  V.  S.  A.  May  10,  1777. 
u  Ibid.,  III.  214. 

14  Ibid.,  III.  280. 

"Ibid.,  III.  192. 

”  Ibid.,  III.  200. 

”  Ibid.,  III.  277. 
u Ibid .,  III.  231. 

"Ibid.,  III.  145. 
xIbid„  III.  152. 


THE  UNDERLYING  POINT  OF  VIEW 


9 


and  common  sense,  that  “He  is  a  bad  citizen  who  can  enter¬ 
tain  a  doubt  whether  the  Law  will  justify  him  in  saving  his 
country  or  who  will  scruple  to  risk  himself  in  support  of  the 
spirit  of  a  Law  where  unavoidable  Accidents  have  prevented 
a  literal  compliance  with  it.”21 

Notwithstanding  the  tribulations  of  unpreparedness,  Jef¬ 
ferson  was  not  easily  discouraged  by  his  countrymen,  even 
if  at  times  he  was  compelled  to  reduce  his  expectations  of 
their  immediate  achievements.  He  refused  to  sacrifice  the 
ideals  of  his  life  to  momentary  exigencies,  and,  in  1779, 
while  the  war  was  pressing  on,  he  found  time  for  the  more 
congenial  task  of  drafting  “A  Bill  for  the  Amending  of  the 
Constitution  of  the  College  of  William  and  Mary,”  in  which 
he  recited  the  great  need  of  a  training  school  for  “the 
future  guardians  of  the  rights  and  liberties  of  their  coun¬ 
try.”22 

It  was  no  part  of  Jefferson’s  plan,  one  is  assured,  to  sub¬ 
ject  those  liberties  to  military  despotism.  An  old  complaint 
against  George  III  was  his  quartering  of  British  troops  in 
America  without  consent.23  The  constitutions  which  Jeff¬ 
erson  proposed  for  Virginia  in  177  624  and  in  178325 
guarded  against  executive  tyranny  by  intrusting  military 
prerogative  to  the  legislative  branch.  A  decidedly  acrimon¬ 
ious  letter  from  Jefferson  to  Steuben26  complains  of  a  self- 
important  quartermaster  to  whom  “We  did  not  think  it 
proper  to  resign  ourselves  and  our  Country  implicity — but 
thought  we  had  some  right  of  judgment  left  to  us,”  while 
one  of  the  most  spirited  passages  in  the  Notes  on  Virginia 27 
protests  against  the  infamy  of  even  the  suggestion  to  betray 

21  The  Works  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  III.  147. 

22  Ibid.,  II.  432. 

23  Ibid.,  II.  86. 

24  Ibid.,  II.  171. 

25  Ibid.,  IV.  147-166. 

xIbid.,  III.  212,  213. 

27  Ibid.,  IV.  34. 


10 


JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


the  cause  of  liberty  throughout  the  world  by  summoning 
a  dictator  to  the  rescue  of  a  free  people.  “What  clause  in 
our  constitution,”  demands  Jefferson,  “has  substituted  that 
of  Rome,  by  way  of  residuary  provision,  for  all  cases  not 
otherwise  provided  for?”28 

Peculiarly  congenial  to  such  a  spirit  as  Jefferson’s,  there¬ 
fore,  must  have  been  the  task  of  drawing  up  rules  of  eti¬ 
quette  for  Washington’s  Farewell  to  Congress  upon  surren¬ 
dering  his  military  commission.  Great  as  were  the  General’s 
merits,  he  must  subordinate  himself  to  civil  law.  In  the 
brief  formula  of  Jefferson,  “When  the  General  rises  to 
make  his  address,  and  also  when  he  retires,  he  is  to  bow  to 
Congress,  which  they  are  to  return  by  uncovering  without 
bowing.”29 

As  was  to  be  expected,  Jefferson  welcomed  peace  in  a 
hearty  spirit  of  conciliation30  and  was  solicitous  that  it  exist 
among  as  well  as  within  the  states.31  But  the  real  signifi¬ 
cance  of  the  Revolution  for  Jefferson’s  later  pacificism  lies 
in  a  philosophical  residuum  best  defined  in  a  celebrated  pas¬ 
sage  from  the  Notes  on  Virginia  ( 1782).  Though  he  asserts 
that  the  military  resources  of  Virginia  and  of  the  Federa¬ 
tion  are  considerable,  he  deprecates  their  employment  against 
any  European  power,  England  not  excepted,  preferring  that 
American  energies  be  devoted  to  the  development  of  a  conti¬ 
nent.  He  is  a  prose  Hamlet  pitting  in  argument  the  incre- 
'ment  of  production  against  the  false  arithmetic  of  war.  And, 
although  he  advocates  an  open  door  and  perfect  freedom 
^for  necessary  commerce,  he  would  cheerfully  abandon  the 
ocean  altogether  for  the  sake  of  a  universal  agriculture. 
Nevertheless,  since  America  had  already  chosen  the  path  of 
commerce,  in  which  occasional  wars  would  be  inevitable, 

28  The  Works  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  IV.  36. 

20  Ibid.,  IV.  202. 

30  Ibid.,  IV.  184. 

31  Ibid. 


THE  UNDERLYING  POINT  OF  VIEW  11 


preparedness  was  a  duty.  Without  provoking  war,  Amer¬ 
ica  should  resist  its  shocks.  Here  the  sea,  even  as  it  invited 
war,  offered  its  own  security.  Land  armies  would  be  useless 
for  offence,  inadequate  for  defence.  Security  depended  upon 
sea  power,  but  not  upon  naval  supremacy.  In  Jefferson’s 
words : 

To  aim  at  such  a  navy  as  the  greater  nations  of  Europe  possess,' 
would  be  a  foolish  and  wicked  waste  of  the  energies  of  our  country¬ 
men.  It  would  be  to  pull  on  our  own  heads  that  load  of  military 
expense  which  makes  the  European  labourer  go  supperless  to  bed, 
and  moistens  his  bread  with  the  sweat  of  his  brows.  It  will  be 
enough  if  we  enable  ourselves  to  prevent  insults  from  those  nations 
of  Europe  which  are  weak  on  the  sea,  because  circumstances  exist, 
which  render  even  the  stronger  ones  weak  as  to  us.32 

Naval  powers  of  the  first  rank  could  not  risk  their  entire 
forces  in  distant  waters.  America  would  be  her  own  base 
of  supplies,  from  which  detached  territories  might  readily  be 
seized.  Moreover,  present  resources  equal  to  equipping 
annually  a  navy  of  eighteen  hundred  guns  at  a  cost  of 
$2,304,000  could  be  counted  upon  to  double  every  twenty 
years,  as  the  country  grew  in  wealth  and  population.  In 
brief,  Jefferson  had  already  molded  the  ideals  and  policies 
of  his  post-Revolutionary  career.  An  ideal  pacifism  under¬ 
lay  a  pragmatism  and  opportunism  by  no  means  blind  to  the 
continental  and  even  international  role  which  America 
might  yet  be  called  to  play. 

Jefferson  was  himself  to  be  an  empire  builder  in  the 
great  destiny  awaiting  his  country.  The  interval  between 
the  Revolution  and  his  own  presidency  was  for  him  an  indis¬ 
pensable  apprenticeship  in  statecraft.  His  mission  to 
France  and  the  portfolio  of  state  under  Washington,  though 
they  necessarily  destroyed  some  illusions  of  international 
comity,  introduced  the  needful  leaven  to  convert  a  Virginia 
farmer  into  a  patriotic  cosmopolitan.  If  the  note  of  idealism 

82  The  Works  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  IV.  100-102. 


12 


JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


seems  less  pronounced  in  these  years  of  the  new  tutelage, 
the  breadth  of  interest  widens  as  the  philosopher  of  democ¬ 
racy  accommodates  his  theory  to  the  exigencies  of  an  unre¬ 
generate  world. 

In  naught  was  the  conflict  sharper  than  between  his 
views  of  an  ideal  agricultural  state  and  the  needs  of  an 
aggressive,  commercial  people.  In  this  Jefferson  made  a  vir¬ 
tue  of  necessity.  Discarding  Chinese  exclusiveness  as 
admirable  but  not  practicable,  and  condemning  even  free 
trade  as  unattainable,33  though  all  the  world  would  be  the 
.gainer  from  a  free  exercise  of  this  “natural  right,”34  Jef¬ 
ferson  was  concerned  to  secure  commercial  treaties  favorable 
I  to  the  new  nation,  even  at  the  bayonet  point  of  a  protective 
4  tariff.35 

Closely  allied  with  this  strong  commercial  policy  was  a 
scheme  for  internal  improvements,  linking  the  West  with 
the  Potomac  in  order  to  break  the  New  York  and  Phila¬ 
delphia  monopoly  of  trans-Alleghany  trade.36  The  cause 
lay  near  to  his  heart,  and  in  1784  he  was  urging  George 
Washington  to  devote  to  it  the  years  of  his  retirement. 
Thus,  in  the  tariff  and  internal  improvements,  Jefferson, 
•  though  by  no  means  the  apologist  of  protection,  and  though 
unequivocally  opposed  to  Federal  activity  where  state  re¬ 
sources  were  sufficient,  was  in  some  sense  anticipating  the 
“American  Plan”  of  a  later  statesman. 

But  if  he  sacrificed  something  to  principle  in  the  field 
of  commercial  intercourse,  he  could  inveigh  against  undem¬ 
ocratic  manifestations  at  home  with  the  full  approval  of  his 
conscience.  The  Order  of  the  Cincinnati  was  his  particular 
detestation.  He  condemned  it  as  contrary  to  the  Federa¬ 
tion,  unconstitutional  in  several  states,  and  foreign  to  the 


/ 


53  The  Works  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  IV.  469. 
“Ibid.,  IV.  445;  VI.  64. 

36  Ibid.,  IV.  469-470. 

“Ibid.,  IV.  267. 


THE  UNDERLYING  POINT  OF  VIEW  13 


spirit  of  them  all.37  He  feared  its  concentration  of  power 
and  honor  as  a  menace  to  the  government  itself,  not  only 
through  its  own  patronage  in  the  development  of  a  military 
aristocracy,  but  through  the  corrupt  agency  of  European 
powers  as  well.  He  beheld  in  the  Order  the  seed  of  a  divis¬ 
ion  between  the  civil  and  the  military  authority.38  Even  its 
social  and  eleemosynary  features  found  no  favor  with  Jef¬ 
ferson.  He  foresaw  dissensions  at  its  meetings39  and  pro¬ 
fessed  to  lament  the  spirit  of  dependence  which  its  treas¬ 
ury  would  ingraft  in  succeeding  generations  of  loungers  and 
snobs,  “too  proud  to  work,  and  drawing  out  a  miserable 
existence  by  eating  on  that  surplus  of  other  men’s  labour 
which  is  the  sacred  fund  of  the  helpless  poor.”40  The  horrible 
object  lesson  of  the  French  aristocracy,  among  whom  Jeffer¬ 
son  moved  as  the  minister  from  his  country,  rendered  him 
almost  a  fanatic  in  demanding  the  total  extinction  of  the 
Order  as  the  only  hope  for  the  republic.41 

Jefferson’s  residence  at  Paris  cost  the  democratic  ele¬ 
ments  in  the  Constitutional  Convention  a  powerful  champion. 
But  his  interpretation  to  Frenchmen  of  American  political 
trends  was  of  value  to  both  countries,42  while  his  correspon¬ 
dence  with  American  leaders  permitted  a  silent  presentation 
of  his  own  views  upon  the  greatest  political  achievement  of 
his  time.  His  admiration  for  this  achievement  was  great 
but  not  unqualified.  The  mildness  of  the  old  Congress  in 
coercing  the  several  states  warranted  the  strengthening  of 
the  Federal  arm.43  But  the  absence  of  a  bill  of  rights44  boded 
ill  for  liberty,  particularly  in  the  failure  to  provide  against 

37  The  Works  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  IV.  325. 

33  Ibid.,  IV.  347. 

39  Ibid.,  IV.  323-329. 

40  Ibid.,  V.  59. 

41  Ibid.,  V.  221-223. 

“Ibid.,  V.  16  ff. 

43  Ibid.,  V.  319. 

44  Ibid.,  V.  385. 


14 


JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


standing  armies  and  suspension  of  habeas  corpus.  Notwith¬ 
standing  these  imperfections,  already  subject  to  popular  cen¬ 
sure,45  he  paid  tribute  to  the  Constitution  as  a  triumph  of 
reason  over  passion,  which  unhappily  the  world  was  too  far 
oppressed  to  imitate.46 

(<-  His  mission  to  France  brought  Jefferson  into  early  touch 
with  the  Algerine  question,  a  sore  spot  of  European  diplo¬ 
macy,  and  converted  him,  free  trader  and  pacifist  though  he 
was,  into  the  altogether  surprising  role  of  a  propagandist  of 
sea  power.  Yet  acceptance  of  commerce  as  a  legitimate  field 
of  American  endeavor  inevitably  dictated  an  acquiescence  in 
naval  power  as  its  indispensable  concomitant,  and  the  Alger¬ 
ine  nuisance  merely  focused  the  issue.  “Can  we  begin  it 
[a  navy]  on  a  more  honorable  occasion,”  Jefferson  repeatedly 
asks,  “or  with  a  weaker  foe?”47  Nearer  to  the  scenes  of  in¬ 
sult  than  his  countrymen  at  home,  he  tells  us  that  his  facul¬ 
ties  were  “absolutely  suspended  between  indignation  and  im¬ 
potence,”48  and  he  assured  his  American  correspondent,  with 
characteristic  scope  of  vision,  that  “The  motives  pleading 
for  war  rather  than  tribute  are  numerous  and  honorable, 
those  opposing  them  are  mean  and  short  sighted.”49  He  held 
that  power  could  alone  insure  the  maintenance  of  peace,50 
and  in  its  absence  he  advised  Americans  to  keep  out  of  the 
Mediterranean.51  Until  the  United  States  should  be  strong ' 
enough  for  independent  action,  he  recommended  a  league 
with  other  nations  for  a  perpetual  cruise  against  the  Alger¬ 
ines,  eight  months. out  of  twelve.52  And  he  advised  Wash- 
’ington  to  sound  Spain  for  a  possible  subsidy  in  return  for 


45  The  Works  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  V.  426. 

46  Ibid.,  V.  423. 

47  Ibid.,  IV.  376-377,  390-391,  398. 

48  Ibid.,  IV.  392. 

48  Ibid.,  IV.  398.  To  James  Monroe.  Paris.  February,  1785. 
"Ibid.,  V.  106-107.  Paris.  May  10.  1786. 

51  Ibid.,  V.  345-346.  September  25,  1787. 

°3  Ibid.,  VI.  86.  New  York.  July  4,  1790. 


THE  UNDERLYING  POINT  OF  VIEW  15 


fighting  her  battle  against  the  pirates.53  Nor  did  he  relinquish 
this  idea  of  a  subsidized  cruise,54  even  though  Congress 
preferred  to  toy  with  a  $40,000  ransom  for  American  cap¬ 
tives.55 

So  pronounced  a  stand  against  the  Algerines  wrought  its 
logical  reflex  in  a  general  belligerency  of  spirit  quite  out  of 
plumb  with  Jefiferson’s  prevailing  temper.  In  1788  he  was 
predicting  the  Great  War  so  soon  to  burst  over  Europe,56 
and,  in  sundry  aphorisms  on  the  perils  of  a  “want  of  respect¬ 
ability  in  the  national  character,”57  he  warned  the  nation  to 
hold  itself  in  readiness  for  rich  plums  ripe  for  the  shaking. 
A  strong  front  could  demand  as  the  price  of  our  neutrality 
the  opening  of  much  territory  then  closed  to  American  ship¬ 
pers.58  _  sxle»si'cr 

But  no  prospects  of  national  aggrandizement 
swerve  Jefferson  from  his  hostility  to  standing  armies, 
rejoiced  that  the  new  Constitution  had  muzzled  the  dog 
war  “by  transferring  the  power  of  letting  him  loose  from  the 
executive  to  the  Legislative  body,  from  those  who  are 
to  spend  to  those  who  are  to  pay.”59  In  1792  he  opposed 
increasing  the  regular  army  to  five  thousand  men,  holding 
that  fifteen  hundred  woodsmen  would  easily  end  the  Indian 
war.60  And  he  looked  upon  the  encouragement  which  In¬ 
dian  uprisings  afforded  to  the  war  party  as  their  chief  incon¬ 
venience.61 

Quite  otherwise  with  sea  power,  the  national  specific 
against  insult,62  particularly  useful  against  nations  with 


63  The  Works  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  VI.  397. 
“Ibid.,  VI.  439-440.  March  18,  1792. 

55  Ibid.,  VI.  473.  April  10,  1792. 
sa  Ibid.,  V.  398-399. 

"  Ibid.,  V.  79. 

58  Ibid.,  V.  438. 

“Ibid.  VI.,  11. 

00  Ibid.,  VI.  407. 

“  Ibid.,  VI.  243. 

“Ibid.,  IV.  450-51. 


l§  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 

stakes  in  the  West  Indies.63  He  welcomed  (1785)  a  packet 
service  between  Havre  and  New  York  as  the  nucleus  of  a 
navy,64  and  deprecated  (1788)  the  failure  of  Congress  to 
secure  Paul  Jones  for  a  rear  admiral,  in  order  that  he  might 
gain  experience  for  that  time  “when  we  shall  be  more  popu¬ 
lous  than  the  whole  British  dominions  and  able  to  fight  them 
ship  to  ship,”65 — a  delectable  prospect  pending  solely  upon 
the  success  of  the  land  office  in  first  ridding  us  of  debt,66  and 
not  to  be  compromised  by  premature  forfeiture  of  legalized 
piracy  in  the  fitting  out  of  privateers.67 

Adjusting  naval  expenditures  to  the  income  from  land 
sales  was  characteristically  Jeffersonian.  He  abhorred  nat¬ 
ional  debts,68  and  regarded  the  license  to  pile  them  up  as  a 
prime  cause  of  war.  The  best  safeguard  against  such  accu¬ 
mulations  of  debt  seemed  to  him  a  limit  upon  their  legal 
existence.  He  held  that  no  generation  should  be  permitted 
to  bind  its  successor  by  obligations  in  the  incurring  of  which 
the  latter  was  not  consulted.  And  he  believed  that  the 
world’s  peace  would  be  immeasureably  advanced  if  all  loans 
expired  at  the  end  of  the  nineteen  years  during  which  any 
one  generation  remained  dominant.69 

On  the  other  hand,  it  is  not  surprising  that  this  economic 
point  of  view  should  have  led  Jefferson  to  a  smug  compla¬ 
cency  over  those  world  disasters  which  might  profit  the  Uni¬ 
ted  States  as  a  neutral.  His  moralizings,  in  1790,  on  the 
prospective  war  between  England  and  Spain  are  the  calcula¬ 
tions  of  a  shop-keeper  with  a  sharp  ear  for  trade.  Human¬ 
ity  is  subordinated  to  lucre  in  dicta  like  the  following:  “I 

63  The  Works  of  Thomas  Jefferson ,  IV.  451,  400. 

“  Ibid.,  IV.  435. 

“Ibid.,  V.  403. 

M  Ibid.,  IV.  451. 

'7  Ibid.,  VI.  439. 

68  Ibid.,  V.  348. 

09  Ibid.,  VI.  8. 


THE  UNDERLYING  POINT  OF  VIEW  17 


hope  peace  and  profit  will  be  our  share.”70  “Our  object  is 
to  feed  and  theirs  to  fight.  If  we  are  not  forced  by  England, 
we  shall  have  a  gainful  time  of  it.”71  “If  there  be  war, 
France  will  probably  take  part  in  it.  This  we  cannot  help, 
and  therefore  we  must  console  ourselves  with  the  good  price 
of  wheat  which  it  will  bring  us.”72  “Since  it  is  so  decreed 
by  fate,  we  have  only  to  pray  their  souldiers  may  eat  a  great 
deal.”73 

But  cynical  cash  balances  are  no  measure  for  the  many- 
sided  Jefferson.  Side  by  side  with  petty  calculations  of  nat¬ 
ional  loss  and  gain,74  he  is  capable  of  arguing  for  observ¬ 
ance  of  treaty  obligations,  even  when  contrary  to  imme¬ 
diate  interests,75  “under  a  conviction  that  .  .  .  stipula¬ 

tions  by  Treaty  are  irrevocable  but  by  joint  consent,  let  a 
change  of  circumstances  render  them  ever  so  burthensome.”76 
He  rejoices  that  the  treaty  with  Prussia  sets  a  precedent  for 
fair  dealing  among  the  nations.77  Nor  does  he  exclude  even 
the  Indians  from  the  number  of  those  entitled  to  honorable 
treatment.78  On  the  contrary,  he  would  exert  the  power  of 
government  to  restrain  greedy  land  grabbers  from  forcing 
America  into  war  merely  to  serve  their  own  wicked  pur¬ 
poses.70 

The  military  arm  should  be  wielded  not  in  behalf  of 
speculators  in  Indian  lands,  but  only  for  high  national  ends. 
Of  these  latter,  one  appeared  very  early  in  the  Western 
question.  Even  as  the  Louisiana  Purchase  was  to  strain  the 
Jeffersonian  theory  of  strict  interpretation,  so  the  long  train 

70  The  Works  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  VI.  84. 

71  Ibid.,  VI.  89. 

Ibid.,  VI.  106. 

73  Ibid.,  VI.  145,  108. 

"Ibid.,  V.  101-102. 

75  Ibid.,  VI.  40. 

73  Ibid.,  VI.  184. 

77  Ibid.,  V.  184. 

78  Ibid.,  VI.  302,  passim. 

78  Ibid.,  VI.  224,  455. 


JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


of  preliminary  negotiation  taxed  whatever  of  pacific  sur¬ 
vived  in  Jefferson  the  diplomat  and  cabinet  minister  Al¬ 
ready,  in  1790,  the  imminence  of  war  between  Spain  and 
England  brought  the  Louisiana  question  into  the  limelight. 
Our  growing  West  needed  a  Mississippi  port  and  outlet. 
This,  Jefferson  set  himself  the  task  of  securing.  Yet  his. 
policy  was  distinctly  that  of  waiting  watchfully.  Western 
allegiance  to  the  new  republic  hinged  ultimately  upon  our 
control  of  New  Orleans,80  but,  in  attaining  this  goal,  tem¬ 
perament  and  necessity  alike  urged  Jefferson  to  caution. 
In  controversies  between  Spain  and  Great  Britain,  he  in¬ 
stinctively  chose  neutrality81  as  the  wisest  course,  so  long  at 
least  as  the  belligerents  kept  their  treaty  obligations,82  from 
a  perception  that  American  strength  would  count  more 
effectively  in  swaying  the  balance  of  power  than  if  used  on 
one  side  or  the  other.  He  would  even  submit  to  the  passage 
of  foreign  troops  across  American  territory83  rather  than, 
by  refusal,  provoke  insults  and  war,  which  we  were  not  pre¬ 
pared  to  resist.  In  the  critical  posture  of  European  affairs, 
he  believed  that  American  interests  might  be  conserved 
without  the  costs  and  dangers  of  war.84 

More  immediately  threatening  than  a  western  problem, 
quite  certain  in  the  final  event  to  yield  to  diplomatic  nego-, 
tiation,  was  the  question  of  American  rights  at  sea,  an  ele¬ 
ment  on  which  our  independence  of  England  was  as  yet  far 
from  being  acknowledged.  What  Jefferson  counted  a  nat¬ 
ural  right  was  by  no  means  easy  to  uphold,  and  the  British 
decision,  in  1791,  to  restrict  American  trade  to  vessels  built 
in  the  United  States,  put  a  decided  crimp  in  those  profits 
which  a  European  war  would  naturally  hold  out  for  any 


80  The  Works  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  VI.  116. 

81  Ibid.,  VI.  142. 

82  Ibid.,  VI.  123.  New  York,  August  12,  1790. 

83  Ibid.,  VI.  142,  144. 

84  Ibid.,  VI.  444,  March  18,  1792. 


THE  UNDERLYING  POINT  OF  VIEW  '19- 

neutral  nation  prepared  for  sudden  accessions  to  its  ship¬ 
ping.  As  Washington’s  prime  minister,  Jefferson  was  al¬ 
ready  confronting  the  great  foreign  problem  of  his  own  ad¬ 
ministration. 

Professional  duty  required  Jefferson  to  make  diplomatic 
representations  against  British  seizure  of  American  sailors 
off  the  African  coast.85  But  his  interest  was  far  keener  in 
the  blockade  of  France  projected  in  1793,  which  threatened 
to  exclude  our  goods  from  much  of  continental  Europe.  Such 
a  contingency  presented,  according  to  Jefferson,  a  casus 
belli,  and  he  took  the  constitutional  ground  that,  even  as  the 
executive  could  not  in  a  positive  sense  declare  war,  so,  in  a 
negative  sense,  it  should  not  compel  peace  by  a  failure  to 
summon  the  legislature  for  deliberation  upon  the  issues  in¬ 
volved.86  Yet  he  trusted  that  the  sovereign  legislature,  when 
duly  assembled,  would  seize  the  golden  opportunity  of  teach¬ 
ing  humanity  the  lesson  of  an  appeal,  not  to  the  sword,  but 
to  enlightened  self-interest  by  a  retaliation  in  kind,  which 
should  exclude  European  goods  and  vessels  from  our  own 
ports.87 

A  blockade  of  continental  Europe  presaged  disaster  to 
neutral  commerce  in  direct  violation  of  one  of  Jefferson’s 
favorite  concepts,  that  of  a  law  of  nature  which  guaranteed 
to  nations  at  peace  the  rights  of  uninterrupted  intercourse.88 
Even  regulations  of  contraband  chafed  this  militant  free" 
trader,  who  asserted  that  “in  the  present  improved  state  of 
the  arts  when  every  country  has  such  ample  means  of  pro¬ 
curing  arms  within  and  without  itself,  the  regulations  of 
contraband  answer  no  other  end  than  to  draw  other  nations 
into  the  war.”89  His  chief  consolation  was  that  the  treaty 

86  The  Works  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  VII.  157,  October  12,  1792. 

"Ibid.,  VII.  250.  March,  1793. 

81  Ibid. 

"Ibid.,  VII.  314-315,  386,  387,  May  7,  1793. 

89  Ibid.,  VII.  314-315.  May  7,  1793. 


20 


JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 

with  Prussia  already  recognized  the  futility  of  contraband 
and  thereby  erected  a  new  milestone  in  international  rela¬ 
tions.90 

He  perceived  the  gains  which  might  be  ours  as  the  great 
neutral  carrying  nation  and  protested  against  any  British 
discrimination  respecting  foreign-built  vessels  flying  our 
flag,91  especially  since  it  was  no  part  of  our  intention  to  allow 
foreigners  to  participate  in  the  war  profits  through  owner¬ 
ship  of  our  shipping  shares.  The  troubled  state  of  the  times 
induced  him  to  comment  upon  the  Lusitania  case  more  than 
a  century  before  its  occurrence.  He  asked : 

Can  it  be  necessary  to  say  that  a  merchant  vessel  is  not  a  privateer  ? 
That  tho’  she  has  arms  to  defend  herself  in  time  of  war,  in  the  course 
of  her  regular  commerce,  this  no  more  makes  her  a  privateer,  than  a 
husbandman  following  his  plough,  in  time  of  war,  with  a  knife  or 
pistol  in  his  pocket,  is  thereby  made  a  soldier?  The  occupation  of 
a  privateer  is  attack  and  plunder,  that  of  a  merchant-vessel  is  com¬ 
merce  &  self  preservation.92 

He  particularly  condemned  the  British  definition  of  grain 
as  contraband,  and  held  that  British  action  in  restricting  our 
grain  market  made  us  unneutral  by  disenabling  us  from 
dealing  equally  with  both  belligerents.93  He  was  wholly  out 
of  sympathy  with  Great  Britain’s  attempt  to  starve  an  enemy 
nation94  at  our  expense.  All  in  'all,  the  times  furnished  new 
arguments,  not  only  for  naval  preparedness,  but  also  for  a 
protective  tariff  and  non-intercourse.95  “It  is  not  to  the 
moderation  and  justice  of  others,”  Jefferson  regretfully  con¬ 
cedes,  “we  are  to  trust  for  fair  and  equal  access  to  market 
with  our  productions,  or  for  our  due  share  in  the  transpor¬ 
tation  of  them;  but  to  our  own  means  of  independence,  and 
the  firm  will  to  use  them.”96 

90  The  Works  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  VII,  314-315. 

"Ibid.,  VII.  386-387.  June  13,  1793. 

"Ibid.,  VII.  494.  August  16,  1793. 

"Ibid.,  VIII  24-31.  September  7,  1793. 

94  Ibid.,  VII.  28.  September  7,  1793. 

"Ibid.,  VIII.  114-118.  December  16,  1793. 

"Ibid.,  VIII.  117. 


THE  UNDERLYING  POINT  OF  VIEW 


21 


It  is  evident  that,  in  1793,  Jefferson  was  not  the  leading 
pacifist  in  President  Washington’s  cabinet.  And  a  four 
ears’  trial  of  the  Hamiltonian  policy  of  truckling  to  Great 
Britain  justified  his  complacent  reflections  on  what  might 
have  been  had  America  only  followed  his  advice  in  a  strong 
assertion  of  neutral  rights.  “A  little  time  will  unfold  these 
things,  and  show  which  class  of  opinions  would  have  been 
most  friendly  to  the  firmness  of  our  government,  and  to  the 
nterests  of  those  for  whom  it  was  made.”97  Quite  a  con- 
rast,  this,  to  his  more  characteristic  wish  that  we  give  it  all 
ip, — commerce,  and  the  carrying  trade,  even  a  diplomatic 
establishment — and  live  by  agriculture  alone.98 

His  militant  neutrality  and  advanced  definition  of  contra¬ 
band  point  to  Jefferson  as  an  original  thinker  and  a  path¬ 
finder  in  pacifism.  His  philosophy  of  a  national  morality  is 
equally  creditable.  “For  a  nation  as  a  society  forms  a  moral 
person,”  declares  Jefferson,  “and  every  member  of  it  is  per¬ 
sonally  responsible  for  his  society.”99  He  believed  that  true 
reformation  of  this  body  politic  was  attainable  only  by  per¬ 
suasion,  not  at  all  by  force.100  A  practical  expression  of  this 
code  of  ethics  is  Jefferson’s  contribution  to  the  fourth  an¬ 
nual  message  of  Washington.  “The  interests  of  a  nation, 
when  well  understood,”  affirms  the  secretary  of  state,  “will 
be  found  to  coincide  with  their  moral  duties.”101  This  doc¬ 
trine  was  well  in  harmony  with  its  expounder’s  belief  in 
peace  as  the  true  law  of  nature,102  though  he  was  obliged  to 
make  exception  of  man,  whose  boasted  civilization  merely 
enabled  him  “to  pursue  the  principle  of  helium  omnium  in 
omnia  on  a  larger  scale,  and  in  place  of  the  little  contests  of 

97  The  Works  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  VIII.  277 '.  January  22,  1797. 

98  Ibid.,  IX.  65-66.  April  22,  1799. 

09  Ibid.,  VII.  84-5.  1792. 

100  Ibid.,  VII.  122.  To  Thomas  Paine,  June  19,  1792. 

101  Ibid.,  VII.  160-161.  October  15,  1793. 

102 Ibid.,  VII.  400.  To  Genet,  June  17,  1793. 


22  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 

tribe  against  tribe.”103  Peace  being  thus  the  true  law  of  na¬ 
ture  and  of  nations,  Jefferson  set  a  high  value  upon  personal 
cordiality  among  diplomats  as  a  means  to  its  attainment.104 

To  preserve  the  friendship  of  republican  France,  which 
felt  itself  ill  used  at  our  neutrality  in  its  war  against  allied 
Europe,105  and  at  the  same  time  to  convince  the  American 
people  that  their  honor  was  safe  from  British  aggression, 
constituted  a  perplexing  problem  to  Washington’s  advisers. 
But  on  one  point  Jefferson  was  adamant,  namely,  his  determ¬ 
ination  to  uphold  the  right  of  individual  citizens  to  manufac¬ 
ture  and  to  export  munitions.106  In  his  mind  this  was  no 
violation  of  neutrality,  and  his  attitude  is  the  more  convin¬ 
cing  because  he  objected  to  allowing  France  to  fit  out  priva¬ 
teers  in  the  United  States,  since  her  enemies  were  forbidden 
to  do  it  by  treaty.107  Such  nicely  balanced  neutrality  was  not 
calculated  to  curry  favor  with  the  Republican  party,  now 
assuming  form  under  his  own  leadership.  On  the  other 
hand,  he  was  loath  to  proceed  to  extremities  against  certain 
violators  of  neutrality  at  Charleston  merely  to  please  the 
British  ministry.108  Further  to  placate  French  sentiment,  he 
advocated  prompt  interest  and  loan  payments  to  the  de  facto 
government  at  Paris.109 

The  interval  of  Jefferson’s  retirement  from  the  cabinet 
of  Washington  enabled  him  to  consolidate  Republican  per¬ 
sons  and  principles  for  the  electoral  campaign  of  1796,  but 
called  forth  little  that  was  new  in  his  pacifism.  Free  from 
the  irritations  of  office,  he  was  at  liberty  to  indulge  his  own 

103  The  Works  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  VIII.  264.  January  1,  1797. 

104  Ibid.,  VII.  202.  January  1,  1793.  VII.  449.  July  14,  1793.  See 
also  VIII.  281.  February  9,  1797. 

103  Ibid.,  VII.  302. 

103  Ibid.,  VII.  326.  See  also  VIII.  84-85. 

307  Ibid.,  VII.  333.  Opinion  on  the  Little  Sarah.  May  16,  1793.  See 
also  VII.  440,  485. 

108  Ibid.,  VII.  357. 

109  Ibid.,  VII.  371. 


THE  UNDERLYING  POINT  OF  VIEW  23 


philosophy,  which  craved  for  peace,  with  honor  to  be  sure,110 
but  a  peace  not  to  be  sacrificed  to  the  issues  of  war  until  the 
policy  of  non-intercourse  should  have  been  weighed  and 
found  wanting.111  A  peace  such  as  the  Jay  Treaty  offered  to  1 
purchase  by  the  sacrifice  of  western  interests  seemed  to  him 

no  settlement  at  all,  but  only  an  invitation  to  future  aggres- 

*  112 
sion.  J 

Whatever  perils  darkened  his  country’s  future,  the  elec¬ 
tion  of  1796  summoned  Jefferson  to  take  his  share  in  facing 
them.  His  ancient  friendship  for  the  new  chief  magis¬ 
trate  encouraged  him  to  hope  for  a  peaceful  course,  and  wise 
measures.113  He  trusted  Adams  to  recover  lost  ground  by 
putting  more  backbone  into  foreign  relations  than  Washing¬ 
ton  had  used.114  But  the  President  soon  adopted  an  anti- 
French  attitude  by  no  means  agreeable  to  Jefferson;115  and 
the  more  strongly  pro-British  became  the  government’s  pol¬ 
icy,  the  more  actively  pacific  were  the  Vice-President’s  senti¬ 
ments.  To  his  old  friend,  Elbridge  Gerry,  he  went  so  far  as 
to  write : 

Peace  is  undoubtedly  at  present  the  first  object  of  our  nation. 
Interest  &  honor  are  also  national  considerations.  But  interest,  duly 
weighed,  is  in  favor  of  peace  even  at  the  expence  of  spoliations 
past  &  future;  &  honor  cannot  now  be  an  object.  The  insults  & 
injuries  committed  on  us  by  both  the  belligerent  parties,  from  the 
beginning  of  1793  to  this  day,  &  still  continuing,  cannot  now  be 
wiped  off  by  engaging  in  war  with  one  of  them.116 

So  pragmatical  a  pronouncement  is  inconsistent  with  hyper¬ 
sensitiveness  to  the  opinion  of  other  nations  whose  “kicks  & 
cuffs  prove  their  contempt.”117  But  this  with  him  is  rare. 

110  The  Works  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  VIII.  145.  April  25,  1794. 

111  Ibid.,  VIII.  147-8.  May  1.  1794. 

333  Ibid.,  VIII.  221.  March  2,  1796. 

113  Ibid.,  VIII.  260.  December  28,  1796. 

314  Ibid.,  VIII.  293. 

313  Ibid.,  VIII.  300,  305. 

333  Ibid.,  VIII.  313.  June  21,  1797. 

337  Ibid.,  VIII.  318. 


24 


JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 

His  norm  is  a  serene  originality,  mindful  of  America’s  mis¬ 
sion  to  pioneer  in  many  things. 

Once  convinced  that  Adams  was  bent  on  war  with 
France,  he  condemned  a  system  which  permitted  the  execu¬ 
tive  to  press  matters  so  far  as  to  commit  the  nation  to  war 
against  its  will.118  For  a  brief  period  in  1798  he  regarded 
the  war  as  imminent.119  But,  with  prophetic  insight,  he 
concluded  that  France  would  harass  us  by  annoying  decrees 
rather  than  by  war,120  while  our  part  was  to  bear  the  yoke  a 
little  longer,121  to  avert  wars  as  far  as  possible  by  limiting 
the  borrowing  power  of  government,122  and  at  the  same  time 
to  prepare  ourselves  by  a  trained  militia,123.  ...  a  pro¬ 
gram  not  devoid  of  those  inconsistencies  which  have  so  en¬ 
chanted  the  critics  of  Jefferson.  A  nominal  peace  was,  how¬ 
ever,  maintained,  the  credit  for  which  Jefferson  was  disposed 
to  assign  to  the  moderation  rather  than  to  the  necessities  of 
France.124  To  whomsoever  it  was  due,  Jefferson  was  per¬ 
mitted  to  enter  upon  his  own  administration  in  a  time  of 
peace.  His  inaugural  outlined  an  intention  to  continue  peace¬ 
ful  relations  with  all  nations,  entangling  alliances  with  none, 
and  he  recommended  the  militia  as  the  best  reliance  for  a 
nation  at  peace.125  A  more  intimate  communication  of  this 
period  to  Thomas  Paine  disclaims  “implicating  ourselves 
with  the  powers  of  Europe,  even  in  support  of  principles 
which  we  mean  to  pursue,”126  while  such  coercion  as  was 
needful  to  preserve  our  more  immediate  interests,  he  be- 

u8  The  Works  of  Thovias  Jefferson,  VIII.  387. 

™Ibid„  VIII.  392,  395. 

™  Ibid.,  VIII.  408. 

121  Ibid.,  VIII.  417. 

“  Ibid.,  VIII.  481.  Nov.  26,  1798. 

123  Ibid.,  IX.  18.  January  26,  1799. 

124  Ibid.,  IX.  55-63. 

125  Ibid.,  IX.  198. 

128  Ibid.,  IX.  212-213,  219;  X.  27,  298-301. 


THE  UNDERLYING  POINT  OF  VIEW 

lieved  we  possessed  in  our  commerce,127  which  would  induce 
foreign  nations  in  their  own  interest  to  be  accommodating. 

He  had  scarcely  taken  office  when  the  western  question 
entered  upon  a  new  phase  in  the  prospective  cession  of  Louis¬ 
iana  by  Spain  to  France.128  He  felt  that  French  occupation 
of  our  western  boundary  would  impose  an  impossible  strain 
upon  the  traditional  friendship  of  the  two  nations,129  since 
“There  is  on  the  globe  one  single  spot,  the  possessor  of  which 
is  our  natural  and  habitual  enemy.  It  is  New  Orleans.”130 
With  such  views,  it  was  inevitable  that  he  should  seek  a  rap¬ 
prochement  with  Great  Britain,131  and,  in  the  summer  of 
1802,  he  expressed  delight  at  the  “various  manifestations  of 
just  and  friendly  disposition  toward  us”132  on  the  part  of 
the  British  government. 

Jefferson’s  correspondence  with  Monroe,133  Livings¬ 
ton,134  and  Du  Pont  de  Nemours135  indicates  the  Louisiana 
Purchase  as  the  supreme  practical  outgrowth  of  his  pacifism. 
He  felt  that  Louisiana  was  certain  to  be  ours  whenever 
France  became  sufficiently  entangled  in  Europe  to  make  it 
worth  our  while  to  occupy  the  country,  but  he  preferred  to 
work  out  manifest  destiny  by  peaceful  means.  “It  secures^ 
us,”  he  rejoices,  “the  course  of  a  peaceful  nation.”136 

In  the  light  of  Jefferson’s  earlier  patronage  of  the  navy, 
and  encouragement  of  the  militia,  one  would  expect  a  large 
development  of  both  arms  during  his  administration.  Re¬ 
peated  admonitions  in  his  annual  messages  to  Congress137 

137  The  Works  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  IX,  220. 

13,1  Ibid.,  IX.  263. 

”  Ibid.,  IX.  357. 

120  Ibid.,  IX.  364.  See  also  X.  20  n. 

m  Ibid.,  IX.  365. 

132  Ibid.,  IX.  386. 

133  Ibid.,  IX.  419. 

134  Ibid.,  IX.  442. 

185  Ibid.,  IX.  437-438. 

122  Ibid.,  X.  28. 

137  Ibid.,  IX.  337,  413. 


®  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 

attest  the  permanence  of  his  interest  in  the  militia.  But  the 
navy  counts  for  less  than  one  might  anticipate,  possibly  be¬ 
cause  the  seaports  and  big-navy  men  were  in  the  Federalist 
[camp.  He  preferred  gun-boats  to  frigates138and  resented 
Federalist  obstruction  to  his  plan  for  the  economical  defence 
^)f  the  country.  Yet  his  heart  could  thrill  at  naval  feats  in 
Algerine  waters,  which  he  trusted  would  prove  to  the  world 
that  American  patience  was  due,  not  to  a  lack  of  courage, 
but  to  “a  conscientious  desire  to  direct  the  energies  of  our  na¬ 
tion  to  the  multiplication  of  the  human  race  and  not  to  its 
destruction.”139 

i*~  Peace  and  economy  reenforced  each  other  in  Jefferson’s 
program.  A  tax  on  stock  shares  in  order  to  levy  “a  sensi- 
Dle  portion  of  the  expences  of  a  war  on  those  who  are  so 
mxious  to  engage  us  in  it,”140  met  his  approval  before  elec- 
ion,  and.  after  it,  he  asserted  that  ‘‘Peace  is  our  most  im- 
portant  interest,  and  a  recovery  from  debt.”141  To  the  politi¬ 
cal  economist,  Thomas  Cooper,  he  enunciated  the  doctrine 
that,  “If  we  can  prevent  the  government  from  wasting  the 
labors  of  the  people,  under  the  pretence  of  taking  care  of 
them,  they  must  become  happy.  Their  finances  are  now 
under  such  a  course  of  application  as  nothing  could  derange 
but  war  or  federalism.”142  He  believed  that  sound  finances 
could  be  readily  adjusted  to  emergencies,  and  that  in  peace 
times  loans  and  internal  taxes  were  a  mistake,143  a  convic¬ 
tion  which  the  common  people  seem  to  have  shared.144  The 
National  Bank  he  despised  on  political  as  well  as  economic 
principles,  fearing  its  disloyalty  in  periods  of  crisis.145 

1SS  The  Works  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  X.  41,  124. 

139  Ibid.,  IX.  332. 

™Ibid„  IX.  112. 

ulIbid.,  IX.  309. 

“  Ibid.,  IX.  403. 

1U  Ibid.,  IX.  412. 

™Ibid.,  IX.  445. 

™Ibid.,  X.  57-58. 


THE  UNDERLYING  POINT  OF  VIEW  27  ^ 


Having  preserved  peace  with  the  Indians  by  just  deal¬ 
ings,146  and  having  won  it  from  the  pirates  by  the  glorious 
exploits  of  a  navy  on  which  he  proposed  to  economize, 
Jefferson  might  view  the  Napoleonic  wars  with  a  virtuous 
aloofness.  From  his  comfortable  vantage,  he  exclaims, 
“Tremendous  times  in  Europe!  How  mighty  this  battle  of 
lions  &  Tygers !  With  what  sensations  should  the  common 
herd  of  cattle  look  on  it?  With  no  partialities,  certainly. 

If  they  can  so  far  worry  one  another  as  to  destroy  their 
power  of  tyrannizing,  the  one  over  the  earth,  the  other  over 
the  waters,  the  world  may  perhaps  enjoy  peace,  till  they 
recruit  again.”147  His  own  impulse  is  to  succor  the  unfortu¬ 
nate  while  administering  the  means  of  annoyance  to  none.148 
Indeed,  he  is  too  keen  a  statesman  to  desire  any  one 
power  to  rule  supreme.  Against  England  he  bears  no 
malice;  neither  against  France.  “We  consider  each,”  he 
adds,  “as  a  necessary  instrument  to  hold  in  check  the  disposi¬ 
tion  of  the  other  to  tyrannize  over  other  nations.”149  In 
the  closing  message  of  his  first  administration,  he  congratu¬ 
lates  the  country  and,  by  inference,  himself  that  “from  the 
governments  of  the  belligerent  powers  especially  we  continue 
to  receive  those  friendly  manifestations  which  are  justly  due 
to  an  honest  neutrality.”150  Not  until  his  second  term  was 
Jefferson  to  drain  in  its  full  bitterness  the  cup  of  neutrality 
violated. 

The  position  of  a  neutral,  then  as  now,  was  intolerable.  ' 
Friction  over  Florida,151  uncertainty  concerning  the  Louis¬ 
iana  boundary,  and  a  fear  that  French  intentions  were 
hostile,152  inclined  Jefferson  in  the  summer  of  1805  to  an 

140  The  Works  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  IX.  407,  410. 

147  Ibid.,  X.  32. 

148  Ibid.,  X.  42,  October  17,  1803. 

™Ibid.,  X.  67-68. 

150  Ibid.,  X.  112. 

151  Ibid.,  X.  140. 

Ibid.,  X.  171. 


28  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 

l^ajliance  with  Great  Britain.153  But  the  continued  insolence 
of  British  war  vessels  off  our  coast154  soon  led  him  to  change 
tack  and  to  reassert  the  proposition  that  “we  will  remain 
uprightly  neutral  in  fact,  tho’  leaning  in  belief  to  the  opinion 
that  an  English  ascendancy  on  the  ocean  is  safer  for  us 
than  that  of  France.”155  He  esteemed  the  death  of  Mr. 
Fox  an  additional  blow  to  any  British-American  entente, 
for,  as  he  wrote  Monroe,  “His  sound  judgment  saw  that 
political  interest  could  never  be  separated  in  the  long  run 
from  moral  right,  &  his  frank  &  great  mind  would  have 
made  a  short  business  of  a  just  treaty  with  you.”156 

Any  lingering  dreams  of  overtures  to  Great  Britain  were 
rudely  shattered  by  the  Chesapeake  outrage,  which  the 
resident’s  own  proclamation  sufficiently  describes : 

And  at  length  a  deed,  transcending  all  we  have  suffered,  brings 
|  the  public  sensibility  to  a  serious  crisis,  and  forbearance  to  a 
necessary  pause.  A  frigate  of  the  U  S.  trusting  to  a  state  of  peace 
and  leaving  her  harbor  on  a  distant  service,  has  been  surprised  and 
attacked  by  a  British  vessel  of  superior  force,  one  of  a  squadron 
then  lying  in  our  waters  to  cover  the  transaction,  &  has  been  disabled 
Trom  service  with  the  loss  of  a  number  of  men  killed  &  wounded. 
This  enormity  was  not  only  without  provocation  or  justifiable  cause; 
hut  was  committed  with  the  avowed  purpose  of  taking  by  force  from 
a  ship  of  war  of  the  U  S.  a  part  of  her  crew ;  and  that  no  circum¬ 
stance  might  be  wanting  to  make  its  character,  the  commander  was 
apprised  that  the  seamen  thus  forcibly  .  .  .  were  native  citizens 

of  the  U  S.1” 

Here,  if  ever,  was  a  test  of  national  self-control,  and 
Jefferson  met  it.  He  considered  it  no  part  of  his  duty  to 
commit  Congress  to  a  declaration  of  war  in  preference  to 
nonintercourse  or  other  measures.158  He  granted  full  time 
for  Great  Britain  to  disavow  the  act159  and  at  once  set 


153  The  Works  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  X.  168,  171,  172. 


™Ibid.,  X.  188. 

165  Ibid.,  X.  263-264. 
™lbid.,  X.  296-7. 

157  Ibid.,  X.  441-444. 

158  Ibid,,  X.  433. 

158  Ibid.,  X.  451. 


THE  UNDERLYING  POINT  OF  VIEW  (29 


about  recalling  our  merchantmen  at  sea  for  a  mobilizing 
of  resources.160  Yet  his  own  wrath  was  deeply  stirred,  and 
he  approved  the  war  spirit  which  swept  the  country  in  a 
unanimity  long  unknown.  “Now,”  he  exults,  “.  .  .  they 
have  touched  a  chord  which  vibrates  in  every  heart.  Now 
then  is  the  time  to  settle  the  old  and  the  new.”161  With 
war  in  prospect,  he  felt  it  a  good  time  to  bring  our  Spanish 
troubles  to  an  end,  and  he  outlined  a  plan  not  unworthy 
of  the  Ostend  Manifesto.  While  one  force  was  seizing 
Florida,  another  should  engage  Mexico,  and  Cuba  should 
be  annexed  ;162  rather  an  imperial  program  for  a  pacifist,  f 
but  Jefferson  had  suffered  much  disillusionment. 

The  outcome,  however,  was  not  war  but  the  embargo^ 
An  entire  generation  had  passed  away  since  the  Declara-  - 
tion  of  July  4.  Meanwhile,  for  Jefferson  youth  had  departed 
and  experience  had  arrived.  The  embargo  was  the  ripened 
policy  of  a  thinker  who  had  inspired  independence,  but 
who  had  shuddered  at  the  horrors  of  her  birth.  It  coin-  XS 
cided  with  a  calm  estimate  of  Britain,  the  old  time  enemy, 
and  a  cool  comprehension  of  France,  the  quondam  ally. 

It  combined  impartiality  with  economy  and  suited  the 
inclinations  of  a  statesman  who  was  too  much  of  a 
farmer  to  love  commerce,  yet  could  not  afford  to  despise  it. 

It  agreed  with  the  personal  qualms  of  a  patriot  who  had 
found  one  war  quite  enough,  while  it  safe-guarded  America 
from  the  world’s  primal  curse.  Such  were  the  considera¬ 
tions  leading  Jefferson  to  the  grand  experiment  in  pacifism  ^ 
which  promised  so  much  and  achieved  so  little. 

And  now,  when  the  world  is  gasping  in  horror  at  the 
struggle  so  recently  ended  and  praying  for  guidance  to  avoid 
future  outbreaks,  whatever  pertains  to  former  experiments 
toward  world  peace  acquires  an  interest  more  than  academic. 


160  The  Works  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  X.  456. 

161  Ibid.,  X.  471. 

163  Ibid.,  X.  476-477. 


JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


€> 


All  the  circumstances  attending  the  embargo — its  causes, . 
operation  at  home  and  abroad,  and  final  repeal — take  on  a 
fresh  significance  just  now,  when  the  true  meaning  of  the 
freedom  of  the  seas  demands  an  answer  and  when  the  rights 
of  neutrals  seek  a  fresh  definition  and  a  more  effective 
sanction.  In  the  rising  day  of  a  new  democracy,  humanity 
may  still  learn  many  lessons  from  the  greatest  of  democrats. 
And  of  all  the  lessons  of  his  career,  that  which  cost  Jeffer¬ 
son  most  in  preliminary  education,  in  anxiety,  and,  later,  in 
chagrin,  was  the  embargo.  The  following  pages  endeavor 
to  shed  some  light  upon  Jefferson’s  experience  with  his 
cherished  scheme.  First,  however,  let  us  glance  at  the 
embargo  of  Jefferson  with  reference  to  prevailing  concep¬ 
tions  of  the  law  of  nations.  For  the  embargo  of  1808 
was  the  product  of  a  two-fold  evolution.  It  grew,  as  we 
have  just  seen,  out  of  the  natural  pacifism  of  Jefferson 
himself.  Other  roots  tapped  the  sequences  of  earlier  Ameri¬ 
can  history.  Still  others  linked  with  the  progressive  effort 
of  Europe  and  America  to  classify  and  ameliorate  inter¬ 
national  relations.  J[he  embargo,  thus  viewed,  i^a  part  of 
Jefferson’s  concept  of  international  law. 

The  results  of  the  measure  as  gleaned  from  a  one  year’s 
trial  under  circumstances  most  adverse,  are  scarcely  the 
index  of  its  wisdom.  Jefferson  had  fair  reason  to  antici¬ 
pate  not  only  the  saving  of  American  ships  and  goods, 
which  did  come  about ;  but  he  was  also  legitimately  entitled 
to  count  on  European  developments,  either  responsive  to 
the  embargo  or  independent  of  it,  which  should  vindicate 
his  judgment  and  his  concessions  to  peace.  For  Jefferson, 
in  1807,  was  no  youthful  enthusiast,  but  a  statesman  of 
ripe  experience.  It  is  true  that  he  owes  his  undying  fame 
to  no  other  quality  more  than  to  the  abiding  permanence 
of  an  idealism  which,  in  most  men,  dies  with  youth.  But 
the  preceding  summary  of  his  point  of  view  reveals  a 


5k 


THE  UNDERLYING  POINT  OF  VIEW  (  31 

rather  curious  blending  of  the  practical,  sometimes  almost 
of  the  cynical,  with  the  idealistic,  and  accounts  for  the 
matter-of-fact  and  even  pedestrian  application  which  Jeffer¬ 
son  was  to  give  to  what  in  theory  was  novel  and  humani¬ 
tarian. 

Though  it  is  doubtful  whether  idealism  played  a  very 
conscious  part  in  Jefferson’s  first  determination  to  experi¬ 
ment  with  the  embargo — it  lay  at  hand,  a  ready  weapon 
forged  in  the  armory  of  a  long  experience  in  asserting 
national  dignity  in  the  face  of  insults  and  injuries  beyond 
our  physical  power  to  repel — on  its  theoretical  side,  it 
appeared  to  be  a  consistent  application,  or  possibly  extension, 
of  principles  derived  by  Jefferson  from  his  studies  in  the^ 
law  of  nations.  For  the  embargo  should  be  considered  as 
part  of  a  progressive  effort  in  Europe  and  America  to 
classify  and  ameliorate  international  relations.  The  em¬ 
bargo,  thus  viewed,  is  a  part  of  Jefferson’s  concept  of  inter¬ 
national  law,  and  as  such  it  leads  into  a  fruitful  aspect  of 
Jefferson’s  thinking.  An  inquiry,  therefore,  as  to  the 
position  of  the  embargo  and  its  author  in  the  general  field 
of  international  law  may  properly  precede  any  examination 
of  the  measure  itself,  its  causes,  its  operation  at  home  and 
abroad,  and  its  final  repeal. 


CHAPTER  II 
a 

JEFFERSON  AND  THE  LAW  OF  NATIONS 

Z— ■ »  The  embargo  upon  commerce  which  Congress,  at  the 
suggestion  of  President  Jefferson,  decreed  in  1807  was  more 
Jhan  an  experiment  in  practical  politics.  It  was  a  test  on 
a  magnificent  scale  of  a  theory  of  international  law  long 
maturing  in  the  President’s  mind,  and  the  fitting  contribu¬ 
tion  of  a  new  nation  to  a  body  of  doctrine  which  owed  its 
revival,  if  not  its  inception,  to  the  need  of  curbing  the  inter¬ 
national  anarchy  which  accompanied  the  rise  of  modern 
Y  states.  The  law  of  nations  was  a  new  development.  Less 
than  two  centuries  had  passed  since  Grotius  put  forth  the 
pioneer  work  De  jure  belli  ac  pads  (1625).  The  interval 
between  the  publication  of  this  book  and  the  issuance  of 
the  embargo  decree  was,  in  fact,  the  classical  period  in 
international  law.  The  labors  of  Leibnitz,  Wolff,  Vattel, 
and  Bynkershoek  built  up  a  system  popular,  not  only  with 
doctrinaires  and  philosophers,  but  even  with  enlightened 
despots  in  their  more  subjective  moments.  By  the  close  of 
the  eighteenth  century,  the  law  of  nations  had  acquired  as 
much  prestige  as  it  could  ever  hope  to  secure  without  the 
support  of  its  own  guns  and  navies.  It  was  the  highest  poli¬ 
tical  expression  of  an  age  which  believed  in  the  perfecti¬ 
bility  of  human  relations  through  sheer  intellect.  If  its 
dicta  sometimes  failed  to  govern  the  actions  of  courts  and 
cabinets,  its  infringement  was  not  a  matter  of  indifference. 

International  law  since  Grotius  has  in  reality  known  two 
great  eras  and  is  now  entering  upon  a  third.  The  first 
culminated  between  1758  and  the  French  Revolution,  when 
for  an  entire  generation  Yattel’s  Le  Droit  des  gens,  ou 
principes  de  la  loi  naturelle  appliques  a  la  conduite  et  aux 


JEFFERSON  AND  THE  LAW  OF  NATIONS  33 


affaires  des  nations  et  des  souverains  enjoyed  a  vogue  which 
has  been  accorded  to  but  few  of  the  world’s  books.1  The 
Napoleonic  Wars  overthrew  this  older  law  of  nations  along 
with  the  nations  it  represented.  It  was  amid  the  debris* 


ancLxuins  of  this  international  law  that  Jefferson  inaugm 
ra.ted_h.is  embargo.  A  second  stage  of  development  marked 
the  century  between  the  Congress  of  Vienna  and  the  meet¬ 
ing  of  the  Hague  Conference  in  1907.  This  was  essentially 
a  period  of  disillusionment.  The  age  of  reason  had  suc¬ 
cumbed  to  the  unreason  of  much  that  was  human,  and 
visions  of  immediate  perfection  paled  and  faded  before  the 
Darwinian  view  of  imperceptible  evolution.  International 
law,  then,  as  the  expression  of  a  pragmatic  and  skeptical 
world,  contented  itself  with  as  efficient  a  system  of  balance 
of  power  as  it  could  devise  and  endeavored  at  two  world 
gatherings  to  place  a  limit  upon  the  military  use  of  the  tools 
which  modern  industrialism  had  created.  In  the  tragedy 
of  the  World  War  the  international  law'  of  Gladstone,  Bis¬ 
marck,  Nicholas  II,  and  Bryan  was  swept  away  as  utterly 
as  the  older  system  of  the  “fathers.” 

From  this  larger  synthesis  of  the  law  of  nations,  it  is 
of  interest  to  examine  more  particularly  Jefferson’s  acquaint¬ 
ance  with  the  authorities  upon  the  subject2  and  his  concep¬ 
tion  of  his  own  relation  to  the  law.  Jefferson  had  all  his 
life  been  a  student  of  political  theory,  and  the  authors  to 
whom  he  refers  from  time  to  time  and  a  perusal  of  whom 
he  recommends  to  his  friends  constitute  a  gallery  of  the 


1  For  an  interesting  study  of  Vattel,  see  Charles  G.  Fenwick,  “The 
Authority  of  Vattel”  in  The  American  Political  Science  Review,  VII 
(1913),  395-410.  An  article  by  Thomas  Willing  Balch  in  the  Pennsyl¬ 
vania  Law  Review  for  1916  also  treats  of  Jefferson’s  interest  in  the  law 
of  nations. 

3  Among  others  he  cites:  The  Writings  of  Jaynes  Madison  (Hunt 
ed.),  II.  43,  Madison  to  Thomas  Jefferson,  March  16,  1784,  “The  tracts 
of  Bynkershoek,  which  you  mention”;  The  Works  of  Thomas  Jefferson 
(Federal  ed.,  1904-05),  IV.  29,  Puffendorf ;  IV.  248,  Bynkershoek; 
VI.  63,  Adam  Smith ;  also  Montesquieu,  Locke,  Burke,  De  Lolme, 
Hume,  Molloy,  Beccaria,  and  Vattel. 


34  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 

political  scientists  of  his  period.  The  underlying  concept 
of  eighteenth  century  political  thought  was  the  theory  of 
compact.  Like  most  of  his  contemporaries,  Jefferson  ac¬ 
cepted  the  contract  theory  as  it  had  developed  in  England 
through  Hooker  and  Milton  in  theology,  Hobbes  and  Locke 
in  politics,3  and  as  it  had  been  popularized  in  France  through 
Montesquieu  and  Rousseau.  His  own  “Declaration  of  Inde¬ 
pendence”  embodied  the  finest  statement  in  English  of  the 
theory. 

Up  to  1776,  Jefferson  had  been  thinking  of  the  theory 
in  a  somewhat  limited  aspect  as  an  explanation  for  the  origin 
of  individual  societies  and  governments.  But  the  exigencies 
of  practical  administration  which  faced  him  as  secretary 
of  state  and  later  as  chief  executive  called  his  attention  to 
a  phase  of  the  general  theory  not  frequently  emphasized. 
The  customary  explanation  of  compact  presupposed  a  state 
of  nature  out  of  which  man  emerged  into  organized  society 
by  means  of  a  formal  and  specific  agreement.4  On  all  points 
not  covered  by  this  agreement,  he  was  still  regarded  as  in  the 
original  state  of  nature.  The  significance  of  this  for  the 
law  of  nations  was  that  the  state  of  nature  was  one  of 
peace.5  No  Nietzschean  school  of  thought  had  as  yet 
arisen  to  glorify  war  as  the  natural  state  of  man.  To 
eighteenth  century  thinkers  war  was  the  abnormal  and  the 
unnatural;  and  the  state  of  nature  which  governed  both 


3  For  an  epitome  of  the  place  of  the  theory  of  contract  in  American 
thought,  see  L.  M.  Sears,  “The  Puritan  and  his  Anglican  Allegiance” 
in  Bibliotheca  Sacra,  October,  1917. 

*M.  de  Vattel  (Carnegie  Institution,  1916),  Introduction  by  A.  de 
Lapradelle,  p.  xviii :  “Dans  l’ecole  de  droit  de  la  nature  et  des  gens,  a 
laquelle  appartient  Vattel,  le  contrat  joue  un  grand  role.  De  meme  qu’il 
est  a  la  base  de  l’Etat,  dans  le  droit  public  interne,  sous  le  nom  de  pacte 
social,  il  est  encore  a  la  base  du  droit  international  public,  sous  le  nom  de 
traite.  Par  le  pacte,  1’Etat  se  forme.  Par  le  traite  il  s’assure  les  droits 
necessaires  a  son  developpement.” 

5  See  J.  S.  Reeves,  “The  influence  of  the  Law  of  Nature  upon  Inter¬ 
national  Law  in  the  United  States,”  etc.,  in  American  Journal  of  Inter¬ 
national  Lava,  III  (1909),  559.  See  also  The  Works  of  Thomas  Jeffer¬ 
son,  VII.  400. 


JEFFERSON  AND  THE  LAW  OF  NATIONS  (  35 


individuals  and  nations,  except  as  modified  by  special  laws 
and  treaties,  was  a  state  of  peace.  Vattel  furnished  the 
text;6  Washington  and  his  advisers,  the  sermon.  The 
neutrality  which  the  United  States  pursued  in  1793  was  a 
definite  advance  in  international  law,  based  upon  the  funda¬ 
mental  pacifism  of  the  state  of  nature  idea  included  in  the 
theory  of  compact.7 

Neutrality  was,  in  fact,  dictated  by  plain  necessity,  but 
Jefferson  found  authority  for  it  among  the  lawyers,  and 
it  was  pleasant  to  indulge  in  what  Genet  termed  the  “aphor¬ 
isms”  of  Vattel.8  This  same  neutrality  continued  under 
Adams,  in  spite  of  the  near  approach  to  war  in  1798,  and 
it  remained  the  fixed  policy  of  Jefferson’s  own  term.  It  bore 
a  golden  harvest  in  the  carrying  trade  of  a  warring  world, 
for,  until  the  decrees  and  orders  of  the  chief  contestants 
closed  the  seas  to  our  shipping,  neutrality  paid  financially 
as  well  as  morally.  But  the  increasing  rigor  of  the  belliger¬ 
ents  after  1805  forced  the  issue  anew,  and  the  decision  to 
maintain  neutrality  rested,  it  must  be  confessed,  more  upon 
the  practical  impossibility  of  attacking  both  offenders  than 
upon  any  theory  that  our  own  state  of  nature  was  peaceful. 
Most  of  Jefferson’s  allusions  to  Vattel  and  other  authorities 


6 M.  de  Vattel  (Carnegie  Institution,  1916),  Introduction  by  A.  de 
Lapradelle,  p.  xxiv :  “Vattel,  le  premier,  declare  que  l’impartialite  n’est 
pas  obtenue  par  l’egalite  des  secours,  mais  par  l’absence  de  secours.  ‘Ne 
point  donner  de  secours,  quand  on  n’y  est  pas  oblige ;  ne  fournir  librement 
ni  troupes,  ni  armes,  ni  munitions,  ni  rien  de  ce  qui  sert  directement  a  la 
guerre  .  .  .  ne  point  donner  de  secours  et  non  pas  en  donner  egale- 

ment telle  est  sa  formule,”  etc.  See  also  ibid.,  p.  xxxvi. 

’See  J.  J.  Burlamaqui,  The  Principles  of  Natural  Law  (5th  ed., 
Dublin,  1791),  p.  164:  “  .  .  .  let  us  observe  that  the  natural  state  of 
nations,  in  respect  to  each  other,  is  that  of  society  and  peace.”  M.  de 
Vattel  (Carnegie  Institution),  Introduction  by  A.  de  Lapradelle,  p.  xxiii : 
“Machiavel  donnait  aux  princes  le  conseil  d’epouser  les  querelles  les  uns 
des  autres,  en  vue  de  partager,  avec  le  vainqueur,  les  depouilles  du  vaincu. 
Diplomate  de  l’ecole  de  Jean-Jacques,  Vattel,  au  contraire,  les  engage  a 
rester  spectateurs.  Pour  la  premiere  fois  le  nom  de  neutrality  penetre 
dans  un  traite  de  droit  des  gens.” 

8  The  Works  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  VII.  485,  Jefferson  to  Gouverneur 
Morris,  August  16,  1793. 


36  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 

are  to  be  found  in  the  correspondence  of  1793.  Another 
ten  years  of  conflict  taught  the  futility  of  appeals  to  text¬ 
books  against  the  might  which  Napoleon  and  Canning  both 
mistook  for  right.  By  nature  a  theorist,  inexorable  destiny 
made  of  Jefferson  a  realist.  Yet  devotion  to  ideals  is,  after 
all,  his  salient  characteristic.  And  his  utterances  upon  the 
law  of  nations  and  its  framers  possess  a  unique  interest 
for  a  world  which  is  once  more  called  upon  to  formulate 
not  only  its  practice,  but  its  theory  as  well.  If  the  following 
pages  seem  to  concern  many  matters  besides  the  embargo, 
the  latter  may  still  be  kept  in  mind  as  the  practical  outcome 
of  much  theorizing. 

Frequently  his  allusions  are  only  incidental.  For  example, 
the  right  of  an  assembly  to  determine  its  own  quorum  re¬ 
minds  him  of  Puffendorf.9  Again  he  says  of  Bynkershoek’s 
works :  “There  are  about  a  fourth  part  of  them  which  you 
would  like  to  have.  They  are  the  following  tracts.  Questiones 
juris  publici — de  lege  Rhodea — de  dominio  maris — du  Juge 
conopetent  des  Ambassadeurs,  for  this  last  if  not  the  rest 
has  been  translated  into  French  with  notes  by  Barbeyrae.”10 
More  important,  because  of  their  subject,  are  his  observa¬ 
tions  on  The  Wealth  of  Nations : 

In  political  economy,  I  think  Smith’s  wealth  of  nations  the  best 
book  extant,  in  the  science  of  government  Montesquieu’s  spirit  of 
laws  is  generally  recommended.  It  contains  indeed  a  great  number 
of  political  truths;  but  also  an  equal  number  of  heresies:  so  that  the 
reader  must  be  constantly  on  his  guard.  .  .  .  Locke’s  little  book 

on  government  is  perfect  as  far  as  it  goes.  Descending  from  theory 
to  practice  there  is  no  better  book  than  the  Federalist.  Burgh’s 
Political  disquisitions  are  good  also,  especially  after  reading  De 
Lolme.  Several  of  Hume’s  political  essays  are  good.  There  are 
some  excellent  books  of  Theory  written  by  Turgot  &  the  economists 
of  France.  For  parliamentary  knowledge,  the  Lex  parliamentaria 
is  the  best  book.11 

’  The  Works  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  IV.  29. 

10  Ibid.,  IV.  248. 

11  Ibid.,  VI.  63,  Jefferson  to  Thomas  Mann  Randolph,  May  30,  1790. 


JEFFERSON  AND  THE  LAW  OF  NATIONS  37 

Several  of  the  above  named  works  were  regarded  by 
Jefferson  as  indispensable  to  the  training  of  a  lawyer.  And 
a  chart  of  readings,  recommended  to  his  young  cousin  for 
daily  study  between  the  hours  of  twelve  and  two,  includes 
Molloy,  De  jure  maritimo;  Locke,  On  Government ;  Montes¬ 
quieu,  Spirit  of  Lazo;  Smith,  Wealth  of  Nations;  Beccaria; 
Kaim,  Moral  Essays;  and  Vattel,  Lazv  of  Nations.12 

But  the  law  of  nations  meant  to  Jefferson  far  more 
than  an  elegant  supplement  to  a  legal  education.  It  was  a 
reality  in  diplomacy,  ready  to  function  upon  any  issue.  In 
1792,  that  issue  was  Spain.  During  the  Revolution,  Spain 
had  encroached  upon  Georgia.  But  the  peace  treaty  failed 
to  recognize  her  gains,  and  she  was  obligated  to  return  them 
to  Georgia.  So  far  as  the  treaty  applied,  this  might  be  to 
Georgia  direct,  or,  on  the  theory  that  British  sovereignty 
still  held  when  the  attacks  were  made,  restitution  might 
be  made  to  Britain  first,  for  transfer  to  the  United  States. 
In  support  of  direct  dealings  between  Spain  and  the  United 
States,  Jefferson  enlisted  the  doctrine  of  natural  right,  we 
being  the  real  proprietors  of  the  places  seized;  and,  to  sup¬ 
port  natural  right,  he  appealed  to  Vattel.13  The  case  was 
simple.  If  Britain  was  the  real  proprietor,  it  was  certain 
that  she  had  never  ceded  her  rights  to  Spain.  On  the  con¬ 
trary,  her  relinquishment  had  been  to  the  United  States. 
If  America  was  the  original  and  lawful  proprietor,  the  situa¬ 
tion  was  absurd,  for  America  and  Spain  were  allies  at  the 
very  time  the  seizures  occurred.  Common  sense  alone  would 
uphold  the  American  contention,  but  Jefferson  called  in  a 
battery  of  legal  support.  “See,”  he  urges,  “on  this  subject, 
Grotius,  1.  3.  c.  6,  §26.  Puffendorf,  1.  8,  c.  17,  §23.  Vattel, 
1.  3,  §197,  198.”14 

13  Ibid.,  VI.  72,  Jefferson  to  John  Garland  Jefferson,  June  11,  1790. 
For  a  comment  on  Beccaria,  see  ibid.,  I.  71. 

13  American  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  I.  252,  March  18,  1792. 
See  Vattel,  I.  3,  p.  122. 

14  American  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  I.  252,  March  18,  1792. 


38  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 

The  law  of  nations  was  equally  serviceable  for  Ameri¬ 
can  rights  to  navigation  on  the  Mississippi.  “What  senti¬ 
ment,”  demands  Jefferson,  “is  written  in  deeper  characters 
than  that  the  ocean  is  free  to  all  men,  and  their  rivers  to  all 
their  inhabitants?”15  Obstructions  to  river  navigation  had 
always  been  acts  of  force,  and,  if  recognized,  were  matters 
of  treaty  and  not  of  natural  right.  Even  exclusive  control 
of  the  lower  waters  of  a  river  gave  its  owners  no  dispensa¬ 
tion  from  the  general  law.  And,  in  the  case  in  question, 
Spain  held  on  both  sides  of  the  Mississippi  so  narrow  a 
zone  “that  it  may  in  fact  be  considered  as  a  strait  of  the 
sea.”16  On  this  point,  as  in  the  case  of  the  Georgia  claims, 
the  authorities  are  duly  cited:  “See  Grot.  1.  2.  c.  2  §11,  12, 
13,  c.  3.  §7,  8,  12.  Puffendorf,  1.  3.  c.  3.  §3,  4,  5,  6.  Wolff’s. 
Inst.  §310,  311,  312.  Vattel,  1.  1.  §292,  1.  2.  §123  to  139.”17 

The  right  of  navigation  being  granted,  that  of  mooring 
vessels  to  the  shore  and  even  of  landing  if  necessary  was  the 
inevitable  corollary.  Lest  there  be  any  doubt  of  this 
simple  truth,  Jefferson  calls  to  witness  “Grot.  1.  2.  c.  2.  §15. 
Puffend.  1.  3.  c.  3.  §8.  Vattel,  1.  2.  §129.”18  If  these  were 
not  convincing,  there  was  the  further  arsenal  of  Roman 
law.  The  Romans  placed  river  navigation  on  the  basis  of 
natural  right — “(flumina  publica  sunt,  hoc  est  populi  Roma¬ 
ni,  Inst.  2  t.  1.  §2)”19— and  derived  an  incidental  right  to 
the  use  of  the  shores  “(Ibid.,  §1,  3,  4,  5)”20  This  shore 
privilege  was  automatically  extended  in  emergency  to  the 
beaching  of  a  damaged  ship  when  simply  mooring  it  would 
prove  unsafe.  Here  Jefferson  quotes  at  length  from  “Inst. 
1.  2.  t.  1.  §4.”21  It  thus  appears  that  all  the  lawyers,  both 

15  American  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  I.  253. 

18  Ibid.,  p.  254. 

17  Ibid.,  p.  254. 

18  Ibid.,  p.  254. 

19  Ibid.,  p.  254. 

20  Ibid.,  p.  254. 

21  Ibid.,  p.  254,  March  22,  1792. 


JEFFERSON  AND  THE  LAW  OF  NATIONS  39 

ancient  and  modern,  upheld  American  rights  upon  the  Miss¬ 
issippi.  Is  it  surprising  that  the  case  was  finally  won? 

Meanwhile  even  more  urgent  difficulties  with  Great 
Britain  pressed  for  solution.  The  Peace  of  Paris  was  vio¬ 
lated  by  both  parties.  Great  Britain  still  held  the  western 
forts  ;22  America  still  owed  the  royalist  debts.  In  support¬ 
ing  the  American  position,  Jefferson  took  for  his  major 
premise  the  validity  of  the  status  quo  as  defined  at  the  time 
of  the  peace-signing.23  He  next  pointed  out  that  the  treaty 
became  binding  only  when  it  was  published  to  the  country 
at  large.24  At  the  moment  when  the  treaty  was  so  pro¬ 
claimed,  much  British  property  was  by  the  fortune  of  war 
in  American  hands.  The  claim  to  permanent  ownership  of 
these  confiscations  would  hold  in  law,  save  for  the  custom 
grown  quite  general  in  Europe  of  returning  to  individuals 
their  private  property.25  America  would  have  been  glad 
to  observe  this  courtesy  had  the  war  been  of  a  normal 
character,  but  such  was  far  from  the  case.  Our  resources 
were  too  exhausted  to  permit  of  mere  amenities.  More¬ 
over,  Great  Britain  had  placed  us  as  rebels  beyond  the  pale 
of  international  law.  “She  would  not  admit  our  title  even 
to  the  strict  rights  of  ordinary  war;  she  cannot  then  claim 
its  liberalities ;  yet  the  confiscations  of  property  were  by  no 
means  universal,  and  that  of  debts  still  less  so.”26 

Even  granting  the  righteousness  of  certain  British 
claims,  reason  and  law  were  one  in  cautioning  delay  in  their 
payment.27  In  Jefferson’s  own  formula :  “Time  and  con- 

22  For  a  recommendation  of  commercial  retaliation  on  this  account, 
see  The  Works  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  I.  210. 

23  American  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  I.  201,  May  29,  1792, 
citing  “Vattel,  1.4.  s.  21,”  and  “Wolf,  1222.” 

24  American  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  I.  201,  quoting  “Vattel, 
1.  4.  s.  24”  and  s.  25;  “Wolf,  s.  1229.” 

25 American  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  I.  201-202,  May  29, 
1792,  quoting  Bynkershoek  “Quest.  Jur.  Pub.  I.  1.  c.  7.” 

29  American  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  I.  202,  May  29,  1792. 

27  Ibid.,  pp.  208-209,  citing  “Vattel,  1.  4.  s.  51”  and  “Bynkershoek, 
1.  2.  c.  10.”  See  also  Bynkershoek,  1.  1.  c.  7. 


40 


JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


sideration  are  favorable  to  the  right  cause — precipitation  to 
the  wrong  one.”28  And  as  for  interest,  that  was  preposter¬ 
ous,  even  according  to  British  precedents.29  Where  both 
debtor  and  creditor  lost,  the  court  would  not  double  the 
loss  of  one  to  save  that  of  the  other.  In  both  natural  and 
municipal  law,  in  questions  “de  damno  evitando  melior  est 
conditio  possidentis.”30  All  the  more  so  where  the  creditor 
inflicted  the  damage.31 

Turning  to  British  delinquencies,  Jefferson  quotes  the 
treaty  pledge  to  retire  “with  all  convenient  speed,”32  and 
conjures  up  Vattel  to  show  that  this  really  meant  ‘‘as  soon 
as  possible.”33  In  his  reply,  the  British  minister  disclaimed 
any  authority  to  surrender  the  posts,  and  the  conference  was 
barren  as  respects  its  chief  objective. 

Nevertheless,  one  truly  constructive  development  grew 
out  of  the  diplomatic  interchange  as  to  debts  and  forts. 
Hammond  expressed  the  regret  that  Great  Britain  and  the 
United  States  had  no  buffer  state  between.  He  feared 
trouble  from  rival  army  posts  on  either  side  the  Canadian 
border.  Thereupon  Jefferson  suggested  that  both  sides  re¬ 
strict  their  forces  to  a  minimum  to  be  agreed  upon.  And 
the  friction  of  wits  between  Jefferson  and  Hammond  then 
generated  a  thought  spark  of  more  value  to  humanity  than 
many  a  treaty  of  peace.  Seizing  Jefferson’s  idea  of  a  limi¬ 
tation  of  armaments,  Hammond  went  the  further  step 
of  urging  the  abolition  of  all  military  posts  in  favor  of 
trading  stations.  Jefferson  hailed  the  suggestion.  “I  told 
him,”  he  records,  “that  the  idea  of  having  no  military  post 

18  American  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  I.  211,  Section  45. 

28  Ibid.,  I.  213.  He  quotes  here  Lord  Mansfield,  “Dougl.  753,”  and 
376. 

,0  American  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  I.  213.  See  also  The 
Works  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  VII.  84-85. 

81  See  in  this  connection  American  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations, 
I.  214,  citing  ‘‘Wolf,  s.  229”  and  s.  1224,  and  ‘‘Grotius,  1.  3.  c.  20,  s.  22.” 

82  American  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  I.  206,  May  29,  1792. 

83  Ibid.,  I.  206,  citing  “Vattel,  1.  4.  c.  26.” 


JEFFERSON  AND  THE  LAW  OF  NATIONS  (41 

on  either  side  was  new  to  me,  that  it  had  never  been  men¬ 
tioned  among  the  members  of  the  Executive.  That  there¬ 
fore  I  could  only  speak  for  myself  &  say  that,  prima  facie, 
it  accorded  well  with  two  favorite  ideas  of  mine  of  leaving 
commerce  free,  &  never  keeping  an  unnecessary  souldier, 
but  when  he  spoke  of  having  no  military  post  on  either  side 
there  might  be  difficulty  in  fixing  the  distance  of  the  nearest 
posts.”34  A  great  war  was  to  intervene  before  the  unforti¬ 
fied  Canadian  boundary  became  a  fact.  But  Jefferson  and 
Hammond  both  deserve  credit  for  the  germ  of  a  real  pacif¬ 
ism  and  of  international  good-neighborliness.  Less  heeded 
than  the  grand  climaxes  in  his  life,  this  conversation  of 
Jefferson  with  Hammond  is  memorable  for  its  genesis  of  a 
great  idea.  It  marked  him  as  a  trail-blazer  in  international 
law. 

While  Washington  and  his  cabinet  were  struggling  with 
these  American  issues,  the  war  cloud  in  Europe  was  threat¬ 
ening  to  engulf  all  the  neutrals.35  The  death  grapple  be¬ 
tween  England  and  France,  which  lasted  with  one  brief 
intermission  from  1793  to  1815,  raised  from  the  first  grave 
questions  of  international  law  and  the  rights  of  neutrals, 
and  called  from  our  own  state  department  important  declara¬ 
tions  of  principle.  When  Great  Britain  first  threatened  her 
paper  blockade,  Jefferson  assured  Pinckney,  the  American 
minister  at  London,  that  such  an  infringement  of  neutral 
rights  was  past  belief.36  The  law  of  nations  was  too  in¬ 
grained  in  civilized  practice,  as  witness  the  recent  American 
treaty  with  Prussia  which  went  even  so  far  as  to  deny  the 
existence  of  contraband,  “for,  in  truth,  in  the  present  im¬ 
proved  State  of  the  arts  when  every  country  has  such  ample 

34  The  IVorks  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  I.  227,  Anas  Papers,  1792. 

35  It  had  really  been  looming  since  1787,  even  before  the  French  Revo¬ 
lution  began,  and  Jefferson  had  then  predicted  our  eventual  neutrality 
(see  The  Works  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  I.  114)  and  attempted  to  demon¬ 
strate  its  advantages  to  both  belligerents. 

36  The  Works  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  VII.  314,  May  7,  1793. 


42 


JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


means  of  procuring  arms  within  and  without  itself,  the  regu¬ 
lations  of  contraband  answer  no  other  end  than  to  draw 
other  nations  into  the  war.  However,  as  nations  have  not 
given  sanction  to  this  improvement,  we  claim  it,  at  present, 
with  Prussia  alone.”37 

Such  a  view  of  contraband  was  not  likely  to  countenance 
the  British  objection  to  shipments  of  arms  for  French 
account,  and  Jefferson  vigorously  asserted  the  right  of  our 
citizens  to  a  traffic  in  munitions,  a  right  in  which  they  were 
amply  sustained  by  the  law  of  nations,  which  simply  desig¬ 
nated  munitions  as  contraband  if  the  enemy  could  capture 
them.38  What  was  true  of  cargoes  was  equally  true  of  their 
vessels.  The  law  of  nations  insured  their  right  to  pass 
unharmed,  “and  no  one  has  a  right  to  ask  where  a  vessel 
was  built,  but  where  is  she  owned?”39  To  assert  this  right 
was  all  the  more  essential,  as  our  increasing  commerce  de¬ 
manded  additional  cargo  space,  and  shipping  once  purchased 
enjoyed  the  protection  in  some  cases  of  specific  treaties ;  in 
others,  of  the  general  law  of  nations.40 

Questions  of  navigation,  contraband,  blockade,  and 
seizure  were  of  course  fundamental.  Upon  their  solution 
depended  the  ability  of  America  to  remain  outside  the  gen¬ 
eral  conflagration.  But  even  more  annoying,  for  the  mo¬ 
ment,  were  the  demands  of  the  French  agents  on  American 
soil.  These  parvenus  in  diplomacy  outraged  all  the  canons 
of  the  old  regime  by  their  insolent  demands,  to  yield  which 
would  be  suicidal,  to  refuse,  churlish.  The  balance  between 
gratitude  and  self-interest  was,  indeed,  hard  to  preserve,  and 
the  law  of  nations  was  in  demand  as  a  prop  for  a  neutrality 
more  sensible  than  romantic. 

87  The  Works  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  VII.  314-315,  May  7,  1793. 

36  Ibid.,  VII.  326,  May  15,  1793.  See  also  ibid.,  pp.  84-85;  also  Ameri¬ 
can  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  I.  147,  188,  November  30,  1793. 

38  The  Works  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  VII.  386-387,  Jefferson  to  Gouver- 
neur  Morris,  our  Minister  at  Paris,  June  13,  1793. 

40 Ibid .,  VII.  416,  Jefferson  to  James  Monroe,  June  28,  1793. 


JEFFERSON  AND  THE  LAW  OF  NATIONS  43 


The  most  offensive  of  these  French  representatives,  the 
Girondist  Genet,  although  he  violated  all  the  laws  of  hospi¬ 
tality  by  his  conduct  at  Charleston  and  Philadelphia,  con¬ 
trived  to  place  the  American  government  on  the  defensive. 
Jefferson  explained  to  him  our  point  of  view  with  an  almost 
loving  patience,  finding  ample  vindication  for  neutrality  in 
the  pages  of  Vattel  and  Wolff.  He  quoted  at  length  from 
Vattel  :41 

‘Tant  qu’un  peuple  neutre  veut  jouir  surement  de  cet  etat,  il  doit 
montrer  en  toutes  choses  une  exacte  impartialite  entre  ceux  qui  se 
font  la  guerre.  Car  s’il  favorise  l’un  au  prejudice  de  l’autre,  il  ne 
pourra  pas  se  plaindre,  quand  celui-ci  le  traitera  comme  adherent  et 
associe  de  son  ennemi.  Sa  neutralite  seroit  une  neutralite  fraud- 
uleuse,  dont  personne  ne  veut  etre  la  dupe.  Voyons  done  en  quoi 
consiste  cette  impartialite  qu’un  peuple  neutre  doit  garder. 

‘Elle  se  rapporte  uniquement  a  la  guerre,  et  comprend  deux 
choses.  1,  Ne  point  donner  de  secours  quand  on  n’y  est  pas  oblige; 
ne  fournir  librement  ni  troupes  ni  armes,  ni  munitions,  ni  rien  de 
ce  qui  sert  directement  a  la  guerre.  Je  dis  ne  point  donner  de 
secours  et  non  pas  en  donner  egalemcnt ;  car  il  seroit  absurde  qu’un 
etat  secourut  en  meme  terns  deux  ennemis.  Et  puis  il  seroit  im¬ 
possible  de  le  faire  avec  egalite,  les  memes  choses,  le  meme  nombre 
de  troupes,  la  meme  quantite  d’armes  de  munitions,  &c.  fournies  en 
des  circonstances  differentes ;  ne  forment  plus  de  secours  equivalens, 
&c.’ 

If  the  neutral  power  may  not,  consistent  with  its  neutrality, 
furnish  men  to  either  party,  for  their  aid  in  war,  as  little  can  either 
enroll  them  in  the  neutral  territory,  by  the  law  of  nations.  Wolf,  s. 
1774  says,  ‘Puisque  le  droit  de  lever  des  soldats  est  un  droit  de 
majeste  qui  ne  peut  etre  viole  par  une  nation  etrangere,  il  n’est  pas 
permis  de  lever  des  soldats  sur  le  territoire  d’autrui  sans  le  consente- 
ment  du  maitre  du  territoire.’  And  Vattel,  before  cited,  1.3,  s.  15, 
‘Le  droit  de  lever  des  soldats  appartenant  uniquement  a  la  nation  ou 
au  souverain,  personne  ne  peut  en  enroller  en  pays  etranger  sans  la 
permission  du  souverain.  Ceux  qui  entreprenent  d’engager  des 
soldats  en  pays  etranger  sans  la  permission  du  souverain  et  en  gen¬ 
eral  quiconque  debauche  les  sujets  d’autrui,  viole  un  des  droits  les 
plus  sacres  du  prince  et  de  la  nation.  C’est  le  crime  qu’on  appele 
plaigiat  ou  vol  d’homme.  Il  n’est  aucun  etat  police  qui  ne  le  punise 
tres  severement.’ 

.  .  .  The  testimony  of  these  and  other  writers  on  the  law 

and  usage  of  nations,  with  your  own  just  reflections  on  them,  will 

“  American  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  I.  154-155,  Jefferson  to 
Genet,  June  17,  1793,  quoting  “Vattel,  1.  3.  s.  104.’’ 


44  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 

satisfy  you  that  the  United  States,  in  prohibiting  all  the  belligerent 
Powers  from  equipping,  arming,  and  manning  vessels  of  war  in 
their  ports,  have  exercised  a  right  and  a  duty,  with  justice  and  with 
great  moderation. 

Jefferson  continued  this  discourse  on  the  law  of  nations 
by  recalling  to  his  unwilling  pupil,  Genet,  the  principle  that 
"'friendly  goods  in  the  vessel  of  an  enemy  are  free,  while  ene¬ 
my  goods  in  the  vessel  of  a  friend  are  prize.  Exceptions  to 
this  rule  did  occur,  it  was  true,  and  it  was  the  effort  of  the 
United  States  to  convert  the  exception  into  the  rule  and 
establish  the  principle  that  free  ships  make  free  goods.42 
But  this  was  in  each  case  a  matter  for  special  treaty,  and 
where  such  a  treaty  had  not  been  concluded,  the  general 
law  of  nations  still  prevailed.  Unhappily,  we  had  no  such 
treaty  with  England,  Spain,  Portugal,  and  Austria.  And  if, 
for  the  time  being,  this  might  seem  to  operate  against 
France,  by  exposing  her  goods  if  found  in  our  ships  to 
seizure  by  the  said  powers,  there  was  at  any  rate  the  compen¬ 
sation  of  gaining  our  goods  whenever  they  were  found  in  the 
vessels  of  these  same  enemies  of  France.  America  herself,  as 
Jefferson  explained,  was  the  real  loser  by  the  principle  she  was 
seeking  to  make  popular,  and  she  would  continue  to  lose  as 
long  as  its  acceptance  was  only  partial.  The  advantages  would 
appear  only  when  the  principle  that  free  ships  make  free 
goods  should  become  the  universal  law  of  nations.  Then, 
indeed,  our  position  as  a  friendly  neutral  would  vastly  im¬ 
prove  through  exemption  from  search.  “To  this  condition 
we  are  endeavoring  to  advance,  but  as  it  depends  on  the 
will  of  other  nations,  as  well  as  our  own,  we  can  only  obtain 
it  when  they  shall  be  ready  to  concur.”43 

“See  The  Works  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  I.  96,  for  an  early  mention 
of  this  principle. 

43  American  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  I.  166-167,  Jefferson  to 
Genet,  July  24,  1793.  For  the  same  idea,  see  ibid.,  I.  170,  Jefferson  to 
■Gouverneur  Morris,  August  16,  1793. 


JEFFERSON  AND  THE  LAW  OF  NATIONS  45 

The  neutrality  which  Jefferson  was  so  zealously  ex¬ 
plaining  to  Genet  involved  an  equal  care  in  upholding  our 
rights  against  Great  Britain.44  Jefferson  particularly  ob¬ 
jected  to  the  British  naval  orders  of  June  8,  1793,  designed 
to  cut  off  American  grain  from  enemy  countries.  He  in¬ 
sisted  that  grain  was  not  contraband  and  that  for  America 
to  submit  would  be  an  unneutral  act,  tantamount  to  war 
upon  France.  “[Great  Britain]  may,  indeed,  feel  the  desire 
of  starving  an  enemy  nation;  but  she  can  have  no  right  of 
doing  it  at  our  loss,  nor  of  making  us  the  instrument  of 
it.’’45  He  further  made  it  clear  to  Hammond  that  we  were 
within  our  rights  in  according  to  France  certain  special  cour¬ 
tesies,  such  as  admission  of  her  prizes  and  privateers  into 
our  ports  and  even  of  her  regular  line-of-battle  ships  in  face 
of  emergencies,  such  as  storms,  pirates,  and  enemies  ;46 
though,  for  ordinary  cruising  on  our  coast  beyond  the  three- 
mile  limit,47  England  possessed  equal  rights  with  France  and 
all  other  nations.48 

Jefferson’s  own  bias  was  frankly  French  throughout 
the  cabinet  crises  which  Genet  precipitated.49  So  far  as 
American  interest  would  permit,  he  remained  true  to  his 
Gallophile  sentiments.  Even  when  the  irritation  over  Genet 
was  at  its  height,  he  did  not  lose  sight  of  those  French 
interests  which  the  conduct  of  a  scatter-brained  minister 
had  so  gravely  jeopardized.  To  steer  a  firm  yet  just  course 

44  Ibid.,  p.  170,  on  neutrality.  See  also  The  Works  of  Thomas  Jeffer¬ 
son,  VII.  302,  309,  387,  415. 

46  The  Works  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  VIII.  28,  Jefferson  to  Thomas 
Pinckney,  September  7,  1793.  Also  American  State  Papers,  Foreign 
Relations,  I.  239.  Also  H.  E.  Egerton,  British  Foreign  Policy  in  Europe 
to  the  End  of  the  19th  Century,  pp.  374-375.  Lord  Grenville,  on  his 
side,  relied  on  Vattel  to  prove  England’s  right  to  this  corn  seizure, 
American  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  I.  241,  July  5,  1793. 

46  American  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  I.  176,  September  9, 
1793.  Also  The  Works  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  I.  271,  273,  289-290. 

47  American  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  I.  183,  November  8, 
1793. 

iSIbid.,  I.  176. 

49  The  Works  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  I.  259,  271-273,  326-328,  etc. 


46 


JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


was  not  easy.  To  deal  with  the  “Reds”  of  1793  was  as 
embarrassing  as  might  be.  A  statesman  engaged  in  treaty 
making  with  the  Bolsheviki  can  appreciate  the  difficulties 
involved.  Aside  from  tolerating  the  vagaries  of  a  one-time 
friend,  America  might  not  ignore  the  effect  upon  home 
politics  of  crowning  Genet  as  a  martyr.  If  for  this  reason 
only,  the  state  department  was  fortunate  to  be  under  the 
guidance  of  a  devotee  of  international  law  and  a  friend  of 
France. 

Jefferson  left  the  cabinet  on  January  1,  1794,  while  the 
final  disposition  of  Genet  was  still  pending.  But  he  had 
already  accomplished  much.  He  had  been  firm  but  not 
uncompromising  over  the  surrender  of  the  posts  and  British 
relations  on  the  border.  His  Mississippi  policy  was  shaped 
by  the  necessity  of  maintaining  peace  with  Spain  without 
casting  off  the  West  from  the  older  states.  His  friend¬ 
ship  for  France  had  withstood  the  vexations  of  an  inexper¬ 
ienced  and  irresponsible  government.  Is  it  too  much  to 
attribute  this  steadfastness  to  the  influence  of  a  general 
body  of  principles  incorporated  in  the  law  of  nations?  Cer¬ 
tainly  Jefferson  was  conscious  of  their  authority. 
r~~~An  underlying  concept  of  a  genuine  international  law, 
/  possessing  a  moral  if  not  a  physical  sanction,  thus  appears 
(as  part  of  Jefferson’s  thought.  He  was,  however,  too  good 
a  lawyer  and  too  experienced  a  statesman  to  regard  this  as  a 
completed  revelation  from  on  high,  and  he  himself  made 
valuable  contributions  to  both  theory  and  practice.^- One  of 
these  was  his  insistence  upon  the  principle  that  free  ships 
make  free  goods.  To  this,  reference  has  already  been 
made.  50^ 

second,  and  this  is  of  especial  interest  today,  was 
no  less  than  a  plea  for  a  league  of  nations.  He  urged  it 
for  the  first  time  in  1786,  while  he  was  our  minister  at 
Paris;  and,  although  the  idea  was  not  acted  upon  in  his 


50  But  see  also  The  Works  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  I.  390. 


JEFFERSON  AND  THE  LAW  OF  NATIONS  4?> 

lifetime,  he  never  wholly  abandoned  it.  The  common 
objective  of  the  league,  as  proposed  by  Jefferson,  was  joint 
action  against  the  Barbary  Pirates.51  All  the  powers  with  a 
stake  in  the  Mediterranean  commerce  were  asked  to  place 
a  quota  of  ships  under  the  direction  of  an  international 
body  sitting  at  Paris.  Cooperative  effort  under  unified  com¬ 
mand  would  make  short  shrift  of  the  pirates.  But  the  pro¬ 
ject  fell  through;  partly  because  it  was  in  advance  of  the 
time,  partly  because  the  government  of  the  Confederation 
was  not  strong  enough  to  bind  America  herself  to  a  share 
in  the  compact. 

A  vital  element  of  Jefferson’s  scheme  of  international' 
law  was  his  work  on  behalf  of  neutrals.  His  ideas  con¬ 
cerning  freedom  of  the  seas  and  contraband  succumbed 
before  a  great  European  war.  The  only  rights  of  neutrals 
were  those  maintained  by  force.  But  force  might  be  active 
or  passive.  The  former  was  war,  and  a  neutral  at  war 
ceased  to  be  neutral.  But  there  is  a  power  in  passive  resis¬ 
tance  which  many  tyrants  have  learned  to  respect.  And 
Jefferson  determined  to  turn  that  power  to  account  in  shap¬ 
ing  American  foreign  policy  in  the  difficult  years  from  1805 
to  1809.  His  solution  was  the  embargo. 

The  embargo  of  1807  was  not  a  sudden  expedient. 
Jefferson  had  worked  it  out  in  detail  more  than  thirty  years 
before.  The  resolution  of  Albemarle  County,  put  forth 
in  July,  1774,  was  the  work  of  his  pen.52  It  declared  for 

61  Ibid.,  I.  100-103.  See  also  American  State  Papers,  Foreign  Rela¬ 
tions,  I.  104-105,  report  of  Thomas  Jefferson  on  the  Mediterranean 
Trade,  January  3,  1791.  Also  ibid.,  p.  134,  March  7,  1792.  Also  The 
Works  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  IX.  265,  June  11,  1801. 

63  The  resolution  of  Albemarle  County  should  be  remembered  with 
the  Mecklenburg  Declaration  of  Independence  as  one  of  a  series  of  eco¬ 
nomic  and  political  protests  developing  all  along  the  western  frontier 
from  Pennsylvania  to  the  Carolinas.  Taken  together,  these  indicate  a 
sectional  self-consciousness  which  marked  the  west  as  united,  not  only 
as  against  the  Mother  Country  but  also  as  against  tide-water  counties  and 
the  older  East.  Shut  off  from  a  European  market,  the  West  might 
contemplate  with  more  serenity  than  commercial  centers  on  the  coast 
the  workings  of  an  embargo. 


48 


JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


a  very  real  embargo,  proposing  “an  immediate  stop  to  all 
imports  from  Great  Britain,  (cotton,  osnabrigs,  striped 
duffil,  medicines,  gun-powder,  lead,  books  and  printed  papers, 
the  necessary  tools  and  implements  for  the  handicraft  arts 
and  manufactures  excepted,  for  a  limited  term)  and  to  all 
exports  thereto,  after  the  first  day  of  October,  which  shall 
be  in  the  year  of  our  Lord,  1775;  and  immediately  to  dis¬ 
continue  all  commercial  intercourse  with  every  part  of  the 
British  Empire  which  shall  not  in  like  manner  break  off 
their  commerce  with  Great  Britain A53 

The  report  on  commerce,  prepared  while  Jefferson  was 
secretary  of  state,  is  less  definite  as  to  an  embargo  but  does 
advocate  reprisal  against  European  powers  guilty  of  dis¬ 
criminating  against  our  trade.  The  suggested  remedy  was 
a  system  of  “Counter  prohibitions,  duties,  and  regula¬ 
tions.”54 

In  1794,  after  Jefferson  had  withdrawn  from  the  cabi¬ 
net,  he  again  pronounced  in  favor  of  commercial  retaliation 
as  an  efficient  substitute  for  war.  The  misfortune  of  war 
was  that  it  injured  the  punisher  quite  as  much  as  the 
punished.  “I  love,  therefore,  mr.  Clarke’s  proposition  of 
cutting  off  all  communication  with  the  nation  which  has  con¬ 
ducted  itself  so  atrociously.”55  The  objection  that  this 
might  bring  on  war  anyway,  he  countered  by  saying  that,  if 
it  came,  we  should  meet  it;  if  it  did  not  come,  the  experi¬ 
ment  would  have  paid.  A  certain  reasonableness  would  at 
least  mark  its  attempt,  inasmuch  as  the  best  hope  of  obtain¬ 
ing  justice  from  the  British  government  lay  in  bringing 
pressure  upon  it  from  the  British  people,  and  “this  can 
never  be  excited  but  by  distressing  their  commerce.”56 

“  The  Works  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  II.  43-44. 

“ The  Writings  of  George  Washington  (Ford  ed.),  XII.  414,  note. 

65  The  Works  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  VIII.  147-148,  Jefferson  to  Tenche 
Coxe,  May  1,  1794. 

50  Ibid.,  VIII.  150,  Jefferson  to  George  Washington,  May  14,  1794. 


JEFFERSON  AND  THE  LAW  OF  NATIONS  A9> 

As  vice-president,  Jefferson  was  more  the  critic  than 
the  statesman.  He  clung  to  the  view  that  war  was  uselessl 
particularly  that  which  so  nearly  came  in  1798,  and  although 
his  references  to  commerce  are  not  especially  numerous,  ha 
restated  his  belief  in  commerce  as  the  most  efficient  instru-J 
ment  for  compelling  justice.  r*r  this,  his  attitude  was 
that  of  “I  told  you  so.”  Thus  he  declares : 

If  the  commercial  regulations  had  been  adopted  which  our  legis¬ 
lature  were  at  one  time  proposing,  we  should  at  this  moment  have 
been  standing  on  such  an  eminence  of  safety  &  respect  as  ages  can 
never  recover.  But  having  wandered  from  that,  our  object  should 
now  be  to  get  back,  with  as  little  loss  as  possible,  &  when  peace  shall 
be  restored  to  the  world,  endeavor  so  to  form  our  commercial  regu¬ 
lations  as  that  justice  from  other  nations  shall  be  their  mechanical 
result.57 

He  predicted  that  as  soon  as  Great  Britain  and  France 
should  have  adjusted  their  difficulties,  they  would  both  com¬ 
bine  to  exclude  America  from  the  ocean  “by  such  peaceable 
means  as  are  in  their  power.”58  And,  in  moments  of  dejec¬ 
tion,  he  seems  to  have  thought  it  useless  to  resist.  “What 
a  glorious  exchange  would  it  be  could  we  persuade  our 
navigating  fellow  citizens  to  embark  their  capital  in  the 
internal  commerce  of  our  country,  exclude  foreigners  from 
that  &  let  them  take  the  carrying  trade  in  exchange :  abolish 
the  diplomatic  establishments  &  never  suffer  an  armed  ves¬ 
sel  of  any  nation  to  enter  our  ports.”59  But  this  need  not 
be  taken  seriously.  It  is  a  leap  into  the  Utopia,  which 
Jefferson  in  his  calmer  moods  seeks  to  attain  by  more  prac¬ 
ticable  means. 

As  President,  in  his  first  months  of  office,  Jefferson  de¬ 
fined  the  policy  which  he  adhered  to  for  eight  years.-  He 
insisted  that  freedom  of  the  seas  must  be  restored,  but 

67  Ibid.,  VIII.  293,  Jefferson  to  Thomas  Pinckney,  May  29.  1797. 

68  Ibid.,  VIII.  374,  Jefferson  to  James  Madison,  February  22,  1798. 

68 Ibid .,  IX.  65-66,  Jefferson  to  Edmund  Pendleton,  April  22,  1799. 
For  similar  pessimism,  see  ibid.,  VIII.  286-287,  May  13,  1797 ;  also  ibid., 
IX.  95,  January  18,  1800. 


50  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 

l  opposed  taking  up  arms  for  the  purpose.60  He  reiterated 
his  definition  of  contraband,  as  everything  or  nothing,  and 
extended  it  to  commerce.  Either  all  commerce  with  belli¬ 
gerents  was  lawful,  or  none  was.61  Again,  neutrals  must  be 
^  maintained  in  their  rights ;  yet  we  were  in  no  condition 
for  a  war  on  their  behalf,62  and  “those  peaceable  coercions 
which  are  in  the  power  of  every  nation  if  undertaken  in  con¬ 
cert  &  in  time  of  peace,  are  more  likely  to  produce  the 
('  desired  effect.”63  Already,  in  these  early  utterances,  one 
might  perceive  a  reminiscence  of  the  league  of  nations  idea 
of  1786,  a  recognition  that  international  law  actually  counted 
little  in  times  of  stress,  and  a  forecast  of  that  embargo  which 
was  eventually  to  be  put  into  operation. 

On  the  general  subject  of  commerce,  he  continued  to 
uphold  the  principle  that  free  ships  make  free  goods,64 
though  he  recognized  that  the  principle  would  never  count 
for  much  until  Great  Britain  yielded  her  assent.  And  this 
she  would  never  volunteer,  nor  could  she  be  forced  to  it.65 

Notwithstanding  the  incorrigibility  of  England  in  her 
abuse  of  sea  power,  Jefferson  was  too  far-seeing  to  wish 
her  destruction.  Great  Britain  had  herself  to  thank  for 
the  world’s  indifference  to  her  fate.66  But  it  would  be  a 
mistake  to  wish  either  Britain  or  France  eliminated  from 
the  balance  of  power.67  Now  and  then  one  might  even 
find  points  to  emulate  in  British  practice,  as,  for  example, 

M  The  Works  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  IX.  219,  Jefferson  to  Dr.  George 
Logan,  March  21,  1801. 

61  Ibid.,  IX.  299,  Jefferson  to  Robert  R.  Livingston,  September  9,  1801. 

“Ibid.,  IX.  300-301. 

63  Ibid.,  IX.  300. 

64  See  John  Taylor,  Curtius,  A  Defence  of  the  Measures  of  the  Ad¬ 
ministration  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  1804,  pp.  111-118. 

“  The  Works  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  X.  27,  Jefferson  to  James  Madi¬ 
son,  Secretary  of  State,  July  31,  1803. 

66  Ibid.,  X.  67,  Jefferson  to  James  Monroe,  January  8,  1804,  and  p.  77, 
Jefferson  to  James  Madison,  April  23,  1804. 

“Ibid.,  X.  67.  He  preferred  England  to  France,  though,  after  all: 
ibid.,  p.  263-264,  May  4,  1806. 


JEFFERSON  AND  THE  LAW  OF  NATIONS  /IT 

that  of  conveying  prizes  to  the  nearest  neutral  port,  a  pro¬ 
cedure  “so  much  for  the  interest  of  all  weak  nations  that 
we  ought  to  strengthen  it  by  our  example.”68 

Other  interpolations  in  the  law  of  nations  were  less  to 
be  desired,  and  Jefferson  in  his  fifth  annual  message  con¬ 
demned  them  as  “founded  neither  in  justice,  nor  the  usage 
or  acknowledgment  of  nations.”69  He  never  lost  sight  of 
America’s  interest  in  the  law  of  nations  and  remained  con¬ 
vinced  that  commerce  was  our  best  weapon  for  its  defense,  a 
weapon  whose  virtues  should  not  be  forfeited  by  acts  of 
belligerency,  whose  chief  usefulness  was,  in  fact,  “to  encour¬ 
age  others  to  declare  &  guarantee  neutral  rights,  by  exclud¬ 
ing  all  intercourse  with  any  nation  which  infringes  them.”70 

Jefferson  thought  he  beheld  a  kindred  spirit  in  the  Em¬ 
peror  Alexander,  and  a  letter  on  the  subject  of  neutral  rights 
addressed  in  1806  by  the  chief  of  democrats  to  the  Tsar 
of  all  the  Russias  is  of  great  interest.  Jefferson  entreated 
Alexander  to  throw  all  the  weight  of  his  influence  in  favor 
of  “a  correct  definition  of  the  rights  of  neutrals  on  the 
high  seas,”  and  suggested  that  excluding  offenders  against 
neutral  rights  from  all  commerce  with  other  nations  would 
provide  an  appropriate  sanction,  efficient,  and  at  the  same 
time  preferable  to  war.71 

The  possibility  of  peace  which  had  prompted  this  letter 
to  Alexander  did  not  materialize.  Instead,  the  war  entered 
upon  a  deadlier  phase,  and  the  British  blockade  of  Napoleon 
intensified  the  demand  for  ships  and  stimulated  the  impress¬ 
ment  of  American  sailors  to  man  them.  Impressment,  as  a 
crying  abuse,  complicated  the  already  ^numerous  infractions 
of  international  law  which  America  must  endure  or  pre- 

68  The  Works  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  X.  118,  Jefferson  to  Jaryes^Madi- 
son,  November  18,  1804. 

66  Ibid.,  X.  188,  December  3,  1805. 

70  Ibid.,  X.  247-248,  Jefferson  to  Thomas  Paine,  March  25,  1806. 

71 Ibid .,  X.  250,  Jefferson  to  Alexander  First,  April  19,  1806. 


*  52  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 

..vent72  Negotiations  with  Great  Britain  had  been  proceed¬ 
ing  for  some  time  with  slight  result,  and,  in  March,  1807, 
Jefferson  warned  Monroe,  who  was  in  London  with  Pink¬ 
ney,  that  no  treaty  with  Great  Britain  which  failed  to  take 
cognizance  of  the  impressment  question  could  possibly  be 
ratified.73  On  the  other  hand,  he  had  slight  faith  that  an 
agreement  would  be  reached.  In  the  event  of  failure,  there 
was  the  old  weapon  of  embargo,  forged  in  1774  and  never 
fully  tested.74 

The  embargo,  nevertheless,  almost  missed  being  tested  at 
all,  for  the  affair  of  the  Chesapeake  in  the  summer  of  1807 
nearly  precipitated  the  war  which  the  embargo  was  planned 
('wto..avoid.75  Sentiment  in  America  ran  very  high  over  the 
insult  of  halting  and  searching  our  warship,  and  Jefferson 
himself  shared  the  enthusiasm  of  the  hour.76  Cooler  coun¬ 
sels  prevailed,  however,77  and  the  worst  violation  of  inter¬ 
national  law  to  which  America  had  submitted  since  the  rati¬ 
fication  of  the  Constitution  passed  off  with  a  tardy  apology 
from  Great  Britain.  During  the  excitement,  our  shipping 
had  been  recalled,78  and  this  circumstance  rendered  the 
embargo  easier  of  enforcement  when  it  was  finally  decided 
upon  in  December,  1807. 

To  generalize  concerning  Jefferson  and  international 
law :  his  position  is  excellent.  Acquainted  with  the  leading 
thought  and  thinkers  of  the  eighteenth  century,  he  based  his 
|  early  concept  of  international  law  on  the  theory  of  com¬ 
pact  and  the  recognition  of  a  state  of  nature  wherein  man 

72  The  Works  of  Thomas  Jefferson ,  I.  406-407,  February  2,  1807.  For 
an  earlier  statement  on  impressments,  see  American  State  Papers,  For¬ 
eign  Relations,  I.  131,  February  7,  1792. 

72  The  Works  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  X.  375,  Jefferson  to  James  Mon¬ 
roe,  March  21,  1807. 

74/#i(f.,  X.  381,  Jefferson  to  James  Bowdoin,  April  2,  1807. 

"  Ibid:,  I.  410-419. 

"  Ibid .,  X.  466,  471. 

77  Ibid.,  I.  427 ;  ibid.,  X.  433,  456,  458. 

78  Ibid.,  I.  421-422,  advantages  of  keeping  shipping  near  home. 


JEFFERSON  AND  THE  LAW  OF  NATIONS  % 

was  primarily  in  a  condition  of  peace.  These  pacific  theories 
remained  with  him  in  active  politics,  and  he  early  (1774) 
declared  for  an  emhargo,  a  principle  to  which  he  adhered  as 
a  substitute  for  war  until  opportunity  arose  to  put  it  to  the 
test. 

In  his  busy  years  in  the  state  department,  he  witnessed 
the  initial  stages  of  a  world  conflict  which  spelled  the  nega¬ 
tion  and  downfall  of  the  international  law  of  the  eighteenth 
century.  He  himself  appealed  to  the  authorities  in  this 
older  law  and  found  in  them  a  support  for  the  neutrality 
which  Washington  pursued  in  1793  and  later.  But  this 
contribution  of  Grotius,  Wolff,  Vattel,  and  others  to  the 
actual  politics  of  a  rising  nation  was  in  a  sense  the  “twilight” 
of  the  classical  school  of  international  law. 

Its  appeal  henceforth  was  chiefly  academic,  and  men 
turned  from  the  ruins  of  the  old  to  reconstitute  a  new  law 
of  nations.  In  the  latter  undertaking,  Jefferson  was  no 
mean  figure.  Amid  the  wealth  of  his  ideas  on  a  multiplicity 
of  topics  one  may  glean  a  general  system  of  international 
law,  in  which  the  rights  of  neutrals,  their  freedom  of  com¬ 
merce,  the  principle  that  free  ships  make  free  goods,  and 
the  denial  of  any  contraband,  constitute  the  body;  while  the 
spirit  gleams  forth  in  aspirations  for  a  league  of  nations,  in 
reluctance  to  see  even  enemies  perish,  and  in  hopes  for  a 
future  of  cooperative  effort. 

Finally,  the  same  fundamental  pacifism  which  led  him  ~ 
to  welcome  a  frontier  unguarded  by  troops,  impelled  him  to 
clutch  at  any  device  offering  the  least  promise  as  a  substi-^y 
tute  for  war.  Here  the  embargo  stands  out  as  Jefferson’s 
grand  experiment  in  pacifism.  That  it  failed,  for  reasons 
which  concern  its  operation  rather  than  its  philosophy,  was 
a  tragedy.  Jefferson  and  his  embargo  did  not  complete 
a  working  scheme  of  international  law.  On  the  other  hand, 
neither  can  be  ignored  in  any  study  which  attempts  to  show 


54  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 

the  struggle  which  man  has  made  to  lift  himself  above  the 
brute. 

Up  to  this  point,  our  study  has  been  the  background 
of  thought  and  experience  which  led  Jefferson  to  the  embar¬ 
go  as  a  practical  solution  for  the  crisis  of  1807.  In  some 
measure,  the  preceding  pages  have  analyzed  Jefferson  as  a 
thinker.  But  thought  bore  fruit  in  action.  It  is  with 
Jefferson  as  a  doer  and  administrator  that  we  are  next  con¬ 
cerned.  How  did  he  reach  the  final  decision?  What  annoy¬ 
ances  and  compensations  vexed  or  soothed  the  most  difficult 
years  of  his  life?  And  what  judgment  should  posterity 
render  upon  his  “Grand  Design’’  and  its  administration? 
Questions  of  this  sort  can  be  answered  only  by  a  study  of 
the  embargo  and  Jefferson  in  action. 


CHAPTER  III 
THE  ADOPTION  OF  THE  EMBARGO  TO  APRIL  30,  1808 


Hr* 

-r~ 

s  S'S 


The  affair  of  the  Chesapeake  and  the  consequent  near 
approach  to  war  demonstrated  to  the  most  confirmed  of 
optimists  the  need  of  more  aggressive  action.  An  embargo] 
early  suggested  itself  as  the  most  available  weapon  short  ofj 
actual  war.  The  possibilities  which  it  involved  were  matter 
of  earnest  discussion  throughout  the  summer  and  autumn  of 
1807,  and  the  final  decision  was  not  reached  until  conflicting 
viewpoints  had  been  weighed.  One  of  the  most  roseate 
views  was  advanced  by  J.  Barnes,  an  American  stationed  at 
Leghorn,  Italy,  who  predicted,  in  the  event  of  an  embargo, 
the  speedy  collapse  of  the  British  Empire.  His  letter  to 
Jefferson  is  of  especial  significance  as  one  of  the  factors 
contributing  to  the  latter’s  confidence  in  the  aggressive  rather 
than  the  merely  defensive  possibilities  of  an  embargo : 


In  fine,  we  have  only  to  Shut  our  ports  &  remain  firm — the 
People  of  England  would  do  the  rest — for  British  manufacturers 
being  precluded  from  the  Continent  of  Europe  almost  entirely,  their 
chief  resource  is  the  U.  S.  consequently  about  150,000  Manufac¬ 
turers  being  thrown  out  of  Bread  would  rise  in  Mass  and  compel 
the  Minister  to  open  our  Ports  at  any  price,  or  they  would  Massacre 
him — The  disposition  of  the  People  of  England  I  well  know ;  having 
been  about  four  years  in  that  Island.1 


A  sentiment  equally  favorable  to  an  embargo  was  ex¬ 
pressed  to  Jefferson  by  his  boyhood  friend,  John  Page,  who 
wrote  from  Richmond  on  July  12,  1807,  that  he  had  heard 
repeated  arguments : 

that  an  immediate  embargo  is  necessary,  because  before  the  usual 
meeting  of  Congress  all  the  british  Ships  &c  will  have  left  us,  &  even 
our  own  Vessels,  &  Sailors,  who  will  be  impressed  or  detained  in 


1  Jefferson  Papers,  Library  of  Congress. 

t  55  ]  ' 


56  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO . 

British  Ports  throughout  their  Empire:  &  that  their  Ships  of  War 
&  Privateers  without  further  notice  will  sweep  our  vessels  which 
may  be  at  Sea,  from  the  Surface  of  the  Seas;  that  an  immediate 
stop  to  all  intercourse  with  Britain  is  indispensibly  necessary,  to 
retrieve  our  lost  honor,  &  to  bring  the  mad  King  to  his  senses ;  & 
that  that  measure  alone  would  be  of  more  consequence  than  any 
naval  and  military  preparations  we  can  ever  make.  ...  I  con¬ 
fess  that  when  I  recollect  the  hatred  which  G.3d  bears  to  you,  &  our 
Country  &  his  low  Cunning,  abominable  perfidy,  &  execrable  practice 
of  issuing  secret  Instructions,  through  Channels  of  Communication 
unknown  to  his  ostensible  Ministers,  by  which  means  he  began  &  by 
which  alone  he  did  begin  &  carry  on  his  former  War  with  the  U.S., 
I  am  nearly  of  the  same  opinion,  &  fear  that  you  will  lose  by  delay 
as  it  is  evidently  certain  that  he  is  bent  on  a  war  with  the  US.,  rely¬ 
ing  on  the  support  of  the  federal  partizans,  avowed  Tories,  his  own 
Subjects  here,  &  Burr’s  Choice  Spirits,  &  I  suppose  Insurrections 
of  Slaves  in  the  Southern  States ;  and  foolishly  believing,  that  he 
had  conquered  Napoleon,  &  had  added  Turkey  &  Austria  to  his 
Confederacy,  he  had  no  doubt  when  he  issued  his  secret  orders 
which  bound  Berkley  &c,  that  you  would  crouch  under  his  Insult ; 
or  the  U.S.  would  fall  an  easy  Prey  into  his  Hands.2 

The  great  American  manufacturer  of  woollens,  David 
Humphreys,  confirmed  from  a  different  angle  the  opinions 
of  Barnes  and  Page.  On  a  trip  which  he  made  to  England, 
he  found  that  a  large  section  of  the  British  public  favored 
an  immediate  war  with  America,  but  he  perceived  that  this 
was  contrary  to  the  interest  of  the  manufacturers  and  the 
merchants  trading  with  the  United  States,  and  he  counted 
upon  their  ability  to  influence  the  policy  of  the  government.3 
In  a  report  to  Jefferson,  written  soon  after  his  return  to 
America,  Humphreys  says : 

How  long  a  period  will  elapse  before  their  voice  can  be  heard, 
it  is  difficult  to  determine.  The  Ministry  seemed  solicitous  to  collect 

2  Jefferson  Papers. 

*  This  was  alluded  to  by  William  Pinkney,  our  minister  at  London, 
who  wrote  to  Madison  that  “An  attempt  will,  I  think,  be  made  by  some 
of  the  merchants  trading  to  the  United  States  to  prevail  upon  their 
whole  body  in  the  different  parts  of  the  kingdom  to  urge  the  Govern¬ 
ment,  if  not  to  an  abandonment,  at  least  to  a  considerable  modification 
of  the  orders,  so  as,  perhaps  to  leave  the  trade  of  our  country  in  its 
native  productions  free.  I  do  not  believe  that  the  attempt  will  succeed. 
The  orders  in  their  present  shape,  are  more  popular  than  could  have 
been  expected.  American  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  III.  206. 
See  also  ibid.,  III.  203. 


THE  ADOPTION  OF  THE  EMBARGO  57 


the  sense  of  the  Country,  which  is  certainly  no  easy  task. — In  the 
meantime,  Mr  Monroe  &  Mr  Pinckney  entertained  better  hopes  of 
success,  at  the  eve  of  my  departure,  than  they  had  done  some  time 
before. — I  perceive  little  chance  of  enjoying  permanent  safety,  but 
by  our  becoming  in  a  great  degree  an  armed  &  united  People,  in 
effect,  as  well  as  in  name.4 

Nevertheless,  Jefferson  hesitated  to  impose  an  embargo 
until  a  fair  proportion  of  our  shipping  should  have  had  time 
to  be  recalled.  On  July  30,  1807,  he  intimated  to  General 
Smith,  a  politician  of  Baltimore,  that  “ — Congress  could 
not  declare  war  without  a  demand  of  satisfaction,  nor  should 
they  lay  an  embargo  while  we  have  so  much  under  the 
grasp  of  our  adversary.”5  In  October  he  gauged  the  temper 
of  Congress  to  be  “extremely  disposed  for  peace,”6  so  much 
so,  in  fact,  that  there  was  danger  that  it  would  combat 
impressment  by  nothing  more  menacing  than  non-importa¬ 
tion,  a  measure  which  would,  however,  be  highly  irritating 
to  England,  who  would  choose  her  own  time  for  a  declara¬ 
tion  of  war.7  But,  by  the  close  of  November,  Jefferson 
was  confirmed  in  the  opinion  that  the  next  dispatches  from 
Monroe  would  offer  to  Congress  no  other  choice  than  “W^r 
Embargo -or-.  Nothing.”  with  prospects  favorable  to  the 
second  of  the  three.8 

Two  persons  who  might  expect  to  feel  the  weight  of 
such  a  measure  perceived  the  storm  in  advance  and  sought 
to  stave  off  its  consequences.  Both  were  friendly  to  the 
administration.  The  one  was  James  Sullivan,  the  Demo¬ 
cratic  governor  of  Massachusetts,  whose  political  ascendancy 
would  be  immediately  jeopardized  by  any  party  measure 
inimical  to  his  constituents.  The  other  was  Albert  Gallatin, 
the  secretary  of  the  treasury,  who,  more  than  any  other 
person,  would  be  charged  with  enforcing  the  embargo. 

4  Jefferson  Papers,  September  25,  1807. 

5  Ibid.,  Jefferson  to  General  Smith. 

’Ibid.,  Jefferson  to  T.  M.  Randolph,  October  26,  1807. 

T  Ibid. 

’Ibid.,  Jefferson  to  T.  M.  Randolph,  November  30,  1807. 


58 


\T- 

JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 

Early  in  December,  1807,  Sullivan  warned  Jefferson 
that,  owing  to  the  composition  of  both  state  and  federal 
courts  in  Massachusetts,  the  difficulties  of  carrying  out  any 
resolute  course  of  action  would  be  almost  insuperable.  At 
this  time  Sullivan  thought  that  war  would  be  the  course 
determined  upon,  and  he  declared : 

There  is  no  way  to  carry  on  a  war  with  that  vigour  which  is  neces¬ 
sary  to  success  without  the  decisive  aid  of  a  Judiciary:  our  Judiciary 
here,  would,  under  any  circumstances  that  can  take  place,  be  de¬ 
cidedly  against  the  Government  of  the  United  States  and  on  the  part 
of  England. — The  Judiciary  of  the  United  States  in  this  district  is 
still  more  unpropitious  to  the  Safety  of  the  country. — We  shall,  if 
a  war  takes  place,  be  instantly  plunged  in  a  civil  war  in  this  State  if 
the  Judiciary  continues  as  it  is  at  present,  and  yet  I  do  not  conceive 
of  a  remedy.9 

Nor  was  Sullivan’s  anxiety  relieved  by  the  news  that 
embargo  and  not  war  was  the  decision  of  the  government. 
He  lost  no  time  in  painting  for  the  benefit  of  Jefferson  a 
most  depressing  picture  of  conditions  in  Massachusetts 
politics : 

I  would  not  make  the  residue  of  your  administration  more  anx¬ 
ious  and  troublesome  than  is  necessary :  but  you  are  now  in  a  critical 
situation.  .  .  .  The  machinations  of  the  English  party,  for  some 

years  past  have  filled  our  State  Judiciary  with  men  who  are  deter¬ 
mined  to  unite  us  again  with  great  britain:  ostensibly  as  an  ally, 
but  in  reallity  as  a  dependent  on  her  .  .  .  our  militia  does  well 

to  be  talked  about,  but  cannot  be  depended  on.  .  .  .  Your  Judi¬ 

ciary  of  the  United  States  are  worse  than  ours  in  this  district. 
Your  attorneys,  in  some  instances  for  the  United  States,  would  be 
compleatly  on  the  side  of  great  Britain.  .  .  .  The  federalists 

here  openly  avow  that  if  a  war  takes  place  England  will  send  an 

army  to  the  Southern  States  to  cause  the  blacks  to  cut  their  masters 
throats.  They  talk  of  a  division  between  the  southern  and  northern 
States  as  a  matter  of  course,  and  are  openly  forming  a  party  to  be 
united  under  the  protection  of  a  british  standard.  You  will  not 
believe  this  until  it  shall  be  too  late.  Nothing  but  an  alteration  in 
the  judiciary  can  save  us  from  destruction  in  this  way.10 

“Jefferson  Papers.  James  Sullivan  to  Jefferson.  Boston,  December 
7,  1807. 

10  Ibid.,  James  Sullivan  to  Jefferson.  January  7,  1808. 


THE  ADOPTION  OF  THE  EMBARGO  ^59 


Gallatin  was  less  hysterical  than  Sullivan,  but  by  no 
means  friendly  to  a  measure  in  the  execution  of  which  he 
could  anticipate  but  little  thanks.  Three  weeks  before  the 
enactment  of  the  embargo,  Gallatin  hinted  to  the  President 
that  a  repeal  of  the  existing  non-importation  act  and  the  sub¬ 
stitution  for  it  of  another  non-importation  act  more  general 
in  its  scope  was  the  most  reasonable  legislation  for  the  tjiW 
being.11^ — When  the  embargo  was  finally  determined  upon, 
he  expressed  himself  first  upon  a  detail  of  treasury  admin¬ 
istration,  as  favoring  a  lenient  treatment  of  foreign  vessels 
already  on  the  point  of  clearing  from  our  ports.12  Then, 
warming  to  his  theme,  he  declared : 

In  every  point  of  view,  privation,  suffering,  revenue,  effect  on 
the  enemy,  politics  at  home  &c.,  I  prefer  war  to  a  permanent  em¬ 
bargo.  Governmental  prohibitions  do  always  more  mischief  than 
had  been  calculated,  and  it  is  not  without  much  hesitation  that  a 
statesman  should  hazard  to  regulate  the  concerns  of  individuals. 
The  measure  being  of  doubtful  policy  &  hastily  adopted  on  the  first 
view  of  our  foreign  intelligence,  I  think  that  we  had  better  recom¬ 
mend  it  with  modifications,  &  at  first  for  such  a  limited  time  as  will 
afford  us  all,  time  for  re-consideration  &,  if  we  think  proper,  for  an 
alteration  in  our  course  without  appearing  to  retract.  As  to  the 
hope  that  it  may  have  an  effect  on  the  negotiation  with  Mr.  Rose,  or 
induce  England  to  treat  us  better  I  think  it  entirely  groundless.13 


Having  reached  his  decision,  Jefferson  ignored  these 
counter  arguments,  whatever  weight  they  may  originally 
have  had,  and,  on  December  18,  1807,  he  submitted  to 
Congress  the  brief  message  which  follows : 


To  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives  of  the  United  States :  ^ 
The  communications  now  made,  showing  the  great  and  increas¬ 
ing  dangers  with  which  our  vessels,  our  seamen,  and  merchandise 
are  threatened  on  the  high  seas  and  elsewhere,  from  the  belligerent 
powers  of  Europe,  and  it  being  of  great  importance  to  keep  in 
safety  these  essential  resources,  I  deem  it  my  duty  to  recommend  the 
subject  to  the  consideration  of  Congress,  who  will  doubtless  per- 
11  Jefferson  Papers.  Albert  Gallatin  to  the  President.  December  2, 
1807. 


“  Ibid.,  Gallatin  to  Jefferson.  December  18,  1807. 
13  Ibid. 


60 


JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


ceive  all  the  advantages  which  may  be  expected  from  an  inhibition 
the  departure  of  our  vessels  from  the  ports  of  the  United  States. 


Their  wisdom  will  also  see  the  Ttegessity^of  making  every  prepa¬ 
ration- for  whatever  eventsHnay  grow  out  of  the  present  crisis.14 


Here  was  Jefferson’s  reply  to  the  orders  and  decrees  of 
both  belligerents.  It  sought  to  reconcile  neutrality  and 
pacifism  with  dignity  and  national  honor.  It  embodied  the 
ideals  of  a  statesman  who  kept  his  countrymen  from  war, 
even  in  the  face  of  a  direct  insult  like  the  affair  of  the 
Chesapeake.  It  ignored  the  more  hostile  aspect  of  British 
and  French  regulations,  which  might,  after  all,  by  a  euphem¬ 
ism,  he  called  “municipal.”15  Even  where  it  made  posi¬ 
tive  recommendation  of  an  embargo,  it  stressed  only  the 
defensive  advantages  inhering  therein.  The  message  veiled 
such  coercive  utility  as  the  embargo  possessed  under  the 
ambiguous  phrase  “all  the  advantages  which  may  be  ex¬ 
pected.”  War  as  the  ultima  ratio  it  hinted  at  only  in  the 
final  clause. 

So  great  was  the  necessity  for  action,  swift  and  secret, 
and  so  smooth  was  the  operation  of  the  Democratic-Repub¬ 
lican  machine,  that,  within  four  days  of  the  receipt  of  the 
message,  its  suggestions  had  become  law.  In  obedience  to 
the  presidential  mandate,  Congress  committed  itself  to  a 
course  of  action  the  wisdom  of  which  has  never  been  fully 
resolved  and  which  became  for  the  President  a  source  of 
greater  unhappiness  and  more  chagrin  than  any  other  event 
in  his  career,  with  the  possible  exception  of  his  flight  from 
the  British  in  the  Arnold  invasion  of  1781. 

The  act  was  no  sooner  passed  than  amendments  were 
needed.  On  the  very  day  of  its  enactment,  Gallatin  pointed 
out  to  his  chief  the  absence  of  penalties  for  its  violation,  the 


11  The  Works  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  X.  530-531. 

11  American  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  III.  205.  Pinkney  to 
Madison,  November,  23,  1807.  “The  French  decree  .  .  .  was  no 
more  than  a  legitimate,  though  possibly  an  ungracious  exercise  of  the 
rights  of  local  sovereignty.” 


*  ■ 

THE  ADOPTION  OF  THP  EMBARGO  61 


neglect  to  mention  coasting  vessels,  and  the  failure  to  prevent 
the  export  of  specie  in  payment  for  foreign  cargoes  landed 
in  the  United  States.16  On  December  24,  he  urged  the 
necessary  amendments,  meanwhile  undertaking  to  enforce 
the  original  act  with  revenue  cutters  and  gunboats.17  Galla¬ 
tin’s  troubles  began  at  once,  for  on  December  31,  before  the 
embargo  was  ten  days  old,  he  mentions  the  receipt  of  “num¬ 
erous  letters  stating  gross  evasions.”18  Nor  were  complaints 
at  all  slow  in  reaching  Jefferson  himself.  The  first  was 
anonymous  from  New  York,  informing  him  as  follows:  — 

We  are  the  shipping  interest  and  we  will  take  care  that,  shall  not 
be  destroyed  by  your  attachment  to  France,  your  implacable  enmity 
to  G.B,  and  in  short,  by  your  madness  &  folly — I  have  ever  been  a 
warm  Republican  but  when  I  see  my  country  on  the  verge  of  de¬ 
struction,  I  am  compelled  to  oppose  those,  whose  measures  I  once 
approved.19 

From  the  adoption  to  the  repeal  of  the  embargo,  Jeffer¬ 
son  was  under  attack.  He  became  of  necessity  the  chief 
apologist  of  his  own  pet  measure.  Defence  of  the  embargo 
sometimes  brought  him  into  unaccustomed  roles,  such,  for 
example,  as  that  of  a  protagonist  of  manufactures.  Already 
in  August,  1807,  he  had  written  benignly  to  say: 

No  one  wishes  success,  more  than  I  do,  to  domestic  manufacture, 
&  especially  under  present  appearances;  &  no  one  will  more  certainly 
give  them  the  most  important  of  all  encouragements,  the  preference 
of  all  others,  so  far  as  my  own  wants  go,  but  the  establishing  such 
works,  the  conducting  them,  &  the  having  concern  in  them,  are  so 
entirely  within  the  competence  of  private  and  patriotic  citizens,  & 
they  are  so  much  more  competent  &  at  leisure  for  them,  that  it 
would  be  a  double  abuse  for  me  to  become  anything  more  than  their 
customer.20 

In  January,  after  the  embargo  had  become  law,  his  interest 
was  more  keen : 


“Jefferson  Papers.  Gallatin  to  Jefferson,  December  22,  1807. 
”  Ibid.,  December  24,  1807. 

18  Ibid.,  December  31,  1807. 

19  Ibid.,  December  26,  1807. 

20  Ibid.,  Jefferson  to  John  Gardiner,  August  19,  1807. 


62 


JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 

I  am  much  pleased  to  find  our  progress  in  manufactures  to  be  so 
great.  That  of  cotton  is  peculiarly  interesting,  because  we  raise  the 
raw  material  in  such  abundance,  and  because  it  may  to  a  great 
degree  supply  our  deficiencies  both  in  wool  &  linen.21 

If  New  England  had  been  as  willing  as  Jefferson  to 
recognize  the  possibilities  for  wealth  in  manufacturing,  a 
trying  chapter  in  her  history  might  have  been  avoided.  The 
Middle  States,  which  had  less  capital  tied  up  in  shipping  and 
were  therefore  more  free  to  grasp  the  opportunity  pre¬ 
sented  by  immunity  from  the  competition  of  Europeans, 
found  the  embargo  a  stimulus  rather  than  a  hindrance.  But 
with  Jefferson  himself,  the  argument  for  manufactures  was, 
at  best,  only  an  embellishment  of  the  sounder  doctrine  that 
the  embargo  saved  our  shipping  and  averted  war.  This 
doctrine  he  preached  again  and  again  as  the  true  milk  of  the 
word.  To  select  but  one  from  among  many  examples,  a 
letter  from  Jefferson  to  Gideon  Granger,  his  Postmaster 
General,  is  in  point : 

/If  we  had  suffered  our  vessels,  cargoes  and  seamen  to  have  gone 
ouTCall  would  have  been  taken  by  England  or  it’s  enemies,  and  we 
must  have  gone  to  war  to  avenge  the  wrongly  it  was  certainly  a 
better  alternative  to  discontinue  all  intercourse  with  these  nations 
till  they  shall  return  again  to  some  sense  of  moral  right.  I  only 
lament  the  situation  of  our  seamen,  and  wish  it  could  be  relieved, 
as  to  the  sacrifices  of  the  farmers  &  citizens-merchants,  I  am  sure 
they  will  be  cheerfully  met.22 

These  sacrifices  were  met  with  a  far  from  uniform  cheer¬ 
fulness.23  But,  notwithstanding  the  numerous  protests  of 

a  Jefferson  Papers,  Jefferson  to  J.  Dorsey,  January  21,  1808. 

“  Ibid.,  Jefferson  to  Granger,  January  22,  1808.  Cf.  also  The  Works 
of  Thomas  Jefferson,  XI.  7.  Jefferson  to  Charles  Thomson,  Jan¬ 
uary  11,  1808.  “Time  prepares  us  for  defence;  time  may  produce  peace 
in  Europe  that  removes  the  ground  of  difference  with  England  until 
another  European  war,  and  that  may  find  our  revenues  liberated  by  the 
discharge  of  our  national  debt,  our  wealth  and  numbers  increased,  our 
friendship  and  our  enmity  more  important  to  every  nation.” 

“Jefferson  Papers.  Anonymous,  Boston,  February  2,  1808.  .  . 

if  you  will  go  to  war  with  Britain,  you  will  be  denounced,  as  the  greatest 
traitor  that  history  has  exhibited.  We,  who  live  in  the  Seaports  shall 
be  ruined.  Two  or  3  ships  will  destroy  our  whole  coast,  left  defenseless 
by  Mr.  Jefferson.  Awake — arouse.  French  Philosophy  will  not  do  for 
us  Republicans.  We  are  for  liberty :  but  we  will  not  be  destroyed,”  etc. 


THE  ADOPTION  OF  THE  EMBARGO  63 


interests  adversely  affected  by  the  embargo,  Jefferson  long 
held  to  a  belief  that  the  measure  was  not  unpopular.  He 
told  his  son-in-law,  Thomas  Mann  Randolph,  that  definite 
news  of  the  British  Orders  of  November  11  had  “entirely 
hushed  all  opposition  to  the  embargo.”24  The  news  was 
indeed  belated.  Congress  had  acted  upon  rumor  only.  It 
was  not  until  February  2  that  Jefferson  transmitted  an 
official  copy  of  the  Orders,  at  the  same  time  observing  that 
they  were  “further  proof  of  the  increasing  dangers  to  our 
Navigation  and  Commerce  which  led  to  the  provident  meas¬ 
ure  of  the  act  of  the  present  session  laying  an  embargo  on 
our  own  vessels.”25 

Jefferson  had  already  come  to  the  conclusion  that  war 
with  England  was  not  imminent,  but  he  was  satisfied  that 
it  was  no  time  to  discontinue  the  embargo.26  Laudatory 
resolutions  of  the  Massachusetts  legislature,27  carried 
through  by  Sullivan  and  the  Republican  machine,  gave  him 
encouragement.  And  assurances  from  a  North  Carolina 
correspondent,  Colonel  William  Tatham,28  that  the  planters 
around  Newbern  were  in  a  mood  to  tax  themselves  volun¬ 
tarily  for  the  benefit  of  injured  commercial  men,  if  only  the 
amounts  could  be  justly  ascertained,  with  a  view  of  strength¬ 
ening  the  President’s  hand  so  as  “to  overturn  all  the 
feeble  theories  of  European  policy,”  served  to  fill  his  cup 
of  happiness.  If  anything  was  still  lacking,  it  was  made 

“Jefferson  Papers.  Jefferson  to  T.  M.  Randolph,  January  26,  1808. 
Cf.  also  American  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  III.  208.  Madison 
to  Pinckney,  February  19,  1808.  “.  .  .  the  appearance  of  these  de¬ 

crees  has  had  much  effect  in  reconciling  all  descriptions  among  us  to 
the  embargo.” 

“Jefferson  Papers.  Jefferson  to  Congress,  February  2,  1808.  Cf.  also 
The  Works  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  XI.  9. 

“Jefferson  Papers.  Jefferson  to  T.  M.  Randolph,  February  6  and 
February  22,  1808.  The  British  Consul  at  New  York  reported  to  his 
government  that  war  was  unlikely,  also  that  America  was  wearying  of 
the  embargo.  See  his  letter  of  April  4,  1808,  in  George  Lockhart  Rives 
(ed.),  Selections  from  the  Correspondence  of  Thomas  Barclay,  p.  275. 
See  also  Jefferson  to  Governor  Pinckney,  March  30,  1808. 

27  Jefferson  Papers.  Boston,  February  8,  1808. 

28  Ibid.,  Newbern,  February  10,  1808. 


64 


JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


up  by  the  instructions  of  the  Massachusetts  legislature  to 
its  representative  in  the  United  States  Congress  to  work 
for  a  constitutional  amendment  which  would  place  the 
removal  of  federal  judges  under  the  control  of  the  Presi¬ 
dent,  subject  to  the  approval  of  a  majority  of  the  House 
and  two  thirds  of  the  Senate.  Here  was  a  step  toward  weak¬ 
ening  the  bench,  one  of  Jefferson’s  pet  aversions,  and  at  the 
same  time  an  evidence  that  Massachusetts  was  setting  her 
house  in  order  against  the  judiciary,  the  menace  from  which 
had  been  alluded  to  in  Sullivan’s  earlier  letters  to  Jefferson.29 

These  cheerful  considerations  were,  to  be  sure,  at  least 
partially  offset  by  a  contraband  trade  with  Canada,  which 
Gallatin  was  urged  to  prevent  ;30  by  the  need  for  gun-boats 
to  enforce  the  government’s  regulations,31  and,  if  Jeffer¬ 
son  chose  to  take  them  seriously,  by  personal  appeals  for 
help  from  individual  citizens  in  distress.  One  such,  who 
implored  assistance  for  his  wife  and  seven  children,  declared 
that  he  was  a  veteran  of  the  Revolution  and  “ready  to  Lift 
my  musquit  again  should  there  be  any  invation.”32 

But,  if  all  was  not  smooth  in  America,  England,  too, 
had  her  difficulties.33  Of  these  latter,  Jefferson  had  confir- 
mation  through  James  Bowdoinj  who  was  in  London,  on  his 

29  Jefferson  Papers.  “Commonwealth  of  Massachusetts”  in  Senate, 
February  11,  1808. 

30  Ibid.,  Jefferson  to  Gallatin,  February  14,  1808. 

31  Ibid.,  Jefferson  to  Smith,  February  14,  1808.  See  also  The  Works 
of  Thomas  Jefferson,  I.  421.  A  cabinet  meeting  on  April  5,  1808, 
agreed  that  twenty  gunboats  with  twenty  men  apiece  would  be  needed 
at  New  Orleans,  and  “about  half  a  dozen  [to]  be  kept  in  different  places 
for  enforcing  the  embargo  with  8  or  10  men  each.”  .  .  .  “Let  the 
frigates  &  sloop  remain  where  they  are  with  about  20  or  30  men  each 
to  keep  them  clean.  Which  will  reduce  the  number  of  seamen  to  less 
than  900.”  This  in  a  time  of  crisis. 

33  Jefferson  Papers.  James  Lewis,  a  citizen  of  New  York,  to  Jeffer¬ 
son,  February  16,  1808. 

33  William  Pinkney,  Life  of  William  Pinkney,  p.  192.  “I  am  greatly 
deceived  if  it  will  not  in  a  few  weeks  be  matter  of  surprise  among  all 
descriptions  of  people  here,  that  a  manufacturing  and  commercial  nation 
like  Great  Britain,  could  have  expected  anything  but  disaster  and  ruin 
from  such  a  venture.”  Pinkney  to  Madison,  January  7,  1808. 


THE  ADOPTION  OF  THE  EMBARGO  65 


way  home  from  Spain.  Bowdoin  wrote  that  so  learned  an 
Englishman  as  Mr.  Williams,  the  friend  of  Franklin,  warned 
America  against  any  compromise.  If  America  would  but  be 
firm,  she  might  place  her  commercial  relations 

upon  the  broad  basis  of  Reciprocity  to  extend  to  every  part  of  the 
british  dominions.  The  advocates  of  british  restrictions,  prohibi¬ 
tions,  &  navigation  acts  stand  appalled  at  the  perplexed  &  dangerous 
situation  in  which  this  country,  her  colonies  &  commerce  are  in¬ 
volved  :  and  with  a  governmt.  so  fixed  in  its  habits  as  this  is,  &  so 
difficult  of  change  on  all  questions  of  reform,  it  is  necessary  to  seize 
the  occasion  &  to  press  home  upon  it,  those  points  in  favour  of  our 
commerce  which  justice  and  reciprocity  demand.34 

Bowdoin’s  letter  enclosed  the  pamphlet  of  Alexander  Baring 
denouncing  the  Orders  in  Council,  certain  to  be  cheerful 
reading  for  the  American  President. 

At  about  this  time,  in  a  communication  to  the  Tammany 
Society  of  New  York,  which,  like  the  good  Republican  Club 
that  it  was,  had  declared  its  approbation  of  the  party  plat¬ 
form,  Jefferson  set  forth  the  underlying  philosophy  of  the 
embargo  with  a  dignity  which  he  never  surpassed : 

.  .  .  but  the  ocean,  which,  like  the  air,  is  the  common  birth¬ 

right  of  mankind,  is  arbitrarily  wrested  from  us,  and  maxims  conse¬ 
crated  by  time,  by  usage,  &  by  an  universal  sense  of  right,  are 
trampled  on  by  superior  force :  to  give  time  for  this  demoralizing 
tempest  to  pass  over,  one  measure  only  remained  which  might  cover 
our  beloved  country  from  it’s  overwhelming  fury;  an  appeal  to  the 
deliberate  understanding  of  our  fellow  citizens  in  a  cessation  of  all 
intercourse  with  the  belligerent  nations,  until  it  can  be  resumed 
under  the  protection  of  a  returning  sense  of  the  moral  obligations 
which  constitute  a  law  for  nations  as  well  as  individuals.  There  can 
be  no  question  in  a  mind  truly  American,  whether  it  is  best  to  send 
our  citizens  &  property  into  certain  captivity,  and  then  wage  war 
for  their  recovery,  or  to  keep  them  at  home,  and  to  turn  seriously  to 
that  policy  which  plant  the  manufacturer  &  the  husbandman  side  by 
side,  and  so  establish  at  the  door  of  every  one  that  exchange  of 
mutual  labors  &  comforts  which  we  have  hitherto  sought  in  distant 
regions,  and  under  perpetual  risk  of  broils  with  them.35 

“Jefferson  Papers.  Bowdoin  to  Jefferson.  London,  February  17, 
1808. 

.  35  Ibid.,  February  29,  1808. 


66 


JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


In  one  so  sensitive  to  public  opinion  as  Jefferson,  March, 
1808,  must  have  been  a  season  of  conflicting  emotions.  From 
Philadelphia36  and  from  North37  and  South  Carolina38 
came  the  most  enthusiastic  encomiums ;  from  Massachusetts 
came  diatribes.  For  just  as  Jefferson  was  thanking  Sullivan 
for  the  official  approval  of  the  state  legislature,  the  Boston 
merchants  put  forth  an  independent  protest,  all  their  own, 
praying  for  light  on  the  causes  of  the  embargo  and  on  its 
probable  duration,  asking  help  for  their  impoverished  neigh¬ 
bors  from  a  treasury  so  often  boasted  of  as  “overflowing,” 
and  closing  with  a  gentle  warning  that  unless  this  was 
'‘speedily  done  perhaps  the  United  States  will  lose  New 
England  she  not  having  the  wish  to  bear  insults  &  to  let 
them  go  unrevenged,  this  notwithstanding  the  approbation 
of  the  Legislature  is  the  sentiment  of  the  Inhabitants  of 
Boston.”39 

a"*  On  March  7,  Jefferson  wrote  to  a  private  correspon¬ 
dent  that  the  embargo  was  undoubtedly  injurous  to  per- 
/  sonal  interests,  but  that  for  a  limited  time  it  was  pre- 
I  ferable  to  war.  Just  when  that  time  would  expire,  he 
thought  might  well  be  determined  at  the  next  session  of 
Congress.40  Meanwhile,  the  embargo  itself  deserved  a  fair 
trial,  and  Jefferson  felt  alarmed  for  his  pet  measure  because 
of  a  joker  in  the  amending  bill  of  March  14.41  This  provi¬ 
sion  would  enable  merchants  who  could  prove  their  claim  to 
property  abroad  to  send  a  ship  for  it.  Many  merchants 

"Jefferson  Papers.  “Delegates  of  the  Democratic  Republicans  of 
the  City  of  Philadelphia  to  Thomas  Jefferson,”  March  1,  1808. 

"  Ibid.,  Printed  Resolutions. 

88  Ibid.,  Resolutions  of  the  South  Carolina  Legislature,  forwarded  by 
Governor  Charles  Pinckney,  March  8,  1808. 

"Jefferson  Papers.  “Petition  of  Boston  Merchants  and  others, 
March  4,  1808.” 

40  Ibid.,  Jefferson  to  Major  Joseph  Eggleston,  March  7,  1808.  Also 
Ibid.,  Jefferson  to  Levi  Lincoln,  March  23,  1808.  Also  The  Works  of 
Thomas  Jefferson,  XI.  13-17,  March  11,  1808. 

“Jefferson  Papers.  Jefferson  to  Governor  Cabell,  March  13,  1808. 


THE  ADOPTION  OF  THE  EMBARGO  f6 7 

applied  for  the  privilege,  and  the  whole  purpose  of  the 
embargo  legislation  was  in  a  fair  way  to  be  frustrated. 

The  merchants  in  question  were  merely  seeking  legal 
warrant  for  violations  which  others  carried  out  in  defiance 
of  law.  Thus  protests  of  affection42  for  the  embargo  did 
not  prevent  North  Carolinians  from  violating  it.43  An  orgy 
of  smuggling  on  Lake  Champlain  challenged  the  utmost 'f 
efforts  of  the  executive.44  The  coastwise  trade  in  flour  sud¬ 
denly  assumed  unprecedented  proportions,45  mute  testimony 
to  illicit  practices.  Other  problems  confronting  the  execu¬ 
tive  were  the  proper  regulation  of  the  Indian  trade,  the 
continued  fostering  of  manufactures,  the  maintenance  of 
Republican  majorities  in  disaffected  states,  and  the  inter¬ 
pretation  of  developments  in  Great  Britain  with  a  view  to 
the  wisest  shaping  of  foreign  policy.  Concerning  the  first 
of  these,  Jefferson  told  Gallatin  that  simple  justice  required 
a  free  passage  of  supplies  to  the  Indians,  that  the  treaty  with 
them  guaranteed  such  a  traffic,  and  that  the  treaty  was 
more  fundamental  law  than  the  embargo.  If,  however, 
doubt  existed  on  this  score,  an  amendment  should  be  sought 
from  Congress.46  With  reference  to  the  second,  North 
Carolina  reports,  which  for  that  matter  were  usually  en¬ 
couraging,  informed  Jefferson  that  preparations  were  mak¬ 
ing  for  local  manufactures  sufficient  to  clothe  the  popula¬ 
tion  “without  being  put  to  any  non  plus  for  supplies  from 
any  nation  on  earth.”47 

More  perplexing  than  proper  relations  with  Indians  and 
manufacturers,  was  what  to  do  for  Republican  majorities 

“Ibid.,  "Resolutions  of  the  Grand  Jury  of  the  Superior  Court  of  Law 
&  Equity  of  the  County  of  Brunswick  held  on  the  12th  day  of  April 
1808.” 

43  Ibid.,  Gallatin  to  Jefferson,  March  12,  1808. 

“  Ibid.,  Proclamation  by  Jefferson,  April  19,  1808. 

“Ibid.,  C.  Rodney  to  Jefferson,  April  22,  1808. 

“Ibid.,  Jefferson  to  Gallatin,  March  26,  1808. 

*'  Ibid.,  James  Lyne  to  Jefferson,  March  30,  1808. 


68 


JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


in  districts  where  embargo  losses  were  upsetting  the  party 
morale.  Massachusetts  presented  an  extreme  example  of 
restlessness.  Yet  local  authorities,  high  in  the  councils  of 
the  party,  themselves  disagreed  as  to  the  condition  of  the 
patient.  The  protest  of  the  “Inhabitants  of  Boston”  has 
been  already  noted.  But  Levi  Lincoln,  the  lieutenant  gover¬ 
nor  of  the  state,  maintained  that  such  clamors  were  not  to 
be  taken  seriously : 

It  is  the  comparative  few  which  make  all  the  noise ;  the  desperate 
in  politics,  the  desperate  in  property,  who  wish  by  the  risk  of  other 
people’s  capitals  to  take  a  possible  chance  of  getting  one  of  their 
own,  &  the  unprincipled.  The  great  body  of  the  people,  all  the 
republicans,  &  many  of  the  federalists  beleive  (sic)  in  the  necessity 
&  utility  of  the  measure.  The  choice  between  it  &  National  dis¬ 
honor  is  unhesitatingly  made  by  the  citizens  of  the  State.  Their 
confidence  is  unabated  in  the  wisdom,  integrity,  &  patriotism  of 
their  Govt.  &  they  will  support  its  measures,  the  vile  attempts  to 
prevent  it  notwithstanding.48 

Over  against  this  cheerful  comment  of  Lincoln’s,  as  if  on 
the  parallel  columns  of  bull  and  bear  advice  in  a  broker’s 
office,  Jefferson  might  set  the  lugubrious  views  of  James 
Sullivan,  the  governor  of  Massachusetts,  and  make  his 
choice  between  them.  Sullivan  took  the  extremists  at  their 
word.  On  April  2,  on  the  eve  of  the  state  elections,  he 
wrote  to  Jefferson  that  an  alliance  with  England  was  the 
avowed  object  of  Federalist  machinations: 

The  attempt  is  to  revolutionize  this  state  in  order  to  affect  the 
election  of  a  president  of  the  united  States,  then  to  divide  the  nation 
and  establish  in  this  part  of  this  hemisphere  a  different  form  of  gov¬ 
ernment,  under  the  protection  of  Great  britain.  .  .  .  They  are 

now  urging  the  Yazoo  claim  in  favour  of  Clinton  as  the  next  presi¬ 
dent  ;  but  without  any  design  to  have  him  elected.49 

Three  days  later,  apparently  from  a  fear  that  Jefferson 
would  take  the  Republican  victory  at  the  polls  as  proof  that 
he  had  been  a  mere  alarmist,  Sullivan  repeated  his  warn- 

48  Jefferson  Papers.  Levi  Lincoln  to  Jefferson,  April  1,  1808. 

“Ibid.,  James  Sullivan  to  Jefferson,  April  2,  1808. 


THE  ADOPTION  OF  THE  EMBARGO  69 


ings,  only  with  greater  detail.  Dissolution  of  the  Union  by 
a  separation  of  North  from  South  and  a  new  confederation 
under  British  patronage  was  the  goal  of  the  Tories: 

and  however  you  may  treat  the  idea  with  neglect,  it  is  on  the  request 
of  this  party  in  New  England,  that  seven  ships  of  the  line,  and  ten 
thousand  troops  are  on  their  way  to  Halifax.  I  know  not  what 
Lyman  your  consul  is  about  in  England ;  Williams,  his  predecessor 
the  Nephew  of  Pickering  is  very  vigilant  there.  His  letters  give 
assurance  to  the  merchants  in  England,  that  the  New  England  people 
will  compel  a  repeal  of  the  Embargo  Act.  His  letters  to  his  friends 
here  give  them  assurance  that  great  britian  will  cordially  receive  the 
returning  northern  States,  and  leave  the  Southern  hemisphere  to 
provide  for  its  negroes,  or  to  to  (sic)  submit  to  the  french  for  pro¬ 
tection.  You  will  stand  astonished  to  find  that  any  considerable 
proportion  of  Massachusetts  came  forward  in  maintainance  of  such 
a  project.  But  the  old  tories  and  old  tory  familys  (sic)  are  resusci¬ 
tated :  the  aristocracy  of  wealth;  even  though  nominal  in  banks,  and 
wrapt  in  the  base  corruption  of  speculation  has  crowded  all  principle 
from  our  community,  and  our  people  are  essentially  changed.  There 
are  open  and  public  avowals  every  day,  in  the  assurance  offices,  that 
great  britian  is  our  only  protector,  that  we  are  unable  to  protect 
ourselves,  that  her  fleet  is  our  fleet,  her  navy  our  navy,  and  gunboats 
must  be  held  in  contempt.  All  the  opposition  they  have  made  to 
gun  boats,  has  arisen  in  this  way:  not  that  they  wished  or  expected 
an  American  navy  but  wished  to  show  that  a  connexion  with  Eng¬ 
land  for  the  sake  of  her  navy  was  necessary  to  us.50 

Lest  the  pessimism  of  Sullivan  should  take  too  deep  root 
in  the  mind  of  Jefferson,  the  more  light-hearted  Lincoln 
wrote  him  a  victory  paean,  boasting  that  the  Republican 
ticket  had  won  by  a  majority  better  than  last  year’s,  that 
Pickering’s  seditious  utterances,  “sowed  much  thicker 
among  us  by  the  enemies  to  our  Government  than  were  the 
tares  by  the  enemy  of  goodness,  among  the  wheat’’  had  not 
prevailed.  In  fine,  Republicanism  had  been  severely  tested, 
“But  is  stronger  for  having  been  attacked.”51 

If  conditions  in  New  England  were  thus  open  to  such 
opposite  interpretations,  those  in  old  England  were  equally 
mystifying.  A  Liverpool  correspondent  wrote  Jefferson 

“Jefferson  Papers.  James  Sullivan  to  Jefferson,  April  5,  1808. 

"Ibid.,  Levi  Lincoln  to  Jefferson,  April  7,  1808. 


JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


that  that  town,  “so  long  famed  for  its  immense  commerce 
with  the  U.  S.  A.,  in  all  probability,  is  shortly  to  experience 
a  sad  reverse.”  But,  if  the  prosperity  of  Liverpool  depended 
upon  the  American  trade,  and  the  American  trade  was  in 
eclipse,  why  was  there  no  greater  price  advance  on  Ameri¬ 
can  goods?  “Although  the  United  States  furnish  this 
country  with  54th  of  the  Cotton  she  manufactures,  yet  the 
upland  Georgia  is  only  about  18d.  whereas  in  Holland  3/  & 
in  France  4/2  the  pound.”52 

Undoubtedly  the  embargo  was  imposing  hardships  in 
Great  Britain,  for  the  King,  in  April,  instructed  his  warships 
and  privateers  to  encourage  the  passage  of  all  neutral  vessels 
laden  with  lumber  and  provisions,  and  bound  for  either  the 
West  Indies  or  South  America.  The  neutrals  meant  were 
Americans,  and  these  fresh  orders  were  an  open  bid  to 
Americans  to  defy  their  own  authorities,  being  assured  of 
British  licenses,  even  if  they  could  get  no  clearance  papers 
from  their  home  ports.53  From  one  point  of  view,  this  was 
a  concession  to  the  potency  of  an  embargo  which  was  de¬ 
priving  British  colonies  of  sustenance.  From  another  point 
of  view,  it  was  an  insulting  appeal  to  the  people  over  the 
'.head  of  their  government.  Pinkney,  our  minister  at  Lon¬ 
don,  adopted  the  latter  interpretation,  but  concluded  that  its 
only  effect  would  be  “to  add  to  the  vigilance  of  the  govern¬ 
ment  in  guarding  the  law,  and  to  render  more  conspicuous 
the  just  pride  and  the  public  spirit  of  our  citizens  by  an 
open  disdain  of  all  foreign  allurements  to  break  it.”54 

To  Jefferson  and  his  friends,  the  political  life  of  Eng¬ 
land  was  as  inexplicable  as  the  economic.  Notwithstanding 
all  the  protests  from  manufacturers  and  the  American 
traders,  Parliament  was  certain  to  confirm  the  Orders  in 

“Jefferson  Papers.  James  Maury  to  Jefferson.  Liverpool,  March 
15,  1808. 

“  American  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  III.  281. 

M  Pinkney,  The  Life  of  William  Pinkney,  Pinkney  to  Madison,  p.  195. 


THE  ADOPTION  OF  THE  EMBARGO  71 


Council;55  the  ministry  was  secure  in  its  parliamentary  ma¬ 
jority,  a  circumstance  boding  ill  for  peace  between  Britain 
and  America  ;56  and  the  only  real  hope  of  any  immediate  ad¬ 
justment  seemed  to  lie  in  the  possibility  of  a  general  peace 
in  Europe,  “in  which  case  our  embargo  will  cease,  from  that 
time.”57 

Amid  cares  so  many  and  varied,  Jefferson  was  not  im¬ 
mune  from  petty  annoyances,  like  the  appeal  already  cited 
from  the  old  soldier  with  seven  children  and  a  musket.  A 
further  importunity  of  this  sort  came  from  the  guardian 
of  a  Boston  orphan.  He  rendered  to  Jefferson  the  follow¬ 
ing  bill  for  damages : 

Miss  S.T.  an  orphan  child:  four  months  rent  of  a  Store  in  Bos¬ 
ton  due  this  29  March  1808 — which  Store  the  Tenant  has  left  in 
consequence  of  the  Embargo  laid  by  Mr.  Jefferson;  and  the  said 
orphan  is  deprived  of  the  past  income  without  the  least  prospect  of 
any  future  tenant  occupying  her  store  left  by  her  departed  parents, 
&  has  nothing  but  the  prospect  of  poverty  before  her — The  quarter 
Rent  ‘  $100.58 

Among  so  many  tribulations,  foreign  and  domestic, 
Jefferson  was  well  nigh  exhausted.  When  Congress  finally 
rose  at  the  end  of  April  for  its  summer  recess,  he  wrote  to 
a  member  of  his  cabinet,  Caesar  Rodney,  that  “this  six 
months  session  has  worn  me  down  to  a  state  of  almost  total 
incapacity  for  business.”59  Relief  was  not  in  sight,  for 
with  Congress  adjourned  to  hear  the  voice  of  the  country 
and  to  mend  its  political  fences,  Jefferson  was  left  to  execute 


55  The  Jefferson  Papers.  Jefferson  to  C.  Rodney,  April  24,  1808.  See 
The  Works  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  XI.  29. 

M  Jefferson  Papers.  Jefferson  to  Col.  Worthington,  April  24,  1808. 
It  was  believed  by  Jefferson’s  enemies  in  New  England  that  war  was 
the  very  thing  he  desired.  Cf.  Bernard  C.  Steiner,  Life  and  Correspond¬ 
ence  of  James  McHenry,  p.  544.  Ben  Stoddart  to  McHenry,  IV^rch  31, 
1808. 

"Jefferson  Papers.  Jefferson  to  Mr.  Strode,  April  3,  1808.* 

58  This  bill  is  preserved  in  Jefferson  Papers,  March  29,  1808. 

10  Jefferson’s  handwriting  confirms  this. 


72 


JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


the  embargo  and  at  the  same  time  to  negotiate  for  its  sus¬ 
pension.60  His  experiences  in  this  dual  task  are  the  sub¬ 
ject  of  the  next  chapter. 

“  American  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  III.  222.  Madison  to 
Pinkney,  April  30,  1808.  “.  .  .  the  United  States  are  ready  to  resume 
their  export  trade  as  soon  as  the  aggressions  on  it  shall  cease ;  and  that, 
in  a  hope  that  this  might  happen  during  the  recess  of  Congress,  the 
President  is  authorized,  in  such  an  event,  to  suspend,  in  whole  or  in  part, 
the  several  embargo  laws.” 


CHAPTER  IV 


SUCCESS  AND  FAILURE 


The  experiences  which  Jefferson  was  to  encounter  alone 
and  face  to  face  with  the  embargo  were  foreshadowed  by  the 
events  of  the  previous  months.  Before  the  session  came  to 
an  end,  the  chief  difficulties  of  embargo  enforcement,  the 
ultimate  division  between  supporters  and  opponents  of  the 
measure,  and  the  probable  effect  of  the  embargo  upon  Euro¬ 
pean  developments  were  all  fairly  evident  to  the  critical 
observer. 

But  the  interval  of  personal  government,  in  a  test  to  the 
finish  of  liberalism  as  a  substitute  for  war,  affords  a  study, 
which  can  never  be  devoid  of  interest,  of  a  humanitarian 
autocrat  administering  a  panacea  for  the  woes  of  mankind. 
Jefferson  brought  to  the  task  of  rendering  the  embargo  an 
efficient  engine  of  peace  both  the  highest  idealism  and  all 
the  arts  of  the  trained  politician.  No  one  knew  better  than 
he  how  to  mould  public  opinion.  No  American  of  his  time 
could  rival  him  in  the  technique  of  party  management  and 
in  the  subtle  machinations  which  build  a  strong  machine. 
His  endowments  of  heart  and  mind  were  both  of  the  high¬ 
est  order.  But  they  were  pitted  against  forces  which  might 
baffle  a  superman,  forces  which,  by  their  very  success  in 
overthrowing  him,  were  to  lift  Jefferson  into  the  noble  army 
of  martyrs  who  have  fought  the  good  fight  for  mankind. 

Most  fundamental  of  the  obstacles  to  success  were  the 
facts  of  human  nature.  Jefferson  was  asking  his  country¬ 
men  to  play  a  passive  role.  They  were  pitted  against  Europe, 
but  the  struggle  was  negative — a  test  not  of  aggression  but 
of  endurance.  This  in  itself  was  a  handicap,  since  the  usual 
incitements  to  emotional  patriotism  were  absent.  It  was 


74 


JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


to  be  a  long  pull  and  a  hard  pull,  with  the  shoreline  too 
distant  to  register  daily  progress.  Worse  still,  it  trenched 
upon  the  economic  life  of  the  entire  American  people.  The 
rich  merchant,  who  would  willingly  have  given  his  son 
for  his  country,  scorned  a  country  which  asked  only  for 
his  moneybags. 

If,  in  spite  of  these  difficulties,  Jefferson’s  extraordinary 
hold  upon  the  imagination  and  affections  of  his  country¬ 
men  were  to  insure  the  fairest  possible  trial  of  his  new  weap¬ 
on  of  peace  in  time  of  war,  how  could  he  be  certain  that  even 
a  total  cessation  of  American  exports  would  bend  the  chan¬ 
celleries  of  Europe  to  his  will?  The  odds  were  certainly 
against  him  when,  in  May  of  1808,  he  embarked  upon  an 
era  of  personal  government  which  called  for  the  arbitrary 
enforcement  of  a  most  inquisitorial  act,  for  a  tampering 
with  what  many  men  regarded  as  their  dearest  rights,  and 
which  put  in  jeopardy  both  his  popularity  and  his  fame, 
the  cherished  rewards  of  a  long  career.  Yet  it  is  during 
these  six  months  of  autocracy  that  Jefferson  is  most  con¬ 
vincing  as  a  democrat.  A  demagogue  would  have  served  his 
<witi  fflmp  /efferson  preferred  to  serve  his  people  by  spar¬ 
ing  them  from  what  he  regarded  as  man’s  greatest  curse. 
He  was  in  a  position  to  test,  as  few  reformers  have  been, 
the  potency  of  those  pacific  theories  by  which  he  had  chosen 
to  guide  his  life-/  Among  the  sordid  details  of  administra¬ 
tion  aFhome  ana  negotiation  abroad,  pacifism,  or  a  scheme 
of  peace  as  a  substitute  for  war,  was  on  trial. 

We  are  first  concerned  with  the  progress  of  embargo 
enforcement  and  with  the  state  of  American  opinion,  for 
upon  these  the  negotiations  abroad,  whether  successful  or 
otherwise,  would  in  a  large  measure  depend. 

One  of  Jefferson’s  first  moves  was  a  proclamation  to 
the  governors  of  Orleans,  Georgia,  South  Carolina,  Massa¬ 
chusetts,  and  New  Hampshire,  calling  attention  to  the  act 


SUCCESS  AND  FAILURE 


75 


of  April  25  authorizing  him  to  detain  all  coasting  vessels 
and  their  cargoes  upon  suspicion  of  intent  to  evade  the 
embargo.1  Flour  in  particular  he  designated  as  suspect. 
At  the  same  time,  in  order  to  insure  a  supply  of  flour  to 
communities  which  were  not  self-sufficing,  he  authorized  the 
governors  to  issue  to  trusted  merchants  warrants  for  the 
importation  of  the  amounts  required  by  their  respective 
states,  duplicates  to  be  filed  with  the  secretary  of  the 
treasury. 

The  underlying  idea  in  this  plan  coincided  with  Jeffer¬ 
son’s  whole  political  philosophy  of  distributing  authority 
whenever  it  was  too  centralized.  At  the  same  time,  it  re¬ 
laxed  the  ironclad  provisions  of  a  law  which  represented  the 
very  maximum  of  interference  with  the  individual  rights 
of  the  citizen.  To  Gallatin,  toward  whom  he  may  have  felt 
apologetic  for  a  ruling  which  was  bound  to  complicate  the 
workings  of  the  treasury,  Jefferson  wrote  on  the  same  day, 
urging  the  importance  of  a  rigid  execution  of  the  new  law, 
for 

the  great  leading  object  of  the  legislature  was,  and  ours  in  execution 
of  it,  ought  to  be,  to  give  compleat  effect  to  the  embargo  laws. 
They  have  bidden  Agriculture,  Commerce,  Navigation  to  bow  before 
that  object,  to  be  nothing  when  in  competition  with  that.  Finding 
all  their  endeavors  at  general  rules  to  be  evaded,  they  finally  gave  us 
the  power  of  Detention  as  the  Panacea,  and  I  am  clear  we  ought  to 
use  it  freely  that  we  may  by  a  fair  experiment  know  the  power  of 
this  great  weapon,  the  embargo.2 

Jefferson  went  on  to  demonstrate  to  Gallatin  that  the 
letters  to  the  governors  were  a  positive  safeguard  for  such 
enforcement,  because  the  treasury  would  know  that  applica¬ 
tions  not  properly  vouched  for  were  unwarranted.  He 
concluded  with  an  obiter  dictum  that  coast-wise  trade  “may 

1  Jefferson  Papers.  May  6,  1808. 

2  Ibid.,  Jefferson  to  A.  Gallatin,  May  6,  1808.  Cf.  also  ibid.,  same  to 
same,  May  15.  “I  place  immense  value  in  the  experiment  being  fully 
made,  how  far  an  embargo  may  be  an  effective  weapon  in  future  as  well 
as  on  this  occasion.” 


76 


JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


be  some  trifling  advantage  to  individuals  .  .  .  but  it  is 

not  a  farthing’s  benefit  to  the  nation  at  large,  and  risks 
their  great  object  in  the  embargo.”3 

The  Governor  of  New  Hampshire  was  the  first  to  reply. 
He  assured  Jefferson  that  his  constituents  were  almost  wholly 
dependent  for  flour  upon  the  southern  states  and  that  the 
trade  therefore  was  vital.  He  was  amazed  that  Jefferson 
construed  New  Hampshire  as  a  “revenue  district  adjacent 
to  The  Territories  of  a  foreign  Nation,”  and  reminded  him 
that  the  Canadian  border  was  a  wilderness  two  hundred 
miles  from  the  settled  parts  of  the  state,  with  no  possibility 
of  evasion.  Besides,  the  people  of  the  state  were  “nearly 
all  in  favor  of  the  embargo,  and  the  merchants  of  this  place 
[Portsmouth]  would  not  suffer  a  few  enemies  and  specula¬ 
tors  to  make  their  fortunes,  while  they  themselves  were 
suffering  every  inconvenience  and  seeing  (if  permitted)  it 
would  defeat  the  intention  of  the  government.”4 

Gallatin  could  not  at  once  test  the  influence  of  the  gover¬ 
nors’  warrants  upon  the  general  problem  of  enforcing  the 
embargo.  He  did,  however,  feel  that  the  law  of  April  25 
giving  the  President  complete  authority  to  suppress  the 
coastwise  trade  was  too  severe,  and  wrote  Jefferson  to  that 
effect,  at  the  same  time  reciting  the  extent  of  contraband 
trade  along  the  St.  Lawrence  from  Lake  Ontario  to  Mont¬ 
real.5 

Jefferson  recognized  the  validity  of  Gallatin’s  observa¬ 
tion  and  agreed  in  the  execution  of  the  law  to  distinguish 
■“between  provisions,  lumber,  naval  stores  and  such  things 
as  by  the  exaggerated  prices  they  have  got  to  in  foreign 
markets  would  enable  infractors  to  pay  all  forfietures  [sfc] 
&  still  make  great  profit,  and  cotton  &  such  other  articles  as 
have  not  got  to  such  prices.  I  am  for  going  substantially 

3  Jefferson  Papers.  Jefferson  to  Gallatin.  May  6,  1808. 

1  Ibid.,  John  Langdon  to  Jefferson,  May  14,  1808. 

‘Ibid.,  A.  Gallatin  to  Jefferson,  May  16,  1808. 


SUCCESS  AND  FAILURE 


77 


to  the  object  of  the  law,  and  no  further;  perhaps  a  little 
more  earnestly  because  it  is  the  first  experiment,  and  it  is 
of  great  importance  to  know  it’s  full  effect.”6 

If  the  letter  just  cited  reveals  Jefferson  as  a  theorist, 
another,  of  the  same  period,  demonstrates  that  in  whatever 
new  forms  his  theories  found  expression,  he  himself  re¬ 
mained  true  to  his  faith  in  the  common  people.  Though 
deprecating  the  evasions  along  the  northern  frontier,  he 
rejoiced  at  the  “spontaneous  aid  of  our  good  citizens  in  the 
neighborhoods  where  there  has  been  occasion,”  and  con¬ 
cluded  that  “Through  the  body  of  our  country  generally  our 
citizens  appear  heartily  to  approve  &  support  the  embargo.”7 

Jefferson’s  circular  on  the  coastwise  trade  was  directed 
to  the  governors  of  only  five  states.8  Gallatin  felt  that 
other  districts  might  require  similar  dispensations,  and,  on 
the  twentieth,  he  accordingly  directed  a  circular  to  all  the 
collectors  of  the  ports,  ruling  that,  where  shipments  of  flour 
and  provisions  did  not  exceed  one  eighth  of  the  total  cargo, 
they  should  be  assumed  to  be  bona  fide,  and,  not  being  de¬ 
signed  for  evasion  of  the  embargo,  they  need  not  obtain 
special  warrants. 

At  this  period  Gallatin  felt  that  the  worst  enemy  of  the 
embargo  was  not  the  coastwise  trade,  accountable  to  the 
officers  of  the  treasury,  but  rather  the  secret  loading  and 
departure  of  vessels  with  no  clearance  papers  whatever.  He 
wrote  to  Jefferson  on  May  23  : 


I  think  that  we  have  little  to  fear  from  any  quarter.  The  great 
violations  which  have  heretofore  taken  place  have  been,  either  on 
the  frontier  districts,  or  in  the  sailing  of  vessels  before  the  penalties 
were  in  force.  Of  this  I  have  clear  proof  in  the  returns  of  vessels 
arrived  at  Havannah  (sic)  from  the  United  States  till  the  lltli  ult. 
&  deposited  by  our  Consul  in  the  Department  of  State.  I  have 
analysed  it;  and  taking  two  periods  of  42  days  each,  the  first  from 


“Jefferson  Papers.  Jefferson  to  A.  Gallatin,  May  20,  1808. 
'Ibid.,  Jefferson  to  General  Benjamin  Smith,  May,  1808. 

6  A  Printed  Circular. 


78  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 

the  11th  January  to  29th  Feby.,  &  the  other  from  1st  March  to  11th 
April ;  I  find  that  43  vessels  arrived  from  the  United  States  during 
the  first  period,  and  only  four  during  the  last;  one  of  which  was  in 
ballast,  &  only  one  had  flour ;  an  evident  proof  that  the  embargo 
operates  &  that  since  the  penalties  were  enacted  and  the  second 
supplemt.  act  was  passed,  the  evasion  (those  on  the  British  lines 
excepted)  have  been  less  than  we  had  apprehended.9 

Inasmuch  as  the  control  over  sea-borne  traffic  had 
proved  so  successful,  Gallatin  felt  that  the  provisioning  of 
flour  to  needy  districts  might  have  been  more  wisely  intrusted 
to  the  treasury  than  to  local  governors.  The  collectors  were 
responsible  to  the  executive ;  the  state  magistrates  had  their 
own  popularity  to  consider.  And  the  weaker  of  them  might 
yield  to  a  temptation  to  bolster  this  at  the  expense  of  an 
unpopular  law.  “Knowing  Gov.  Sullivan  &  Chas.  Pickney 
[sic]  as  we  do,  we  can  have  no  confidence  in  the  last,  & 
must  rest  assured  that  the  other  will  refuse  no  certificates. 
They  begin  already  to  arrive  in  large  quantities.”10  Con¬ 
sidering  all  the  abuses  which  might  creep  into  the  system, 
Gallatin  begged  for  its  repeal,  or  at  any  rate  that  it  be  not 
extended  to  the  other  governors,  and  offered  a  plan  by 
which  the  governors  might  submit  advice  rather  than  issue 
warrants.11  A  general  rule  rather  than  the  caprice  of  politi¬ 
cians  was  the  more  essential,  inasmuch  as  applications  for 
coasting  permits  would  necessarily  exceed  the  anticipations 
of  Jefferson,  owing  to  the  increasing  dependence  of  the 
cotton  states  upon  outside  supplies  of  food,  a  condition  espe¬ 
cially  true  of  “the  greater  part  of  the  S.  Carolina  sea-coast 
and  the  whole  of  Georgia.”12  The  treasury  system  of  non¬ 
interference  with  cargoes  in  which  food  did  not  exceed  one 
eighth  of  the  total  was,  as  Gallatin  observed,  “much  less 
exceptionable,  than  the  permission  from  the  Governors  under 

“Jefferson  Papers.  Library  of  Congress.  A.  Gallatin  to  Jefferson, 
May  23,  1808. 

10  Ibid. 

11  Ibid. 

12  Ibid. 


SUCCESS  AND  FAILURE 


79 


which  whole  cargoes  of  provisions  will  be  perpetually  trans¬ 
ported  and  that  perhaps  done  by  persons  who  have  violated 
the  embargo  without  the  knowledge  of  the  Governors.”13 

To  these  suggestions  Jefferson  made  a  characteristic 
reply.  He  desired  Gallatin  to  transmit  his  thanks  to  various 
subordinates  who  had  aided  in  enforcing  the  law,  assured 
him  that  his  only  desire  with  regard  to  the  coastwise 
trade  was  a  proper  execution  of  the  laws,  for  “I  do  not 
wish  a  single  citizen  in  any  of  the  states  to  be  deprived  of  a 
meal  of  bread,  but  I  set  down  the  exercise  of  commerce 
merely  for  profit,  as  nothing  when  it  carries  with  it  danger 
of  defeating  the  objects  of  the  embargo,”14  and  made  a 
profession  of  faith  in  the  governors.  “I  cannot  think  that 
any  of  them  would  wink  at  abuses  of  that  law.”15  Was 
Jefferson  sincere  in  this  rather  unctuous  sentiment,  or  was 
it  a  somewhat  lame  explanation  for  hasty  action  on  his  own 
part?  He  praised  Gallatin’s  circular,  however,  and  admitted 
that,  ‘‘had  the  practicability  of  this  mode  of  restraint 
occurred  [ffr]  before  the  recurrence  to  the  governors,  I  should 
have  preferred  it,  because  it  is  free  from  the  objection  of 
favoritism  to  which  the  governors  will  be  exposed,  and  if 
you  find  it  work  well  in  practice,  we  may  find  means 
to  have  the  other  course  discontinued,  our  course  should 
be  to  sacrifice  everything  to  secure  the  effect  of  the  law.  & 
nothing  beyond  that.”16  As  for  ships  sailing  without  clear¬ 
ance  papers,  the  naval  department  must  prevent  that.17 

The  response  of  the  governor  of  New  Hampshire  had 
been  immediate,  doubtless  because  of  the  imputation  con¬ 
cerning  his  state.  Other  governors  were  in  less  haste.  But, 
on  May  28,  Charles  Pinckney  wrote  that  the  normal  con- 

w  Jefferson  Papers.  A.  Gallatin  to  Jefferson,  May  23,  1808. 

u  Ibid.,  Jefferson  to  A.  Gallatin,  May  27,  1808. 

15  Ibid. 

”  Ibid. 

11  Ibid. 


80 


JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


sumption  of  flour  in  Charleston  and  its  vicinity  was  three 
thousand  barrels  a  month,  coming  coastwise  from  Phila¬ 
delphia,  Baltimore,  and  Richmond.  He  promised  to  issue 
certificates  for  this  only  “to  substantial  houses  which  have 
always  imported  it,”  and  denounced  as  nidering  “those  who 
for  sake  of  gain  are  endeavoring  to  defeat  the  great  pur¬ 
poses  intended  by  the  embargo.”18  Pinckney  showed  more 
circumspection  than  Gallatin  had  given  him  credit  for.  The 
weak  reed  was  Sullivan,  of  whom,  before  he  had  been  exer¬ 
cising  his  new  authority  a  month,  Gallatin  complained  that 
he  had  not  the  backbone  to  refuse  certificates  to  any  one. 
“One  mail  alone  brought  me  permits  for  eleven  thousand 
barrels,  exclusively  of  corn  and  rye  meal.  As  we  must  let 
those  go  at  all  events  and  without  restriction  there  is  really 
more  danger  from  that  quarter  than  from  any  other.”19 
It  looked  as  if  Jefferson’s  philosophic  confidence  in  the  wis¬ 
dom  of  Republican  governors  might  cost  him  the  efficient 
administering  of  the  one  measure  nearest  his  heart. 

Sullivan  had  only  begun.  Six  weeks  later,  Gallatin  filed 
with  Jefferson  a  detailed  report  on  Sullivan’s  licenses.  They 
already  amounted  to  49,800  barrels  of  flour,  94,400  bushels 
of  corn,  560  tierces  of  rice  and  2000  bushels  of  rye;  with 
permits  issued  but  not  yet  acted  upon  to  the  extent  of 
7450  barrels  of  flour,  or,  if  preferred  by  the  importer,  of 
30,000  bushels  of  corn.20  Some  of  these  certificates,  as 
Gallatin  pointed  out,  were  to  merchants  of  Alexandria,  or 
Georgetown,  of  whose  commercial  standing  the  governor 
must  be  entirely  ignorant.  But  he  admitted  that  Sullivan 
was  the  exception  to  a  rule  which  otherwise  was  not  work¬ 
ing  out  so  badly  after  all.  “Govr.  Langdon  [of  New  Hamp¬ 
shire]  has  given  four  certificates  for  so  many  cargoes  of 
flour — say  4000  barrels  and  two  certificates  each,  for  a 

18  Jefferson  Papers.  Governor  Charles  Pinckney  to  Jefferson,  May 
28,  1808. 

“  Ibid.,  A.  Gallatin  to  Jefferson,  May  28,  1808. 

30  Ibid.,  A.  Gallatin  to  Jefferson,  July  15,  1808. 


SUCCESS  AND  FAILURE 


81 


cargo  of  rice.  No  certificates  have  been  transmitted  by  the 
other  Governors.”21 

Jefferson  agreed  with  Gallatin  that  it  was  necessary  to 
put  some  curb  upon  the  headlong  Sullivan.  But  how  to 
accomplish  this  without  offence  was  something  of  a  problem. 
Jefferson  attacked  it  by  calling  the  governor’s  attention 
to  the  extent  of  his  requisitions,  intimating  that  “these 
supplies,  altho  called  for  within  the  space  of  two  months, 
will  undoubtedly  furnish  the  consumption  of  your  state  for 
a  much  longer  time,”  and  urging  him  to  discontinue  the 
practice  in  question.  He  repeated  his  desire  that  no  citizen 
be  deprived  of  needed  supplies,  but  reminded  Sullivan  that 
the  coastwise  trade  offered  special  temptation  to  evaders 
of  law.  He  requested  a  memorandum  for  the  guidance  of 
the  administration  as  to  the  probable  future  requirements 
of  Massachusetts.22 

Though  couched  in  the  friendliest  language,  the  rebuke 
was  none  the  less  real,  and  the  recipient  felt  its  force.  He 
replied  with  ill-concealed  vexation.  In  the  first  place,  he 
had  no  desire  to  assume  responsibilities  so  burdensome.  He 
undertook  the  issuing  of  warrants  simply  to  save  the  state 
from  actual  hunger,  which  would  have  multiplied  the  foes 
of  the  administration.  So  far  as  he  personally  was  con¬ 
cerned,  he  would  welcome  relief.  But  he  was  sure  that 
Jefferson  would  not  grant  it  if  he  knew  the  circumstances.23 

To  begin  with,  Jefferson  was  probably  ignorant  that  the 
importations  had  not  affected  prices.  Here,  of  course,  was 
an  economic  fallacy.  Those  prices  were  in  the  last  resort 
determined  by  a  world  market,  so  long  as  any  flour  at  all 
could  reach  it.  And  flour  was  certainly  leaving  the  country 
by  various  channels.  What  Jefferson  thought  of  the  conten¬ 
tion  is  not  recorded.  In  the  second  place,  it  was  certain 

“Jefferson  Papers.  A.  Gallatin  to  Jefferson,  July  15,  1808. 

”  Ibid.,  Jefferson  to  Sullivan,  July  16,  1808. 

”  Ibid.,  Sullivan  to  Jefferson,  July  21,  1808. 


82 


JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


that  no  flour  was  going  to  Canada,  because  Sullivan  would 
not  permit  its  unloading  within  two  hundred  miles  of  Pas- 
samaquoddy.  In  the  third  place,  the  amount  so  far  certi¬ 
fied  seemed  excessive  only  because  nearly  all  contracts  for 
the  year  were  signed  in  the  spring.  And  finally,  the  refusal 
of  further  certificates  would  “involve  this  State  in  mob 
riots  and  convulsions  pretendedly  on  account  of  the  em¬ 
bargo,”  which  would  mean  “an  additional  triumph”  for  the 
enemies  of  Jefferson,  and  “new  mortifications”  for  his 
friends.  All  things  considered,  Sullivan  would  take  the 
liberty  of  ignoring  Jefferson’s  request  until  further  orders, 
which  he  trusted,  if  given,  would  be  so  explicit  a  withdrawal 
of  the  grant  of  May  6  that  he  might  publish  it  to  “satisfy 
the  public  claims.”24 

In  the  letter  just  cited,  Sullivan  was  on  the  defensive. 
Two  days  later  he  carried  the  war  into  the  enemy’s  coun¬ 
try.  He  began  in  a  vein  of  sarcasm.  “I  derive  great  relief 
from  the  consideration  that  the  President  is  under  no 
necessity  to  read  it,  and,  that  merely  breaking  the  seal 
and  glancing  on  the  superscription,  will  take  but  a  moment’s 
time.”  In  the  body  of  the  letter,  he  informed  Jefferson  of 
his  growing  conviction  that  the  Federalists  were  plotting  to 
renew  their  connection  with  Britain.  Here  the  advance 
ended  and  retreat  was  sounded.  Sullivan  had  evidently  slept 
on  the  proposition  of  defying  his  party  chief  and  pondered 
its  unwisdom.  He  would  hereafter  evade  the  demands  of 
the  merchants,  and  would,  moreover,  furnish  the  estimate 
which  Jefferson  requested.  Meanwhile,  he  assured  the  Presi¬ 
dent  that,  “Upon  the  best  calculation  I  can  make  of  the  per¬ 
sons  who  live  on  imported  flour  in  the  sea  ports  in  this  State, 
they  are  ninety  thousand.  This  at  one  pound  for  each  day 
will  raise  a  demand  for  about  164,250  barrels  per  year  or 
13,687  barr.  per  month.  This  is  to  be  sure  an  astonishing 

54  Jefferson  Papers.  Sullivan  to  Jefferson,  July  21,  1808. 


SUCCESS  AND  FAILURE 


83 


quantity  but  I  do  not  believe  the  calculation  extravagant.”25 
Sullivan  admitted  that  the  coastwise  trade  afforded  an 
opportunity  to  the  wicked,  but  he  maintained  that  too 
severe  measures  of  repression  would  only  serve  notice  to  the 
northern  states  that  the  President  had  no  confidence  in  them, 
but  that  he  and  the  Virginia  adherents  upon  whom  he  did 
rely  were  enemies  by  principle  “to  the  commerce  and  navi¬ 
gation  of  the  northern  part  of  the  nation.”26  In  this  seem¬ 
ingly  impersonal  way,  Sullivan  was  touching  upon  a  sore 
spot,  as  well  he  knew.  His  next  statement  is  less  cutting, 
really  a  very  philosophical  and  detached  estimate  of  Massa¬ 
chusetts  for  one  who  had  lived  through  much  of  which  he 
describes : 

The  habits  of  this  State,  contracted  under  the  royal  Government 
and  yet  continued  lead  to  smuggling  and  the  contravention  of  the 
embargo  laws ;  and  other  laws  restraining  commerce.  I  believe  the 
present  embargo-laws  have  been  as  much  respected  as  laws  of  this 
nature  have  heretofore  been;  nor  do  I  believe,  that  until  lately, 
there  have  been  any  evasions  of  them  worthy  of  notice.27 

Sullivan,  who  seems  to  have  had  the  pen  of  a  ready 
writer,  was  evidently  in  no  hurry  to  bring  his  epistle  to  a 
conclusion.  He  proceeded  to  an  historical  sketch  of  Massa¬ 
chusetts  opinion  on  the  embargo.  It  had  at  first  been  popu¬ 
lar  with  the  Republicans.  But  failure  to  produce  any  appar¬ 
ent  effect  on  Europe  was  costing  it  popular  support,  thanks 
to  which  and  to  the  efforts  of  the  Federalists,  illegal  acts  were 
multiplying.  In  fact,  many  judicious  men,  former  friends 
to  the  measure,  now  doubted  the  feasibility  of  its  continu¬ 
ance,  viewing  it  as  an  incubus  to  the  party,  “a  decisive  blow 
against  the  republican  interest,  now  supported  in  this  com¬ 
monwealth.”28  With  a  rather  fine  irony,  Sullivan  concluded 
by  an  appeal  to  Jefferson,  in  the  event  that  a  continuance  of 

25  Jefferson  Papers.  Sullivan  to  Jefferson,  July  23,  1808. 

M  Ibid. 

27  Ibid. 

28  Ibid. 


84  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 

the  coastwise  trade  was  decided  upon,  to  bestow  the  respon¬ 
sibility  of  issuing  certificates  upon  someone  else.29 

On  August  6,  two  months  after  the  letter  to  the  governors 
which  had  precipitated  the  correspondence  under  review, 
Gallatin  once  more  admitted  that  his  original  fears  were 
unfounded : 

I  would  have  preferred  not  to  have  written  at  all  to  the  Governors 
&  to  have  kept  the  coasting  trade  on  the  footing  of  my  first  circular 
of  29  of  April  which  you  thought  not  strict  enough.  It  is,  how¬ 
ever,  certain,  that,  with  the  exception  of  Govr.  Sullivan’s  certifi¬ 
cates,  the  mode  which  you  directed  has  been  perfectly  efficacious  on 
the  sea-coast.  No  evasions  can  now  take  place  worthy  of  notice, 
under  colour  of  the  coasting  trade.  The  embargo  is  now  defeated, 
as  I  have  already  mentioned,  by  open  violations,  by  vessels  sailing 
without  any  clearances  whatever ;  an  evil  which  under  the  existing 
law  we  cannot  oppose  in  any  way  but  by  cruisers.30 

Gallatin  confirmed,  however,  the  warning  which  Sulli¬ 
van  had  uttered  before  ever  the  law  was  passed:  namely, 
that  the  state  courts  would  impede  the  operation  of  any  act 
not  popular  with  their  constituents.  Here  was  rising  to 
taunt  him  a  principle  which  Jefferson  had  invoked  in  his 
support  of  Roane  against  Marshall.  The  specific  case  was 
furnished  by  Rhode  Island.  With  the  connivance  of  the 
court,  the  state  authorities  at  Newport  strove  to  prevent 
detention  under  the  act  of  April  25.  Although  these  state 
courts  had  absolutely  no  maritime  jurisdiction,  their  opposi¬ 
tion  was  none  the  less  embarrassing,  and  this,  on  top  of  all 
the  wearying  details  of  his  office,  drove  Gallatin  to  his  first 
admission  of  pessimism.  He  had  opposed  the  embargo,  but 
labored  tremendously  on  its  behalf.  “I  deeply  regret,”  he 
sighed, 

to  see  my  incessant  efferts  [ric]  in  every  direction,  to  carry  the 
law  into  effect,  defeated  in  so  many  quarters  &  that  we  will  proba¬ 
bly  produce,  at  least  on  the  British,  but  an  inconsiderable  effect  by 
a  measure  which  at  the  same  time  threatens  to  destroy  the  Republi- 

”  Jefferson  Papers.  Sullivan  to  Jefferson,  July  23,  1808. 

”  Ibid.,  A.  Gallatin  to  Jefferson,  August  6,  1808. 


SUCCESS  AND  FAILURE 


85 


can  interest.  For  there  is  almost  an  equal  chance  that  if  proposi¬ 
tions  from  Great  Britain  or  other  events  do  not  put  it  in  our  power 
to  raise  the  embargo  before  the  1st  of  October,  we  will  lose  the 
Presidential  election.  I  think  that  at  this  moment  the  Western 
States,  Virginia,  S.  Carolina,  &  perhaps  Georgia  are  the  only  sound 
States  &  that  we  will  have  a  doubtful  contest  in  every  other.  The 
consciousness  of  having  done  what  was  right  in  itself  is  doubtless 
sufficient ;  but  for  the  inefficacy  of  the  measure  on  the  Lakes  &  to 
the  northward  there  is  no  consolation ;  and  that  circumstance  is  the 
strongest  argument  that  can  be  brought  against  the  measure  itself.31 

The  times  were  indeed  anxious  for  the  statesman  who 
had  cast  his  all  upon  the  die,  and  for  his  faithful  associate. 
The  warning  of  Sullivan  as  to  the  danger  of  flour  riots  in 
Boston  greatly  alarmed  Jefferson.  He  wrote  to  General 
Dearborn,  the  secretary  of  war,  then  at  home  in  Massa¬ 
chusetts,  that  “The  Tories  of  Boston  openly  thregieft-ifi^ur^" 
rection  if  their  importation  of  flour  is  stopped  The  next 
post  will  stop  it.  I  fear  your  governor  is  not  up  to  the 
tone  of  these  parricides,  and  I  hope,  on  the  first  symptom 
of  an  open  opposition  to  the  laws  by  force,  you  will  fly  to  the 
scene  and  aid  in  suppressing  any  commotion.”32  He  also 
paid  his  respects  to  Sullivan  in  a  note  of  the  same  date  to 
Gallatin.  “I  have  some  apprehension  the  tories  of  Boston 
etc.,  with  so  poor  a  head  of  a  governor  may  attempt  to  give 
us  trouble.”33  Jefferson,  it  will  be  remembered,  was  on 
record  as  the  advocate  of  a  revolution  every  twenty  years 
to  purify  the  atmosphere.  But  that  was  the  thought  of  a 
philosopher.  To  an  executive,  the  idea  was  less  attractive. 

Between  the  instructions  of  Jefferson  to  the  governors 
and  of  Gallatin  to  the  collectors,  the  coastwise  trade  had 
a  sufficiently  brisk  but  decorous  existence.  That  of  North 
Carolina  consisted  of  just  the  articles  proscribed.  Gallatin 

81  Jefferson  Papers.  A.  Gallatin  to  Jefferson,  August  6,  1808. 

”  Ibid.,  Jefferson  to  General  Dearborn,  August  9,  1808.  See  also  The 
Works  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  XI.  40-41. 

88  Jefferson  Papers.  Jefferson  to  A.  Gallatin,  August  19,  1808. 

84  The  Works  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  I.  422,  June  30,  1808.  “Agreed 
to  continue  the  regulation  of  Mr.  Gallatin’s  Circular  of  May  20,  except 


86  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 

took  note  in  a  treasury  circular  to  the  collector  at  Edenton 
of  the  special  conditions  which  differentiated  it  from  the 
commerce  of  other  states.  To  permit  only  one  eighth  of  a 
North  Carolina  cargo  to  consist  of  food  stuffs  or  of  other 
articles  in  particular  demand  overseas  was  discrimination, 
owing  to  the  fact  that  almost  the  entire  trade  of  North 
Carolina  consisted  of  just  the  articles  proscribed.  Gallatin, 
accordingly,  left  greater  discretionary  powers  to  the  collec¬ 
tors  in  North  Carolina,  with  a  recognition  that: 

shipments  even  of  provisions,  naval  stores,  or  lumber,  which  are 
made  to  the  same  places  where  it  was  usual  to  send,  such  articles, 
and  which  do  not  exceed  in  quantity  or  vary  from  the  quantities 
thus  usually  shipped  in  former  times,  may  in  many  instances  be 
allowed  without  subjecting  the  vessel  to  detention,  although  their 
value  should  exceed  l/8th  part  of  the  bond.35 

After  its  extreme  frankness  in  July,  the  exchange  between 
Sullivan  and  Jefferson  assumed  a  milder  tone.  Perhaps  it 
was  because  Sullivan  had  shot  his  last  arrow ;  perhaps  be¬ 
cause  he  was  hastening  toward  the  tomb,  where  mundane 
matters  cease  to  interest.  But  his  words  were  more  accept¬ 
able  than  his  deeds.  On  August  24,  he  wrote  as  follows : 
“Sir — I  have  yours  of  the  12th  and  will  continue  to  act  as 
discreetly  as  I  can  in  the  business  of  certificates  according 
to  your  request.”  He  called  the  attention  of  Jefferson  to  a 
recent  rise  in  the  cost  of  flour,  due  to  the  prospect  that  its  im¬ 
portation  would  be  prohibited,  and  drew  the  proper  moral 
that,  “There  is  no  engine  but  what  is,  and  will  be  used  here 
against  your  administration.  Truth,  Justice,  and  reason  are 
expelled.”36 

that  it  may  be  relaxed  as  to  vessels  usually  employed  in  the  coasting 
trade.  This  has  a  special  view  to  the  relief  of  N.  C.  that  her  corn  & 
lumber  may  be  sent  coastwise.” 

3SA.  Gallatin  to  Samuel  Tredwell,  collector  at  Edenton,  N.  C.,  Aug¬ 
ust  17,  1808.  The  Circular  is  in  Jefferson  Papers.  See  also  ibid., 
Gallatin  to  Jefferson,  August  5,  1808. 

36  Ibid.,  August  24,  1808.  Sullivan  to  Jefferson. 


SUCCESS  AND  FAILURE 


87 


A  few  weeks  afterward,  Levi  Lincoln,  in  the  absence  of 
the  governor,  wrote  Jefferson  that  he  had  the  admission 
from  Sullivan’s  son  that  abuses  undoubtedly  existed  but 
were  most  difficult  to  prevent.  Like  his  superior,  Lincoln 
believed  ninety  thousand  persons  in  Massachusetts  to  be 
actually  dependent  upon  flour  imports,  and  felt  that  permits 
for  these  to  the  value  of  only  one  eighth  of  the  bond  value 
of  a  cargo  were  insufficient.37 

It  was  evident  that  Sullivan  and  Lincoln,  who  in  April 
had  taken  such  divergent  views  of  the  Tory  question  and 
the  general  political  situation,  were  in  entire  accord  on  the 
need  of  a  liberal  treatment  of  the  coastwise  trade.  Both 
the  standard  bearers  of  Republicanism  in  Massachusetts 
were  at  cross  purposes  with  the  national  leader  of  their 
party.  Their  position  was  natural.  They  represented,  as 
it  were,  the  sentinels  of  the  party,  and  were  most  exposed 
to  enemy  fire.  Their  interests  were  endangered  by  legislation 
undermining  the  party  domination  of  the  state.  They  worked 
together  to  soften,  if  possible,  the  rigors  of  that  unpopular 
legislation.  A  ready  weapon  for  their  genial  purpose  was 
liberal  distribution  of  grain  warrants. 

But  Gallatin,  who  favored  the  very  minimum  of  com¬ 
mercial  restrictions  and  belonged  intellectually  with  the 
malcontents  and  party  rebels,  was  not  the  man  to  wink  at 
evasions  of  what  it  was  his  sworn  duty  to  enforce.  He 
again  addressed  to  his  chief  a  strong  protest  against  the 
evasions  which  Sullivan  condoned. 

New  York  16  Sept.  1808. 

Dear  Sir. 

I  am  again  compelled  to  address  you  on  the  subject  of  Governor 
Sullivan’s  certificates,  which  he  continues,  as  I  am  informed  from 
several  quarters,  pertinaciously  to  issue.  Whether  he  still  sends 
duplicates  to  the  Treasury  I  do  not  know,  but  from  the  new  form 
which  he  has  adopted,  rather  think  that  he  does  not.  I  write  how- 

31  Jefferson  Papers.  Lieutenant  Governor  Levi  Lincoln  to  Jefferson, 
September  10,  1808. 


88 


JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


ever  to  the  principal  clerk  in  my  office  to  send  to  you  along  with 
this  letter  a  memorandum  of  the  gross  amount  of  his  permissions 
so  far  as  they  have  been  received  there.  But  of  the  effect  I  can 
speak  with  certainty.  Those  permissions  do  not  only  create  dissatis¬ 
faction  &  operate  unequally  in  favor  of  those  who  obtain  them : 
but  they  materially  interfere  with  the  execution  of  the  embargo 
laws.  As  a  proof  they  are  granted  without  discretion  &  for  districts 
where  flour  is  not  wanted,  I  enclose  a  letter  from  the  deputy  collec¬ 
tor  of  Barnstable  then  at  Boston.  The  provisions  imported  into 
Massachusetts  in  large  quantities  are  intended  for  exportation  and 
are  the  foundation  of  the  violations  of  the  embargo  there.  The 
facilities  afforded  by  the  immediate  egress  from  the  ports  of  that 
State  to  the  sea,  by  the  vicinity  of  Nova  Scotia,  &  by  the  number  of 
British  vessels  hovering  on  the  coast  for  the  purpose  of  receiving 
cargoes,  give  already  sufficient  temptations  for  violations  of  the  law. 
The  systematic  opposition  connected  with  the  political  views  which 
prevails  there,  renders  the  execution  of  the  embargo  still  more 
difficult:  and  the  Governor’s  permissions  supply  the  objects  to  be 
exported ;  as,  otherwise,  fish  would  be  the  only  article  that  could 
be  smuggled  away.  I  think  it  really  necessary  that  some  efficient 
means  should  be  adopted  to  put  an  end  to  his  certificates,  or  to 
prevent  their  being  respected  by  the  collectors.  With  very  few 
exceptions,  the  embargo  is  now  rigidly  enforced  in  every  part  of 
the  sea  border. 

With  great  respect 
and  attachment 

Your  obedt.  servt. 

Albert  Gallatin.38 

In  so  far  as  these  complaints  concerned  Sullivan  per¬ 
sonally,  they  were  no  longer  necessary,  as  he  had  withdrawn 
from  active  affairs,  convinced,  as  he  wrote  Lincoln,  that  in 
any  event  the  treasury  circular  advising  collectors  at  south¬ 
ern  ports  “not  to  detain  any  vessels  whose  cargo  shd.  be 
so  apportioned  as  not  to  excite  suspicion  of  a  foreign  desti¬ 
nation,”  solved  the  problem  of  food  supply  for  Massachu¬ 
setts.  If  a  further  need  for  governor’s  warrants  should 
arise,  he  intrusted  their  issuance  to  Lincoln,  with  a  polite 
expression  of  willingness  to  be  of  any  assistance  possible. 
Lincoln  promptly  notified  Jefferson  of  these  developments, 
and  assured  him,  meanwhile,  of  his  own  belief  in  the  right- 

38  Jefferson  Papers.  A.  Gallatin  to  Jefferson,  September  16,  1808. 


SUCCESS  AND  FAILURE 


89 


eousness  of  the  embargo — and  in  the  sinfulness  of  its  eva¬ 
sion.39 

The  parting  shots  in  this  battle  of  the  grain  boats  were 
fired  by  Jefferson  in  letters  to  Gallatin  and  Lincoln.  To  the 
former  he  said,  “As  we  know  that  Sullivan’s  licences  have 
overstocked  the  wants  of  the  Eastern  States,  with  flour; 
the  proposal  to  carry  more  there  is  of  itself  suspicious,  and 
therefore  even  regular  traders  ought  not  to  be  allowed.”40 
And  to  Lincoln  he  refused  supplies  for  Nantucket,  on  the 
ground  that  if  that  town  lacked  flour,  it  was  only  because 
she  had  exported  her  own  stocks.41  He  reminded  Lincoln 
that  Sullivan’s  permits  were  bought  on  the  open  market  in 
Alexandria  and  elsewhere.  What  Sullivan  perhaps  meant 
in  kindness,  but  certainly  continued  in  weakness,  had  thus 
assumed  the  proportions  of  a  national  scandal,  contribut¬ 
ing  greatly  to  the  ineffectiveness  of  the  embargo  and  the 
embarrassment  of  the  President.  Here  was  the  uncomfort¬ 
able  side  of  a  theory  which  sought  to  link  the  governors 
with  the  President  in  a  brotherhood  of  good  works. 

The  controversy  with  Sullivan  was  far  from  being  the 
only  thorn  in  the  flesh  for  Jefferson  and  Gallatin.  The 
troubles  on  the  Canadian  border  were  even  more  mischiev¬ 
ous.  The  extent  of  the  illicit  trade  discouraged  honest  pat¬ 
riots  and  weakened  European  confidence  in  the  sincerity 
and  outcome  of  the  American  experiment.  There  was  con¬ 
siderable  smuggling  even  before  Congress  adjourned,  and  by 
the  middle  of  May  it  had  reached  a  pass  where  collectors  at 
danger  points  were  resigning  their  posts  in  order  to  escape 
the  odium  of  enforcing  the  law.42 

38  Jefferson  Papers.  Lincoln  to  Jefferson,  September  23,  1808,  quot¬ 
ing  a  letter  to  himself  from  Governor  Sullivan. 

40  Ibid.,  Jefferson  to  A.  Gallatin,  October  14,  1808. 

41  Ibid.,  Jefferson  to  Lincoln,  November  13,  1808. 

43  Ibid.,  A.  Gallatin  to  Jefferson,  May  16,  1808.  “.  .  .  Sackett  has 
resigned,  I  believe  from  fear,  or  at  least  from  a  wish  not  to  lose  his 


90/  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 

Jefferson  treated  the  emergency  more  calmly  than  he 
otherwise  might  have  done  because  of  his  confidence  that 
the  citizens  of  the  danger  zones  would  feel  themselves  per¬ 
sonally  responsible  for  enforcing  the  laws.43  To  some  extent 
this  faith  was  not  misplaced,  for,  as  he  declared,  “we  have 
experienced  this  spontaneous  aid  of  our  good  citizens  in 
the  neighborhoods  where  there  has  been  occasion,  as  I 
am  persuaded  we  ever  shall  on  such  occasions.”44 
"  The  strategic  points  for  smuggling  were  the  St.  Law¬ 
rence,  Lake  Champlain,  and  Passamaquoddy  Bay,  on  the 
.bprder  between  Maine  and  New  Brunswick.  Gallatin  was 
inclined  to  eliminate  Lake  Champlain,  as  fairly  well  policed, 
but  he  deplored  the  irresolution  and  final  resignation  of 
Sackett  on  the  St.  Lawrence  and  felt  positive  alarm  as  to 
conditions  at  Passamaquoddy.  Reports  from  there  were 
belated,  but,  at  last  accounts : 

the  opposition  appeared  still  stronger,  the  revenue  boats  having  been 
fired  at  in  the  night  &  open  violations  continuing  to  take  place.  It 
must  have  been  still  more  difficult  in  any  degree  to  carry  the  law 
into  effect  subsequently  to  that  date  as  by  return-vessels,  it  appears 
that  between  2d  &  7th  May  there  were  entered  19,000  barrels  flour, 
4,000  of  pork,  4,000  do.  naval  stores,  &c.  The  people  are  paid  by 
the  British  or  disaffected ;  and  no  assistance  to  be  expected  till  the 
arrival  of  the  Wasp  which  sailed  from  N.  York  on  7th  inst.  Be 
that  as  it  may  all  the  evil  which  can  accrue  both  there  &  on  Cham¬ 
plain  is  now  at  an  end;  and  all  we  have  to  watch  is  our  common 
coasting  trade.45 

Both  the  sanguine  Jefferson  and  the  cautious  Gallatin 
were  mistaken  as  to  conditions  on  Lake  Champlain.  Jeffer¬ 
son  miscalculated  the  patriotism  of  its  people.  Their  sym¬ 
pathies  proved  to  be  not  with  the  government,  but  with 
their  neighbors.  Gallatin  put  too  much  confidence  in  the 

popularity  with  the  people.  It  is  a  fact  that  large  quantities,  particularly 
of  potash,  have  arrived  at  Montreal  from  his  district  which  extends 
along  the  St.  Lawrence  from  the  Canada  line  to  Lake  Ontario.” 

43  Jefferson  Papers.  Jefferson  to  General  Benjamin  Smith,  May  20, 
1808. 

44  Ibid. 

45  Ibid.,  A.  Gallatin  to  Jefferson,  May  23.  1808. 


SUCCESS  AND  FAILURE 


insufficient  forces  levied  for  the  emergency.  The  outcome 
was  disappointing,  showing  “that  we  have  not  been  properly 
supported  by  the  people  &  that  the  love  of  gain  &  British 
agency  had  rendered  the  stoppage  of  intercourse  so  unpopu¬ 
lar  that  even  Sadly  &  other  truly  friendly  characters  were 
afraid  to  act.”46  Under  the  circumstances,  Gallatin  thought 
that  a  company  of  United  States  regulars  and  two  gunboats 
would  not  be  amiss. 

Jefferson  did  not  intend  that  the  whole  burden  of  en¬ 
forcing  the  embargo  should  devolve  upon  the  devoted  secre¬ 
tary  of  the  treasury.  In  July,  in  order  to  strengthen  Galla¬ 
tin’s  hand,  he  called  upon  the  navy  to  maintain  a  more 
effective  cooperation  in  the  capture  of  offenders.  Here  again 
Jefferson  found  that  one  cherished  ideal  interfered  with 
another.  The  pride  of  his  administration  had  been  his « 
economies.  A  pet  economy  had  been  the  navy,  yet  now  the 
navy  was  summoned  to  a  rejuvenation  in  order  to  battle 
some  dozens  or  hundreds  of  individualists — no  greater 
individualists  certainly  than  Jefferson  himself — into  an  en¬ 
forced  cooperation  with  their  neighbors  in  submission  to  a 
hated  law.  Any  philosophy  carried  to  its  limit  encounters 
its  own  antithesis,  but  few  philosophers  have  an  opportunity  , 
like  Jefferson’s  to  press  facts  to  this  inevitable  conclusion. 
Be  that  as  it  may,  there  was  a  sort  of  poetic  justice — or  was  i 
it  dramatic  irony — in  a  fate  which  compelled  Jefferson  to 
revive  a  navy  in  order  to  wage  war  on  individualists^  Itls 
not  at  all  likely  that  he  realized  the  inconsistency.  No 
longer  the  gentle  philosopher,  he  was  now  the  grim  admin¬ 
istrator,  informing  the  secretary  of  the  navy  that : 

Complaints  multiply  upon  us  of  evasions  of  the  embargo  laws  by 
fraud  &  force.  They  come  from  Newport,  Portland,  Machias, 
Nantucket,  Martha’s  vineyard  etc  etc.  as  I  do  consider  the  severe 
enforcement  of  the  embargo  to  be  of  an  importance  not  to  be  meas¬ 
ured  by  money  for  our  future  government  as  well  as  present  ob- 

“  Jefferson  Papers.  A.  Gallatin  to  Jefferson,  May  28,  1808. 


92 


JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


jects,  I  think  it  will  be  adviseable  [Ac]  that  during  this  summer  all 
the  gun-boats  actually  manned  &  in  commission  should  be  distrib¬ 
uted  through  as  many  ports  &  bays  as  may  be  necessary  to  assist 
the  embargo.47 

Not  infrequently  Jefferson  was  in  position  to  inform 
his  secretaries  of  conditions  within  their  special  field.  On 
July  19,  for  example,  he  forwarded  to  Gallatin  the  details 
concerning  “habitual  breaches  of  the  embargo  laws  on  the 
Canada  line.”48  Jefferson  had  them  from  William  Duane, 
a  Philadelphia  editor,  who,  for  his  part,  learned  them  from 
a  local  correspondent.  “I  am  sorry,”  the  local  observer 
laments, 

to  inform  you  that  smugling  [Ac]  is  carried  on  from  Lewiston  to 
Canada  to  a  considerable  extent,  and  disgusting  and  humiliating  as 
the  practice  is  to  every  feeling  that  is  American  it  is  almost  as  pub¬ 
licly  transacted  as  any  common  avocation.  Merchandise  Potash  and 
f  Salt  form,  I  am  told  the  principle  [Ac]  articles.  Whether  it  hap¬ 
pens  through  the  neglect  or  connivance  of  the  Collector  or  his  depu¬ 
ties,  it  is  hard  to  say;  but  from  the  nature  of  the  place,  certain  it  is 
that  the  least  vigilance  on  their  part,  must  effectually  prevent  it.  But 
whatever  the  cause,  the  base  and  traitorous  transactions  ought  to  be 
exposed,  and  the  government  by  some  means  Informed  of  them.  It 
is  some  consolation,  however,  that  I  have  not  heard  of  one  republican 
being  implicated  in  the  business :  the  Collector  and  his  deputies ;  and 
all  Concerned  are  of  a  very  different  Character.49 

In  transmitting  to  Gallatin  the  intelligence  just  quoted, 
Jefferson  made  the  despairing  comment  that,  “To  prevent 
it  is  I  suppose  beyond  our  means,  but  we  must  try  to  harrass 
the  unprincipled  agents  and  punish  as  many  as  we  can.”50 
To  which  Gallatin  assented,  remarking  that  “the  danger  is 
much  greater  from  New  York  northwardly,  principally  from 
Massachusetts, — than  from  either  the  Delaware,  Chesapeak 
or  North  Carolina  .  .  .  until  Congress  meets,  we  must 

17  Jefferson  Papers.  Jefferson  to  the  Secretary  of  Navy,  July  16,  1808. 
On  August  16,  1808,  “The  Navy  reported  the  ff.  captures — Brig  Charles, 
Brig  Montezuma,  Sir  Wm  &  Samuel,  small  boats,  several  Boats  laden 
with  goods  and  Cotton  to  amount  of  Drs  80,000.’’ 

48  Ibid.,  Jefferson  to  A.  Gallatin,  July  19,  1808. 

"Ibid.,  Ez.  Hill  to  William  Duane.  Buffalo  Creek,  July  29,  1808. 

M  Ibid.,  Jefferson  to  A.  Gallatin,  July  29,  1808. 


SUCCESS  AND  FAILURE 


93 


depend  entirely  on  force  for  checking  this  manner  of  violat¬ 
ing  the  law.”51  For  this  critical  situation  he  blamed  defects 
in  the  original  law,  laxity  on  the  part  of  the  collectors  on 
Lake  Ontario,  avarice  among  the  border  dwellers,  and  con¬ 
spiracy  among  their  Federalist  leaders.  He  repeats  that 
force  alone  will  subdue  all  this  stubbornness,  but  rather 
defends  the  wicked  for  not  knowing  where  to  turn  amid 
the  confusion  of  orders,  decrees,  and  embargo.  They 
are  almost  as  sinned  against  as  sinning,  for,  owing  to  the 
lack  of  “a  single  object  which  might  rouse  their  patriotism 
&  unite  their  passions  &  affections,  selfishness  has  assumed 
the  reigns  in  several  quarters.”52  From  all  of  which,  Galla¬ 
tin  draws  the  inevitable  conclusion  that  when  Congress  re¬ 
assembles,  it  “must  either  invest  the  Executive  with  the 
most  arbitrary  powers  &  sufficient  force  to  carry  the  Em¬ 
bargo  into  effect  or  give  it  up  altogether.  ...  I  see 
no  alternative  but  war.”53 

Jefferson  evidently  recognized  the  force  of  these  con¬ 
siderations,  for  he  dismissed  the  faithless  collector  at  New 
Bedford,  Massachusetts,54  urged  that  his  case  be  made  an 
•example,  and  invited  Dearborn,  as  we  have  seen  elsewhere, 
to  be  ready  for  instant  action.55  In  New  York,  however, 
where  opposition  to  the  federal  authorities  fell  little  short 
of  rebellion,  he  met  a  stumbling  block  in  Governor  Tompkins. 
The  collector  at  Oswego,  unable  to  enforce  the  federal 
regulations,  had  appealed  for  some  detachments  of  militia, 
on  the  plea  that  the  opposition  amounted  to  armed  insur¬ 
rection.  But  Tompkins,  who  had  no  desire  to  risk  the 
unpopularity  of  calling  out  state  troops  to  enforce  a  federal 
law  odious  to  so  many  citizens,  wrote  Jefferson  that  the 

51  Jefferson  Papers.  A.  Gallatin  to  Jefferson,  July  29,  1808. 

62  Ibid. 

63  Ibid. 

M  Ibid.,  Jefferson  to  S.  H.  Smith,  August  2,  1808. 

35  Ibid.,  Jefferson  to  General  Dearborn,  August  9,  1808. 


94 


JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


collector  had  overstated  the  case  in  order  to  secure  the  as¬ 
sistance  which  the  militia  law  of  the  state  did  not  warrant 
him  in  sending.56 

To  which  Jefferson  replied: 

this  may  not  be  an  insurrection  in  the  popular  sense  of  the  word 
but  being  arrayed  in  war-like  manner,  actually  committing  acts  of 
war ;  and  persevering  systematically  in  defiance  of  the  public  author¬ 
ity,  brings  it  so  fully  within  the  legal  definition  of  an  insurrection, 
that  I  should  not  hesitate  to  issue  a  proclamation  were  I  not  re¬ 
strained  by  motives  of  which  Y.E.  seems  to  be  apprised.57 

Gallatin  also  took  the  view  that  “The  affair  at  Oswego 
has  broken  into  insurrection.”58  But  Tompkins  refused  to 
be  convinced.  He  held  to  a  pacific  view  of  the  question. 
In  this,  of  course,  he  was  in  philosophical  agreement  with 
Jefferson  himself,  but  his  comfortable  theorizing  ignored 
the  very  palpable  fact  that  Oswego  and  its  neighbors  were 
in  open  rebellion.  Tompkins  wanted  to  try  court  action 
before  proceeding  to  force  : 

It  is  desirable  that  some  competent  legal  character  be  sent  to  those 
places  where  violations  of  the  Embargo  laws  are  most  frequent  for 
the  purpose  of  assisting  the  Collectors  with  advice  and  collecting 
and  forwarding  the  requisite  testimony  to  convict  the  offenders  in 
the  Courts  of  the  United  States.  I  am  persuaded  a  few  prosecu¬ 
tions  and  convictions  would  have  a  greater  tendency  to  make  the 
laws  respected  than  the  appearance  of  a  Military  force.59 

Nevertheless,  although  he  moved  with  reluctance  along 
the  thorny  path  of  unpopularity,  Tompkins  did  not,  like 
his  Massachusetts  confrere,  place  actual  obstacles  in  the 
way  of  the  law.  And  Gallatin  was  able  to  inform  the  Presi¬ 
dent  by  the  middle  of  September  that : 

With  the  assistance  of  Govr.  Tompkins  &  of  Gen.  Wilkinson, 
militia  &  regulars  have  arrived  or  are  on  their  march  to  the  Lakes, 
&  I  hope  that  by  the  1st  of  Octer.  everything  will  be  there  in  toler- 

“  Jefferson  Papers.  Governor  Tompkins  to  Jefferson,  August  9,  1808. 

57  Ibid.,  Jefferson  to  Governor  Tompkins,  August  — ,  1808. 

“  Ibid.,  A.  Gallatin  to  Jefferson,  August  17,  1808. 

“  Ibid.,  Governor  Tompkins  to  Jefferson,  August  22,  1808. 


SUCCESS  AND  FAILURE 


95 


able  order,  &  the  militia  relieved  every  where  but  in  Vermont  by 
the  regulars.  Nothing  new  or  extraordinary  from  New  England 
or  any  other  quarter.  I  did  find  it  difficult  to  have  the  necessary 
prosecutions  instituted  in  the  northern  part  of  this  State.  [New 
York]  But  the  district  Atty.  of  Maine  has  by  going  himself  to 
Passamaquoddy,  collecting  evidence,  instituting  suits  &c  restored 
order  in  that  quarter.60 

Travelers  testified  to  the  effect  produced  by  this  vigor¬ 
ous  conduct.  Thus  one  friend  of  the  administration,  just 
returned  from  a  trip  to  northern  New  York,  describes  for 
Jefferson’s  benefit  his  experiences  en  route :  “The  22nd  Aug¬ 
ust  retd.  &  embarked  at  Cumberland  Heart  in  a  sloop  having 
on  board  66  bbls.  ashes  &  9  Firkins  Butter  seized  the  day 
before  by  Gen.  Woolsey  for  attempting  to  pass  the  line  to 
Canada.”61  He  reports  a  conversation  with  a  traveller 
from  Quebec  who  told  him  “That  provisions  were  scarce; 
that  the  pork  of  which  I  had  seen  so  much,  was  principally 
for  Quebec,  from  whence  it  was  shipped  to  Halifax,  the  W. 
Indies,  &c.  That  pot-ash  had  actually  been  worth  $300 
three  hundred  dollars  per  Ton,  but  was  now  lower;  that  bills 
on  London  were  at  a  discount  of  7  per  cent.  &  that  he  had 
met  at  St.  John’s  $50,000  going  from  New  YTork  to  pur¬ 
chase  bills.  He  also  mentioned  the  smuggling  of  English 
goods  into  Massachusetts  from  the  province  with  this  obser¬ 
vation,  that  it  would  destroy  all  political  allegiance  &  moral¬ 
ity,  &  that  the  present  generation  would  learn  a  pernicious 
trade,  which  they  would  not  soon  forget,  but  very  probably 
teach  it  to  the  next.”62  He  concludes  by  expressing  his  own 
opinion  that  “Avarice  both  in  the  Sea  ports  &  in  the  remote 
parts  of  this  State  appears  to  have  effected  (sic)  16-20ths 
of  the  people.”63  Which  was  another  way  of  saying  that 
only  one  New  Yorker  in  five  favored  the  embargo. 

“Jefferson  Papers.  A.  Gallatin  to  Jefferson,  September  14,  1808. 

61  Ibid.,  Charles  Connell  to  Jefferson,  New  York,  September  29,  1808. 

"  Ibid. 

M  Ibid. 


JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


Considering  the  embargo  from  the  purely  administra¬ 
tive  side,  one  rather  marvels  at  its  efficiency.  The  permits 
to  the  governors  had  resulted  in  only  one  serious  mishap, 
the  weak  and  timid  conduct  of  Sullivan.  The  coastwise 
trade,  so  threatening  in  its  possibilities,  with  British  ships  in 
the  offing  ready  to  transfer  cargoes  if  no  other  means 
afforded,  had  presented  no  serious  difficulties,  thanks  to  the 
moderate  but  well  executed  regulations  of  Gallatin.  A  state 
bordering  on  if  not  actually  amounting  to  insurrection  had 
developed,  to  be  sure,  on  the  northern  frontier.  But  here 
Jefferson  had  acted  with  unwonted  energy — a  marked  ad¬ 
vance  over  his  executive  methods  in  Revolutionary  Vir¬ 
ginia.  A  combination  of  tact  in  his  personal  relations  with 
local  authorities  and  an  unbending  determination  to  enforce 
the  law  at  all  hazards,  lifted  Jefferson  into  the  ranks  of  really 
great  executives.  The  student  of  the  period  should  not 
withhold  from  Jefferson  his  due  meed  of  praise  for  excel¬ 
lence  in  an  unexpected  field. 

There  remains  to  consider,  before  we  turn  to  the  effect 
produced  by  this  competent  administration  of  the  embargo 
upon  the  European  nations  against  which  it  was  aimed,  a 
brief  synopsis  of  how  the  country  as  a  whole  responded 
to  the  prolongation  of  the  embargo  and  what  progress,  if 
any,  it  made  along  those  lines  which  the  embargo  might  be 
expected  to  stimulate. 

Reports  concerning  domestic  conditions  varied  greatly, 
not  only  by  districtsT^uTTn  accordance  with  the  tempera¬ 
ment  of  their  senders.  Colonel  Tatham,  for  example,  who 
had  written  so  glowingly  about  the  North  Carolina  planters, 
told  quite  a  different  tale  about  the  commercial  men  of  his 
neighborhood.  He  found  them  generally  opposed  to  the 
government  and  much  imbued  with  the  doctrines  of  Picker¬ 
ing,  whose  pamphlet  had  been  widely  circulated  about  New- 


SUCCESS  AND  FAILURE 


bern.64  “So  far  as  I  can  judge,  the  Majority  of  our  Citi- 
zens  in  Town  are  as  loyal  subjects  to  John  Bull,  in  their 
hearts,  as  any  about  St.  James’s ;  and  would  willingly  mark 
similar  lines  of  distinction  in  society.”65  He  notes  a  dis¬ 
position  of  sailors  to  turn  to  agricultural  pursuits  and  prays 
that  their  example  may  be  generally  followed.66 

Virginia  sentiment  was  more  reassuring,  at  least  as  re¬ 
ported  by  William  Burwell,  now  returned  from  Congress  to 
his  district.  He  assured  Jefferson  that  his  constituents 
would  continue  to  bear  the  embargo  with  patience  so  lone 
as  they  believed  it  the  only  substitute  for  war.  Merchants 
were  dealing  gently  with  their  customers,  and  few  lawsuits 
were  pending — a  circumstance  contributing  not  a  little  to  the 
tranquillity  of  the  people  under  “a  state  of  things  however 
necessary,  &  unavoidable,  extremely  burthensome.”67  Bur- 
well  warned  the  President  that  it  would  be  hopeless  to  con¬ 
tinue  the  embargo  beyond  fall,  when  it  would  be  “indispen- 
sibly  necessary  to  remove  the  E.  &  give  a  new  direction  to 
the  energies  of  the  nation.”68 

Jefferson  had  an  opportunity  on  his  journey  to  Monti- 
cello  to  test  for  himself  the  loyalty  of  Virginia  to  the  em¬ 
bargo.  He  found  the  people  unanimous  in  preferring  em¬ 
bargo  to  war  and  sanguine  in  anticipating  a  collapse  of  Brit¬ 
ish  tyranny  and  the  repeal  of  the  Orders  in  Council.69  But 
this  was  in  May;  before  Congress  reconvened,  sentiment 
seems  rather  to  have  veered.  Such,  at  any  rate,  was  the 
opinion  of  Wilson  Cary  Nicholas,  a  friend  of  Jefferson,  who 
wrote  him  on  the  eve  of  the  new  session : 


"Jefferson  Papers.  Wm.  Tatham  to  Jefferson,  Craven  County,  North 
Carolina,  May  6,  1808. 

65  Ibid. 

66  Ibid. 

<”  Ibid.,  Wm.  A.  Burwell  to  Jefferson,  May  21,  1808. 

68  Ibid. 

80  Ibid.,  Jefferson  to  Mr.  Lieper,  May  25,  1808. 


98  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 

From  the  experiment  we  have  made,  I  think  there  is  not  only  ex¬ 
cuse  to  distrust  the  firmness  of  our  own  people,  but  to  doubt  its 
being  practicable  to  execute  the  law  in  a  way  to  make  it  produce 
much  effect  abroad.  .  .  .  But  if  the  complete  execution  of  it 

and  the  support  of  the  people  cannot  be  counted  upon,  it  will  neither 
answer  our  purpose,  nor  will  it  be  practicable  to  retain  it.70 

The  context  of  Nicholas’s  letter  suggests,  however,  that 
this  view  proceeded  from  a  general  survey  of  the  Union 
rather  than  of  strictly  Virginia  sentiment.  Certainly  that 
was  not  the  attitude  of  one  Virginia  family,  the  Gunnells. 
Report  had  gone  out  that  this  entire  clan  had  gone  over  to 
the  Federalist  opinion.  Such  slander  demanded  prompt 
denial,  and  one  of  the  family  rose  to  champion  the  honor  of 
his  kindred: 

.  .  .  feeling  as  I  do  the  reproach  of  such  a  report,  I  have  therefore 
taken  the  liberty  to  trouble  you  with  this  letter  to  contradict  the 
report  so  far  as  it  relates  to  myself  in  the  most  pointed  manner  and 
believe  I  may  do  the  same  with  respect  to  most  of  the  name,  or  per¬ 
haps  all  of  them,  for  indeed  I  dont  know  of  any  of  the  Family  that 
has  changed  their  sentiments  relating  to  the  Government,  tho  there 
are  some  I  have  not  seen  since  the  passage  of  the  Embargo  Law 
.  .  .  The  Embargo  certainly  is  a  wise  measure  as  a  preven¬ 

tative  against  French  aggression  as  well  as  against  British  taxation 
plunder  and  massacrees  and  should  Congress  think  well  to  prolong 
the  Embargo  seven  years  and  the  belligerent  powers  should  persist 
in  their  aggressions  that  long  I  should  not  withdraw  my  confidence 
but  should  think  the  prolongation  wise  provided  War  could  not  be 
waged  to  better  advantage.71 

If  Virginia  was  wholly  loyal,  there  was  at  least  a  shadow 
of  doubt.  In  South  Carolina,  there  was  none.  As  the 
House  of  Representatives  expressed  it,  “Thomas  Jefferson, 
President  of  the  United  States  in  recommending,  and  the 
Congress  of  the  United  States  in  passing  the  Acts  imposing 
and  enforcing  the  Embargo,  have  deserved  well  of  their 
Country.”12  Nor  could  it  be  said  that  this  was  mere  lip 

70  Jefferson  Papers.  Wilson  Cary  Nicholas  to  T.  Jefferson,  October 
20,  1808. 

"Ibid.,  Robert  Gunnell  to  Jefferson.  Minorca,  Fairfax  County,  Vir¬ 
ginia,  October  29,  1808. 

"Ibid.,  House  of  Representatives  of  South  Carolina,  June  28,  1808. 


SUCCESS  AND  FAILURE 


99 


service  from  a  section  which  had  not  suffered,73  for  South 
Carolina,  only  less  than  New  England  and  the  ports  of 
Philadelphia  and  Baltimore,  was  a  commercial  center.  At 
all  events,  it  strengthened  Jefferson’s  determination  to  press 
the  experiment  to  the  utmost.  It  was  as  an  investigator 
in  a  huge  laboratory  of  political  science  that  he  wrote  to 
Governor  Pinckney :  “I  am  determined  to  exert  every 
power  the  law  has  vested  in  me  for  its  vigorous  fulfillment. 
That  we  may  know  the  full  value  and  effect  of  the  measure 
on  any  future  occasion  on  which  a  resort  to  it  might  be 
contemplated.”74 

South  Carolina  was,  in  truth,  one  of  the  surprises  of 
the  year.  Where  opposition  was  expected,  enthusiasm 
reigned,  and  votes  told  the  tale.  The  old  stronghold  of 
Federalism  was  now  a  Republican  fortress,  and  Jefferson 
could  count  as  one  of  his  greatest  assets  the  unwavering 
loyalty  of  his  Palmetto  admirers.  “Eight  years  are  now 
nearly  ended,”  wrote  Peter  Freneau,  in  September, 

since  69  members  of  our  Legislature  voted  that  you,  Sir,  ought  not 
to  be  the  president  of  the  United  States,  fortunately  for  America 
87  said  otherwise ;  One  year  ago  when  the  Legislature  resolved 
that  you  had  deserved  well  of  the  Country,  there  were  but  six 
members  to  be  found  in  the  negative,  and  in  June  last,  when  a  reso¬ 
lution  was  brought  forward  approving  of  the  reasons  you  gave  for 
recommending  the  Embargo,  not  one  arose  in  opposition.  This 
change  in  the  minds  of  our  Legislature,  so  honorable  to  your  admin¬ 
istration,  is,  in  my  opinion,  a  complete  refutation  of  all  the  abuse  the 
federal  presses  have  abounded  with,  and  if  the  authors  of  it  could 
possibly  have  the  feelings  of  honest  men  would  drive  them  to 
despair.  .  .  .  The  Embargo  bears  heavy  on  us,  but  there  are 

no  people,  generally  speaking,  who  bear  it  more  cheerfully,  they  are 
convinced  that  it  was  the  only  prudent  measure  that  could  be  pur¬ 
sued  at  the  time.75 

"Jefferson  Papers.  Jos.  Alston,  Speaker  of  the  House  of  Repre¬ 
sentatives  of  South  Carolina,  to  Jefferson,  July  6,  1808. 

14  Ibid.,  Jefferson  to  Pinckney,  July  18,  1808. 

15  Ibid.,  Peter  Freneau  to  Jefferson,  Charleston,  South  Carolina,  Sep¬ 
tember  18,  1808. 


100  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


Equally  gratifying  must  have  been  assurances  of  fidel¬ 
ity  from  New  Orleans,  for  no  one  knew  better  than  Jeffer¬ 
son  how  tenuous  had  been  the  thread  of  loyalty  binding  the 
Southwest  to  the  Union,  and  that  but  a  few  years  earlier. 
With  flowing  heart  he  thanked  the  “Legislative  Council  and 
House  of  Representatives  of  the  territory  of  Orleans”  for 
their  willingness  to  “submit  to  whatever  sacrifices  &  priva¬ 
tions  may  be  necessary  for  vindicating  the  rights  the  honor, 
&  independance  [jic]  of  our  nation.”76 

From  Mississippi  came  protestations  of  devotion  to  the 
principle  of  the  embargo,  but  a  plea  to  escape  its  conse¬ 
quences.  Mississippi  was  in  the  infancy  of  its  agricultural 
and  commercial  life,  and  upon  it  the  embargo  fell  like  a 
blight.  One  cannot  fail  to  sympathize  with  the  pioneers  as 
one  reads  their  memorial  to  the  President : 

Cotton  is  the  staple  commodity  of  our  Country.  On  it  alone  we  de¬ 
pend  for  Cash.  For  this  reason  every  Planter  directs  his  efforts  to 
that  particular  article.  With  this  medium  in  our  Barnes,  we  were 
prepared  to  meet  the  demands  of  Government  &  take  one  more  step 
toward  the  fee  simple  title  but  these  pleasing  anticipations  have  been 
cut  off  from  every  hope  of  payment  by  an  Act  of  that  Government 
to  which  they  are  indebted.  It  has  been  deemed  expedient  to  sus¬ 
pend  by  Embargo  our  Mercantile  operations,  and  thereby  our  pro¬ 
duce  lies  unsold  and  unsaleable  in  our  Barns.  The  Policy  of  this 
measure  is  no  where  admired  more  than  by  the  people  of  this  Ter¬ 
ritory  the  promptitude  with  which  it  is  maintained  merits  their 
fullest  approbation  &  Support  but  at  the  same  time  we  admire  the 
Wisdom  &  Energy  of  the  measure  we  deplore  the  severe  and  des¬ 
tructive  effect  which  will  inevitably  accompany  the  operation  of  the 
Law  if  the  payments  due  to  the  United  States  are  rigidly  executed. 
We  therefore  humbly  solicit  the  parental  interposition  of  the  Gen¬ 
eral  Government  and  in  the  warmth  of  your  highest  confidence  ask 
of  the  Government  an  extension  of  the  time  for  the  payment  of  the 
first  instalment.77 

One  marvels  at  the  detachment  of  people  who  could 
rise  above  the  prospect  of  utter  ruin  to  examine  on  its  own 

76  Jefferson  Papers.  Jefferson  to  the  Legislative,  Council  and  House 
of  Representatives  of  the  territory  of  Orleans,  June  18,  1808. 

"Memorial  of  the  House  of  Representatives  of  the  Mississippi  Ter¬ 
ritory,  September  19,  1808. 


SUCCESS  AND  FAILURE 


101 


>V 


nerits  the  cause  of  their  sufferings,  and  then  pronounce  it 
a  measure  of  wisdom.  Yet  the  memorial  of  the  legislature 
s  confirmed  from  a  private  source.  “Everybody  wishes  the 
Embargo  raised :  but  not  until  the  object  for  which  it  was 
layed  is  affected  [ffc]  ;  or  it  is  found  insufficient  to  affect 
it.”78 

Surveying  the  country  south  of  the  Potomac,  the  Presi 
dent  might  conclude  that  the  people  bore  their  yoke  with 
patience.  Sentiment  was  submissive  where  it  was  not  en¬ 
thusiastic,  and  there  was  every  disposition  to  give  the  em¬ 
bargo  a  fair  test.  The  South  was  to  Jefferson  a  rod  of  com¬ 
fort  as  he  faced  the  Federalists  of  New  England,  but  even 
there  he  did  not  lack  friends. 

New  England,  as  we  have  seen,  furnished  a  very  special 
problem.  Here  the  embargo  worked  its  heaviest  injuries^ 
yet  here  were  the  best  opportunities  for  its  evasion  and  a 
political  organization  to  uphold  the  law  breaker.  That  the 
embargo  had  many  enemies  is  not  so  surprising  as  that 
it  had  many  friends.  These  latter,  while  they  could  not 
prevent  breaches  of  the  peace,  did  keep  matters  from 
going  to  the  last  extremity  of  organized  rebellion.  The 
troubles  of  the  period  constitute  one  of  the  most  dramatic 
chapters  in  the  history  of  the  section.  But  they  will  be 
touched  upon  here  only  in  so  far  as  allusions  to  them  in 
the  Jefferson  Papers  indicate  that  the  President  was  influ¬ 
enced  by  them  in  the  adherence  to  his  policy. 

The  most  detailed  accounts  which  Jefferson  received  were 
from  the  agricultural  state  of  Vermont  and  the  commercial 
state  of  Massachusetts.  From  the  former  came  an  elab¬ 
orate  relation  of  the  low  prices  of  agricultural  goods  for 
want  of  a  market,  the  lawsuits  by  which  creditors  attempted 
to  collect  from  impoverished  debtors,  the  distress  of  the 
entire  debtor  class,  the  judgments  against  property  to  meet 

78  Jefferson  Papers.  John  Sibley  to  General  Dearborne.  Natchi¬ 
toches,  October  12,  1808. 


102  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 

small  claims,  the  increase  of  imprisonment  for  debt,  and  the 
temptation  for  the  more  reckless  to  recoup  their  fortunes  by 
smuggling  along  Lake  Champlain,  where  price  inducements 
were  high.  Nor  did  the  evil  stop  with  this.  Defiance  of  law 
brought  inevitable  punishment.  Volunteers  were  called  for; 
these  failing,  troops  were  drafted;  and  “military  law  with 
all  its  terrific  attendants  stalks  before  them  and  stares  them 
in  the  Face  and  the  Embargo  is  Cursed  and  Recursed  again 
and  again.”  Vermont  would  continue  in  this  wretched 
state  until  some  market  was  found  for  her  produce.  The 
way  to  right  matters  would  be  to  use  the  money  spent  on 
coercing  the  state  in  finding  employment  and  in  providing 
an  artificial  market  until  normal  trade  might  be  resumed.79 

While  Vermont  was  thus  groaning  in  travail,  her  neigh¬ 
bor  of  Massachusetts  was  bent  on  righting  her  own  wrongs. 
In  the  senatorial  elections,  the  anti-embargo  men  seated  their 
candidate,  James  Lloyd,  by  a  vote  of  two  hundred  and 
forty-six  as  against  the  two  hundred  and  thirteen  cast  for 
John  Quincy  Adams,  and,  although  it  was  six  months  before 
his  term  expired,  the  latter  immediately  resigned.80 

A  war  of  pamphleteers  developed  in  Massachusetts,  and 
the  circulation  of  anti-embargo  petitions  went  on  at  a  merry 
pace.  Even  the  untiring  Jefferson  found  it  impossible  to 
reply  to  them  all  in  long  hand  and  caused  an  edition  of  one 
hundred  and  fifty  copies  of  form  letters  to  be  struck  off  for 
this  one  branch  of  his  correspondence.  One  type  of  reply 
was  sent  to  the  petitioners  for  an  immediate  suspension  of  the 
embargo  by  executive  order.  The  other  type  strove  to  reach 

79  Jefferson  Papers.  Samuel  Harrison  to  Jefferson,  Chittenden,  Rut¬ 
land  County,  Vermont,  May  28,  1808.  For  a  parallel  account  with  differ¬ 
ent  accent,  see  William  Pope  to  Jefferson.  Montpelier,  September  8, 
1808.  “It  is  said  that  the  merchants  at  least  sum  of  them,  are  very  ac¬ 
tively  engaged  in  getting  the  new  crop  of  wheat  to  smuggle  that,  like  they 
did  the  last  years  crop,  the  only  complaint  in  the  Country,  is  that  those 
traitors  should  be  suffered  to  violate  the  laws  with  impunity,  like  Burr; 
get  rich  by  continually  practiseing  treason,  against  their  Country ;  while 
the  virtuous  patriot  should  suffer  poverty  distress  and  privation.” 

80  Ibid.,  Governor  James  Sullivan  to  Jefferson,  June  3,  1808. 


SUCCESS  AND  FAILURE 


103 


advocates  of  “the  calling  of  Congress  if  my  power  of  sus¬ 
pension  is  doubted.”81 

These  petitions,  it  may  be  noted,  were  not,  even  in 
Massachusetts,  uniformly  hostile  to  the  embargo.  The  ship 
builders  of  Plymouth  furnish  a  case  in  point.  They  described 
at  length  the  hush  which  had  fallen  over  erstwhile  hives  of 
industry,  but  assured  the  President  that  : 

We  venerate  the  laws  of  our  country,  we  respect  its  constituted 
authorities,  we  will  submit  to  every  privation  necessary  to  preserve 
our  just  rights  and  Independence  as  a  nation — We  bow  in  submis¬ 
sion  to  your  superior  wisdom  and  patriotism,  and  with  the  most 
sincere  confidence  in  your  integrity  and  good  conduct,  we  pledge 
ourselves  to  support  the  measures  of  the  present  administration  of 
our  national  government.82  » 

But  if  the  friends  of  Jefferson  were  numerous,  his  ene¬ 
mies  were  active,  and  the  New  England  mail  brought  him 
vilification  in  plenty.  One  epistle,  commencing  with  the 
friendly  salutation,  “You  Infernal  Villain,”  quite  lives  up  to 
one’s  anticipations.  “How  much  longer  are  you  going  to 
keep  this  damned  Embargo  on  to  starve  us  poor  people 
one  of  my  children  has  already  starved  to  death  of  which 
I  [am]  ashamed  and  declared  that  it  died  of  apoplexy.” 
There  follows  a  fierce  story  of  hardships  and  a  wish  that 
Jefferson  may  have  the  same  luck.  “I  am  a  Federalist.”83 

Of  broader  political  bearing  was  confirmation  from  a 
Connecticut  source  of  the  propaganda  which  Sullivan  had 
long  declared  to  be  rampant : 

.  .  .  a  few  weeks  since  a  Reverend  D.D.  from  the  State  of  Mas¬ 

sachusetts,  and  then  standing  in  the  Desk  of  the  House,  where  1 
usually  attend  divine  worship,  after  describing  the  administration 
of  the  general  government  in  colours  suited  to  his  imagination; 
declared  that  we  ought  no  longer  to  Confederate  in  such  a  Confeder- 

81  Jefferson  Papers.  Jefferson  to  S.  H.  Smith,  September  9,  1808. 

83  Ibid.,  Elijah  Haywood  to  Jefferson.  Hanover,  Plymouth  County, 
Mass.,  October  10,  1808. 

83  Thomas  Jefferson  Correspondence.  Printed  from  the  Originals  in 
the  Collections  of  Wm.  K.  Bixby,  p.  166.  From  John  Lane  Jones,  Bos¬ 
ton,  August  8,  1808. 


104  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 

ation.  this  was  the  first  time  I  had  heard  the  sentiment  avowed  be¬ 
fore  a  public  assembly;  tho  I  had  for  about  four  years  perceived 
the  leading  Federalist [s]  cautiously  beating  the  pulse  of  the  people 
to  the  tune  of  separation:  the  great  body  of  the  people,  even 
Federalist,  are  still  opposed  to  such  a  step,  and  did  they  but  fully 
see  its  object,  they  would  execrate  its  advocates,  but  they  are 
impelled  forward  by  the  great  phalanx  of  the  pulpit  the  bar  and  the 
Monied  Interest  of  New  England,  the  headquarters  of  this  spirit 
is  to  be  found  in  the  Town  of  Boston,  and  there  is  not  a  doubt  to  my 
mind  what  the  object  is  getting  Town  Meetings,  to  express  senti¬ 
ments  respecting  the  Embargo  is  not  to  effect  its  removal ;  but  with 
a  view  of  increasing  discontents  and  wanton  calumnies,  and  augment¬ 
ing  murmurs  to  a  state  of  unworthy  disafection  to  the  government 
and  to  work  up  such  a  state  of  irritation  as  will  furnish  them  with 
a  favourable  opportunity  to  boldly  avow  their  objects,  the  Centinel, 
Gazette  and  Paladium  of  Boston  since  the  1st  Sept  carries  strong 
evidence  that  the  late  success  of  Federalism  in  New  England  has 
thrown  them  off  their  guard  and  if  the  Vermont  election  (which  is 
undoubtedly  Republican)  does  not  make  them  more  cautious  and 
less  sanguine;  they  may  rouse  the  spirit  of  an  indignant  people  be¬ 
fore  they  are  aware  of  it.84 

New  England  was,  however,  far  from  a  unit  in  its  hostil¬ 
ity  to  the  embargo.  For  in  June,  when  the  difficulties  of 
enforcing  the  law  were  multiplying,  the  legislature  of  New 
Hampshire  thought  it  the  best  of  all  possible  times  to  tender 
its  approbation,  assuring  Jefferson  that  “We  will  suffer  any 
privations  rather  than  submit  to  degradation,  and  will  co¬ 
operate  with  the  General  Government  in  all  its  measures.”85 
In  spite  of  the  growing  burden,  New  Hampshire  remained 
loyal  throughout  the  summer,  if  one  may  accept  the  testi¬ 
mony  of  two  social  extremes,  one  an  almost  illiterate 
soldier,  the  other  the  governor  of  the  state,  sworn  to  defend 
her  integrity  against  all  her  foemen,  even  the  emissaries 
of  the  Essex  Junto.  The  former,  though  willing  for  the 
embargo  to  continue,  pleads  for  a  moratorium  on  debts ;  the 

M  Op.  cit..  p.  171.  Elisha  Tracy,  of  Norwich,  Connecticut,  to  Jefferson, 
September  15,  1808. 

“Jefferson  Papers.  Resolutions  of  the  Legislature  of  New  Hamp¬ 
shire  June  14,  1808.  Cf.,  also  a  letter  of  Win.  Plumer  to  Jefferson. 
Epping,  New  Hampshire,  July  22,  1808:  “I  most  cordially  approve  of 
the  embargo,  &  the  raising  of  the  additional  army,”  etc 


SUCCESS  AND  FAILURE 


105 


latter  decries  the  money  with  which  the  Federalists  are  try¬ 
ing  to  buy  up  the  opinion  of  the  state.  The  backwoodsman 
secures  the  effect  of  pathos  by  a  dialect  redolent  of  local 
color : 

Sir  I  have  respected  your  laws  and  your  government  for 
the  younited  Stats  of  merricia  and  I  wish  to  have  you  continue 
your  laws  and  goverment  and  keep  the  embargo  on  til  you  see  fit 
to  take  it  off,  though  it  is  very  trying  to  the  people  in  this  country 
about  thare  debts  and  it  is  my  wish  that  you  would  make  some  laws  to 
pay  our  debts  without  paing  the  money  and  if  the  is  a  law  to  pay  with 
produce  &  cattle  and  horses  I  think  that  the  orter  be  a  tender  act  so 
we  can  pay  our  debts  without  monay  I  sopose  that  you  think  strange 
of  my  writing  to  you  but  the  reason  of  my  writing  is  becase  I  have  a 
father  and  a  mother  and  thay  cant  take  care  of  them  selves  and  as 
times  are  I  cant  pay  for  thare  place  so  that  we  could  live  &  respect 
your  laws  and  I  hope  that  you  will  take  som  notis  of  me,  and  write 
to  me  as  soon  as  you  get  my  letter  so  I  may  know  if  your  oner  will 
do  a  little  for  me, 

Jonathan  Hall  Capt.86 

The  governor  was  the  friendly  Langdon,  first  of  the 
warrant  purveyors  to  reply  to  Jefferson.  He  stood  firmly 
by  the  colors : 

Every  candid  and  honest  man  must  acknowledge  the  embargo  to  be 
a  measure,  that  should  and  ought,  to  have  been  gone  into,  at  the 
very  time  it  took  place,  we  must  see  that  it  has  saved  to  our  Country 
many  millions  of  dollars  and  thousands  of  men  and  ships.  .  .  . 
This  Junto  [Essex],  are  at  this  moment  sending  emissaries  into 
every  Town  in  this  State,  and  I  believe  in  other  States,  to  effect  the 
choice  of  federal  Representatives  to  Congress  no  pains  or  money  is 
spared  to  bring  about  a  change  of  sentiment  among  the  people ; 

87 

Federalist  influences,  backed  by  the  power  of  money, 
finally  carried  the  day  in  the  state  elections,  and  New  Hamp¬ 
shire  was  lost  to  the  Jeffersonians.88  As  Caesar  Rodney 
diagnosed  it,  “our  friends  in  New  Hampshire  have  been  too 
confident  &  have  suffered  themselves  to  be  taken  by  sur- 

86  Jefferson  Papers.  Capt.  Jonathan  Hall  to  Jefferson.  Charlestown, 
New  Hampshire,  August  12,  1808. 

81  Ibid.,  John  Langdon  to  Jefferson,  August  13,  1808. 

88 Ibid.,  Caesar  A.  Rodney  to  Jefferson,  Wilmington,  September  16, 

1808. 


106  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


prise.”  The  blow  was  all  the  more  severe  because  the  popu¬ 
lation  of  New  Hampshire  was  of  the  backwoods  type,  on 
which  Jefferson  relied  for  support  against  the  more  sophis¬ 
ticated  influences  of  an  effete  civilization  as  represented  by 
the  merchant  princes  of  Newport  or  Salem. 

If  the  entire  strength  of  the  country  had  been  confined 
to  the  Southern  States  and  New  England,  the  great  experi¬ 
ment  could  never  have  been  carried  to  the  lengths  which  it 
reached.  But  there  was  a  vast  region  in  between,  whose 
opinion  might  easily  prove  decisive.  The  action  of  New 
York  has  already  been  sketched.  The  position  of  the  state 
was  essentially  that  of  her  New  England  neighbors.  Unless 
Pennsylvania,  the  greatest  state  of  the  middle  group,  could 
be  reckoned  upon  as  friendly,  the  balance  would  certainly  lie 
with  the  opposition. 

In  Pennsylvania,  as  elsewhere,  opinion  was  of  course 
divided.  There  were  strong  commercial  and  aristocratic 
elements  in  the  state  who  found  at  best  little  to  admire  in 
Republicanism ;  who  perhaps  even  welcomed  ruin  as  the 
fulfillment  of  their  prophecies.  Many  of  these  foes  of 
Jefferson  were  to  be  found  among  the  older  Quaker  stock, 
and  the  coldness  of  that  sect  puzzled  Jefferson  as  much  as 
it  annoyed  him.  His  insistence  upon  religious  toleration 
had  made  him  enemies  in  some  quarters,  but  had  raised  up 
friends  in  others.  That  it  had  not  won  over  the  Quakers 
as  a  body  was  to  Jefferson  a  source  of  amazement,  for 
they,  if  any,  had  suffered  at  the  hands  of  the  intolerant.  He 
seized  upon  the  opportunity  afforded  by  a  testimonial  of 
approval  from  one  prominent  Quaker  to  rebuke  the  gener¬ 
ality  of  the  brethren : 

Th.  Jefferson  returns  his  thanks  to  Mr.  Franklin  for  the  address  to 
the  society  of  friends  which  he  was  so  kind  as  to  send  him.  The 
appeal  both  to  facts  and  principles  is  strong,  and  their  consistency 
will  require  an  able  advocate  conscious  that  the  present  adminis¬ 
tration  has  been  essentially  pacific,  and  that  in  all  questions  of  im¬ 
portance  it  has  been  governed  by  the  identical  principles  professed 


SUCCESS  AND  FAILURE 

by  that  society  it  has  been  quite  at  a  loss  to  conjecture  the  unknown 
cause  of  the  opposition  of  the  greater  part,  &  bare  neutrality  of  the 
rest.  The  hope  however  that  prejudices  would  at  length  give  way 
to  facts  has  never  been  entirely  extinguished  &  still  may  be  realized 
in  favor  of  another  administration.89 

Philadelphia,  as  a  great  seaport,  was  naturally  the  center 
of  such  hostility  as  existed  in  the  state.  Men  felt  the  blows' 
of  the  embargo  and  did  not  hesitate  so  to  inform  the  author. 
A  vigorous  petition  was  dispatched  early  in  August  by 
the  seafaring  men  of  the  port,  persons  “engaged  in  the  Mer¬ 
cantile  service,  since  their  Infancy  with  few  exceptions,  and 
accustomed  only  to  conduct  ships  or  vessels  across  the  nrenn”— 
urging  an  amelioration  of  their  lot.90  /The  merchants  who 
usually  employed  them  also  found  cause  for  complaint  in  a 
permit  which  Jefferson  granted  to  a  Chinese,  supposedly 
a  Mandarin,  to  charter  a  ship  for  Canton  and  load  a  return 
cargo.  The  petitioners  affirmed  that  many  of  them  had 
themselves  lived  in  Canton  and  knew  the  Chinese  in  ques¬ 
tion  to  be  “a  petty  shopkeeper  in  Canton,  utterly  incapable 
of  giving  a  credit.”91 

An  individual  Philadelphian  contributed  the  verdict  that 
any  long  continuance  of  the  existing  conditions  would  men¬ 
ace  the  peace  of  the  Union.  War  would  be  less  ruinous  to 
the  Eastern  States  than  complete  stagnation  of  trade.  The 
planters  were  not  earning  even  the  rent  on  their  lands. 
Fishermen  were  debarred  from  other  ventures  by  the  ex¬ 
pectation  that  their  trade  might  reopen.  And  the  same  was 
true  of  ship  owners.92 

89  Jefferson  Papers.  Jefferson  to  Mr.  W.  Franklin,  June  22,  1808.  But 
cf.  Jos.  Binghurst  to  Jefferson,  Wilmington,  Delaware,  July  20,  1808:  “In 
this  place,  with  a  very  few  exceptions  the  Society  of  Friends  is  sincerely 
attached  to  our  present  administration.  I  hope  the  day  is  not  far  dis¬ 
tant  when  the  great  body  of  the  Society  will  rank  among  the  warmest 
supporters  of  the  pacific  and  dignified  measures  of  our  Government.” 

'"‘Ibid..,  Petition.  Philadelphia,  August  8,  1808/  A  second  petition 
from  a  similar  source  was  signed  August  10,  1808. 

”  Ibid.,  Philadelphia  Merchants  to  A.  Gallatin,  August  10,  1808. 

“  Ibid.,  Wm.  Montgomery  to  Jefferson,  Philadelphia,  August  16,  1808. 


108  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


But  seamen  and  shipowners  were  not  the  only  spokes¬ 
men  for  Philadelphia.  William  Short,  a  trusted  friend  of 
Jefferson,  wrote  more  encouragingly: 

And  this  City  has  really  acted  as  the  government  could  wish  on  the 
subject  of  the  embargo — I  speak  of  those  who  are  considered  as  of 
.•opposition  politics  &  who  are  numerous. — They  frequently  &  pub- 
-  licly  speak  their  approbation  of  the  measure,  their  determination 
®to  support  it,  &  if  on  a  jury  to  punish  with  rigor  the  violators  of  it. 
I  have  more  than  once  heard  it  affirmed  &  not  contradicted,  that  if 
the  merchants  of  this  City  were  assembled :  confined  to  Federalists 
^  alone  nine  out  of  ten  would  approve  the  embargo,  &  of  the  Tenth 
disapproving,  most  of  them  would  be  men  without  capital.93 

This  message  from  Short  was  balm  to  Jefferson.  He 
promptly  replied : 

I  am  much  pleased  with  the  account  you  give  of  the  sentiments  of 
the  federalists  of  Philadelphia  as  to  the  embargo,  and  they  are  not 
in  sentiment  with  the  insurgents  of  the  North,  the  papers  have 
lately  advanced  in  boldness  and  flagiciousness  [Ac]  beyond  even 
themselves,  such  daring  and  atrocious  lies  as  fill  the  3d  &  4th  col¬ 
umns  of  the  3d  page  of  the  U.  S.  Gazette  of  Aug.  31,  were  never 
before  I  believe  published  with  impunity  in  any  country.94 

The  truth  was  that,  in  the  very  capital  of  commerce,  the 
embargo  was  creating  a  substitute  therefor.  And  Penn¬ 
sylvania,  which  had  stood  firmly  by  Jefferson  for  seven  years, 
continued  faithful  even  to  the  end.  The  secret  of  content¬ 
ment  in  Philadelphia,  even  of  positive  enthusiasm,  was  the 
growth  of  manufactures.  This  growth  absorbed  a  capital 
which  elsewhere  was  stagnant.  Jefferson  appreciated  the 
political  as  well  as  the  economic  importance  of  diverting 
men’s  minds  from  brooding  over  their  losses  to  rejoicing 
over  their  gains,  and  he  took  a  constructive  interest  in 
Philadelphia  developments.  In  October,  1808,  for  example, 
he  sent  a  fleece  of  Iceland  wool  to  James  Ronaldson,  a  cor¬ 
respondent  in  Philadelphia,  “as  this  peculiar  wool  may  pos¬ 
sibly  be  useful  for  some  manufacture  here  ...  I  am 

“Jefferson  Papers.  Wm.  Short  to  Jefferson,  Philadelphia,  August 
27,  1808. 

M  Ibid,.,  Jefferson  to  Wm.  Short,  September  6,  1808. 


SUCCESS  AND  FAILURE 


109 


encouraged  to  take  this  liberty  by  the  zeal  which  your  letter 
manifested  for  the  promotion  of  manufactures.”95 

The  fact  was  that,  whatever  New  England  and  allied 
commercial  interests  might  think,  Philadelphia  was  in  the 
midst  of  a  positive  boom.  The  variety  and  extent  of  her 
manufactures  awakened  civic  pride  and  created  the  demand 
for  a  newspaper  exclusively  economic  to  keep  good  Phila¬ 
delphians  informed  of  the  industrial  progress  in  their  city. 
It  was  called  the  Philadelphia  Price  Current,  and  its  files 
reveal  an  economic  progress  truly  notable.  The  editor 
recognized  his  indebtedness  to  Jefferson  for  a  law  which 
provided  the  initial  impetus  for  most  of  this  development. 
A  letter  to  this  effect  deserves  quotation  in  full : 

The  Editor  of  the  Philadelphia  Price  Current,  in  the  most  res¬ 
pectful  Manner,  Solicits  from  the  President  of  the  United  States, 
permission  to  lay  before  him,  irrefragable  testimony  of  the  benefits, 
resulting  from  the  Non  Importation  acts,  and  Embargo  Laws,  this 
he  would  beg  leave  to  do  by  a  reference,  to  an  article  in  his  paper 
of  today,  which  he  encloses,  headed  “American  Manufactures”, 
the  sensation  it  has  caused  here  is  considerable,  and  has  induced 
him  thus  to  arrest  the  President’s  Attention,  for  which  he  will  only 
make  this  Apology,  that,  his  sole  Motive  is  to  prove  that  by  the 
Presidents  originating  partial  deprivations,  he  has  ultimately  be¬ 
stowed  on  his  country  immense,  and  imperishable  benefits.96 

The  political  consequence  of  this  promising  state  of 
affairs  was,  as  Thomas  Cooper  congratulated  Jefferson  in 
October,  that : 

The  embargo  has  not  converted  one  republican  in  this  State  to 
tenets  of  federalism.  Snyder  had  a  majority  of  1940  over  M.  Kean 
in  1805;  this  year  he  has  a  majority  of  3061  over  Ross.  All  the 
members  of  Congress  from  this  State  will  be  republican:  &  the 
success  of  Snyder  ensures  to  Mr.  Madison  the  electoral  votes  of 
Pennsylvania.97 

No  attempt  has  been  made  in  these  pages  at  an  exhaus¬ 
tive  study  of  the  various  sections  of  the  Union  in  their 

85  Jefferson  Papers.  Jefferson  to  James  Ronaldson,  October  13,  1808. 

88  Ibid November  7,  1808. 

”  Ibid.,  Thomas  Cooper  to  Jefferson,  October  16,  1808. 


110  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 

relation  to  the  embargo.  Such  a  study  is  of  course  essential 
to  an  understanding  of  the  embargo  in  its  fullest  aspects. 
Only  such  references  have  been  given  in  the  present  con¬ 
nection  as  are  preserved  in  the  Jefferson  Papers  and  as 
can  thus  be  positively  identified  as  having  influenced  the 
thinking  of  Jefferson  himself  concerning  the  effect  which 
the  embargo  was  producing  upon  the  country.  Irrespective 
of  what  a  more  complete  knowledge  of  the  situation  might 
have  done  for  Jefferson,  it  would  seem  that,  from  the  infor¬ 
mation  at  his  command — and  this  came  to  him,  as  we  have 
seen,  from  sources  the  most  varied — the  President  was  jus¬ 
tified  in  thinking  that  if  the  country  was  not  precisely  with 
him,  it  certainly  was  not  against  him.  He  believed  that  the 
great  body  of  Republicans  throughout  the  country  were 
loyal  and  felt  that  this  was  true  of  a  majority  of  the  Feder¬ 
alists  as  well,  “but  as  they  think  it  an  engine  which  may  be 
used  advantageously  against  the  Republican  system,  the[y] 
countenance  the  clamours  against  it.”98  Certainly  his  con¬ 
fidence  that  the  people  stood  behind  him  had  much  to  war¬ 
rant  it. 

This  belief  of  Jefferson’s  that  the  great  mass  of  the 
common  people  were  capable  of  sharing  in  his  grand  experi¬ 
ment  of  pacifism  lent  confidence  and  strength  to  his  conduct 
of  foreign  relations,  on  which  hung  the  ultimate  deci¬ 
sion  of  failure  or  success.  The  rigor  with  which  Jefferson 
enforced  the  embargo  and  the  extent  of  his  anxiety  as  to 
popular  opinion  concerning  it  were  chiefly  due  to  his  inter¬ 
est  in  the  great  experiment  of  warfare  without  armaments, 
the  final  verdict  as  to  which  would  be  rendered  by  its  effect 
upon  the  enemy.  America  would  scarcely  continue  her  sacri¬ 
fices  unless  they  could  be  demonstrated  to  bear  fruit.  So 
that  every  development,  whether  in  England  or  on  the  Conti¬ 
nent,  looking  toward  the  abandonment  of  the  Orders  and 

88  Jefferson  Papers.  Jefferson  to  Colonel  D.  C.  Brent,  June  24,  1808. 
See  also  Jefferson  to  La  Fayette,  July  15,  1808. 


SUCCESS  AND  FAILURE 


111 


Decrees  was  watched  with  suspense.  Jefferson  knew  the 
suffering  which  his  policy  entailed,  but  the  poor  felt  it  most, 
and  he  doubted,  as  well  he  might,  the  extent  of  their  influence 
on  the  policies  of  government.  He  wrote : 

Whether  the  pressure  on  the  throne  from  the  suffering  people  of 
England  &  of  their  islands,  the  conviction  of  the  dishonorable 
as  well  as  dishonest  character  of  their  orders  of  council,  the  strength 
of  their  parliamentary  opposition,  &  remarkable  weakness  of  defence 
of  their  ministry,  will  produce  a  repeal  of  these  orders,  and  cessa¬ 
tion  of  our  embargo  is  yet  to  be  seen." 

With  so  vast  an  experiment  in  progress,  any  testimonial 
to  its  success  was  more  than  gratifying.  James  Bowdoin 
made  Jefferson  his  debtor  with  the  good  news  that : 

from  what  I  observed  when  in  England  &  from  the  best  information 
I  was  able  to  procure,  I  think  myself  founded  in  supposing,  that  ye 
british  cabinet  will  soon  be  constrained  to  modify  or  recall  them  in 
order  to  recover  the  advantages  of  our  commerce:  her  critical  sit¬ 
uation  with  respect  to  the  continental  powers,  the  distresst  state  of 
her  manufacturers  at  home,  added  to  that  of  her  west  india  colonies 
must  throw  so  many  embarrasmts  in  the  way  of  her  continuing 
the  war  without  a  better  understanding  with  the  U.S.  that  I  expect 
not  only  a  repeal  of  the  orders  of  council,  but  ye  most  conciliatory 
overtures  to  place  the  commerce  of  the  two  countries  upon  a  bet¬ 
ter  footing  than  it  has  hitherto  stood.100 

However  reassuring  this  confidence  of  Bowdoin’s  may 
have  seemed,  Jefferson  did  not  develop  any  hasty  spirit  of 
exultation.  In  June,  he  expressed  the  conviction  that  the 
country  could  not  know  for  two  or  three  months  yet  the 
outcome  of  Anglo-American  relations.101  That  this  would 
be  peace,  not  war,  was  the  basic  hope  of  the  whole  experi¬ 
ment,  and  intelligent  correspondents  of  Jefferson  shared  the 
desire  of  their  chief.  A  Baltimore  observer  called  the  atten¬ 
tion  of  Jefferson  to  the  foreign  prints.  “The  English 
newspapers  appear  very  anxious  that  this  country  &  France, 
shd.  be  in  actual  war. — no  doubt  the  French  breath  [e]  the 

89  Jefferson  Papers.  Jefferson  to  Mr.  Lieper,  May  25,  1808. 

100  Ibid.,  James  Bowdoin  to  Jefferson,  Boston,  June  9,  1808. 

101  Ibid.,  Jefferson  to  Dr.  Leib,  June  23,  1808. 


112  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


same  language  between  America  &  England  but  it  is  to 
be  hoped,  neither  will  be  gratified.”102 

News  from  England  was  belated  in  those  days  of  slow 
communication,  and  the  trouble  naturally  worked  both 
ways.  Jefferson  was  content  to  allow  a  considerable  time 
for  American  news  to  reach  England,  and  more  still 
for  it  to  exert  its  natural  effect  upon  British  opinion.  “I 
have  never  supposed,”  he  said  in  July,  “that  we  could  form 
a  final  opinion  of  the  British  course  until  the  public  should 
be  possessed  of  our  communications  to  Congress  and  the 
Act  of  Congress  hanging  the  discontinuance  of  the  embargo 
on  that  of  their  orders  in  Council.”103  Since  the  act  in 
question  had  been  law  for  over  two  months,  Jefferson  could 
not  be  accused  of  undue  haste,  or  of  half-baked  anticipations 
of  the  impossible. 

If  Jefferson  was  not  prematurely  elated  by  Bowdoin’s 
sanguine  conclusions  as  to  the  British  outlook,  it  does  not 
appear  that  he  was  cast  down  by  Bowdoin’s  pessimism  as 
to  American  resolution.  In  July,  when  evasions  were  at 
their  worst  and  repression  was  most  strict,  Jefferson  was 
too  preoccupied  with  the  management  of  affairs  to  pay  more 
attention  than  circumstances  called  for  to  Bowdoin’s  con¬ 
clusion  that  : 

Considering  the  present  posture  of  affairs,  no  measure  could  be  bet¬ 
ter  devised  than  the  Embargo;  but  it  is  yet  doubtful,  whether  the 
country  has  disposition,  fortitude  or  virtue  to  submit  to  its  pri¬ 
vations,  for  a  sufficient  length  of  time,  to  procure  those  advantages 
which  are  contemplated  from  it.104 

American  resolution  was  indeed  sorely  tried,  but  if  the 
American  people  could  but  realize  it,  so  too  was  British. 
This  was  true  more  especially  during  the  spring  of  1808. 
By  summer,  Britain  was  buoyed  by  false  hopes.  Events  in 

102  Jefferson  Papers.  John  Hollins  to  Jefferson,  Baltimore,  June  27, 
1808. 

103  Ibid.,  Jefferson  to  Mr.  Vaughan,  July  10,  1808. 

IW  Ibid.,  James  Bowdoin  to  Jefferson,  July  18,  1808. 


SUCCESS  AND  FAILURE 


113 


Spain,  leading  to  the  opening  to  British  traders  of  the  rich 
markets  of  South  America,  created  a  revival  of  commerce, 
which,  superficially,  at  any  rate,  promised  to  counterbalance 
the  loss  of  the  American  trade. 

Americans,  however,  thanks  to  the  slowness  of  sea  voy¬ 
ages  and  an  isolation  which  the  embargo  itself  increased, 
were  slow  to  learn  of  these  changes  in  British  opinion.  As 
late  as  August  4,  one  correspondent,  basing  his  statement  on 
recent  letters  from  England,  wrote  Jefferson  what  would 
have  been  in  April  a  more  faithful  representation  of  British 
sentiment  :105 

By  my  letters  from  England,  together  with  a  tolerable  knowledge  of 
things  in  that  Country,  I  have  every  reason  to  believe  that  the  John 
Bulls  are  not  only  uneasy  but  alarmed  at  the  state  of  things,  &  that 
the  thinking  or  sensible  ones  among  them  are  now  anxious  to  with¬ 
draw  those  unjustifiable  council  orders,  Edicts  etc  etc.  under  which 
our  trade  has  been  so  injured  &  their  own  exports  so  diminished.106 

The  shift  in  British  sentiment  was  known  to  Jefferson 
by  August  10  at  the  latest,  for  in  a  letter  of  that  date  he 
alludes  to  the  probable  influence  of  these  new  Spanish  hopes. 
His  tone  betokens  an  unusual  bitterness.  It  is  the  voice  of  a 
profound  disappointment.  Significantly  enough,  in  refer¬ 
ring  to  the  effect  of  the  embargo  upon  England,  he  uses  the 
past  tense : 

I  believe  that  the  English  ministers  as  well  as  people  were  coming 
over  to  the  opinion  that  peace  with  us  was  their  interest,  but  it  is  a 
nation  more  puffed  up  by  small  events  than  any  one  on  earth,  it  is 
not  improbable  that  the  turn  in  Spanish  affairs  may  mount  them  on 
their  stilts  again,  it  is  a  government  with  which  no  stable  connec¬ 
tion  can  be  depended  on.  their  ministry  is  often  changed,  &  with  them 
their  system,  a  new  ministry  so  far  from  thinking  themselves  bound 
to  observe  what  their  predecessors  had  done  make  a  point  of  revers¬ 
ing  it.  it  is  a  government  of  no  faith,  and  the  same  may  be  said  of 
France  &  Spain.107 

105  It  must  be  remembered  that  the  letters  alluded  to  were  weeks  en 
route. 

106  Jefferson  Papers.  Thomas  Digges  to  Jefferson,  August  4,  1809. 

107  Ibid,.,  Jefferson  to  Thomas  Digges,  August  10,  1808. 


114  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


Canning,  the  minister  with  whom  Jefferson  had  to  deal, 
was  a  Realpolitiker  without  the  least  intention  of  yielding 
to  either  the  overtures  or  the  threats  of  America.  He  tried 
to  manoeuver  the  American  minister  into  admitting  that 
the  embargo  was  laid  before  the  Orders  were  known.108 
And,  when  Pinkney  set  forth  the  desire  of  the  President 
to  remove  the  embargo  if  only  Britain  would  take  the  lead,109 
he  met  him  at  first  with  tantalizing  delays110  and  finally 
with  open  ridicule.  Not  that  the  embargo  was  impotent.111 
There  was  much  suffering,  particularly  at  first,  until  an 
industrial  revival  came,  supplemented  by  opportunities  for 
smuggling.112  But  the  cabinet  was  in  a  strong  position, 
secure  of  support  from  the  commercial  interests  and  armed 
with  dictatorial  war  powers.  When,  therefore,  after  months 
lof  delay,  Canning  spoke,  it  was,  as  Jefferson  afterwards 
described  it,  “in  the  high  ropes.”  Nothing  would  give  him 
such  pleasure  as  to  restore  American  commerce.  But  to 
do  so  would  be  to  admit  that  the  embargo  had  produced 
some  effect.  Pinkney  remonstrated  in  vain,113  and  he  and 
^lonroe  were  obliged  to  make  a  discouraging  report.114 

No  better  progress  was  made  in  the  negotiations  at 
Washington,  though  .Erskine,  the  British  minister,  yielding 
to  a  natural  temptation  to  make  himself  agreeable,  held  out 
false  hopes.  Of  one  of  these  diplomatic  interchanges,  Jeff¬ 
erson  has  left  a  memorandum  : 

Conversn.  with  Mr.  Erskine.  He  was  much  alarmed  at  the  con- 
versn  out  of  doors  looking  like  a  decln  of  war  with  Gr.  Br.  .  .  . 

108 American  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  III.  226,  August  4, 
1808;  also  III.  231,  September  23,  1808. 

™  Ibid.,  III.  228,  August  23,  1808. 

1,0  Pinkney,  The  Life  of  William  Pinkney,  pp.  217-219,  quoting  Pink¬ 
ney  to  Madison,  September  10,  1808. 

111  American  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  III.  229-230.  Pinkney 
to  Madison,  September  21,  1808. 

113  Ibid. 

113  Ibid.,  III.  235,  October  10,  1808. 

114  Ibid.,  III.  197,  October  22,  1808. 


SUCCESS  AND  FAILURE 


415 

I  told  him  that  there  were  but  3  alternatives,  1.  war,  2.  embargo,  3. 
submission  and  that  no  American  would  look  a  moment  at  the  last,. 
he  agreed  it. 

I  told  him  I  thot  it  possible  France  mt.  repeal  her  decrees  as  to 
us,  yet  I  did  not  understand  from  Mr.  Pinckney’s  communicns  that 
Engld.  would  even  then  revoke  her  decree ;  he  declared  in  the  most 
explicit  terms  she  would.  I  then  explain’d  that  the  French  repeal 
mt.  only  go  to  the  high  sea.  He  observed  that  he  did  not  know  that 
that  cd.  produce  a  repeal  from  Engld.  because  the  exclusion  of  her 
merchandise  wd.  remain  ...  I  told  him  ...  I  wished  to 
correct  an  error  .  .  .  this  was  the  supposed  partiality  of  the 

admn  &  particularly  myself  in  favr.  of  France  &  agt.  England  I 
observed  that  when  I  came  into  the  admn  there  was  nothing  I  so 
much  desired  as  to  be  on  a  footing  of  intimate  frdshp  with  England 
that  I  knew  as  long  as  she  was  our  friend  no  enemy  could  hurt : 
.  .  .  I  observed  that  if  we  wished  war  with  England  as  the 

Federalists  charged  us,  &  I  feared  his  Govmt.  might  believe,  noth¬ 
ing  would  have  been  so  easy  when  the  Chesapeake  was  attacked,  & 
when  even  the  feds  themselves  would  have  concurred,  but  on  the 
contrary  that  our  endeavors  had  been  to  cool  down  our  countrymen 
&  carry  it  before  their  Govrmt.  ...  I  told  him  in  the  course  of 
the  conversn  that  this  country  would  never  return  to  an  intercourse 
with  Engld  while  those  orders  of  council  were  in  force,  in  some 
part  of  it  also  I  told  him  that  Mr.  Madison  (who  it  was  now  pretty 
well  seen  wd.  be  my  successor,  to  which  he  assented)  had  enter¬ 
tained  the  same  cordial  wishes  as  myself  to  be  on  a  friendly  footing 
with  England.115 

Thus,  when  Congress  reassembled,  negotiations,  although 
by  no  means  at  an  end,  were  at  a  standstill,  and  the  hope 
of  immediate  results  was  gone.116  England  must  discover 
the  unreality  of  her  castles  in  Spain ;  America’s  resolution 
must  be  tested  with  refiner’s  fire,  before  Jefferson  and  his 
policy  could  be  vindicated.  So  far,  the  foreign  outlook 
warranted  no  report  of  progress.  Failing  such  a  report, 
could  Congress,  freshly  returned  from  an  electorate  groan¬ 
ing  under  the  yoke,  be  persuaded  longer  to  continue  the 
experiment?  This  was  a  vital  question,  and  it  suggests  that 
the  final  outcome  of  the  embargo  was  determined  not  at 
Washington  or  in  London  but  on  the  battle  fields  of  Spain. 


115  The  Works  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  I.  424,  November  9,  1808. 
u®  Jefferson  Papers.  Charles  Pinkney  to  Jefferson,  September  10,  1808. 


116  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


Somewhat  wearily,  Jefferson  wrote  to  Madison  in  Sep¬ 
tember,  when  prospects  were  already  growing  dim,  restating 
the  alternative :  .  .  if  they  repeal  their  orders  we 

must  repeal  our  embargo,  if  they  make  satisfaction  for  the 
Chesapeake,  we  must  revoke  our  proclamation,  and  gener¬ 
alize  it’s  operation  by  law.  if  they  keep  up  impressments, 
we  must  adhere  to  nonintercourse,  manufactures  &  a  navi¬ 
gation  act.”117  Nor  did  a  letter  from  Pinkney,  indicating 
a  continued  confidence  in  the  repeal  of  the  Orders,  afford 
Jefferson  much  encouragement.  He  was  an  old  man,  dis¬ 
illusioned.  As  he  wrote  his  son-in-law,  John  W.  Eppes, 
‘‘[Pinkney]  infers  this  from  a  conversation  with  Canning, 
but  I  have  little  faith  in  diplomatic  inferences  &  less  in  Can¬ 
ning’s  good  faith.”118 

The  cheerless  aspect  of  foreign  relations  was  known  to 
Republican  leaders.  Wilson  Cary  Nicholas,  one  of  Jeffer¬ 
son’s  Virginia  friends,  in  an  elaborate  survey  of  the  situa¬ 
tion  at  home  and  abroad,  written  October  20,  practically  on 
the  eve  of  the  new  session,  tried  to  make  it  clear  to  the 
President  that  there  were  limits  beyond  which  the  party 
would  not  sustain  him.  Nicholas  concludes  that  the  Ameri¬ 
can  people  have  been  none  too  firm  in  supporting  the  experi¬ 
ment;  while  as  for  Europe,  ‘‘the  sensation  in  England  I 
suspect  is  more  to  be  ascribed  to  the  nonimportation  act,  than 
to  the  embargo,  and  the  revolution  in  Spain  will  repair 
the  effect  of  both.”119 

/if  the  embargo  seemed  not  to  be  winning  its  way  over 
^eas,  it  nevertheless  opened  the  field  for  a  diplomatic  pro¬ 
nouncement  closely  akin  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  The  Presi- 
"cRnt  anticipated  as  one  of  the  consequences  of  the  embargo  a 
larger  opportunity  for  expansion  on  our  own  continent. 
Thus,  in  August,  1808,  he  suggested  to  the  secretary  of  war 

“’Jefferson  Papers.  Jefferson  to  James  Madison.  September,  1808. 

118  Ibid.,  Jefferson  to  J.  W.  Eppes,  September  20,  1808. 

119  Ibid.,  W.  C.  Nicholas  to  Jefferson,  October  20,  1808. 


SUCCESS  AND  FAILURE 


117 


that,  “The  enforcing  the  embargo  would  furnish  a  pretext 
for  taking  the  nearest  healthy  position  to  Saint  Mary’s,  and 
on  the  waters  of  Tombigbee.”120  And  he  unfolded  the 
dazzling  possibility  that,  “Should  England  make  up  with 
us,  while  Bonaparte  continues  at  war  with  Spain,  a  moment 
may  occur  when  we  may  without  danger  of  commitment 
with  either  France  or  England  seize  to  our  own  limits  of 
Louisiana  as  of  right,  &  the  residue  of  the  Floridas  as  reprisal 
for  spoliation.”121 

The  Spanish  American  situation,  which,  as  we  have 
seen,  contributed  to  the  defeat  of  Jefferson’s  object  in 
Europe,  was  not  wholly  without  its  compensations.  The 
situation  was  not  dissimilar  to  that  of  1823,  when  the  same 
Mr.  Canning  interested  himself  in  a  South  American  policy 
designed  to  checkmate  the  Holy  Alliance.  Just  as,  at  that 
time,  President  Monroe  intervened  to  claim  the  fruits  of 
South  American  championship  for  his  own,  to  the  ill-dis¬ 
guised  chagrin  of  the  British  Cabinet,  so,  in  1808,  when 
British  rapprochement  with  Spanish  nationalists  threatened 
undue  preponderance  in  South  America,  it  was  Jefferson 
who  nipped  the  project.  His  declaration  is  often  quoted  as 
a  step  in  the  evolution  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  But  the 
parallels  in  the  circumstances  which  called  it  forth  have 
been  ignored.  Writing  to  Claiborne,  the  Governor  of 
Louisiana,  he  says,  “The  truth  is  that  the  patriots  of  Spain 
have  no  warmer  friends  than  the  administration  of  the 
U.  S.,  but  it  is  our  duty  to  say  nothing  &  to  do  nothing 
for  or  against  either.”  Natural  sympathy  was  contending 
with  diplomatic  prudence,  for  the  victory  of  the  revolution¬ 
ists  would  imply  the  profit  of  their  British  allies.  Yet  no 
liberal  could  actually  wish  the  republican  defeat.  With  this 
in  mind,  Jefferson  continues: 

120  The  Works  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  XI.  43,  August  12,  1808. 

121  Ibid. 


118  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


If  they  succeed,  we  shall  be  well  satisfied  to  see  Cuba  &  Mexico  re¬ 
main  in  their  present  dependence ;  but  very  unwilling  to  see  them  in 
that  of  either  France  or  England,  politically  or  commercially. 

We  consider  their  interests  and  ours  as  the  same,  and  that  the 
object  of  both  must  be  to  exclude  all  the  European  influence  from 
this  hemisphere.  We  wish  to  avoid  the  necessity  of  going  to  war, 
till  our  revenue  shall  be  entirely  liberated  from  debt.  Then  it  will 
suffice  for  war,  without  creating  new  debt  or  taxes.122 

In  1808,  Jefferson  stood  alone  against  Great  Britain  and 
the  Continent  alike.  In  1823,  Monroe  acted  with  a  know¬ 
ledge  that  the  hands  of  Great  Britain  at  least  were  tied  by 
her  own  desire  to  thwart  the  Holy  Allies.  For  this  antici¬ 
pation  by  Jefferson  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,123  the  embargo 
supplied  the  motive.  Jefferson  was  compelled  to  a  decided 
attitude  by  his  recognition  that  a  commercial  union  between 
Great  Britain  and  Spain  would  deprive  the  embargo  of 
its  sting.  America  would  thenceforth  suffer,  with  little 
power  to  injure. 

If  slight  progress  was  apparent  toward  an  understanding 
with  England,  our  relations  with  France  were  no  more 
promising.  The  enemies  of  Jefferson  once  and  again  raised 
the  old  cry  of  1793,  that  he  was  hopelessly  Gallophile.  They 
declared  that  he  and  Napoleon  were  allies  and  that  the  em¬ 
bargo  was  a  surrender  of  American  sovereignty  to  the  dic¬ 
tates  of  the  Emperor.  Party  feeling  had  run  so  high  and 
raged  so  long  between  the  friends  of  France  on  the  one 
hand  and  of  England  on  the  other,  that  neither  side  would 
accept  foreign  relations  merely  as  facts  and  hope  to  make  use 
of  world  conditions  for  the  advantage  of  its  own  country.  If 
Federalists  were  inclined  to  vent  their  spleen  on  Republicans, 

122  The  Works  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  XI.  55,  October  29,  1808. 

123  Jefferson’s  connection  with  the  decision  of  Monroe  to  put  forth 
the  famous  doctrine  in  his  message  of  December,  1823,  is  well  known. 
He  is  credited,  too,  with  a  long-time  sponsoring  of  the  policy  of  which 
it  was  the  culmination.  This  is  well  expressed  by  Albert  Shaw  in 
“Jefferson’s  Doctrines  under  New  Tests,”  in  Representative  Phi  Beta 
Kappa  Orations,  p.  304.  So  far  as  the  writer  is  aware,  however,  the 
influence  of  the  embargo  on  Jefferson’s  development  of  a  pre-Monroe 
Doctrine  has  not  been  noted  hitherto. 


SUCCESS  AND  FAILURE 


119 


once  as  “Jacobins”  and  now  as  “Imperialists,”  it  was  but  a 
natural  retaliation  on  men  who  had  beheld  in  the  entire  period 
of  Federalist  control  no  other  motive  in  foreign  affairs  than 
the  basest  truckling  to  Great  Britain,  the  abandonment  of 
sacred  pledges  to  France,  and  the  outrageous  conspiracy  of 
American  and  British  Tories  to  overthrow  the  newly  won 
liberties  of  the  French. 

Posterity  knows  that  both  parties,  Federalists  and  Repub¬ 
licans,  kept  America  first,  whichever  friendship  abroad  it 
seemed  wiser  for  the  moment  to  cultivate.  If  his  enemies 
misjudged  Jefferson,  they  did  him  no  greater  wrong  than 
he  had  done  them.  But  wrong  him  they  did.  Less  was 
hoped,  it  is  true,  from  the  embargo  on  France  than  from 
that  on  Great  Britain,  but  if  its  effect  would  be  less  damag¬ 
ing,  that  was  due  to  the  nature  of  things  and  not  to  the  will 
of  the  President,  who,  although  he  conceived  the  conduct 
of  the  British  to  be  more  insulting  than  that  of  the  French — 
the  Chesapeake  affair  still  rankled — was  sufficiently  alive 
to  the  injuries  of  the  French  to  retaliate  if  possible.  With 
war  out  of  the  question,  as  driving  us  into  alliance  with  one 
or  the  other  of  our  hated  foes,  the  embargo  was  a  logical 
means  for  coercing  both,  its  unequal  incidence  being  no  fault 
of  its  sponsor.  One  looks  in  vain  for  evidences  of  cordiality 
in  the  attitude  of  Jefferson  toward  Napoleon. 

As  Armstrong,  our  minister  at  Paris,  wrote  Jefferson  in 
June,  “There  is  now  a  Champ  de  bataille  between  you  and 
france.  hitherto  there  has  been  none.”124  But  it  was  difficult 
to  persuade  Jefferson  that  France  would  cling  permanently 
to  her  obnoxious  decrees.  To  his  staunch  supporter  and 
good  friend,  John  Taylor,  he  wrote:  “I  am  not  without  hope 
that  France  will  exempt  us  from  the  operation  of  her  decrees 
of  Berlin  &  Milan,  if  she  does,  England  is  bound  by  her 

“•Jefferson  Papers.  General  Armstrong  to  Jefferson,  Paris,  June 
15,  1808.  See  also  The  Writings  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  XI.  36. 


120  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 

declaration  to  do  the  same.”125  This  hopeful  view  was  not 
shared  by  Armstrong,  who  was,  in  any  event,  too  great  a 
pessimist  to  please  his  superior: 

.  .  .  Nor  is  France  more  disposed  to  change  her  system.  She 

is  as  much  attached  to  it  as  if  it  were  both  wise  and  honest.  .  .  . 

The  Emp.  has  taken  it  into  his  head  to  identify  our  trade  with  that 
of  England.  “You  pay,”  said  he  “from  ten  to  fifteen  millions  of  a 
yearly  balance  of  trade  to  G.B.  and  you  receive  from  the  rest  of 
Europe,  what  enables  you  to  pay  this  ballance.  You  are  in  fact, 
then,  only  agents  between  England  and  the  Continent.”126 

To  our  other  agent  in  Paris,  Robert  R.  Livingston,  the 
Emperor  was  equally  uncompromising.  He  made  it  a 
sine  qua  non  that  England  act  first.  “Tell  the  President  from 
me,”  he  commanded  Livingston,  in  an  audience  at  Bayonne, 
July  6,  1808,  “that  if  he  can  make  a  treaty  with  England  pre¬ 
serving  his  maritime  rights,  it  will  be  agreeable  to  me — 
but  that  I  will  make  war  upon  the  universe  should  it  support 
her  unjust  pretensions.  I  will  not  abate  any  part  of  my 
system.”127 

Such  arrogance  as  this  of  Napoleon  deprived  the  British 
and  patriot  victories  in  Spain  of  part  of  their  sting.  If 
they  did  threaten  to  prolong  the  deadlock  between  America 
and  Great  Britain,  they  at  least  gave  pause  to  the  archtyrant. 
In  Jefferson’s  words,  “I  am  glad  to  see  that  Spain  is  likely 
to  give  Bonaparte  emploiment — tant  mieux  pour  nous.”128 

Now  and  then  some  correspondent,  ignorant  no  doubt  of 
the  importance  which  Napoleon  attached  to  his  commercial 
war  upon  England,  assured  Jefferson  that  all  would  yet  be 
well.  “I  have  every  reason,”  wrote  one  of  these  on  Sep¬ 
tember  8,  “to  hope  sir,  that  all  will  soon  be  amicable  [ffc] 

“‘Jefferson  Papers.  Jefferson  to  John  Taylor,  June  23,  1808. 

Ibid.,  General  Armstrong  to  Jefferson,  July  28,  1808. 

™  Ibid.  Quoted  in  Armstrong’s  Dispatch  of  July  28,  1808. 

128  Ibid.,  Jefferson  to  A.  Gallatin,  August  9,  1808.  See  also  Jefferson 
to  J.  W.  Eppes,  September  20,  1808.  See  also  Jefferson  to  Governor 
Claiborne,  October  29,  1808. 


SUCCESS  AND  FAILURE 


121 


settled  between  this  country  &  the  United  States.”129  But, 
if  a  reconciliation  should  take  place,  it  would  be  on  the  level 
of  an  entente  with  Tripoli,  for,  to  Jefferson’s  way  of  think¬ 
ing,  Napoleon  was  no  better  than  a  pirate :  .  his 

condemnation  of  vessels  taken  on  the  high  seas  by  his  pri¬ 
vateers  &  carried  involuntarily  into  his  ports  is  justifiable  by 
no  law,  is  piracy,  and  this  is  the  wrong,  we  complain  of  in 
him.”130 

In  spite  of  the  severity  with  which  Jefferson  judged  the 
acts  and  motives  of  Napoleon,  it  was  impossible  for  Feder¬ 
alists  to  regard  an  embargo  which  affected  him  so  slightly — 
the  British  blockade  of  his  ports  being  quite  capable  of  seal¬ 
ing  them  up  without  our  assistance — as  really  aimed  at  him 
at  all.  Wilson  Cary  Nicholas,  therefore,  in  the  letter  already 
cited,  proffered  the  advice  of  wisdom,  when  he  urged  Jeff¬ 
erson  to  confide  to  Congress  every  detail  of  his  negotiations 
with  both  France  and  England: 

Take  away  all  pretence  that  anything  is  concealed  that  ought  to  he 
made  public.  Everything  that  has  been  said  to  the  government  of 
France  in  opposition  to,  or  by  way  of  remonstrance  against  their 
arts  will  have  a  good  effect.  No  motives  of  delicacy  to  that  govern¬ 
ment  ought  to  outweigh  the  great  object  of  securing  to  the  admin¬ 
istration  the  entire  confidence  of  the  people.  Prepare  the  public  for 
the  course  that  ought  to  be  pursued,  and  give  to  the  well  disposed  in 
Congress  and  in  the  nation  the  full  weight  of  your  name  and 
authority.131 

In  other  words,  it  would  be  as  well  to  make  a  clean 
breast  of  it  that  the  embargo  had  not  yet  justified  the  expec¬ 
tations  of  those  who  beheld  in  it  the  equivalent  of  aggressive 
action.  England  was  in  the  “high  ropes”  over  Spanish  vic¬ 
tories  and  Spanish-Ameriean  speculations,  and  “The  Em¬ 
peror  is  too  well  satisfied  with  the  slow  &  silent  but  sure 
progress  of  his  experiment  to  wish  a  change  on  his  own  ac- 

“*  Jefferson  Papers.  N.  Haley  to  Jefferson,  Paris,  September  8,  1808. 

130  Ibid.,  Jefferson  to  R.  L.  Livingston,  October  15,  1808. 

131  Ibid.,  W.  C.  Nicholas  to  Jefferson,  October  20,  1808. 


122  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 

count,  and  to  expect  it  because  it  would  be  convenient  to 
us,  is  expecting  more  than  a  knowledge  of  his  general  policy 
will  justify.”132 

Such  was  the  posture  of  affairs  when  Jefferson’s  personal 
administration  of  the  government  drew  to  its  close.  Con¬ 
gress  would  soon  summon  him  to  account  for  his  steward¬ 
ship,  and  the  report  would  make  dull  reading.  His  achieve¬ 
ments  on  the  positive  side  were  considerable.  He  could  point 
to  an  enforcement  of  the  embargo  remarkable  for  its  consis¬ 
tency  and  firmness.  His  admirers  might  even  recognize  in 
it  hitherto  unsuspected  qualities  of  greatness.  He  could  point 
with  truth  to  rising  manufactures,  already  transforming  the 
country  and  destined  ultimately  to  be  the  most  significant 
factor  in  its  life.  He  could  present  the  documentary  evi¬ 
dence  of  a  sincere  attempt  to  adjust  our  complaints  with 
foreign  countries  and  restore  commerce  to  its  own.  But 
here  the  credit  ended. 

On  the  debit  side  was  a  growing  restlessness  among  the 
people,  in  some  localities  amounting  to  and  in  others  border¬ 
ing  upon  revolution.  Even  districts  which  held  fast  to  the 
faith  based  their  trust  on  the  evidence  of  things  unseen 
and  suffered  in  silence.  Negotiations  abroad  had  resulted 
in  nothing  tangible.  The  prospect  of  submission  by  either 
France  or  England  was  more  remote  than  it  had  been  in 
April.  It  was  evident  that  the  embargo,  if  persisted  in  at 
all,  would  need  a  term  of  years  for  permanent  results  to  be 
secured. 

By  the  irony  of  circumstances,  Jefferson’s  positive 
achievements  during  these  months  of  personal  government 
would  better  be  ignored  in  his  reports  to  Congress,  whereas 
the  only  hope  of  favorable  action  from  that  body  would  lie 
in  the  frankest  possible  setting  forth  of  just  wherein  his 
hopes  had  been  frustrated — not  a  happy  situation  for  a 

Jefferson  Papers.  General  Armstrong  to  Jefferson,  Paris,  October 
27,  1808. 


SUCCESS  AND  FAILURE 


123 


great  idealist,  who  had  staked  his  all  on  one  of  the  mightiest 
experiments  ever  initiated  in  the  laboratory  of  world  peace. 

It  is  with  the  manner  in  which  Jefferson  met  this  situa¬ 
tion  and  with  his  handling  of  Congress  and  the  country  in  a 
great  battle  for  his  principles  that  we  are  next  concerned. 


CHAPTER  V 


FAILURE  AND  SUCCESS 


A  repeal  of  the  embargo  on  honorable  terms  was  the 
hope  of  the  country  when  Congress  adjourned  for  the  sum¬ 
mer.  Accordingly,  when  the  new  session  convened  after 
months  of  fruitless  negotiation,  the  President’s  position  was 
not  easy.  His  message  naturally  took  the  form  of  an  elab¬ 
orate  defence  of  the  administration.  He  dwelt  upon  the 
promptness  of  his  effort  for  suspension,  the  reasonable  pros¬ 
pect  for  its  success,  and  the  unexpectedness  of  its  rejection. 
Acknowledging  his  disappointment  in  the  immediate  objec¬ 
tive,  Jefferson  fell  back  upon  the  actual  achievements  of 
the  embargo,  reminding  Congress  that  it  “has  thus  long 
frustrated  those  usurpations  and  spoliations  which,  if  resist¬ 
ed,  involve  war;  if  submitted  to,  sacrifice  a  vital  principle  of 
our  national  independence.”1  To  maintain  these  salutary 
effects,  he  urged  the  importance  of  the  militia.  The  growth 
of  manufactures  he  deemed  to  be  another  factor  in  the 
nation’s  independence.  Without  denying  that  “The  suspen¬ 
sion  of  our  foreign  commerce  produced  by  the  injustice  of 
the  belligerent  powers,  and  the  consequent  losses  and  sacri¬ 
fices  of  our  citizens,  are  subjects  of  just  concern,”-  he  never¬ 
theless  found  a  ray  of  encouragement  in  the  new  impetus 
to  manufactures  made  possible  by  the  release  of  so  much 
commercial  capital.  “The  extent  of  this,  conversion  is  daily 
increasing,  and  little  doubt  remains  that  the  establishments 
formed  and  forming  will — under  the  auspices  of  cheaper 
materials  and  subsistence,  the  freedom  of  labor  from  taxa¬ 
tion  with  us,  and  of  protecting  duties  and  prohibitions — 

1  The  Works  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  XI.  64,  November  8,  1808. 

a  Ibid.,  XI.  69-70. 


FAILURE  AND  SUCCESS 


become  permanent.”3  In  this  renewed  prosperity  even  com¬ 
merce  with  the  Indians  was  to  share.4 

The  message  admitted  a  failure  in  the  chief  objective. 
As  a  measure  of  conservation,  the  embargo  served  its  pur¬ 
pose  for  a  few  months  at  most,  during  which  ships  and 
sailors  could  be  gathered  home.  Its  subsequent  utility  de¬ 
pended  mainly  upon  forcing  England  and  France  to  a 
repeal  of  their  edicts.  Failing  this,  the  country  would 
regard  the  incidental  development  of  manufactures  as  insuffi¬ 
cient  compensation  for  commerce  destroyed.  Yet  this, 
together  with  the  assertion  that  the  alternative  was  war,  was 
all  that  the  government  could  adduce  in  favor  of  the  em¬ 
bargo.  Its  pressure  upon  Europe  was  undoubted,  hut  no 
one  could  affirm  when,  if  at  all,  Europe  would  yield.  The 
message,  therefore,  was  in  a  sense  a  forecast  that  the  em¬ 
bargo  was  doomed.  Nevertheless,  so  intimately  was  the 
prestige  of  both  President  and  party  bound  up  with  the  em¬ 
bargo  that  the  chief  legislation  of  the  session  revolved  about 
its  strengthening  rather  than  its  repeal. 

The  President  held  strong  cards.  He  knew  what  he 
wanted.  He  possessed  a  Congress  of  his  own  party,  the 
leaders  of  which  were  accustomed  to  his  guidance.  And, 
discouraging  though  the  economic  outlook  was  to  many  men 
in  all  parts  of  the  country,  there  were  in  each  section  ele¬ 
ments  who  found  in  the  embargo  no  obstacle  to  self-interest. 
New  England,  for  example,  which  had  grown  so  rich  as  a 
neutral  carrier,  was  already  turning  to  manufactures,  and 
these  would  suffer  by  a  sudden  reversal  of  policy.  The  Mid¬ 
dle  States  had  witnessed  an  even  greater  development  in 
this  same  direction,  and,  if  commerce  and  agriculture  both 
suffered,  the  pronounced  development  of  manufactures 
offered  an  equivalent.  In  the  South,  agricultural  losses  found 

3  The  Works  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  XI.  70. 

*  Ibid. 


JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


no  manufacturing  offsets,  and  it  is  fair  to  say  that  the 
embargo  contributed  the  final  blow  to  the  old  tide-water 
prosperity,  no  substitute  for  which  was  ever  found  in  the 
region  affected.  Yet  here,  by  a  psychological  paradox,  the 
embargo  found  its  staunchest  support.5 

The  economic  interpretation  of  history  wholly  fails  to 
explain  southern  loyalty  to  the  embargo.  To  southerners 
possibly  least  among  Americans  was  it  possible  to  apply  the 
hedonistic  calculus.  The  economic  man  of  Adam  Smith 
still  dominated  the  “dismal  science,”  but  that  creature  of 
the  mind  of  economists  never  wore  the  homespun  of  a 
Georgia  cracker  or  rode  in  the  coach  of  a  Virginia  planter. 
The  southerner,  having  once  accepted  Jefferson,  accepted 
him  fully.  His  mind  made  up,  he  walked  with  simple  trust. 

With  so  loyal  a  following,  Jefferson  was  prepared  to 
contend  for  his  ideals,  though  he  himself  did  not  realize 
until  the  end  how  close  the  battle  would  prove  to  be.  Con¬ 
gress  was  the  chief  arena,  but  the  issue  was  joined  wherever 
the  embargo  was  felt.  Thus,  as  so  often  happens  in  Ameri¬ 
can  history,  it  was  a  war  of  sections,  commercial,  manufac¬ 
turing,  agricultural. 

In  Congress  the  Federalists  redoubled  their  clamor, 
hoping  thereby  to  influence  legislation  directly.  As  Levi 
Lincoln  wrote  the  President  in  December,  “From  the 
leading  federalists  we  hear  expressions  of  disapprobation 
of  the  embargo  &  of  violence  beyond  anything  which  is  seen 
in  the  papers”6 — no  small  accusation,  if  one  remembers 
the  rare  frankness  of  the  early  press. 


s  Cf.  Henry  Adams,  The  Life  of  Albert  Gallatin,  p.  380.  “Her  strug¬ 
gle  saved  her  (i.e.,  New  England)  ;  necessity  taught  new  modes  of  exis¬ 
tence  and  made  her  at  length  almost  independent  of  the  sea.  Virginia, 
however,  friendly  to  the  Government,  and  herself  responsible  for  the 
choice,  submitted  with  hardly  a  murmur,  and  never  recovered  from  the 
shock;  her  ruin  was  accelerated  with  frightful  rapidity  because  she  made 
no  struggle  for  life.” 

"Jefferson  Papers.  Levi  Lincoln  to  Jefferson,  Boston,  December  S, 
1808. 


FAILURE  AND  SUCCESS  G? 

While  Lincoln  was  making  this  alarming  observation, 
the  “Merchants  Mechanics  Traders  and  Mariners  of  the 
town  of  Boston  in  the  State  of  Massachusetts”  were  de¬ 
nouncing  the  embargo  in  fifteen  pages  of  solemn  rhetoric, 
the  sum  of  which  was  that  “It  would  require  the  tongue  or 
pen  of  inspiration  to  delineate  the  distresses  which  the  Em¬ 
bargo  has  heaped  on  this  people,  a  common  mind  cannot 
conceive  must  [jic]  less  a  common  hand  pourtray  them.” 
Yet,  in  spite  of  it  all,  the  Jeffersonian  tradition  was  so  strong, 
or  the  milk  of  human  kindness  so  rich,  or,  perhaps,  the  temp¬ 
tation  to  irony  so  great,  that  the  petitioners  concluded  their 
memorial  with  the  pious  hope  that  Jefferson  might  be  happy 
in  his  approaching  retirement.  “They  hope  &  pray  that 
after  a  long  life  of  pleasure  &  happiness,  you  may  be  received 
into  Heaven  &  there  enjoy  eternal  happiness  &  inherit  ever¬ 
lasting  Glory.”7 

Doubtless  for  the  sake  of  removing  him  from  his 
present  sphere,  some  of  the  more  tolerant  Federalists  would 
have  consented  to  let  Jefferson  call  Heaven  his  home.  But 
on  earth  they  could  declare  no  truce,  and  he  was  obliged 
to  scrutinize  even  rather  minor  appointments  for  fear  the 
incumbent  might  prostitute  his  office  to  the  enemy.8  No 
precaution  could  be  too  great  with  matters  at  such  a  pass 
as  Jefferson  outlined  to  his  son-in-law  at  the  beginning  of 
January,  1809.  The  “Monarchists  of  the  North”  had 
federalized  five  eastern  states.  They  threatened  New  York. 
Massachusetts  was  about  to  decide  the  question  of  separation 
from  the  Union  “&  to  propose  it  to  the  whole  country  East 
of  the  North  river.”  Even  good  Republicans  in  that  state 
were  urging  that  a  date  be  named  for  the  repeal  of  the 
embargo,  preferably  in  June.  Jefferson  thought  this  might 
be  necessary,  even  though  it  meant  the  defeat  of  the  em- 

’  Jefferson  Papers.  Petition  from  Boston,  December  2,  1808. 

’‘Ibid.,  Jefferson  to  A.  Gallatin,  December  7,  1808. 


128  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 

bargo.  “We  must  save  the  union:  but  we  wish  to  sacrifice 
as  little  as  possible  of  the  honor  of  the  nation.”  Even  a 
surrender  of  the  embargo,  Jefferson  feared,  might  not  suf¬ 
fice  to  save  the  Union,  because  in  the  event  of  war  with 
England,  the  enemy  might  seduce  New  England  by  an  offer 
of  neutrality  and  commerce.  Nevertheless,  Jefferson  in¬ 
dulged  a  hope  that  things  might  not  after  all  come  to  the 
worst,  for : 

it  is  possible  that  England  may  be  wrought  upon,  (1)  by  the  docu¬ 
ments  published  at  the  meeting  of  Congress  which  prove  our  fair 
conduct  toward  both  countries  which  she  had  affected  not  to  believe ; 
(2)  by  the  determination  of  the  Presidential  election;  (3)  by  the 
failure  so  far  of  expected  insurrection  in  Massachusetts;8 9  (4)  by 
the  course  of  affairs  in  Spain,  where  there  can  be  little  doubt  that 
Joseph  is  re-enthroned  before  this  day.  Parts  of  the  country  will 
hold  out  for  a  while,  but  the  ultimate  issue  must  very  soon  be  visible. 
If  these  things  have  the  effect  they  ought  to  have  on  a  rational  gov¬ 
ernment  they  will  prevent  a  war  with  us.  The  nonintercourse  law 
will  be  past.  This  is  a  summary  view  of  our  present  political 
condition.10 

The  sinister  influence  of  Old  upon  New  England  Jeffer¬ 
son  attributed  to  community  of  language  and  customs  and  to 
the  friendly  association  of  commercial  men  on  both  sides 
of  the  water: 

These  circumstances  aided  by  her  intrigues  and  money  have  enabled 
her  to  shake  our  Union  to  its  center,  to  controul  it’s  legislative  and 
executive  authorities,  to  force  them  from  the  measures  which  their 
judgment  would  have  approved,  &  perhaps  to  constrain  us  to  uncon¬ 
ditional  submission  to  her  will,  which  can  never  again  be  opposed, 
if  such  should  be  the  present  result.11 

8  Cf.  The  Works  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  XI.  84-85,  January  14,  1809, 
and  more  especially,  ibid.,  XI.  86-87. 

“Jefferson  Papers.  Jefferson  to  Thomas  Mann  Randolph,  January 
2,  1809.  Cf.,  also  ibid.,  Benj.  Stoddert  to  Jefferson,  January  25,  1809. 
“  .  .  .  most  sincerely  believing,  that  even  a  few  months  further 

perseverance  in  the  embargo,  will  produce  open  defiance  of  the  Laws — if 
not  disunion.  .  .  .  Believe  me,  sir — vast  numbers  of  those  who  in 
public  meetings  approve  of  the  embargo,  condemn  it  in  private  circles.” 

11  Ibid.,  Jefferson  to  Mr.  McRae,  February  8,  1809.  Cf.,  also,  for 
Jefferson’s  suspicion  of  bribery,  ibid.,  “Republicans  of  Essex  Co., 
Mass.,”  February  20,  1809 :  “But  for  the  voice  of  Faction  &  the  Bribery 
of  Britain,  but  for  the  efforts  of  a  party  headed  by  a  man  outrageous  in 


FAILURE  AND  SUCCESS 


129 


In  a  crisis  so  menacing  with  its  constant  undertone  of 
secession,  Jefferson  should  have  taken  some  comfort  from 
the  action  of  the  “Legionary  Brigade”  of  Massachusetts. 
On  January  31,  its  officers  met  to  defend  the  honor  of  the 
organization  against  insinuations  that  it  was  no  longer  faith¬ 
ful  to  the  government.  Following  a  preamble,  which  re¬ 
counted  the  honorable  history  of  the  body  from  1775  to 
the  present  and  set  forth  its  contribution  to  the  safety  and 
glory  of  the  commonwealth,  resolutions  were  adopted  vin¬ 
dicating  the  honor  and  patriotism  of  the  troops.  First,  any 
attempt  to  alienate  the  men  was  “insulting  to  the  Govern¬ 
ment,  injurious  to  the  rights  and  liberties  of  the  people, 
dangerous  to  the  quiet  possession  of  honest  property,  and 
even  hazardous  to  life  itself.  Second,  the  officers  of  the 
Brigade  put  themselves  on  record  as  viewing  with  indigna¬ 
tion  and  abhorrence  every  attempt  to  disaffect  the  Militia 
from  their  known  and  uniform  attachment  and  Fidelity,  as 
American  citizen  soldiers,  to  their  Country,  its  Constitu¬ 
tions,  its  Governments,  and  its  Laws.” 

Other  resolutions  followed,  testifying  to  the  confidence 
of  the  officers  in  their  men  and  their  approval  of  the  Presi¬ 
dent’s  conduct,  “and  we  will  cordially  unite  with  our  Fellow 
citizens  in  affording  effectual  support  to  such  measures  as 
our  Government  may  further  adopt,  in  the  present  crisis  of 
our  affairs.”  The  signers  of  this  vote  of  confidence  were  a 
lieutenant  colonel,  three  majors,  twelve  captains,  ten  lieu¬ 
tenants,  and  six  ensigns.12 

his  passions  and  disgraced  by  his  own  friends,  who  to  effect  his  purposes 
would  ruin  his  Country  &  whose  uneasy  temper  would  disturb  Elysium 
to  gain  the  mastery; — But  for  him  &  his  friends  your  exertions  would 
have  been  crowned  with  the  securement  of  the  rights  of  our  seamen  and 
our  Merchants.” 

n  Jefferson  Papers.  ‘‘Legionary  Brigade  of  Boston.”  Resolutions  of 
January  31,  1809.  Cf.  also  similar  testimony  to  Massachusetts  patriotism 
in  The  Works  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  XI.  84-85,  January  14,  1809,  and 
XI.  86-87. 


130  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


Such  expressions  were  as  alarming  as  they  were  reassur¬ 
ing.  Morale  was  attacked,  or  it  would  have  needed  no  de¬ 
fense.  And,  if  Essex  County  Republicans  continued  to 
praise  Jefferson  for  his  wisdom13  and  the  men  of  Rhode 
Island  to  applaud  his  goodness,14  it  remained  not  a  whit 
the  less  true  that  “our  embargo  has  worked  hard.  It  has 
in  fact  federalized  three  of  the  New  England  states.  Con¬ 
necticut  you  know  was  so  before.”15 

Not  even  an  embargo  could  “federalize”  the  South, 
though  the  warning  of  Wilson  Cary  Nicholas  was  well 
founded.  He  was  not  the  only  friend  of  the  President 
turned  pessimist  by  misfortune.  John  Taylor  was  another. 
He  appealed  to  history : 

Nonintercourse  and  embargo  have  been  tried  by  us  upon  England 
for  eight  years,  and  failed.  As  measures  preparatory  to  the  revolu¬ 
tionary  war,  they  inflicted  privations  both  military  and  domestick, 
which  would  probably  have  caused  that  war  to  terminate  differently 
except  for  French  aid.  Even  provisions,  as  is  usual  in  cases  of  em¬ 
bargo,  became  so  scarce  and  dear,  that  it  was  nearly  as  difficult  to 
feed  as  to  clothe,  a  small  army.  And  a  deficiency  of  Indian  corn 
itself  for  home  consumption  appeared  as  early  as  1778  or  1779. 

The  incitement  to  a  manufacturing  spirit  was  at  least  equal  dur¬ 
ing  the  same  revolutionary  war,  to  what  it  can  be  made  now  by  law, 
or  any  other  contrivance;  it  was  kept  up  for  eight  years  and  also 
failed.16 

13  Cf.  The  Essex  Register,  Salem,  Mass.,  January  16,  1808. 

“Jefferson  Papers.  Bristol  County,  Convention,  Bristol,  Rhode 
Island:  “You  have  all  the  glory  as  you  had  all  the  virtues  of  our 
beloved  Washington.  It  is  not  enough  for  Americans  to  call  you  great; 
— we  call  you  good.’’ 

15  Ibid.,  Jefferson  to  William  Short,  March  8,  1808. 

18  Ibid.,  John  Taylor  to  Jefferson,  Port  Royal,  Virginia,  December  23, 
1808.  Cf.  also  The  Branch  Papers,  II.  298-299.  John  Taylor  to  James 
Monroe,  January  15,  1809:  “I  entirely  agree  with  you  that  the  support  of 
the  administration  has  become  absolutely  necessary,  not  that  I  think  it  can 
now  have  much  influence  on  our  foreign  relations,  but  for  the  sake  of 
supporting  republicanism  at  home.  It  is  extreme  folly  to  suppose  that 
the  bulk  of  the  people  are  influenced  by  abstract  political  principles ;  such 
was  never  the  case  with  any  nation.  Neither  the  principles  of  the  former 
administration  nor  of  the  latter,  caused  their  change  of  places  or  degrees 
of  popularity.  Both  was  done  by  taxes  imposed  and  removed  and  the 
federalists  and  tories  will  work  as  effectually  with  whatever  grates  the 
popular  feeling,  as  the  republicans  did.” 


FAILURE  AND  SUCCESS 


131 


Whatever  may  have  been  the  case  in  Revolutionary 
times,  no  failure  of  the  embargo,  real  or  imaginary,  could 
now  dislocate  the  Virginia  Republican  machine.  With  well- 
oiled  precision,  it  cast  the  entire  electoral  vote  of  the  state 
for  Madison  and  Clinton,  for  the  latter,  however,  with 
great  reluctance  inasmuch  as  “his  friends  appear  hostile  to 
the  administration,  &  have  been  so  uncandid  and  illiberal  as 
to  oppose  Mr.  Madison  on  the  score  of  the  Embargo  Laws 
while  Mr.  C.  himself  is  said  to  observe  profound  silence 
on  that  subject.”17 

Thus,  in  Virginia,  honest  acting  offset  plain  speaking. 
The  case  in  Georgia  was  reversed.  There  speech  was  fair, 
and  conduct  dubious.  The  legislature  was  authority  that 
“The  citizens  of  this  State  .  .  .  feel  happy  that  a 

measure  has  been  adopted  which  they  conceive  to  be  at 
once,  pacific  &  manly.”18  This  at  the  very  time  when 
Gallatin  complained  “that  the  system  of  illegal  exportation 
is  carried  on  the  largest  scale  &  embraces  all  the  sea  coast  of 
Georgia.”19 

These  lawless  transactions  constituted  a  romance  of  the 
sea.  A  friend  in  Savannah  wrote  as  follows : 

A  merchant  in  this  place  has  received  advice  that  London  merchants 
are  fitting  out  ships  of  some  say  from  18  and  20  guns  and  60  to  100 
men  to  come  on  our  coast  with  dollars  the  object  said  to  be,  the 
purchase  of  cotton  at  sea.  in  corroboration  of  this  account  I  have 
been  informed  by  a  planter  of  South  Carolina  that  a  merchant  from 
this  place  has  been  in  his  neighborhood  offering  37 J4  cents  pd.  for 
cotton  delivered  at  sea.  I  have  also  been  informed  by  Mr.  William¬ 
son  that  a  South  Carolina  planter  has  sold  100  bags  at  30  cents  altho 
the  price  at  this  market  is  but  22  cents.20 

"Jefferson  Papers.  Archibald  Stuart  to  Jefferson,  Staunton,  Vir¬ 
ginia.  But  cf.  Stuart’s  reflections  on  the  embargo  itself :  “The  nature  of 
the  Conflict  in  which  we  are  now  engaged  with  Europe  does  not  appear 
adapted  either  to  ye  nature  of  our  Government  or  the  genius  and  charac¬ 
ter  of  Our  people.  .  .  .  Many  of  our  people  are  more  capable  of  feel¬ 

ing  than  reflecting.  ...  It  would  be  almost  worth  the  expense  of  a 
war  to  get  rid  of  British  influence.” 

18  Ibid.,  The  Legislature  of  Georgia,  December  6,  1808. 

18  Ibid.,  A.  Gallatin  to  Jefferson,  December  28,  1808. 

20  Ibid.,  John  Milledge  to  Jefferson,  January  9,  1809. 


132  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 

Nor  were  Georgia  and,  by  implication,  South  Carolina 
the  only  offenders.  The  Southern  States,  as  we  have  previ¬ 
ously  noticed,  found  some  outlet  for  their  crops  in  a  coast¬ 
ing  trade  with  New  England.  And,  in  spite  of  the  scrutiny 
of  revenue  officers  and  the  system  of  bonded  cargoes  worked 
out  by  Gallatin,  occasional  shipments  wholly  eluded  the 
Government.  It  is  of  these  that  Jefferson  was  speaking 
when  he  reminded  Gallatin  that  “we  see  that  N[ew] 
0[rleans]  has  exported  flour  the  last  6  months,  &  that  too 
to  the  IV.  Indies.”21 

Unlike  some  of  her  neighbors,  South  Carolina  continued 
to  win  golden  laurels.  “Every  day  furnishes  fresh  proof 
of  the  integrity,  firmness,  and  unanimity  of  our  Citizens  in 
this  State,  to  support  you  and  our  Government  in  whatever 
measures  may  be  thought  proper  for  our  welfare.”22  Her 
electors,  like  those  of  Virginia,  voted  the  party  ticket  nam¬ 
ing  Clinton  for  vice-president,  but  with  equal  lack  of  enthus¬ 
iasm  for  one  who  had  “discovered  great  hostility  towards 
your  administration,  more  particularly  as  related  to  the 
Embargo.”23  And  her  legislators,  obedient  to  a  resolution 
passed  at  the  June  session,  “appeared  clad  in  an  entire  Suit 
of  Domestic  Manufactures.”24 

More  than  most  Americans,  South  Carolinians  seem 
to  have  visualized  the  economic  struggle  as  a  veritable  war¬ 
fare,  in  which  only  true  heroes  could  conquer.  To  men  in 
such  a  mood,  hardship  was  a  stimulus.  It  was  no  time  to 
mourn  their  losses.  As  their  governor  testified,  “Our  Citizens 

21  Jefferson  Papers.  Jefferson  to  A.  Gallatin,  December  8,  1808. 

22  Ibid.,  House  of  Representatives,  Columbia,  South  Carolina,  Thomas 
Lehre  to  Jefferson,  November  29,  1808. 

23  Ibid.,  December  1,  1808. 

24  Ibid.  Cf.,  also  Samuel  Alston  to  Jefferson,  February  1,  1809:  “Dear 
Sir:  I  received  last  evening  from  S.C.  a  few  patterns  of  Homespun 
Cloth,  manufactured  under  the  direction  of  my  industrious  &  truly  repub¬ 
lican  wife,  by  her  own  servants,  &  calculated  for  the  summer  season — one 
of  which  I  have  the  pleasure  to  send  you  as  a  present,  the  acceptance  of 
which  on  your  part,  will  be  considered  as  a  very  high  &  most  gratifying 
honor  on  mine  &  am  with  highest  veneration,”  etc. 


FAILURE  AND  SUCCESS 


133 


)ear  the  losses  of  the  Embargo  with  great  great  patriotism  & 
ire  ready  to  meet  all  events  in  defence  of  their  independence 
as  a  nation.”25  Their  ardor  was,  in  fact,  quite  ready  for  war 
tself.  As  one  member  of  the  legislature  expressed  it : 

From  my  personal  acquaintance  with,  and  my  knowledge  of  the 
entiments  of  every  member  of  both  Branches  of  our  Legislature,  I 
im  certain,  that  whatever  measures  our  Government  may  think 
oroper  to  adopt  toward  the  Belligerent  Powers  will  meet  with  their 
most  cordial  support.  I  never  knew  a  greater  rancor  among  us  than 
jpon  the  present  occasion.  Every  man  among  us  who  has  yet  the 
east  spark  of  the  Fire  of  76  remaining  in  him,  is  determined  to 
.tand,  or  fall  by  the  Government  of  his  choice.28 


Yet  virtue  even  such  as  this  was  not  exempt  from  the 
shafts  of  the  wicked.  The  grand  jury  of  Charleston  found 
:t  necessary  to  protest  against  violations  of  the  law  and  to 
recommend  the  offenders  for  trial.  “From  every  informa¬ 
tion  I  have  received  there  appears  to  be  a  very  shameful 
Traffic  carried  on  about  St.  Marys  River,  it  is  said  .  .  . 

that  English  ships  go  there,  &  take  in  on  the  Spanish  side 
cargoes  of  Cotton,  Rice  &c.  ...  I  am  fearful  it  will 

have  a  very  bad  tendency,” — all  the  more  to  be  deprecated 
with  Federalists  showing  symptoms  of  restlessness.27 

From  Maryland  there  came  a  most  ingenious  theory. 
John  Crawford,  a  citizen  of  Baltimore,  contended  that  the 
embargo  should  be  kept  in  force  for  the  very  reason  that  it 
encouraged  smuggling.  The  temptation  to  this  illicit  trade 
would  lure  people  from  “our  crowdedly  populous  cities  to 
spread  over  the  Country,  where  they  would  not  so  much 
press  upon  each  other,  and  thus  obviate  an  evil — which  their 
collecting  together  so  numerously  occasions.”28  Less  naive, 


“Jefferson  Papers.  Governor  Pinckney  to  Jefferson,  December  8, 
1808.  Cf.  also  Governor  Pinckney  to  Jefferson,  January  2,  1809:  ‘‘By 
the  average  sales  last  year  the  Planters  of  this  State  lost  one  with  an¬ 
other  fifty  percentum  &  yet  you  hear  of  no  grumbling  among  us,  but  a 
few,  very  few  indeed  violent  federalists.” 

*  Ibid.,  Thomas  Lehre  to  Jefferson,  Columbia,  South  Carolina,  De¬ 
cember  18,  1808. 

”  Ibid.,  Thomas  Lehre  to  Jefferson,  Charleston,  January  21,  1809. 

18  Ibid.,  John  Crawford  to  Jefferson,  Baltimore,  December  1,  1808. 


134  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


but  equally  comforting,  was  a  resolution  adopted  at  Anna¬ 
polis  in  February,  1809,  to  the  effect  that  the  embargo  was 
“a  wise,  salutary  and  indispensable  measure;  that  the  ex¬ 
pediency  of  it  was  never  questioned  until  the  infamous  pro¬ 
duction  of  Timothy  Pickering  taught  the  enemies  of  the 
government  the  use  that  might  be  made  of  it  to  their  advan¬ 
tage.”29 

In  Delaware  near  by,  the  friends  of  the  embargo  were 
said  greatly  to  outnumber  its  enemies.  They  complained, 
however,  that,  in  less  patriotic  districts,  ‘‘the  ingenuity  of 
unprincipled  speculators,  whetted  by  avarice,  has  devised 
various  means  of  evading  it,  and  by  their  frequent  violations 
of  it  have,  in  a  great  measure  defeated  its  object.”30  It  was 
perhaps  natural  for  a  region  so  remote  from  the  temptations 
which  it  denounced  to  assume  the  holier-than-thou  attitude 
of  self-proclaimed  piety. 

More  constructive  was  the  spirit  of  the  manufacturing 
interest.  In  this  connection,  the  opinion  of  Thomas  Cooper, 
the  pioneer  of  American  political  economy,  is  suggestive. 
He  wrote  in  December,  after  almost  a  year  of  embargo : 

I  hope  Congress  will  take  measures  of  permanent  protection  in 
favour  of  our  infant  manufactures.  It  will  be  horrible  fraud  to 
entice  our  citizens  to  embark  in  the  troublesome  and  hazardous 
speculation  of  new  manufactures,  and  then  on  a  sudden  peace  leave 
them  to  all  the  malignancy  of  the  British  competition  in  our  own 
market.  I  well  know  that  Adam  Smith’s  general  doctrine  is  true, 
that  bounties  and  protecting  duties  to  encourage  the  raising  at  home 
at  a  dear  rate,  w'hat  can  be  purchased  from  abroad  at  a  cheap  one  is 
neither  more  nor  less  than  picking  the  pockets  of  one  class  of  the 
Community  to  support  the  monopoly  of  another.  But  there  may  be 
cases,  where  necessity  will  call  for  this.  With  us,  it  will  be,  not  a 
measure  of  economy,  so  much  as  a  measure  of  protection  and  de¬ 
fence.  Our  markets  ought  to  be  more  at  home ;  more  under  our  own 
command :  and  this  will  call  for  permanent  not  temporary  regula¬ 
tions.  .  .  . 

Of  course,  all  the  New  England  States  are  ostensibly  and  ap¬ 
parently  adverse  to  the  measures  of  Government.  I  do  not  believe 

“Jefferson  Papers.  Maryland  Gazette,  (Printed)  Annapolis,  Febru¬ 
ary  8,  1809. 

30  Ibid.,  Wilmington,  Delaware,  February  2,  1809. 


FAILURE  AND  SUCCESS 


135 


they  are  so  really.  Home  manufactures  are  increasing  to  such  a 
degree  there,  that  e’re  long,  in  numbers  as  well  as  in  opulence,  that 
class  of  the  Community  will  be  a  full  match  for  the  Sea-port  mer¬ 
chants.  The  latter  will  separate  from  the  Union  and  join  England 
if  they  can.  The  Farmers  and  manufacturers  certainly  will  not. 
They  may  be  led,  and  misled,  for  a  time,  and  their  voice  drowned 
by  the  mercantile  outcry.  But  their  wishes  and  their  interest  will 
be  in  favour  of  our  own  union.  Would  not  some  early  and  effective 
measure  in  support  of  domestic  manufactures  tend  to  strengthen 
the  opposition  in  those  States  to  the  mercantile  predilection  for  Eng¬ 
lish  goods,  English  politics  and  English  government  ?  It  would  cer¬ 
tainly  fix  the  manufacturing  class  decidedly  in  favour  of  the  present 
measures,  and  probably  frustrate  the  schemes  of  disunion  now  in 
contemplation.31 

In  this  plea  for  protection,  Cooper  was  ahead  of  the 
times.  His  recommendations  were  tabled  till  a  day  when 
manufacturers  could  outvote  the  commercial  interests. 
Jefferson,  meanwhile,  lent  to  rising  manufactures  the  en¬ 
couragement  of  his  personal  patronage  and  ordered  from 
Colonel  Humphreys’  woollen  mills  a  suit  of  homespun  for 
his  New  Year’s  reception.32  To  these  overtures,  the  captain 
of  an  infant  industry  dryly  replied : 

Continuing  to  make  some  efforts  to  draw  forth  the  Industry  of  a 
portion  of  the  Community  hitherto  less  usefully  employed  than  it 
might  have  been;  and  waiting  with  patience  the  result  of  those 
efforts  heretofore  unaided  and  not  particularly  encouraged,  I  remain 
Very  respectfully,  dear  Sir,  Your  Mt.  obt.  Servt,  D.  Humphreys.33 

It  was  a  season  of  great  beginnings,  and  manufactures, 
though  not  of  the  same  traditional  influence  as  commerce, 
were  increasingly  diversified.  In  December,  1808,  Charles 
Thomson,  of  Revolutionary  fame,  wrote  Jefferson  that  with¬ 
in  a  mile  of  his  home  at  Harriston,  Pennsylvania,  were 
three  paper  mills.34  Of  similar  import  was  a  Philadelphia 
boast  that,  “No  one  who  does  not  take  pains  to  keep  him- 

31  Jefferson  Papers.  Thomas  Cooper  to  Jefferson,  December  4,  1808. 

32  Ibid.,  Jefferson  to  Mr.  Bishop,  December  8,  1808. 

33  Ibid.,  D.  Humphreys  to  Jefferson,  New  Haven,  Connecticut,  Decem¬ 
ber  12,  1808. 

“  Ibid.,  Charles  Thomson  to  Jefferson,  December  13,  1808. 


136  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


self  informed  of  the  progress  of  things,  can  have  any  idea 
of  the  rapid  strides  we  are  making  in  mechanical  knowledge 
and  in  manufactures.”  Wire  for  use  in  carding  machines 
was  an  exception,  and  a  scarcity  of  antimony  was  also  de¬ 
precated.  Lack  of  this  essential  was  working  great  hard¬ 
ship  among  type-founders,  many  of  whom  were  discharging 
their  hands.  Dyestuffs,  too,  were  very  scarce,  a  circumstance 
demanding  attention,  inasmuch  as  “The  Consumption  of 
those,  is  immense  already;  and  will  be  increased,  owing  to 
the  astonishing  extent  of  Manufactures.”35  But  occasional 
handicaps  only  emphasized  the  achievements  actually  accom¬ 
plished.  They  were  flies  in  an  otherwise  rich  ointment. 
This  being  so,  it  is  not  surprising  that  “The  Citizens  of 
the  City  and  County  of  Philadelphia  in  general  Town 
Meeting  assembled”  testified  to  their  enthusiasm  for  meas¬ 
ures  of  “an  enlightened  and  pacific  policy,  well  calculated  to 
advance  the  happiness  and  preserve  the  dignity  and  independ¬ 
ence  of  these  United  States.”36 

Practical  men  were  as  keen  as  theorists  like  Cooper  to 
recognize  the  importance  of  tariff  legislation,  if  their  indus¬ 
trial  beginnings  were  to  be  assured  of  permanence.  Jeffer¬ 
son  himself  was  moved  to  recommend  to  Gallatin  the 
placing  of  red  lead  “within  the  pale  of  protection.”37  He 
may  well  have  listened  with  similar  favor  to  a  plea  on  behalf 
of  white  lead  from  one  who  forwarded 

a  sample  of  I  believe  the  first  White  Lead  ever  manufactured  in  the 
U.  States.  This  with  many  other  manufactures  of  the  first  necessity 
that  are  now  progressing  speaks  more  forcibly  the  wisdom  of  the 
late  measures  of  government  than  all  that  has  or  can  be  written  on 
the  subject,  and  should  Congress  deem  it  advisable  to  prohibit  or  to 
lay  protecting  duties  on  the  importation  of  all  articles  that  can  be 

35  Jefferson  Papers.  James  Mean  to  Jefferson,  Philadelphia,  December 
6,  1808. 

M  Ibid.,  Philadelphia,  January  23,  1809.  For  a  similar  plaudit,  see 
Resolutions  of  Niagara  County,  New  York,  January  26,  1809. 

37  Ibid.,  Jefferson  to  A.  Gallatin,  December  24,  1808. 


FAILURE  AND  SUCCESS 


manufactured  in  the  United  States  they  will  do  more  for  the  real 
independance  [.sic]  of  their  country  than  has  been  done  since  the 
year  1783. 38 

Jefferson  found  in  this  constructive  aspect  of  the  em¬ 
bargo  a  solace  for  many  an  anxious  hour  over  its  destruc¬ 
tive  tendencies.  And  he  wrote  in  good  spirits  to  La  Fayette 
that :  “Our  embargo,  which  has  been  a  very  trying  measure, 
has  produced  one  very  happy  &  permanent  effect.  It  has  set 
us  all  on  domestic  manufacture,  &  will  I  verily  believe  reduce 
our  future  demands  on  England  fully  one  half.”39 

Much  of  the  credit  for  this  hopeful  prospect  Jefferson 
chose  to  arrogate  unto  himself.  He  wrote  in  January,  1809  : 

I  have  lately  inculcated  the  encouragement  of  manufactures  to 
the  extent  of  our  own  consumption  at  least,  in  all  articles  of  which 
we  raise  the  raw  material.  On  this  the  federal  papers  and  meetings 
have  sounded  the  alarm  of  Chinese  policy,  destruction  of  commerce, 
&c. ;  that  is  to  say,  the  iron  which  we  make  must  not  be  wrought  here 
into  ploughs,  axes,  hoes,  &c„  in  order  that  the  ship-owner  may  have 
the  profit  of  carrying  it  to  Europe,  and  bringing  it  back  in  a  manu¬ 
factured  form,  as  if  after  manufacturing  our  own  raw  materials  for 
our  own  use,  there  would  not  be  a  surplus  of  produce  sufficient  to 
employ  a  due  proportion  of  navigation  in  carrying  it  to  market  and 
exchanging  it  for  those  articles  of  which  we  have  not  the  raw 
material.  Yet  this  absurd  hue  and  cry  has  contributed  much  to 
federalize  New  England,  their  doctrine  goes  to  the  sacrificing  agri¬ 
culture  and  manufactures  to  commerce;  to  the  calling  all  our  people 
from  the  interior  country  to  the  sea-shore  to  turn  merchants  and  to 
convert  this  great  agricultural  country  into  a  city  of  Amsterdam.40 

38  Jefferson  Papers.  Wm.  Dalzell  to  Jefferson,  Philadelphia,  Febru¬ 
ary  10,  1809.  But  for  the  obverse,  see  J.  Branagan  to  Jefferson,  Phila¬ 
delphia,  February  11,  1809.  “Could  you  see  the  unspeakable  distress  of 
the  poor  in  this  city  your  very  heart  would  almost  weep  blood.”  Cf. 
also  W.  Penn  to  Jefferson,  New  York,  February  24,  1809:  "All  our 
citizens  are  become  paupers,  more  than  10,000  now  depend  on  Charity.” 
But  from  Washington  County,  Pennsylvania,  came  praises  for  embargo 
as  the  sponsor  of  manufactures,  February  21,  1809. 

30  Ibid.,  Jefferson  to  La  Fayette,  February  24,  1809. 

40  The  Works  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  XI.  90-91,  January  21,  1809. 
Cf.  also  Ibid.,  XI.  97-98.  Jefferson  to  Benjamin  Stoddert,  February  18, 
1809 :  “The  converting  this  great  agricultural  country  into  a  city  of 
Amsterdam, — a  mere  headquarters  for  carrying  on  the  commerce  of  all 
nations  with  one  another,  is  too  absurd  .  .  . ;  it  is  essentially  interest¬ 

ing  to  us  to  have  shipping  and  seamen  enough  to  carry  our  surplus  pro¬ 
duce  to  market ;  but  beyond  that  I  do  not  think  we  are  bound  to  give  it 
encouragement  by  drawbacks  or  other  premiums.” 


138  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 

He  drew  the  conclusion  that  true  prosperity  depends  upon  a 
balance  of  activities,  “and  not  in  the  protuberant  navigation 
which  has  kept  us  in  hot  water  from  the  commencement  of 
our  government  and  is  now  engaging  us  in  war.”41  Thus 
an  effort  to  provide  New  England  a  substitute  for  her  com¬ 
merce  awakened  Jefferson  to  the  possibilities  of  New  Eng¬ 
land  manufactures  almost  twenty  years  before  the  Yankees 
themselves  were  ready  to  accept  the  lesson.42 

If  the  embargo  made  a  positive  contribution  to  Jeffer¬ 
son’s  thought  upon  manufactures  and  commerce,  it  did 
almost  as  much  for  his  thought  upon  the  means  of  enforc¬ 
ing  the  nation’s  will.  Notwithstanding  a  pride  which  led 
him  to  argue  that  “The  pressure  of  the  embargo,  though 
sensibly  felt  by  every  description  of  our  fellow-citizens,  has 
yet  been  cheerfully  borne  by  most  of  them,  under  the  con¬ 
viction  that  it  was  a  temporary  evil,  and  a  necessary  one  to 
save  us  from  the  greater  and  more  permanent  evils — the 
loss  of  property  and  surrender  of  rights,”43  Jefferson  could 
not  ignore  the  lawlessness  of  the  “unprincipled  along  our 
seacoast  and  frontiers.”44  As  the  executive,  he  was  com¬ 
pelled  to  adopt  a  rigor  wholly  foreign  to  his  character, 
though  he  cautioned  officials  “ever  to  bear  in  mind  that  the 
life  of  a  citizen  is  never  to  be  endangered,  but  as  the  last 
melancholy  effort  for  the  maintenance  of  order  and  obedi¬ 
ence  to  the  laws.”45 

This  vigorous  policy  bore  fruit,  as  already  noticed,  in 
a  more  or  less  general  obedience  to  law.  And  pride  of  opin¬ 
ion  caused  Jefferson  to  magnify  passive  submission  under 

41  The  Works  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  XI.  90-91. 

42  This  statement  does  not  seem  unwarranted  in  view  ol  New  England 
opposition  to  the  tariff  of  1824. 

43  The  Works  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  XI.  87,  January  17,  1809. 

44  Ibid.,  XI.  88-89. 

45  Ibid.,  XI.  89. 


FAILURE  AND  SUCCESS 

threat  of  gunboats46  and  militia  into  active  approval.47  He 
was  loath  to  recognize  the  blow  which  the  embargo  dealt  to 
his  own  popularity  and  the  party  strength.  With  the  turn 
of  the  year,  however,  it  became  evident  that  the  repeal  was 
only  a  question  of  time,  though  the  majority  still  seemed 
disposed  to  defer  action  until  a  special  session  of  the  eleventh 
Congress,  to  be  called  in  May,  1809.  That  this  was  Jeffer¬ 
son’s  expectation  as  late  as  January  28  appears  from  a  letter 
to  Monroe : 

The  course  the  Legislature  means  to  pursue  may  be  inferred  from 
the  act  now  passed  for  a  meeting  in  May,  and  proposition  before 
them  for  repealing  the  embargo  in  June,  and  then  resuming  and 
maintaining  by  force  our  right  of  navigation.  There  will  be  con¬ 
siderable  opposition  to  this  last  proposition,  not  only  from  the 
federalists  old  and  new,  who  oppose  everything,  but  from  the  sound 
members  of  the  majority,  and  that  it  is  the  only  proposition  which 
can  be  devised  that  could  obtain  a  majority  of  any  kind.48 

Confronting  the  repeal  of  his  favorite  measure,  Jeffer¬ 
son  was  consoled  by  the  reflecton  that  “There  never  has  been 
a  situation  of  the  world  before,  in  which  such  endeavors  as 
we  have  made  would  not  have  secured  our  peace.  It  is 
probable  that  there  never  will  be  such  another.”49  He 
pleaded  for  another  eight  years  of  peace  at  almost  any  price 
until  the  happy  hour  when  “our  income  liberated  from  debt 

46  The  Works  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  I.  429,  December  1,  1808.  “These 
11  small  vessels  to  be  sent  immediately  to  the  Eastern  ports  to  enforce 
the  embargo.” 

"Ibid.,  XI.  87-88.  Circular  from  the  secretary  of  war  to  governors. 
“The  pressure  of  the  embargo  though  sensibly  felt  by  every  description  of 
our  fellow-citizens,  has  yet  been  cheerfully  borne  by  most  of  them,  under 
the  conviction  that  it  was  a  temporary  evil,  and  a  necessary  one  to  save 
us  from  greater  and  more  permanent  evils, — the  loss  of  property  and 
surrender  of  rights.”  He  goes  on  to  threaten  violators  with  the  militia 
power.  January  17,  1809. 

48  Ibid.,  XI.  95.  January  28,  1809.  He  had  already,  January  14,  1809, 
renewed  his  declaration  that  the  embargo  was  never  intended  to  be  perma¬ 
nent.  Ibid.,  XI.  85. 

49 Ibid .,  XI.  96.  January  28,  1809.  In  this  same  letter,  Jefferson  finds 
room  for  cheer  over  Napoleon’s  victories  in  Spain,  for  these  would  teach 
Britain  that  her  true  interests  lay  in  the  North  American  trade,  and  they 
might  even  lead  Bonaparte  to  sue  for  our  good  will  in  order  to  obtain 
our  aid  in  subduing  the  Spanish  Colonies. 


140  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 

will  be  adequate  to  any  war,  without  new  taxes  or  loans,  and 
our  position  and  increasing  strength  put  us  hors  d’  insulte 
from  any  nation.”  The  measures  to  attain  this  desirable 
end  he  relinquished  to  his  successor.50 

It  was  Jefferson’s  expectation  that  the  new  administra¬ 
tion  would  usher  in  a  new  order,  leaving  to  the  old  a  retire¬ 
ment  with  flags  flying  and  the  honors  of  war.  But  as  the 
session  wore  to  a  close,  sentiment  against  the  embargo  gained 
new  adherents,  and  the  disaffection  of  the  Massachusetts 
Republicans,  led  by  Ezekiel  Bacon  and  Joseph  Story,  sealed 
the  fate  of  a  law  which  was  now  sustained  by  sentimental 
reasons  only.  It  was,  accordingly,  in  the  bitterness  of  humili¬ 
ation  that  on  February  7,  1809,  Jefferson  sadly  wrote  his 
son-in-law,  Thomas  Mann  Randolph : 

Dear  Sir, — I  thought  Congress  had  taken  their  ground  firmly  for 
continuing  their  embargo  till  June,  and  then  war.  But  a  sudden  and 
unaccountable  revolution  of  opinion  took  place  the  last  week,  chiefly 
among  the  New  England  and  New  York  members,  and  in  a  kind  of 
panic  they  voted  the  4th  of  March  for  removing  the  embargo,  and 
by  such  a  majority  as  gave  all  reason  to  believe  they  would  not  agree 
either  to  war  or  non-intercourse.  This,  too,  after  we  had  become 
satisfied  that  the  Essex  Junto  had  found  their  expectation  desperate, 
of  inducing  the  people  there  to  either  separation  or  forcible  opposi¬ 
tion.  The  majority  of  Congress,  however,  has  now  rallied  to  the 
removing  of  the  embargo  on  the  4th  of  March,  non-intercourse  with 
France  and  Great  Britain,  trade  everywhere  else,  and  continuing 
war  preparations.  The  further  details  are  not  yet  settled,  but  I 
believe  it  is  perfectly  certain  that  the  embargo  will  be  taken  off  on 
the  4th  of  March.51 


50  The  Works  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  XI.  96.  Cf.  also  XI.  74-75. 
“I  think  it  is  fair  to  leave  to  those  who  are  to  act  on  them,  the  decisions 
they  prefer,  Being  to  be  myself  but  a  spectator.  I  should  not  feel  justified 
in  directing  measures  which  those  who  are  to  execute  them  would  disap¬ 
prove.  Our  situation  is  truly  difficult.  We  have  been  pressed  to  the  wall 
and  all  further  retreat  impracticable.”  November  13,  1808. 

61  Ibid.,  XI.  96-97,  February  7,  1809.  For  an  illustration  of  the  pacific 
temper  of  this  Congress,  see  J.  Fairfax  McLaughlin,  Matthew  Lyon,  p. 
114-115.  “Lyon  took  just  pride  in  the  capture  of  Ticonderoga.”  “Now 
is  the  time,”  he  said  in  the  debate  of  February  7,  1809,  “to  pause  and 
count  the  cost.  I  know  a  little  of  what  war  means.”  Jefferson  thought 
removal  of  the  embargo  presaged  war.  Cf.  The  Bixby  Collection. 
Jefferson  to  Daniel  Lescallier,  February  25,  1809:  “Sir  .  .  .  We  are 


FAILURE  AND  SUCCESS  (W 

Jefferson’s  prophecy  was  correct,  for  the  bill  passed  the 
House  of  Representatives  on  February  27  by  a  vote  of 
eighty-one  to  forty.52  Thus  he  retired  from  office  with  his 
great  commercial  remedy  discredited,  with  the  gloomy  con¬ 
sciousness  of  having  “refederalized”  three  of  the  New 
England  States,  and  with  the  sincere  belief  that  war  was 
imminent.53 

Jefferson  and  the  embargo  wenL_euL-tOg&th€r,  and  the 
fame  of  the  one  is  for  ever  associated  with  the  fortunes  of 
the  other.  Facing  an  unparalleled  political  and  commercial 
crisis,  he  had  chosen  the  embargo  as  a  means  tq  .combine  - 
peace  with  honor  in  an  assertiorLjQf  the,  country’s  dignity. 
The  injury  which  the  enemy  sustained  demonstrated  the 
wisdom  of  the  choice,54  though  it  was  doubtless  a  miscalcu¬ 
lation  to  count  upon  any  temporary  economic  pressure  for 
subduing  the  pride  of  the  European  belligerents,  especially 
in  view  of  the  known  strength  of  the  opposition  from  the 
American  commercial  classes,  which  was  as  well  understood 
in  Parliament  as  in  Congress.  Still  Jefferson  continued  to 
the  end  to  believe  that  under  any  other  circumstances  the 

a  peaceable  people  and  have  sacrificed  much  to  remain  at  peace  with  all 
the  belligerents  of  Europe,  but  the  hope  of  longer  preserving  that  attitude 
seems  desperate.” 

62  The  Works  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  XI.  101. 

“  Ibid.,  XI.  104.  March  8,  1809. 

51  Cf.  Pinkney,  The  Life  of  William  Pinkney,  p.  233.  Pinkney  to 
Madison,  January  23,  1809 :  “The  documents  laid  before  Congress  and 
published  have  had  a  good  effect  here.  Your  letter  to  Mr.  Erskine  I  have 
caused  to  be  printed  in  a  pamphlet,  with  my  letter  to  Mr.  Canning  of 
the  23d  of  August,  and  his  reply.  The  report  of  the  committee  of  the 
House  of  Representatives  is  admitted  to  be  a  most  able  paper,  and  has 
been  published  in  the  Morning  Chronicle.  The  Times  newspaper  (not¬ 
withstanding  its  former  violence  against  us),  agrees  that  our  overtures 
should  have  been  accepted.  The  opposition  in  Parliament  is  unanimous 
on  this  subject,  although  divided  on  others.  Many  of  the  friends  of  gov¬ 
ernment  speak  well  of  our  overtures,  and  almost  everybody  disapproves 
of  Mr.  Canning’s  note.  The  tone  has  changed,  too,  in  the  city.  In  short, 

I  have  a  strong  hope  that  the  eminent  wisdom  of  the  late  American  meas¬ 
ures  will  soon  be  practically  proved  to  the  confusion  of  their  opponents.” 


142  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


embargo  would  have  achieved  its  peaceful  aim.55  Certainly 
his  persistence  in  championing  a  policy  so  odious  to  many  of 
his  fellow  citizens  evinces  a  singlemindedness  not  easily 
reconciled  with  that  role  of  demagogue  and  popularity  seeker 
to  which  his  enemies  consigned  him. 

On  the  whole  the  embargo  is  a  credit  to  both  the  heart 
and  the  head  of  its  originator.  It  marks  him  as  a  lover  of 
mankind,  seeking  a  substitute  for  war,  and  at  the  same  time 
gives  him  credit  for  a  sense  of  Realpolitik.  He  saw  that 
the  war  cloud  over  seas  demanded  the  recall  to  safety  of 
American  shipping.  And  he  perceived  that  with  equivalent 
injuries  from  each  belligerent,  the  utter  impossibility  of  war 
with  both  demanded  an  alternative.  If  the  means  he  selected 
were  not  completely  efficacious,  it  is  at  any  rate  beyond 
dispute  that  no  better  have  since  been  found.  To  Jefferson 
belongs  the  statesman’s  credit  for  a  liberal  project  steadfastly 
pursued.  And  as  the  years  roll  on,  the  shadow  which  the 
embargo  cast  upon  his  popularity  with  contemporaries,  melts 
into  the  sunlight  of  his  larger  fame  as  a  path-finder  on  the 
road  to  peace. 

“  For  support  of  this  view,  see  ibid.,  Pinkney  to  Madison,  August 
19,  1809.  “I  cannot  subdue  my  first  regret  that  it  was  found  to  be  neces¬ 
sary,  at  the  last  regular  session  of  Congress,  to  falter  in  the  course  we 
were  pursuing,  and  to  give  signs  of  inability  to  persevere  in  a  system 
which  was  on  the  point  of  accomplishing  all  its  purposes.  That  it  was 
found  to  be  necessary  I  have  no  doubt ;  but  I  have  great  doubts  whether 
if  it  had  fortunately  been  otherwise,  we  should  have  had  any  disavowals.” 
(He  refers  to  British  disavowals  of  Mr.  ErskineTs  agreement  with  the 
United  States.)  Elsewhere,  Pinkney  wrote  (see  p.  148),  “The  embargo 
was  a  noble  and  magnificent  effort,  suited  to  the  extraordinary  occasion 
by  which  it  was  suggested,  and  adequate  if  persevered  in  to  all  its  pur¬ 
poses.  That  great  measure  being  abandoned,  no  half-way  scheme  of  the 
same  family,  can  ever  hope  to  stand  in  its  place,  and  be  effectual.  .  .  . 

It  would  have  been  successful,  but  that  time  and  prosperity  had  alloyed 
our  virtues  and  unfitted  us  for  such  a  trial.  .  .  .  Any  other  measure 

than  the  embargo  would  have  been  madness  or  cowardice.  For  no  others 
were  in  our  choice  but  war  with  both  aggressors,  or  submission  to  both ; 
with  the  certainty  too,  that  that  submission  would  in  its  progress  either 
lead  to  war,  or  to  a  state  of  abject  degradation.” 


CHAPTER  VI 


NEW  ENGLAND  AND  THE  EMBARGO 

In  one  sense  the  object  of  the  present  study  has  already 
been  accomplished,  however  imperfectly,  by  the  preceding 
summary  of  the  experience  and  philosophy  which  impelled 
Jefferson  to  attempt  the  great  experiment  and  of  the  hard¬ 
ship  and  chagrin  which  it  entailed  upon  him.  But  the  ap¬ 
proach  has  been  up  to  this  point  almost  entirely  personal.  And 
the  inwardness  of  near  success  and  final  failure  can  be  un¬ 
derstood  only  through  an  examination  of  the  political  and 
economic  reactions  upon  both  America  and  Europe  of  a 
system  which  attempted  to  shake  Europe  to  its  foundations 
and  did  shake  America.  For  that  reason,  it  is  proper  to 
inquire  into  the  effect  of  the  embargo  upon  commerce,  in¬ 
dustry,  and  agriculture  among  the  several  states,  section  by 
section,  and  then  to  seek  the  explanation  for  the  considerable 
but  insufficient  effects  produced  by  it  in  Europe.  Since, 
throughout  the  entire  period  of  embargo  enforcement,  New 
England  was  by  far  the  most  vocal  of  American  communi¬ 
ties  in  her  response  to  the  measure,  it  is  as  well  to  consider 
her  reactions  first. 

The  attitude  of  New  England  toward  the  political  and 
commercial  crisis  of  1807  was  the  result  of  her  previous 
history.  The  meagre  returns  of  a  somewhat  unprofitable 
agriculture  and  the  discouragements  to  manufactures  im¬ 
posed  by  the  British  colonial  office,  had  driven  men  early  to 
seek  for  wealth  in  the  commerce  which  New  England  har¬ 
bors  invited  and  in  the  fisheries  which  proximity  to  the 
Grand  Banks  encouraged.  Long  before  the  Revolution, 
New  England  was  recognized  as  the  commercial  center  of 
the  North  American  colonies.  The  difficulties  of  the  Revo- 


[  143  ] 


{  T44  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 

lutionary  period  and  the  rivalries  under  the  Articles  of  Con¬ 
federation  did  not  alter  the  primary^  dependence  of  New 
England  upon  her  commerce,-  and  she  entered  the  Federal 
Union  with  that  as  her  chief  interest.  Within  the  Union, 
her  welfare  did  not  suffer  under  the  watchful  leadership  of 
three  administrations  of  her  own  choice.  She  enjoyed  the 
additional  and  unhoped  for  advantage  of  membership  in  the 
chief  of  neutral  nations  at  a  time  when  a  great  war  in  Europe 
threw  an  unprecedented  volume  of  commerce  into  the  hands 
of  neutrals. 

The  first  phase  of  the  Great  War,  from  1792  to  the  Peace 
of  Amiens,  gave  an  extraordinary  impetus  to  American  com¬ 
merce,  of  which  New  England  was  the  chief  beneficiary. 
But  so  abnormal  a  growth  was  artificial,  and  would  be  en¬ 
dangered  either  by  a  termination  of  the  war  and  a  resump¬ 
tion  of  trade  by  the  belligerents,  or,  failing  that,  by  any  shift 
in  the  policy  of  the  hostile  powers  tending  to  convert  what 
had  been  a  military  and  naval  war  into  a  commercial  war. 
Such  a  change  was  indicated  upon  the  resumption  of  hostili¬ 
ties  in  1803,  when  Napoleon  finally  discovered  the  impossi¬ 
bility  of  a  direct  attack  upon  Great  Britain.  As  he  turned 
from  Boulogne  for  the  campaign  of  Ulm  and  Austerlitz, 
Great  Britain  made  the  similar  discovery  that  an  indirect 
method  of  attack  offered  the  best  chance  against  Napoleon. 
The  weapon  for  this  was  the  blockade.  As  first  employed 
in  1805,  it  extended  only  from  the  Seine  to  Ostend.  This 
blockade  in  combination  with  Nelson’s  victory  at  Trafalgar, 
pointed  the  way  to  a  use  of  British  sea  power  agreeable 
neither  to  Napoleon  nor  to  the  neutrals  who  might  wish 
to  trade  with  him.  For  the  blockade,  though  somewhat  ten¬ 
tative  at  first,  was  capable  of  indefinite  extension.  And  when, 
in  1806  and  1807,  Napoleon  issued  his  Berlin  and  Milan  de¬ 
crees,  imposing  a  paper  blqckade  upon  the  entire  British 
Islands,  the  government  of  George  III  quietly  retaliated  by 


NEW  ENGLAND  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


Vys 

Orders  in  Council  of  January  and  November,  1807,  which 
rendered  any  neutral  trade  with  the  Napoleonic  Empire  a 
virtual  impossibility. 

The  result  for  America  was  a  staggering  blow.  With 
over  one  million  tons  of  shipping  destined  to  lie  idle,  except 
for  a  small  fraction  in  the  coasting  trade,  the  nation  faced 
a  crisis  of  the  first  magnitude.  For  New  England,  where""! 
the  single  state  of  Massachusetts  controlled  about  one  third  of  j 
the  total  tonnage  of  the  country,  with  important  shipping 
interests  in  Connecticut  as  well,  conditions  boded  a  catastro¬ 
phe.  Not  only  would  shipowners  and  their  dependent  sea¬ 
men  face  severe  loss  and  privation,  but  farmers  would 
be  deprived  of  their  customary  market  for  lumber  and 
potash,  butter,  grain,  etc.  Moreover,  it  was  doubtful  whether 
so  huge  a  capital  as  that  devoted  to  commerce  could  find 
a  ready  shift  into  the  hitherto  but  little  developed  manufac¬ 
tures;  which,  in  woollens,  shoes,  and  the  like,  as  yet  gave 
only  a  dim  forecast  of  the  part  they  were  eventually  to  play 
in  New  England  economy.  Accordingly,  when  the  United 
States  government,  completing  the  work  so  well  begun  by  the 
Orders  and  Decrees,  declared  a  total  embargo  of  American 
shipping,  the  temporary  and  artificial  prosperity  of  New 
England  shippers  came  to  a  sudden  and  disastrous  halt. 

The_ embargo  shook  to  its  foundations  the  entire  eco-j'»y. 
nomic  structure  of  New  England.  Nowhere  was  its  harvest 
of  sectional  self-consciousness  and  cleavage  more  marked, 
and  the  result  was  one  of  the  most  illuminating  chapters 
in  the  history  of  American  politics.  But  to  estimate  the 
interaction  of  economic  interest  and  political  opinion,  it  is 
essential  to  examine  the  state  of  political  parties  in  the  New 
England  of  1808. 

In  the  commercial  centers  the  Federalists  had  found 
their  original  stronghold.  Their  appeal  was  conservative. 
Rich  merchants,  whether  in  Boston  or  New  York,  Phila- 


14* 


JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 

delphia,  or  Charleston,  supported  a  party  which  championed 
property.  In  turn,  the  party  crowned  the  merchants  with 
a  shining  halo  as  “the  most  honorable,  the  most  benevolent, 
and  in  every  respect  the  most  important  class  of  men  in 
society.”1  Federalist  America,  in  unison  with  aristocratic 
England,  was  horrified  at  the  crimes  against  persons  and 
property  let  loose  by  the  French  Revolution.  In  fact,  dur¬ 
ing  the  last  decade  of  the  old  century,  the  repressive  and 
reactionary  spirit  which  the  French  Revolution  aroused  in 
Federalist  Tories,  prepared  the  downfall  of  their  party  in 
the  elections  of  1800  and  1804.  New  England,  like  the  rest 
of  the  country,  went  over  to  the  Republicans,  but  her  defec¬ 
tion  from  first  principles  was  political  rather  than  economic. 
Her  mercantile  and  seafaring  interests  had  prospered  under 
the  Federalist  regime.  As  we  have  noticed,  she  had  reaped, 
more  than  any  other  portion  of  America,  the  profits  which 
the  Great  War  in  Europe  flung  into  the  lap  of  neutrals.2 
These  had  continued,  to  be  sure,  under  the  cautious  leader¬ 
ship  of  Jefferson.  And  New  England,  on  the  whole,  sub¬ 
mitted  cheerfully  to  the  Virginia  dynasty  so  long  as  her 
commercial  privileges  remained  uncurbed. 

But  European  developments  were  now  subjecting  New 
England  democracy  to  a  hard  test.  Economic  interest  was 
coming  into  conflict  with  patriotism  over  an  issue  which 
aroused  strong  passions  and  brought  to  light  determined 
leaders.  In  a  section  noted  for  sturdy  mariners  from  the 
time  when  the  men  of  New  England  first  went  down  to  the 
sea  in  ships,  the  commercial  classes  had  exercised  a  prepon¬ 
derating  influence  in  politics.  It  was  to  be  expected  that 
merchant  princes  and  hardy  ship  captains  accustomed  to 
authority  would  defend  their  interests  wherever  threatened. 
The  embargo  was  certain  to  counter  the  will  and  challenge 

1  Annals  of  Congress,  XVIII.  1172,  December  14,  1808. 

2  Moncure  D.  Conway,  Life  of  Thomas  Paine,  II.  408,  a  letter  “To 
the  Federalist  Faction.” 


NEW  ENGLAND  AND  THE  EMBARGO  147 


the  interest  of  the  most  articulate  class  in  New  England.  No 
economic  class  in  American  history — not  even  the  planters 
of  the  Old  South — has  more  completely  mastered  its  section.3 
Once  the  embargo  cut  into  its  profits,  this  caste  would 
scarcely  remain  passive. 

Nor  were  economic  interests  the  sole  objects  of  New 
England  concern.  She  was  sensitive  to  the  reputed  Gallican- 
ism  of  Jefferson.  An  embargo  that  twisted  the  tail  of  the 
British  Lion,  however  dear  to  the  heart  of  a  Jacobin  like 
Jefferson,  would  be  anathema  to  all  good  men.  If,  with 
Jefferson,  an  honest  neutrality  was  hopeless  and  a  breach 
inevitable,  New  England  would  have  favored  her  chief 
customer,  Great  Britain,  rather  than  a  former  ally,  who 
had  used  the  twenty  years  of  our  connection  to  make  demands 
rather  than  to  grant  concessions.  Old  England  held  the  ties 
of  blood  and  profit.  France  was  an  interloper.  Whatever 
respectability  she  once  boasted  had  vanished  with  the  old 
regime.  The  new  order,  whether  of  sans-culottes  or  of 
tyrants,  was  no  fit  object  for  American  contemplation.  To 
play  into  French  hands  by  an  embargo  speciously  neutral 
but  covertly  Gallophile  was  to  insult  the  intelligence  and  the 
virtue  of  New  England. 

Thus  the  embargo  aroused  aggressive  opposition  and 
awakened  dormant  passions  and  prejudices.  But  there 
were  other  and  less  hostile  elements  in  the  community. 
Offsetting  the  merchants  and  their  satellites  were  numbers 
of  men  who  looked  to  the  Republicans  to  satisfy  their 
longings  for  democracy.  There  was  a  numerous  frontier 
element  in  New  England  of  this  period,  with  interests  and 
sentiments  hostile  to  the  merchant  aristocracy.  Giving 
unity,  moreover,  to  otherwise  uncoordinated  and  sometimes 

*  Thomas  Wentworth  Higginson,  Life  and  Times  of  Stephen  Higgin- 
son,  pp.  41,  42.  “Salem  was  Federalist  and  the  headquarters  of  Fed¬ 
eralism  was  Salem.  The  strength  of  that  strong  party  was  in  the 
merchants  of  Essex  County,  most  of  whom  had  been  ship-masters  in 
their  youth.”  The  name  familiarly  given  to  the  party  was  “Essex  Junto.” 


148 


JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 

inarticulate  masses  was  a  strong  party  machine.  Deriving 
its  power  from  party  allegiance,  the  machine  had  everything 
to  lose  by  a  sacrifice  of  party  prestige.  A  small  band  of 
the  faithful  was  always  assured. 

>s«/  Such  was  the  background  of  interest  and  opinion  behind 
the  New  England  delegates  to  the  Congress  that  enacted 
the  embargo  and  its  successive  acts  of  amendment.  While 
the  initial  debate  upon  embargo  was  in  progress,  an  anony¬ 
mous  delegate  from  New  England  sent  to  the  Connecticut 
Courant  a  communication  which  was  published  under  the 
caption,  “Highly  Interesting  to  Men  of  All  Parties  and  Poli¬ 
tics.”4  It  sounded  an  alarm: 

“Dear  Sir, — Yesterday  we  received  a  message  from  the  Pres¬ 
ident  of  a  confidential  nature.  We  immediately  closed  our  doors, 
and  they  are  still  closed.  Of  course  I  am  not  permitted  to  inform 
you  either  what  the  President  has  communicated  to  us,  or  what  we 
have  done  in  consequence  of  it.  But  I  may  be  permitted  to  tell  you 
that  we  are  doing  no  good.  I  fear  we  are  about  to  plunge  the  na¬ 
tion  into  the  most  dreadful  calamities — unnecessarily  and  wantonly 
— I  am  now  more  than  ever  persuaded  that  there  is  too  much 
FRENCH  INFLUENCE.  And  it  is  well  that  those  who  succumb 
to  it,  should  act  in  secret.  This  is  the  reason,  and  I  pledge  myself  to 
you,  almost  the  only  reason  why  we  sit  with  closed  doors.  Our  de¬ 
liberations  no  more  require  secrecy  at  this  moment,  than  they  did 
when  w'e  were  debating  on  the  subject  of  fortifications.  Nay,  sir,  we 
are  in  my  opinion,  violating  the  great  rights  of  the  people,  by  sitting 
at  this  moment  with  closed  doors.  I  cannot  express  to  you  in  terms 
sufficiently  strong  my  abhorrence  of  what  we  are  doing,  and  the 
manner  in  which  we  are  doing  it.5 

The  deliberations  thus  darkly  hinted  at  resulted  in  an 
embargo  in  which  New  England  officially  concurred. 
Rapidity  and  secrecy  were  essential,  lest  ships  in  port  put 
out  to  sea  and  thus  increase  the  very  difficulties  which  the 
embargo  sought  to  avoid.  New  England  Congressmen, 

4  See  also  Abraham  Bishop,  Some  Remarks  and  Extracts  in  Reply  to 
Mr.  Pickering’s  letter  on  the  subject  of  the  Embargo,  p.  13.  “Even  in 
the  short  time,  which  the  measure  was  under  consideration,  [four  hours], 
many  letters  were  issued  and  published,  stating  the  business  of  the  secret 
session  and  the  probability  of  an  embargo.” 

5  The  Connecticut  Courant,  Wednesday,  December  30,  1807. 


NEW  ENGLAND  AND  THE  EMBARGO  149 


therefore,  offered  slight  initial  opposition  to  the  original  em¬ 
bargo  act  of  December  22,  1807.  By  it,  however,  their 
section  was  committed  to  a  policy  which  would  save  her 
ships  hut  ruin  thAr  owners  She  stood  to  win  and  to  lose. 
Having  garnered  her  gains,  she  would  be  the  more~cerfaln 
to  bemoan  her  losses. 

These  latter  she  proceeded  promptly  to  count.  The 
Boston  Gazette  ran  an  extra,  January  11,  1808,  forecasting 
in  detail  the  losses  to  be  sustained  by  New  England.  The 
author  first  showed  how  remarkably  America  had  pros¬ 
pered  by  the  Napoleonic  War,  our  tonnage  of  shipping  hav¬ 
ing  mounted  from  six  hundred  thousand  to  one  million 
two  hundred  thousand,  so  as  to  carry  a  foreign  trade  worth 
one  hundred  and  fifty  million  yearly,  all  of  which  would  be 
sacrificed  by  the  embargo,  at  a  cost  of  twenty-five  dollars  per 
capita  including  children  and  slaves.  Of  this  huge  loss,  the 
Gazette  demonstrated  that  Massachusetts  would  bear  far 
more  than  her  share.  The  editor  claimed  one  third  of  the 
nation’s  tonnage  for  his  own  state.  He  anticipated  a  loss 
of  trade  amounting  to  thirty-eight  million,  two  hundred 
thousand  dollars,  or  somewhat  more  than  one  fourth  of  the 
nation’s  total.  “Thus,  then,  Old  Massachusetts  will  lose' 
by  one  year’s  Embargo,  38  millions  being  38  times  our  whole 
State  Debt.  The  Interest  of  this  will  be  1,980,000  dolls,  a 
year — Boston  will  pay  of  this  interest,  310,000  dolls,  a  year 
— and  each  town  will  lose  14  times  the  amount  of  its  share 
of  the  present  State  tax,  only  to  pay  the  Interest  of  one  year’s 
loss  by  Embargo.”  This,  in  the  opinion  of  the  Gazette,  was 
taxation  without  representation,  since  Massachusetts  had 
only  nineteen  representatives  in  Congress  out  of  a  total 
of  one  hundred  and  sixty.  Yet  she  would  bear  one  fourth 
of  the  entire  loss, — twice  her  rightful  proportion  on  such 
a  basis.6 


"The  Boston  Gazette,  EXTRA,  January  11,  1808 


150  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


Federalist  editors  affected  in  particular  a  deep  concern 
for  the  misfortunes  of  farmers.  But,  according  to  the 
Essex  Register,  of  Salem,  most  of  this  pity  for  the  poor 
farmers  was  wasted.  They  were  not  complaining.  “All 
the  noise  and  clamor  about  their  calamities  and  afflictions 
comes  from — the  merchants  of  Boston  and  their  hireling 
editors!!”7  The  Register  was  sufficiently  aware  of  the  vast 
powers  for  mischief  possessed  by  the  press,  and  its  comment 
upon  the  false  impression  of  American  politics  to  be  derived 
from  a  reading  of  the  Boston  papers  is  an  early  recognition 
of  the  importance  of  propaganda: 

If  as  the  Boston  tories  pretend,  the  farmers  are  “distressed”, 
“impoverished”,  “half  ruined”,  and  about  to  be  utterly  undone,  it 
must  be  allowed  that  their  patience  and  resignation  was  never  ex¬ 
ceeded  by  Job  himself;  for  not  one  word  of  murmuring  or  com¬ 
plaint  do  we  hear  from  “ our  poor  farmers” ! — All  the  noise  and 
clamor  about  their  calamities  and  afflictions  comes  from — the  mer¬ 
chants  of  Boston  and  their  hireling  editors  ! !  Yes — the  monied 
speculators  of  our  metropolis,  with  Park  and  Russell,  and  the  Lord 
knows  who,  are  raising  their  voice  in  favour  of  the  farmers,  while 
the  farmers  themselves  are  quietly  pursuing  their  own  business, 
regardless  of  the  uproar  of  these  new  defenders,  whom  they  never 
engaged  or  hired  and  who  may  be  assured  they  will  never  be 
thanked  for  their  pains. 

If  a  foreigner  were  to  arrive  in  Boston,  read  a  few  paragraphs 
in  the  newspapers,  walk  to  Exchange,  and  saunter  into  a  few  comp- 
ting  rooms,  he  would  think  the  country  at  the  brink  of  utter  ruin 
and  destruction,  in  a  blaze  of  commotion,  and  wonder  why  he  did 
not  see  a  mob  parading  the  streets  and  plundering  the  houses — but 
let  him  take  a  ride  into  the  country  and  there  see  the  people  tran¬ 
quil,  industrious  and  happy,  united  in  support  of  government  and 
ready  to  take  upon  their  shoulders  any  burthen,  necessary  for  its 
honor  and  its  good,  what  must  be  his  opinion  of  Boston  politics? 
It  is  by  the  noise  of  a  worthless  faction  in  our  sea-ports,  that  for¬ 
eigners  have  conceived  an  idea  of  the  confusion  and  distraction  of 
the  nation,  they  peruse  federal  prints,  (for  many  of  these  are  sent 
to  England)  and  from  thence  form  an  opinion  of  the  state  of  our 
politics ;  they  see  the  most  bitter  and  malignant  abuse  of  the  admin¬ 
istration  perseveringly  continued,  and  are  prepossessed  with  a  belief 
that  the  measures  of  government  are  hateful  and  unpopular,  they 
see  our  claims  upon  England  discouraged,  and  her’s  justified;  and 
are  persuaded  that  the  American  people  will  surrender  their  rights 

1  The  Essex  Register,  Salem,  January  16,  1808. 


NEW  ENGLAND  AND  THE  EMBARGO  ( 1 5 1' 

before  they  will  plunge  into  war;  they  see  frequent  misrepresen¬ 
tations  of  the  state  of  our  affairs,  continual  murmuring  at  imagin¬ 
ary  difficulties,  and  predictions  of  approaching  ruin,  and  believe  the 
nation  to  be  grievously  oppressed  and  embarrassed.  If  the  men  who 
create  all  this  disturbance  were  constrained  either  to  leave  the  coun¬ 
try  and  take  up  their  abode  in  what  they  seem  to  think  the  paradise 
of  the  earth  that  free  and  happy  Isle,  Great  Britain,  or  to  keep  their 
peace  and  be  silent  with  regard  to  our  public  concerns,  it  would  be 
much  better  for  both  the  community  and  themselves.8 

That  the  Register  was  correct  as  to  contentment  ajriong 
the  farmers,  alieast  in  the  early-days  of  the  erubargOr-was 
virtually  conceded  by  the  Connecticut  Courant,  a  leading 
Federalist  sheet,  when  it  promised  its  readers  that : 

The  first  good  snow  that  comes  will  bring  down  the  pork,  butter  and 
other  country  produce  to  market.  Let  our  farmers  come.  They  will 
soon  find  their  mistake  if  they  have  been  dupes  of  Mr.  Jefferson’s 
politicks.  We  trust  that  the  price  of  country  produce  between  this 
and  March  next,  will  be  compared  with  what  it  was  last  year.9 

Let  us  postpone  for  the  moment  an  estimate  of  agricul¬ 
tural  opinion  and  examine  the  sentiments  of  a  class  more 
immediately  affected  by  the  embargo ;  namely,  the  fisher- 
men— It  is  possible  to  gauge  for  commercial  and  fishing 
interests  the  degree  of  discontent,  or  at  least  the  activity  of 
its  fomentors,  by  analysis  of  the  petitions  with  which  Con¬ 
gress  was  bombarded  between  January,  1808,  and  the  close 
of  the  session  in  April.  Among  the  petitioners,  the  select¬ 
men  of  Hatfield,  Massachusetts,  for  example,  “with  a  humble 
&  confident  boldness,”  asked  for  relief  from  the  “ruinous 
effects  of  the  embargo,”  or  at  least  for  a  straightforward 
explanation  as  to  why  it  was  ever  imposed.  To  a  more 
aggressive  policy,  they  would  cheerfully  pledge  their  sup- 

8  The  Essex  Register,  Salem,  Mass.,  January  16,  1808.  Quoting  the 
Worcester  Aegis. 

'‘Connecticut  Courant,  January  6,  1808.  Some  at  least  of  the  predicted 
hardships  were  realized,  if  the  following  is  at  all  typical.  “A  cow  and  a 
calf,  and  two  tons  of  hay  were  taken  by  execution  a  few  days  since  in 
Wolfboro,  N.H.  and  sold  at  auction  for  seven  dollars,  not  enough  to  pay 
the  cost  of  court.”  Ibid.,  July  13,  1808. 


152 


JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


port,  assuring  Congress  that  the  spirit  of  1776  was  not  dead 
in  them.10  This  is  typical  of  the  wave  of  petitions  coming 
out  of  New  England.  Some  idea  of  the  numbers  who  signed 
them  may  be  gathered  from  the  following  list  as  now  pre¬ 
served  among  the  Jefferson  Papers.  The  record  is  doubt¬ 
less  incomplete : 


Petition  From  Date  Number  of 

Signers 

Barnstable  Co.  Mass.,  April  11.  ISOS. .  40 

:  •  Mass  11.  1S08  .  120 

Barnstable  (  Provincetown  and  Truro  1,  April  11,  ISOS .  330 

Barnstable,  April  11.  ISOS  . 

Ipswich,  Mass..  April  5.  ISOS  . .  70 

Essex  Count}.  Mass.,  Fishermen.  April  16,  ISOS .  2S5 


Also  "\\  e  the  undersigned  inhabitants  of  the  town  of 
Beverly,  tho  not  actually  engaged  in  the  fishing  bus¬ 
iness  feel  ourselves  interested  in  its  success :  and  do 
therefore  join  in  the  prayer  of  the  foregoing  raerao- 


M.-irch  75.  ISOS 

County  of  Plymouth,  April  5,  ISOS. . . .  93 

Hampshire  County.  Mass.  i  Hatfield),  April  19.  ISOS 

Selectmen  on  behalf  of  the  town . . .  5 

Hainr  S  mhampton.  April  18  18  8 

Selectmen  on  behalf  of  the  town . . . .  2 

Hampshire  County,  Mass..  Greenfield.  April  19,  ISOS 


Selectmen  on  behalf  of  the  town . . . . . 

Hampshire  County.  Mass..  Goshen.  April  19.  ISOS 


Selectmen  on  behalf  of  the  town . . .  3 

Harm; s':- me  Geunty.  Mass..  Easthampton,  April  IS.  ISOS 

Se  1  ec:m  heh.a! :  c :  the  :  3 

Hampshire  County.  Mass..  Northampton.  March  29.  ISOS 

Select:-.'.;  eit.-.l:  c:  the  .  S 

From  Newburyport  came  a  printed  petition  signed  by .  SOI 

Bound  with  the  same  were  from: 

Manchester _ : _  114 


Petiti.r  f  Hatfield.  Massachusetts,  April  6.  ISOS,  in  Jefferson 
Papers.  Library  of  Congress. 


NEW  ENGLAND  AND  THE  EMBARGO  153 


Rowley  .  200 

Box  ford  .  126 

Bradford  .  174 

Topsfield  .  103 

Middleton  .  62 

Salisbury  .  137 

Amesbury  .  153 

Haverhill  .  250 


This  makes  a  total  of  5571  actual  signatures  to  Massa¬ 
chusetts  petitions  during  this  early  period.  The  number  of 
protestants  was  really  far  greater,  since,  in  several  cases, 
the  selectmen  signed  on  behalf  of  their  constituents. 

The  petitions  came  before  a  Congress  in  which  New 
England’s  varied  opinions  were  brilliantly,  if  contradictorily, 
represented.  Among  Federalist  politicians  who  would  wel¬ 
come  every  indication  of  hardship  and  discontent,  the  re¬ 
doubtable  and  pugnacious  Timothy  Pickering  was  leader. 

His  colleague  and  opponent,  John  Quincy  Adams,  already 
in  the  full  tide  of  a  great  career,  was  fully  competent  to 
defend  quite  opposite  convictions.  In  the  House,  the 
polished  Josiah  Quincy  was  a  stalwart  champion  of  particu¬ 
larism.  These  three  men  gave  tone  to  the  point  of  view 
and  the  utterances  of  the  New  England  delegation. 

Adams,  in  his  support  of  the  embargo,  maintained  an 
inherited  point  of  view  and  carried  on  an  inherited  feud. 

His  attitude  was  inevitably  colored  by  the  position  which  his 
father,  John  Adams,  occupied  in  history.  This  position  was, 
in  fact,  singularly  detached.  If,  in  a  general  way,  it  was  t-— 
evident  that  the  prosperity  of  his  native  section  was  jeopard¬ 
ized  by  the  embargo,11  it  ill  became  a  former  advocate  of  the 
embargo12  to  condemn  his  successor  in  office  for  putting  it 

11  Manufactures  had  not  as  yet  provided  a  sufficient  outlet  for  energies 
otherwise  commercial.  See  Francis  Landon  Humphreys,  The  Life  of 
Daniel  Humphreys,  II.  376.  Jefferson,  though  a  nominal  convert,  was  a 
weak  reed  for  the  manufacturers. 

u  The  Life  and  Works  of  John  Adams,  IX.  606.  See  also  the  Frank¬ 
fort,  Kentucky,  Palladium,  June  2,  1808,  quoting  “Albany  April  22: 

“It  is  a  fact  highly  creditable  to  the  late  President  Adams,  that  he 
came  out  to  the  polls  in  Braintree  and  voted  for  Governor  Sullivan  and 


JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 

into  operation.  And  if  the  difficulties  of  the  embargo  bade 
fair  to  humiliate  a  victorious  rival,  who  only  a  few  years 
before  had  been  using  his  entire  influence  to  undermine  the 
prestige  of  Adams  himself,  a  high  sense  of  honor  forbade 
Adams  to  seek  a  petty  retaliation.  Moreover,  Timothy  Pick¬ 
ering  was  fighting  the  embargo  with  all  the  vehemence  of  his 
trenchant  pen  and  bitter  tongue.  For  John  Adams  to  take 
his  stand  with  Timothy  Pickering,  was  asking  too  much  of 
human  nature.  His  successful  rival  and  his  bitterest  enemy 
being  on  opposite  sides  of  the  question,  Adams  was  in  a 
,  position  to  judge. independently: — With  due  regard  for  con¬ 
sistency  with  his  own  record,  he  refused  to  condemn  the 
embargo  outright.  At  the  same  time,  he  gravely  doubted' 
its  efficacy  against  the  pride  and  resolution  of  world 
powers,13  though,  when  the  consequences  of  the  act  appeared, 
he  deprecated  the  rising  storm  of  protest.14  Nevertheless, 
as  a  constructive  statesman  he  failed  to  come  forward  with 
y/  an  alternative  program,  contenting  himself  with  a  pious 
hope  that  neither  embargo  nor  non-intercourse  would  long 
continued-^  The  real  alternative  was  war,  and  this  Adams 
was  not  prepared  to  recommend,  although  he  intimated  that 
even  war  would  be  less  disastrous  than  a  too  determined  en¬ 
forcement  of  the  existing  lawj 
y/  For  the  elder  Adams,  the  embargo  meant,  after  all,  only 
a  reconciling  of  current  views  with  those  long  held.  To 
his  son,  John  Quincy  Adams,  with  a  career  still  in  the  mak¬ 
ing,  the  decision  was  more  vital.  To  cast  in  his  lot  with 
Timothy  Pickering,  Harrison  Gray  Otis,  John  Cabot,  Ste- 


the  Republican  ticket — declaring  that  the  man,  who  would  not  support  the 
administration  in  the  present  crisis,  was  an  enemy  to  his  country.  Al. 
Reg.” 

13  The  Life  and  Works  of  John  Adams,  IX.  605. 

14  Ibid.,  IX.  604,  September  27,  1808.  “The  Union,  I  fear  is  in 
some  danger.” 

15  Ibid.,  IV.  606-607. 


NEW  ENGLAND  AND  THE  EMBARGO  155 


phen  Higginson,16  the  “old  guard”  of  the  Federalists,  in  a 
combat  of  one  section  against  the  rest,  would  be  unbecoming 
the  eldest  son  of  a  President  of  all  the  states  united.  Besides, 
the  position  of  the  professor  in  politics,  then  as  now,  har¬ 
monized  with  a  social  vision  which  could  look  beyond  local 
needs  and  prejudices.  It  is  conformable  with  his  ultimate 
position  in  history  that  the  statesman  of  the  Monroe  Doc¬ 
trine  and  the  defender  of  the  right  of  petition  already,  in 
1808,  was  upholding  the  liberalism  of  his  day  against  Tory 
reactionaries,  whose  policy  was  obstruction. 

In  his  memoirs  and  writings,  John  Quincy  Adams  sets 
at  rest  any  possible  doubt  that  the  Orders  in  Council  of 
November  11  were  unknown  at  Washington  when  the  em¬ 
bargo  was  urged  on  December  18. 17  He  assures  us  that 
it  was  this  knowledge  of  added  injury  from  Great  Britain 
that  won  his  vote  to  the  administration’s  measure.  Even 
so,  he  was  far  from  recommending  its  prolonged  applica¬ 
tion.18  Once  committed  ttyjjie  policy,  he  was  no  lukewarm 
defender,  though  he  wavered  in  January,  1808,  to  the  extent 
of  proposing  a  committee  of  inquiry  into  the  possibility  of 
removing  the  embargo  and  arming  merchant  ships.19  This 
was  in  obedience  to  James  Sullivan,  governor  of  Massa¬ 
chusetts,  who  was  alarmed  at  the  state  of  home  politics.20 
Again,  when  Congress  was  about  to  adjourn  for  the 
summer  recess,  he  submitted  a  proposal  for  non-intercourse 
with  France,  Spain,  Plolland,  and  Great  Britain,  and  the 
repeal  of  any  embargo  against  all  States  not  guilty  of 

10  See  Thomas  Wentworth  Higginson,  Life  and  Times  of  Stephen 
Higginson,  pp.  277 ,  292,  293,  for  a  charming  sketch  of  this  New  England 
merchant  prince. 

17  The  Writings  of  John  Quincy  Adams,  III.  186,  January  10,  1808; 
also  III.  197;  also  III.  282-3. 

“Ibid.,  III.  168,  December  27,  1808;  also  Ibid.,  III.  187,  January  10, 
1808 ;  and  ibid.,  III.  199. 

18  Memoirs  of  John  Quincy  Adams,  I.  504,  January  21,  1808. 

70  Ibid.,  I.  502,  January  4,  1808. 


156y  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 

Orders  and  Decrees.21  This,  too,  was  a  concession  to 
Massachusetts  sentiment.  It  failed  to  carry. 

The  desire  of  Adams  to  mitigate  the  extreme  rigor  of 
the  embargo  was  apparently  a  concession  to  New  Englajid. 
More~JustIy  viewed,  it  was  a  bid  for  a  united  America  cap¬ 
able  of  pursuing  its  own  policy,  without  reference  to  the 
design  of  Great  Britain  and  Mr.  Pickering  to  force  us  into 
war  with  France.22  When  his  colleague,  Pickering,  ap¬ 
pealed  for  state  backing  against  the  will  of  the  nation, 
Adams  was  ready  enough  to  denounce  “the  extraordinary 
interference  of  the  commercial  States,  to  control  the  general 
councils  of  the  nation.’’  Union,  not  division,  he  deemed 
the  crying  need  of  the  hour.23 

Even  in  the  early  days  of  the  embargo,  conceiving  the 
Union  to  be  endangered,  Adams  pressed  its  cause  with 
almost  tearful  urgency  upon  his  kinsman,  Josiah  Quincy, 
a  Massachusetts  member  of  the  Lower  House.24  With  a 
fervor  which  met  no  echo  in  Quincy’s  breast,  he  entreated 
him  to  lay  aside  the  particularism  of  New  England  for  a 
broader  patriotism.  As  for  himself,  he  declared  his  readiness 
to  die  for  the  cause  of  nationalism  in  the  civil  war  which 
he  felt  to  be  threatening.25 

If  Adams  was  the  embodiment  of  nationalism,  Pick¬ 
ering  was  the  incarnation  of  sectionalism,  a  New  England 
protagonist  of  a  principle  for  which  the  South  was  eventu¬ 
ally  to  lay  down  its  life.  Notwithstanding  Pickering’s  impet¬ 
uous  nature  and  headstrong  opposition,  he  maintained  cour¬ 
teous  relations  with  Jefferson,  but  in  the  Senate  and  in  his 
own  Massachusetts,  he  was  a  fire-brand.  His  strength  lay 
in  the  intensity  of  his  convictions.  One  of  these,  most 

21  Memoirs  of  John  Quincy  Adams,  I.  530,  April  30,  1808. 

22  The  Writings  of  John  Quincy  Adams,  III.  219-220. 

23  Ibid.,  Ill,  223  to  Harrison  Gray  Otis,  March  31,  1808 

24  Memoirs  of  John  Quincy  Adams,  I.  510,  February  1,  1808. 

26  Ibid.,  I.  510-511.  His  sincerity  commanded  Quincy’s  respect.  See 
on  this  Edmund  Quincy,  Life  of  Josiah  Quincy,  p.  123. 


NEW  ENGLAND  AND  THE  EMBARGO  157 


tenaciously  held,  was  a  belief  that  England  was  our  sole  pro¬ 
tection  from  the  greed  of  France.26  He  considered  Eng¬ 
land’s  attitude  toward  us  to  be  essentially  benevolent27  and 
attributed  the  failure  of  the  Monroe-Canning  negotiations 
for  settling  the  Chesapeake  Affair  entirely  to  the  nature  of 
Jefferson’s  instructions,28  which  coupled  reparation  for  the 
Chesapeake  inseparably  with  satisfaction  as  to  the  entire 
question  of  impressment  at  sea.  In  the  President’s  handling 
of  the  existing  crisis,  Pickering  found  nothing  to  com¬ 
mend.  Face  to  face  with  the  prospect  of  war,  the  govern¬ 
ment  was  making  no  other  provision  for  defence  save  a 
few  gunboats.29  Yet  the  peaceful  protestations  of  the  Presi¬ 
dent  were  belied  by  constant  incitement  to  mob  prejudice 
against  Great  Britain.30  The  embargo  itself  was  aimed 
solely  against  Great  Britain  and,  but  for  the  danger  of  war, 
would  have  been  avowed  as  such.31  The  irony  of  it  all 
was  that  Great  Britain  stood  to  gain  rather  than  to  lose  from 
our  hostility.32  For  this  reason,  she  was  unlikely  to  make 
aggressive  protest,33  but  was  likely  rather  to  bide  her  time 
till  America  should  recover  her  own  senses,  for  “Fifty  or 
sixty  thousand  seafaring  people,  and  the  many  more  thous¬ 
ands  absolutely  dependent  on  commerce,  will  not  be  content¬ 
ed  to  starve  to  gratify  the  sheer  folly  of  our  administra¬ 
tion  in  an  experiment  of  which  common  sense  would  show 
the  futility.  .  .  .”34 

20  Charles  W.  Upham,  The  Life  of  Timothy  Pickering,  IV.  121-122, 
January  1,  1808,  “but  if  Heaven  permit  this  one  to  be  subdued,  the  United 
States  will  also  fall,  and  one  Tyrant  govern  the  world.” 

"Ibid.,  p.  122. 

”  Ibid.,  p.  122.  See  also  Ibid.,  p.  146-147. 

29  Ibid.,  p.  122. 

30  Ibid.,  p.  122. 

31  Ibid.,  p.  122. 

32  Ibid.,  p.  123.  "By  shutting  up  all  our  own  ports,  and  keeping  all 
our  own  vessels  at  home,  we  leave  all  the  commerce  of  the  world  to 
Britain.  She  will  enjoy  this  monopoly  alone.” 

33  Ibid.,  p.  123. 

34  Ibid.,  p.  123. 


158  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


Convinced  that  opposition  in  Congress  was  futile  against 
the  intrenched  majority  of  Jefferson,  Pickering  addressed 
himself  to  the  legislature  for  state  action  against  the  em¬ 
bargo.  His  letter,  nominally  directed  to  Governor  Sullivan, 
was  returned  unopened  by  the  governor  without  presenta¬ 
tion  to  the  legislature.  An  acrimonious  correspondence  be¬ 
tween  governor  and  senator  ensued,  to  the  edification  of 
their  respective  partisans.  The  immediate  political  conse¬ 
quence  of  it  all  was  that  Pickering’s  letter  to  Sullivan,  fol¬ 
lowing  close  upon  Adams’  letter  to  Harrison  Gray  Otis, 
brought  to  a  head  the  issue  between  the  ill-matched  colleagues 
and  resulted  in  the  resignation  of  Adams  from  the  Senate. 
The  test  of  power  brought  to  Pickering  not  only  revenge 
upon  the  Adams  family  for  his  own  dismissal  from  the 
state  department,  an  old  wound  never  healed,  but  it  carried 
with  it  also  a  public  approval  immensely  gratifying  to  the 
old  agitator.35  He  was  elated  by  the  wide  circulation  ac¬ 
corded  to  his  letter.36  To  his  wife  he  confided  that,  while 
he  had  anticipated  the  raking  up  of  many  old  scores,  he 
had  not  looked  for  fame.  “This  has  come  unsought,  and  is, 
therefore,  welcome.”37  Pickering’s  homecoming  at  the  April 
recess  of  Congress  gave  occasion  for  “a  large  and  respect¬ 
able  number  of  gentlemen  of  Salem,  associated  for  the  pur¬ 
pose”  to  bear  testimony  to  their  gratitude  for  his  distin¬ 
guished  services.38 

While  at  home  these  rivalries  were  moving  toward 
their  issue,  in  Congress  the  New  England  delegates  faced 

35  Alden  Bradford,  History  of  Massachusetts,  III.  99.  “.  .  .  it 

convinced  a  great  portion  of  the  citizens  of  Massachusetts,  of  the  inex¬ 
pediency  of  the  embargo ;  and,  some  were  even  led  to  suppose  that  it  was 
designed  to  favour  the  ambitious  views  of  the  Emperor  of  France.” 

36  Charles  W.  Upham,  The  Life  of  Timothy  Pickering,  IV.  133. 

“  ...  it  has  been  read,  by  this  time,  probably  by  more  than  a  hun¬ 

dred  thousand  persons.  The  public  mind  was  in  a  state  singularly  fitted 
to  hail  the  publication.” 

37  Ibid.,  IV.  134,  April  4,  1808. 

38  Ibid.,  IV.  134,  May  17,  1808. 


NEW  ENGLAND  AND  THE  EMBARGO  159 


the  thankless  task  of  an  opposition,  apparently  without  hope. 
The  embargo  had  been  passed  with  strong  majorities.  The 
combination  of  West  and  South,  which  had  twice  swept 
Jefferson  into  power,  gave  no  present  indication  of  a  breach. 
Moreover,  support  from  New  England  itself  was  by  no 
means  negligible.  What  the  opposition  lacked  in  numbers, 
it  possessed  in  spirit,  however,  and  New  England  Federal¬ 
ists  set  to  work  to  overcome  their  isolation. 

The  campaign  opened  with  the  series  of  petitions  of 
which  some  notice  has  already  been  taken.  These  demanded 
either  a  total  repeal  of  the  embargo  or  special  exemptions 
restricting  its  operation.  Spokesmen  for  the  fisheries  were 
especially  insistent,  but  their  plea  for  leave  “to  export  certain 
quantities  of  fish”  met  a  cold  response  in  the  Senate.39  The 
House  was  more  sympathetic.  Orchard  Cook,  of  Maine, 
commiserated  the  poor  fishermen  on  journeys  of  fifty  to  a 
hundred  miles  a  week  to  take  oath  that  none  of  their  catch 
had  been  sold.40  Josiah  Quincy  deplored  the  hardships  im¬ 
posed  by  the  embargo  upon  dealers  in  perishable  goods.41 
Tobacco,  cotton,  or  even  flaxseed,  he  pointed  out,  could  be 
stored ;  not  so,  fish.  The  petitions  bore  no  immediate  fruit. 
The  Republicans  looked  upon  them  simply  as  “the  result  of 
a  deliberate  electioneering  plan.”42  A  Republican  victory 
at  Marblehead,  “notwithstanding  the  poor  fish  won’t  keep,” 
was  taken  as  a  vote  of  confidence.43 

More  effective  than  the  fisheries  as  a  party  lash  and  a 
goad  to  Republicans,  was  the  perennial  French  question. 
New  England  leaders  made  adroit  use  of  it  to  embarrass  the 
President.  The  opportunity  arose  when,  on  February  26, 

3B  Annals  of  Congress,  XVIII.  375. 

40 Ibid.,  XVIII.  1694-1695. 

41  Ibid.,  XVIII.  1246-1247,  2072.  For  other  lamentations  on  the 
fisheries,  see  ibid.,  XVIII.  2070. 

"Ibid.,  XVIII.  2137. 

*’  For  rejoicings  over  Marblehead  Republicanism,  see  Frankfort,  Ken¬ 
tucky,  Palladium,  for  January  26,  1809. 


,160. 


JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


Jefferson  submitted  to  Congress  his  embargo  correspond¬ 
ence  with  both  France  and  Great  Britain.  His  enemies  at 
once  raised  an  echo  of  the  old  battle  between  Congress  and 
the  executive,  the  opening  guns  of  which  had  thundered 
about  Jay’s  Treaty.  Jefferson  accompaned  the  correspondence 
with  a  request  for  its  return.  Quincy  forthwith  urged  Con¬ 
gress  to  take  a  copy  before  complying.  His  resolution  to 
that  effect  was  voted  down.  Nothing  daunted,  he  proposed 
a  second  and  more  comprehensive  resolution  of  similar 
tenor,44  which  lacked  only  two  votes  of  carrying.  Even 
friends  of  the  embargo  were  not  unwilling  to  tilt  with  the 
President  on  a  question  of  prerogative.  Cheered  by  a  defeat 
which  he  construed  as  victory,  Quincy  returned  in  two  weeks 
to  the  charge.  But  this  time  the  regulars  had  rallied.  The 
resolution  failed  by  forty-four  to  sixty-six.45 


»n  the  subject  of  the  relative  importance  of  commerce 


and  agriculture,  New  England  was  hypersensitive.  The 
constant  moan  of  her  representatives  was  the  injury  to 
the  entire  nation  inflicted  by  any  blow  to  commerce.  The 
efforts  of  Livermore46  and  other  New  Englanders  to  demon¬ 
strate  their  mutual  interdependence  were  childishly  simple. 
It  is  difficult  to  believe  that  Congress  needed  serious  enlight¬ 
enment  on  the  impossibility  of  a  cotton  planter’s  living  unto 
himself  alone.  Yet  the  dreary  platitudes  mustered  in  to 
irove  the  point  betray  the  debaters  as  the  veriest  tyros  in  eco- 
omics. 


"  The  known  and  obvious  was  sometimes  varied  by  excur¬ 
sions  into  economic  theory.  The  economics  of  the  anti¬ 
embargo  men  rested  upon  a  substratum  of  philosophy  equiv¬ 
alent  to  an  early  American  formulation  of  the  laissez-faire 
idea,  then  winning  many  converts  in  England.  America  was 
the  natural  home  of  individualism.  The  pioneer  preferred 

44  Annals  of  Congress,  XVIII.  1693,  February  26,  1808. 

40  Ibid.,  XVIII.  1838. 

49  Ibid.,  XVIII.  1700-1701. 


NEW  ENGLAND  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


© 

to  be  his  own  lawmaker.  Yet  a  race  of  pioneers  suddenly- 
found  itself  yoked  under  an  extension  of  governmental  au¬ 
thority  which  would  have  galled  the  most  bureaucratic  of 
societies.  After  electing  Jefferson  on  a  platform  of  democ¬ 
racy  and  strict  construction,  the  country  found  itself  straight- 
way  committed  to  the  diametrically  opposite,  not  only  in  the 
Louisiana  Purchase  instance,  but,  with  actual  individual 
hardship^ in  the  less  frequently  cited  but  equally  striking 
embargo  as  well.  The  embargo,  quite  as  fully  as  the  Louis¬ 
iana  Purchase,  represented  an  extension  of  the  power  of 
Congress  to  cover  matters  not  specifically  granted  in  the 
Constitution.  The  commercial  clause  in  the  Constitution 
assigned  to  Congress  the  power  to  regulate  foreign  and  inter¬ 
state  commerce.  The  carefully  chosen  wording  of  the  fun¬ 
damental  law  was  far  from  an  authorization  to  proscribe 
commerce  altogether.  Such  a  procedure  rested  upon  war 
powers  which  had  hitherto  not  been  invoked.  Yet  Jefferson 
gave  this  most  elastic  interpretation  to  the  commercial  clause. 
Although  some  speakers  in  Congress  called  attention  to  the 
discrepancy  between  constitutional  theory  and  Jeffersonian 
practice,  posterity  has  remembered  the  dramatic  example  of 
loose  construction  afforded  by  the  Purchase  and  has  for¬ 
gotten  that  which  to  contemporaries  was  equally  real  and 
far  more  irksome. 

The  embargo  was,  in  effect,  a  challenge  to  “Sinith- 
lanismus,”  and  Josiah  Quincy  took  up  the  gauntlet  in  a 
vigorous  speech.  “This  is  the  misfortune  of  the  policy  of 
the  embargo,”  he  maintained,  “that  you  undertake  by  your 
laws  to  do  what  laws  never  did  do — what  they  never  can 
do.  You  undertake  to  protect  better  the  property  of  the 
individual  than  his  own  personal  interest  would  enable  him 
to  protect  it.  The  interests  which  society  has  in  the  property 
of  the  merchant,  are  much  better  secured  by  his  own  pru¬ 
dence  and  understanding  of  his  business,  than  by  any  general 


162  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 

law.”47  From  this  premise,  Quincy  hastened  with  entire 
confidence  to  a  reductio  ad  absurdum.  ‘‘The  true  course 
of  policy  in  such  a  case,”  he  urged : 

would  have  been  to  say  to  the  merchant,  We  will  not  defend  you ; 
here  are  facts ;  these  are  the  orders  of  one  nation,  these  the  decrees 
of  the  other;  you  see  your  danger;  we  have  given  you  all  the  in¬ 
formation  in  our  power ;  now  do  what  you  please.  What  would 
have  been  the  consequence  of  this?  The  merchant  has  his  eyes 
open ;  he  buys  up  the  produce  of  the  country,  and  sends  out  ventures. 
The  article  is  captured ;  it  is  lost.  It  gets  to  a  foreign  market ;  which 
being  understocked,  he  receives  a  better  price  for  it.  If  it  be  lost, 
who  loses  it?  The  insurer,  sir,  not  the  planter,  farmer,  grower,  or 
fisherman ;  not  industry  in  its  first  sources.48 

The  too  active  intervention  of  government  was  thus 
driving  Quincy  and  those  of  like  mind  with  him  to  anarchy 
and  the  virtual  negation  of  all  government.  The  highest 
function  of  government,  in  their  judgment,  was  to  give 
information.  The  function  of  protection  and  responsibility 
for  its  citizens  was  denied.  Quincy  is  as  unconsciously 
humorous  in  the  wild  fancy  just  cited  as  he  is  deliberately 
witty  in  his  famous  picture  of  the  surgeon  who  seized  a 
young  man  in  the  pride  of  health,  and,  after  stretching  him 
on  a  bed,  stopping  all  his  orifices,  and  sealing  all  his  pores, 
left  the  patient  at  the  very  crisis  of  the  treatment  and  went 
away  into  a  far  country.  This  sensible  surgeon  still  further 
demonstrated  his  prowess  and  love  of  scientific  truth  by 
instructing  his  assistant  to  pay  no  attention  to  any  internal 
symptoms.  ‘‘Let  the  patient  be  convulsed  as  much  as  he 
will,  you  are  to  remove  none  of  my  bandages.  But  in  case 
something  external  should  happen;  if  the  sky  should  fall, 
and  larks  should  begin  to  appear,  if  three  birds  of  Paradise 
should  fly  into  the  window,  the  great  purpose  of  all  these 
sufferings  is  answered.  Then,  and  then  only,  have  you  my 
permission  to  administer  relief.”49 

"Annals  of  Congress,  XVIII.  2076. 

"Ibid.,  XVIII.  2076. 

"Ibid.,  XVIII.  2206-220 7. 


NEW  ENGLAND  AND  THE  EMBARGO  163 


This  little  allegory  was  compiled  by  Quincy  to  fit  the 
situation  in  April,  1808,  when  the  House,  on  the  point  of 
adjournment  for  the  summer  recess,  was  debating  what 
latitude  to  allow  Jefferson  in  the  conduct  of  negotiations 
with  France  and  England  growing  out  of  the  embargo.  Lest 
the  moral  should  not  be  sufficiently  obvious,  he  appended  his 
own  interpretation.  “The  conduct  of  such  a  physician,”  he 
asseverated,  “in  such  a  case  would  not  be  more  extraordinary 
than  that  of  this  House  in  the  present,  should  it  adjourn 
and  limit  the  discretion  of  the  Executive  to  certain  specified 
events  arbitrarily  anticipated ;  leaving  him  destitute  of  the 
power  to  grant  relief  should  internal  symptoms  indicate  that 
nothing  else  would  prevent  convulsions.  If  the  events  you 
specify  do  not  happen,  then  the  embargo  is  absolutely  fixed 
until  our  return.”50  Strange  bedfellows,  Josiah  Quincy  and 
Thomas  Jefferson,  but  Massachusetts,  however  she  might 
chafe  at  presidential  authority  in  the  hands  of  a  Republican, 
did  not  propose  to  see  Jefferson  prevented,  by  any  false 
notions  of  Congress,  from  removing  the  embargo  if  oppor¬ 
tunity  arose.  Pro-  and  anti-embargo  men  for  once  found 
themselves  in  harmony,  and,  on  April  25,  1808,  the  House, 
by  a  vote  of  seventy-three  to  twenty-six,  vested  in  the  Presi¬ 
dent,  until  Congress  should  reconvene,  a  wide  discretionary 
power  over  the  embargo.51  Congressmen,  the  New  Eng¬ 
land  delegation  along  with  the  rest,  went  home  to  mend  their 
fences,  leaving  Jefferson  to  his  ill-starred  negotiations  with 
Canning. 

In  the  interval  between  the  adjournment  of  Congress  in 
April  and  the  new  session  in  December,  New  England  ex¬ 
perienced  the  natural  resultant  of  forces  friendly  and  hostile. 
In  so  far  as  men  were  the  victims  of  commercial  losses, 
inflicted  by  a  government  which  they  distrusted  and  in  a 

M  Annals  of  Congress,  XVIII.  2207. 

61  Ibid.,  XVIII.  2268-2269. 


JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


cause  which  they  failed  to  comprehend,  their  attitude  was 
bitter.  Others  there  were  who  positively  benefited  through 
the  stimulus  to  manufactures  consequent  upon  the  embargo. 
With  them,  though  it  was  scarcely  yet  apparent,  lay  the 
future  of  New  England. 

The  true  salvation  for  New  England  depended^  of  neces¬ 
sity,  on  manufactures.  And,  in  so  far  as  she  recognized 
this,  she  set  her  face  toward  the  future.  Commercial  inter¬ 
ests  had,  however,  so  long  predominated,  that  the  transition 
was  made  with  reluctance,  and  New  England  manufactures 
experienced  a  much  less  striking  expansion  than  those  of 
Pennsylvania  and  the  Middle  States.  That  portion  of  New 
England  capital  which  was  fluid,  nevertheless,  found  strong 
inducements  to  seek  a  manufacturing  rather  than  a  com¬ 
mercial  vent,  and  actually,  if  not  relatively,  a  considerable 
expansion  occurred.  Thus,  at  Providence,  Rhode  Island, 
there  were  thirty-four  cotton  factories,  with  a  capacity  of 
twenty  thousand  spindles.  “That  is  at  least  four  times  as 
many  as  have  hitherto  been  in  operation.”  The  oldest  of 
these  establishments  had  been  set  up  at  Pawtucket  in  1792. 
Its  original  twenty-two  spindles  had  grown  into  nine  hun¬ 
dred.52 

The  most  conspicuous  among  the  entrepreneurs  who  di¬ 
rected  the  new  industrialism  was  Colonel  David  Humphreys. 
He  is  best  remembered  as  a  breeder  of  fine  Merino  sheep, 
and  a  manufacturer  of  woollens.  But  his  many  sided  energy 
found  additional  outlet  in  various  other  enterprises,  so  that 
he  is  to  be  reckoned  quite  literally  as  an  early  captain  of 
found  additional  outlet  in  various  other  enterprises,  so  that 
by  Daniel  Mulford,  a  young  graduate  of  Yale,  who  made  a 
horseback  journey  through  New  England  in  search  of  health. 
His  account  is  very  detailed  : 

53  The  Washington  Expositor,  March  19,  1808.  “Extract  of  a  letter 
from  Providence,  Rhode  Island.” 


NEW  ENGLAND  AND  THE  EMBARGO  165 


These  [Colonel  Humphreys’]  works  are  situated  on  the  Nauga¬ 
tuck  River,  5  miles  above  its  junction  with  the  Housatonic  at  Derby. 
They  are  a  Grist  mill,  a  Sawmill,  a  Paper  mill,  2  fulling  Mills  &  the 
Factory.  They  with  their  appendages,  such  as  houses  for  the 
workmen,  mechanic  shops  &c.  have  cost  him  $100,000.  He  manu¬ 
factures  cotton  yarn,  a  course  (sic)  cloth  for  the  southern  market 
(cotton  warp  wool  fitted)  casimeres  &  broad  cloths.  I  was  shown 
a  piece  of  casimere  blue,  a  beautiful  colour,  softer  than  is  common 
for  imported,  &  equally  fine.  I  saw  no  cloth  finished,  but  a  piece 
just  wove,  of  an  excellent  thread,  such  a  piece  as  ought  to  have 
fetched  $7  a  yard  if  properly  finished.  His  best  clothes  and  casi¬ 
meres  are  made  of  wool  from  the  Spanish  sheep  he  imported  several 
years  ago.  He  imported  100.  He  now  owns  between  1  &  2  hun¬ 
dred  full  blooded  &  many  more  half  and  quarter  blooded.  He  sells 
the  full  blooded  at  100  dollars  apiece;  and  might  ere  this  have  sold 
his  whole  flock  at  that  price.  The  legislature  of  New  York  have 
offered  50  doll’s,  bounty  to  the  man  who  shall  introduce  that  breed 
of  sheep  into  the  counties  respectively,  throughout  the  state.  The 
Col.  gave  me  specimens  of  his  casimere  and  fine  wool,  to  carry 
home.  His  best  wool  is  worth  a  Dollar  &  half  p.  lb.  for  the  com¬ 
mon  half-blood  wool,  which  the  farmers  in  the  neighborhood  who 
have  bred  sheep  from  his  rams  bring  in,  he  gives  a  Dollar  a  pound. 
Besides  cloth,  &c.  Stockings  are  here  manufactured  in  considerable 
abundance.  I  think  here  are  a  doz.  stocking  looms :  these  are  cur¬ 
ious  machines ;  as  well  as  the  water  machines  for  spinning — both  so 
complicated  that  from  the  slight  views  of  the  minute  or  so  that 
I  had  of  them,  I  got  no  complete  idea  of  their  construction.53 

From  another  source  it  is  evident  that  the  Colonel,  even 
with  wool  at  a  dollar  a  pound,  made  a  handsome  profit : 


21  lb.  of  wool  at  a  dollar  $21. 

25  yards  of  cloth  from  loom 

at  60  cents  15. 

21  do.  from  the  clothier  21 /-4  4.88 


$40.88 

Sold  2134  at  $2.50  the  yard  54.37  1-2 


Clear  profit  after  paying  every  article 

of  labor  at  common  price  13.49  1-254 


“Daniel  Mulford  Diary.  MS.,  Library  of  Yale  University.  Tran¬ 
script  in  the  Library  of  Congress. 

64  New  York  Evening  Post,  September  27,  1808,  quoting  a  letter  from 
Mr.  Rutledge  of  South  Carolina,  who  had  the  figures  from  Colonel 
Humphreys  himself. 


66. 


JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 

Colonel  Humphreys  submitted  specimens  from  his  loom 
to  the  Philadelphia  Premium  Society,  winning  a  nominal 
prize  of  fifty  dollars,  and,  what  was  far  more  gratifying,  an 
acknowledgment  from  the  judges: 

that  the  article  of  superfine  cloth  from  the  State  of  Connecticut, 
exhibited  for  the  premium  No.l,  is  not  only  superior  to  any  other 
specimen,  or  to  any  idea  they  had  entertained  that  cloth  of  such 
quality  could  be  manufactured  in  the  U.  S.  but  that  it  is  in  good¬ 
ness  of  workmanship,  whether  as  it  regards  the  spinning,  weaving, 
dying  or  dressing,  at  least  equal,  and  in  fineness  of  wool  much 
superior,  to  the  best  Broadcloth  imported  from  any  part  of  Europe.55 

Massachusetts,  for  her  part,  was  taking  a  position  of 
equal  note  in  the  manufacture  of  shoes,  a  department  in 
which  she  has  since  continued  to  lead.  The  indignation  of 
a  shoemaker  of  Lynn  who,  on  a  visit  to  Salem,  heard  a 
political  speech  in  which  manufactures  were  denounced  and 
commerce  extolled,  is  a  symptom  of  the  pride  and  class  con¬ 
sciousness  among  the  emerging  class  of  mill  operatives.  Re¬ 
turning  home,  he  hastened  to  remind  the  Essex  Register 
that : 

The  town  of  Lynn  owe  all  their  wealth  to  the  manufacture  of  shoes, 
and  I  shall  not  give  my  vote  for  a  man  who  wishes  to  destroy  the 
very  sources  from  which  alone  we  can  acquire  a  livelihood.  I  can 
nowhere  see  the  ghastly  countenance  painted  by  Mr.  P.  [ickman] 
and  I  believe  our  morals  are  as  good  and  that  our  citizens  attend 
upon  the  institutions  of  the  Sabbath  as  well,  at  least,  as  they  do  in 
any  commercial  town  in  the  Union.  A  Lynn  Shoemaker ,56 


But  manufacturing  was  the  bright  spot  in  a  rather 


dreary  scene.  Commerce  was  depressed,  and  agriculture, 
which  might  have  held  the  balance,  was  far  from  flourish¬ 
ing^  The  accumulation  of  crops  andjM  farm  products,  such 


as  dairy  supplies,  lumber,  potash,  etc.,  proved  too  great  a. 
temptation  to  smuggling  for  men  who  lived  within  hauf- 
ing  distance  of  the  Canadian  border.  The  entire  line  was  a 
temptation.  But  the  Bay  of  Passamaquoddv,  on  the  border 


65  The  Independent  Chronicle,  January  9,  1809. 
M  The  Essex  Register,  Salem,  October  29,  1808. 


NEW  ENGLAND  AND  THE  EMBARGO  16i 


of  New  Brunswick,  and  the  margins  of  Lake  Champlain,  as 
New  England’s  natural  outlets  into  Canada,  were  the  chief 
danger  zones.  In  these  quarters,  the  efforts  of  the  govern¬ 
ment  to  suppress  illicit  trade  aroused  a  resentment  amount¬ 
ing  almost  to  civil  war. 

The  spirit  of  insurrection  on  the  frontier  was  no  mean 
echo  of  the  times  of  Shay’s  Rebellion.  Boston  papers,  as 
early  as  January  29,  reported  an  outrage  against  a  reputed 
revenue  inspector  in  the  Kennebec  district.  His  horse  was 
killed,  and  he  himself  wounded.  To  meet  the  situation,  four 
hundred  militia  were  called  out.57  By  February,  the  smug¬ 
gling  of  goods  into  Canada  was  in  full  sway58 — “So  much 
for  starving  the  British .”59  Conditions  did  not  improve 
with  spring.  In  May,  the  Augusta  papers  announced  that 
disturbances  were  still  unsuppressed,  “and  but  few  places 
appear  to  be  safe  for  civil  officers  to  execute  the  laws.  Sev¬ 
eral  men  were  shot  at  last  week  and  were  deterred  from 
doing  their  duty  by  men  armed  and  masqued.”  Fears  were 
expressed  that  society  was  on  the  verge  of  complete  disso¬ 
lution.60 

Reports  from  Vermont  were  equally  alarming.  Rumor 
told  of  a  pitched  battle  between  revenue  officers  and  smug¬ 
glers  on  Lake  Champlain,  with  a  loss  of  one  killed  and  thirty- 
nine  wounded.  “It  is  supposed  that  they  [the  law-breakers] 
were  conveying  large  quantities  of  tea  into  Lower  and 
Upper  Canada.”61  In  this  emergency,  the  President  acted 
with  vigor.  Lie  summoned  the  state  authorities  “by  force 
of  arms  or  otherwise,  to  quell  and  subdue”  the  “insurgents.” 
But  he  labored  under  the  disadvantage  of  depending  on  local 

57  The  Connecticut  Courant,  February  3,  1808,  quoting  Boston,  Janu¬ 
ary  29th. 

s8  Ibid.,  February  10,  1808. 

"  Ibid.,  quoting  Hanover,  New  Hampshire,  February  3,  1808. 

90  The  Connecticut  Courant,  May  18,  1808,  quoting  Augusta,  Maine, 
May  6,  1808. 

91  Ibid.,  May  25,  1808,  quoting  Bennington,  Vermont,  May  8. 


168  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


authorities  to  enforce  an  unpopular  measure.  “We  are 
sorry  to  say,”  is  the  comment  from  Keene,  New  Hampshire, 
“that  the  Proclamation  will  not  be  regarded,  and  that  rafts 
valued  at  from  5  to  20  and  30,000  dollars,  loaded  with  all 
kinds  of  produce,  proceed  as  usual  from  the  ports  on  the 
lake  to  Montreal.  The  accounts  also  agree  that  these  rafts 
have  from  20  to  50,  and  even  100  armed  men  according 
to  their  size  to  protect  them  and  bear  down  all  opposition. 
From  present  appearances,  we  fear  serious  consequences.”62 

The  government’s  efforts  in  Vermont  to  suppress  trad¬ 
ing  with  the  enemy  inspired  the  Federalist  wags  to  mirth. 
A  Massachusetts  neighbor  said  of  the  enlistment  of  one  hun¬ 
dred  and  fifty  militia  men  for  service  on  Lake  Champlain, 
that  it 

Must  convince  the  world,  that  the  assertion  that  our  energetic  ad¬ 
ministration  had  ever  shrunk  from  the  menaces  of  a  pair  of  whis¬ 
kers,  to  be  downright  falsehoods.  For  can  it  be  supposed,  that  an 
administration  which  could  nobly  dare  to  order  a  military  force  to 
attack  with  the  bayonet,  a  race  of  hardy,  though  unarmed  farmers, 
waggoners,  and  rafters,  “seeking  a  market  for  their  surplus  pro¬ 
ducts,”  would  ever  be  intimidated  at  a  bunch  of  hair  on  a  French¬ 
man’s  chin,  however  black,  huge,  and  curled?63 

The  “whiskers”  were  necessarily  French,  for  French  in¬ 
fluence  was  the  constant  charge  of  New  England  protes- 
tants.  If  any  proof  were  needed  of  Jefferson’s  submission 
to  the  French,  his  critics  found  it  in  the  difficulty  imposed 
by  circumstances  of  expressing  officially  the  sympathy  actu¬ 
ally  felt  by  our  government  and  people  toward  the  Spanish 
struggle  for  liberty.  For  Washington  to  lend  official  coun¬ 
tenance  to  Spain  would  have  signified  a  sympathetic  under¬ 
standing  with  Spain’s  English  protector,  which  was  in  the 
nature  of  things  impossible.  But,  to  Jefferson’s  numerous 


ro  The  Connecticut  Courant,  May  25,  1808,  quoting  Keene,  New  Hamp¬ 
shire,  May  14,  “From  Vermont.” 

“  Massachusetts  Spy  or  Worcester  Gazette,  June  15,  1808.  From 
Rutland,  June  4,  1808. 


NEW  ENGLAND  AND  THE  EMBARGO 

enemies  in  New  England,  the  sole  explanation  for  hesitancy 
was  the  deep-dyed  hypocrisy  of  the  man.  The  present  gen¬ 
eration  knows  how  easy  it  is  to  level  such  a  charge,  and  how 
impossible  it  often  is  for  the  person  attacked  to  bring  forth 
the  evidence  which  would  acquit  him.  It  was  so  with  Jeffer¬ 
son.  Such  jibes  as  the  following  explain  the  charm  which 
retirement  held  for  the  weary  statesman : 

MR.  JEFFERSON  DISGRACED 

Happily  for  the  country,  it  will  soon  be  well  understood  by  the 
world  that  THE  PEOPLE  of  America,  do  not  support  Mr.  Jeffer¬ 
son  in  his  gallic  attachments. — Next  to  the  direful  effects  of  the 
Embargo  Laws,  (dictated  by  Mr.  Jefferson  to  pacify  Bonaparte,) 
TTieGndecehETnanner  in  which  the  government  papers  have  treated 
the  cause  of  the  Spanish  patriots,  has  tended  to  wean  the  people  of 
this  country  from  their  attachment  to  this  hypocritical  mock-Phil- 
osopher. 

The  people  of  these  States  have  too  much  sincere  love  of  liberty, 
and  with  such  feelings  have  had  too  much  sympathy  for  the  cause 
of  Spain,  not  to  be  disgusted  with  the  contemptuous  manner  in 
which  Mr.  Jefferson  and  his  partisans  have  treated  this  interesting 
subject.  The  “Contest  for  Government”  we  trust  will  soon  be  ended. 
— The  vile  instruments  of  the  Tyrant  are  destroyed  or  driven  be¬ 
fore  the  Patriotic  Armies  of  Spain,  and  eternal  disgrace  will  justly 
attach  to  all  those,  who  not  immediately  under  controul  of  the  Des¬ 
pot,  had  expressed  an  indifference  to  a  cause  SO  JUST. — What 
then  can  be  said  of  the  man  who,  though  at  the  head  of  a  FREE 
REPUBLIC,  has  countenanced  and  supported  the  Despotic  conduct 
of  BONAPARTE,  and  has  endeavored  to  suppress  the  sympathy 
of  his  fellow  countrymen  towards  a  patriotic  people  struggling  for 
their  National  Independence?  But  he  has  his  reward!  Even  the 
loss  of  his  ill-earned  popularity  at  home,  and  of  his  reputation 
abroad.  .  .  ,64 

The  object  of  this  satire  found  abundant  occupation  in 
his  effort  to  reduce  illicit  traders  to  obedience.  That  effort 
divided  itself  into  a  naval  patrol  along  the  coast,  and  a  close 
system  of  inspection  for  Lake  Champlain  and  other  inland 
routes.  Collectors  in  the  interior  warned  boat  owners  against 
the  movement  of  rafts,65  warnings  greatly  needed,  as  mili- 

84  Neiv  England  Palladium,  Boston,  October  14,  1808. 

85  The  Van  Buren  Papers,  Library  of  Congress,  I.  1787-1813,  quoting 
New  York  Republican  Watch  Tower,  June  14,  1808. 


V170  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 

tary  officers  signed  affidavits  that  “hostile  demonstrations 
were  manifested  by  many  on  both  sides  the  line”  and  that 
“boats  have  been  armed  for  the  purpose  of  conveying  prop¬ 
erty  into  the  province  of  Canada,  determined  to  effect  their 
purpose  by  force,  if  they  could  not  otherwise.”66  Blood  was 
drawn  in  a  pitched  battle  between  a  revenue  cutter,  manned 
by  a  lieutenant  and  crew  of  thirteen  men,  and  the  smugglers 
of  the  Black  Snake,  a  large  batteau.  The  cutter  pursued  the 
Black  Snake  up  a  small  river.  The  law  breakers  abandoned 
their  ship  and  then  fired  from  shore  upon  the  government 
forces,  killing  one  man.  The  revenue  men  now  came  ashore. 
Here  the  outlaws  opposed  them  with  “a  wall  piece,  about  ten 
feet  in  length,  carrying  sixteen  ounce  balls.”  Two  more  fell. 
The  villagers  now  lent  a  hand,  one  of  their  own  number  hav¬ 
ing  been  shot,  and  eight  men  were  jailed  to  answer  for 
“WILFUL  MURDER.”  A  price  was  set  upon  the  heads  of 
the  Captain  and  several  of  his  men.67  The  Captain  was  taken, 
found  guilty,  and  paid  the  penalty.  One  of  the  crew,  Dean, 
upon  conviction  of  firing  upon  the  soldiers,  met  his  fate  with 
levity.  “He  appeared  perfectly  composed  and  hardened; 
denied  his  crime,  kicked  his  hat  into  his  grave,  spit  upon 
his  coffin.”68 

On  the  seacoast,  similar  conditions  prevailed.  Men  vowed 
they'would  put  to  sea  in  defiance  oflawT5  At  Newbury - 
j)ort,  revenue  officers,  seeking  to  prevent  the  departure  of  a 
sloop  laden  with  contraband  provisions,  were  “beaten  with 
sticks  and  fired  upon  from  the  sloop.”  When  a  small  revenue 
boat  went  alongside  the  sloop  to  inquire  her  destination,  its 
crew  were  “insulted,”  whereupon  their  officer  commanded 
them  to  retire.  A  schooner  dispatched  in  their  pursuit,  after 


“Van  Buren  Papers,  loc.  cit..  New  York  Republican  Watch  Tower, 
August  17,  1808.  Affidavit  signed  June  24,  1808. 

' ”  Ibid.,  September  13,  1808. 

08  Van  Buren  Papers,  I.  1787-1813,  New  York  Republican  Watch 
Tower,  December  2,  1808. 

69  Van  Buren  Papers,  I.  1787-1813,  Salem  Gazette,  August  5,  1808. 


NEW  ENGLAND  AND  THE  EMBARGO  171 


a  ten  hours’  chase,  apprehended  such  of  the  crew  as  remained 
upon  the  vessel.70 

Years  afterward  transactions  of  this  sort  rose  up  to 
haunt  their  perpetrators.  A  campaign  document  of  1824 
sought  to  discredit  William  King  and  Mark  Langdon  Hill, 
of  Maine,  for  alleged  participation  in  unlawful  trade.  King 
was  a  leading  merchant  of  the  time,  subsequently  governor 
of  his  state,  and  is  now  honored  by  Maine  as  one  of  her 
two  representatives  in  the  Hall  of  Fame  at  the  National 
Capitol.  The  charges  against  him  related  more  particularly 
to  trade  carried  on  by  him  under  the  non-intercourse  act, 
which  followed  the  embargo,  and  during  the  War  of  1812. 
Hill’s  misdoings  were  under  the  embargo. 

Affidavits  were  filed  that  Hill  was  part  owner  of  the 
brig,  Mary  Jane,  lying  in  the  Kennebec  River  loaded,  but 
prevented  from  sailing  by  a  revenue  cutter  stationed  a  mile 
down  stream.  The  deponent  asserted  that  Hill  sent  for  him 
and  urged  him  in  secrecy  to  make  the  finishing  preparations 
for  the  brig’s  departure.  He  did  so,  “Mr.  Hill  being  present, 
aiding,  assisting  and  superintending  the  business.”  Guards 
were  stationed  nearby  to  prevent  discovery  of  the  operations 
under  way.  That  night  guns  were  carried  on  board  for  de¬ 
fence  against  revenue  cutters,  Hill  still  assisting.  A  com¬ 
pany  of  fifteen  men  besides  the  crew  gathered,  their  faces 
blackened  to  avoid  identification,  and  the  brig  cast  off.  Being 
hailed  by  the  cutter  and  giving  no  answer,  the  brig  moved 
down  the  river  past  a  United  States  fort,  which  was  too 
surprised  to  use  more  than  small  arms,  and  sailed  out  to  sea, 
whereupon  the  armed  escort,  leaving  the  crew  to  navigate 
the  vessel,  “returned  and  went  to  the  house  of  Mr.  Hill, 
who  had  in  readiness,  refreshments  suited  to  the  occasion,” 
and  who  was  well  pleased  with  the  night’s  work.  The  de¬ 
ponent  concluded  his  testimony  with  a  statement  of  the  war- 

10  Van  Buren  Papers,  I.  1787-1813,  New  York  Republican  Watch- 
Tower,  August  31,  1808. 


172  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


like  equipment  of  the  piratical  brig.  It  included  “four  can¬ 
non,  small  arms,  and  pitchforks.”  Other  testimony  follows 
from  men  employed  in  the  same  operation,  all  sworn  to  before 
justices  of  the  peace,  and  all  confirming  Hill’s  share  in  the 
attack  on  the  revenue  cutter.71 

This  attack  upon  himself  and  Hill  drew  from  King  a 
declaration  that  he  even  anticipated  the  embargo  by  recalling 
most  of  his  ships  several  months  in  advance,  so  that,  when 
the  act  was  proclaimed,  he  had  in  port  at  Bath  ten  ships : 

In  all  2475  tons;  these  vessels  remained  in  port  during  the  whole  of 
the  embargo,  as  it  was  a  measure  of  our  government  to  coerce  the 
several  nations  of  Europe,  who  were  violating  our  neutral  rights ; 
no  one  ever  heard  any  complaint  from  me,  although  the  actual  loss, 
at  the  most  moderate  calculation  of  charter,  was  5558  dollars  per 
month,  being  more  than  185  dollars  a  day,  exclusive  of  interest  of 
money,  on  the  amount  of  cargoes  from  22nd  December  1807,  to 
May  1809. 72 

Testimony  of  fellow  townsmen  was  adduced  in  King’s  de¬ 
fence  to  the  effect  that : 

In  relation  to  the  embargo,  it  is  well  known,  that  every  vessel  owned 
by  Gen.  King  was  in  port,  entirely  unemployed  during  its  contin¬ 
uance  ;  and  that  few  individuals  in  the  country  suffered  so  severely 
in  their  commercial  interests  from  this  measure  of  the  Government, 
.as  did  Gen.  King.73 

Of  the  two  cases,  that  against  Hill  is  much  the  more 
convincing.  If  one  accepts  the  favorable  estimate  of  King 
— and  that  is  the  one  made  by  the  state  that  knew  him  best — 
he  is  to  be  reckoned  as  one  great  merchant,  at  least,  who  up¬ 
held  the  embargo  in  word  and  deed.  Another  merchant 
prince,  about  whose  loyalty  there  is  not  even  a  question, 
was  William  Gray,  of  Salem.  Perhaps  the  wealthiest  of 

11  The  Disclosure — No.  1.  Documents  relating  to  Violations  and 
Evasions  of  the  Laws  During  the  Commercial  Restrictions  and  late  war 
.with  Great  Britain,  &c.  Part  First,  pp.  34-45. 

n  Mr.  [William]  King’s  reply  to  a  Pamphlet  published  at  Bath,  Maine, 
1825,  p.  7. 

^  Ibid.,  pp.  11,  12. 


NEW  ENGLAND  AND  THE  EMBARGO  173 


American  merchants,  he  endured  his  losses  without  a  mur¬ 
mur,  and  loyally  combatted  the  anti-embargo  principles  of 
the  Federalists.  It  was  hard  for  the  rank  and  file  among 
owners  of  anchored  vessels  to  comprehend  the  calmness  of 
the  heaviest  loser  of  them  all.  But  a  correspondence  be¬ 
tween  Gray  and  the  Federalist  newspaper  of  Salem  shows 
his  ability  to  rise  above  personal  losses  to  an  impersonal 
view  of  the  political  situation: 

Mr.  Cushing 

I  observe  in  your  paper  of  Friday  last,  over  the  signature 
“Cuesta,”  a  piece  imputing  to  me  base  and  sordid  motives  for  ap¬ 
proving  the  embargo ;  in  consequence  of  that,  I  am  compelled  to  de¬ 
clare  to  the  public  FACTS,  and  leave  them  to  judge  how  far  self¬ 
ishness  has  influenced  my  opinion  and  conduct. 

It  is  suggested  that  I  set  the  opinions  of  others  at  defiance. 

I  have  presumed  to  think  for  myself,  and  made  the  Constitution 
my  guide ;  however  mistaken  I  may  be,  my  intentions  are  at  least 
correct,  nor  do  I  defy  or  condemn  others  for  thinking  differently; 
and  so  far  from  excusing  the  administration  for  submission  to 
France,  had  I  perceived  symptoms  of  submission  to  that  or  any 
other  foreign  power,  sooner  than  advocate  such  measures,  I  would 
devote  my  whole  property  for  the  support  of  the  Independence  of 
the  United  States. 

When  the  embargo  law  passed,  I  thought  it  a  constitutional 
measure,  and  I  did  not  think  proper  to  oppose  it.  The  policy  of  the 
measure  has  been  much  questioned ;  yet  I  think  the  then  existing 
circumstances  rendered  it  prudent  and  necessary ;  as  Great  Britain 
had  threatened,  and  had  at  that  time  passed  (though  not  officially 
known  to  us)  the  orders  of  council  of  the  11th  November,  1807, 
authorizing  the  capture  and  condemnation  of  all  vessels  bound  from 
the  United  States,  that  should  sail  for  France  or  the  countries  of  her 
allies,  after  orders  of  council  were  known  in  America;  which  in¬ 
cluded  all  Europe,  except  Great  Britain,  Gibraltar,  Malta  and  per¬ 
haps  Sweden;  at  those  places  very  few  of  those  articles  which  we 
generally  export,  are  admitted ;  and  I  think  fewer  still  would  have 
brought  the  cost  and  charges.  Great  Britain,  it  is  said,  would  have 
permitted  us,  after  touching  there  and  paying  duties,  to  go  to  France 
and  the  countries  of  her  allies.  Is  there  an  independent  American, 
who  would  submit  to  such  impositions  ? 

Bonaparte  had  threatened  to  put  in  operation  his  Berlin  Decree 
which  he  had  however  forborne  to  do,  so  far  as  I  know,  except  in 
one  instance,  of  the  Horizon,  wrecked  upon  the  French  coast;  but 
his  severe  and  tyrannical  decree  of  the  17th  December  last,  called 
the  Milan  Decree,  passed,  declaring  all  vessels  that  should  be  spoken 


174  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 

with  by  the  British,  liable  to  capture,  which  decree  almost  precluded 
the  possibility  of  escape  from  capture  or  detention.  After  these 
restrictions  on  our  commerce,  had  not  the  embargo  been  laid,  I 
think  a  great  part  of  our  vessels,  sent  for  the  continent  of  Europe, 
would  have,  I  think,  been  captured  and  condemned  by  the  British, 
(as  their  orders  authorized  condemnation)  and  probably  the  remnants 
would  have  fallen  into  the  hands  of  the  French.  Had  these  events 
taken  place,  the  effect  upon  the  public  mind  would,  I  think,  have  pro¬ 
duced  war ;  this,  added  to  the  immense  loss  which  the  Americans 
would  have  sustained  by  capture  and  condemnation,  must,  I  think, 
have  been  a  greater  evil  than  the  Embargo ;  though  that,  taken 
separately  from  these  considerations  is  a  serious  evil ;  yet,  as  a 
proof  that  it  was  necessary,  I  find  out  of  seven  vessels,  which  sailed 
from  this  district  for  the  continent  of  Europe,  in  the  month  preced¬ 
ing  the  commencement  of  the  embargo,  not  one  ever  reached  her 
destined  port  in  safety. 

It  is  insinuated  that  I  am  growing  rich,  while  others  are  suffer¬ 
ing  by  the  embargo.  I  have  not  reaped  any  advantage  from  it,  that 
I  know  of,  in  any  form  whatever ;  those  who  best  know  me  can 
say,  whether  I  have  benefitted  others,  or  taken  advantage  of  their 
necessity.  So  far  from  reaping  profit  from  the  embargo,  my  estate 
has  declined  more  than  ten  per  cent,  in  value  since  its  operation, 
which  I  am  ready  to  demonstrate  to  any  person  desirous  of  inves¬ 
tigating  the  subject.  William  Gray,  Salem,  Aug.  11,  1808.74 

The  kind  of  patriots  who  called  forth  Gray’s  defence 
were  satirized  by  the  Boston  Independent  Chronicle  (Repub¬ 
lican)  : 

We  often  hear  the  disinterested  patriotism  of  the  mercantile  interest 
of  the  United  States  spoken  of  in  the  highest  terms,  as  though  the 
very  existence  of  the  government  depended  on  their  exertions. 
There  are  not  perhaps  in  the  community  (with  a  few  exceptions)  a 
class  of  citizens  disposed  to  make  so  few  sacrifices  for  the  good  of 
the  country  as  the  merchants.  If  they  can  promote  their  own  inter¬ 
est,  the  indignities  and  outrages  committed  on  our  government  by 
the  British  will  not  trouble  them.75 

The  cynicism  of  New  England  commercial  circles  is  self- 
proclaimed  by  their  own  organ,  the  Boston  Centinel.  A  few 
years  earlier  a  mere  suggestion  of  peace  on  earth  had  called 
forth  the  following: 

74  The  letter  is  quoted  in  The  Universal  Gazette,  August  25,  1808. 
Gray’s  assertion  concerning  the  seven  lost  ships  led  to  further  corres¬ 
pondence.  He  modified  his  statement  to  make  it  eight  instead  of  seven. 
See  the  National  Intelligencer,  September  5,  1808,  quoting  Gray’s  letter 
of  August  25  in  the  Salem  Gazette. 

75  The  Independent  Chronicle,  Boston,  January  11,  1808. 


NEW  ENGLAND  AND  THE  EMBARGO  (175 


The  conclusion  of  a  gcne\j\al  peace  in  Europe,  will  be  the  com¬ 
mencement  of  the  decline  of  our  commerce.  Every  friend  to  Amer¬ 
ican  navigation,  ought  to  pray  as  fervently  for  a  continuation  of  the 
war  in  Europe,  as  a  husbandman  for  rain  in  a  dry  season  !  The  one 
is  as  necessary  to  the  filling  our  warehouses,  as  the  other  our  gran¬ 
aries. 76 


From  men  capable  of  such  sentiments,  little  could  be  ex¬ 
pected  that  was  patriotic  or  magnanimous. 

The  commercial  interests  found  a  crumb  of  comfort, 
and  at  the  same  time  an  additional  ground  for  resentment, 
in  the  permission  granted  by  Jefferson  for  a  coastwise  trade, 
under  strict  supervision  as  to  the  bonding  and  destination  of 
cargoes^  Massachusetts  was  permitted  to  import  grain 

from  states  to  the  south  of  her,  under  licenses  approved  by 
Governor  Sullivan.77  Such  licenses  were  notoriously  easy  to 
obtain.  But  men  professed  to  see  in  the  system  merely  a~ 


scheme  for  plaguing  Federalists  and  rewarding  Democrats. 
“Shew  us,”  demanded  the  Connecticut  Courant,  “in  any  civi¬ 
lized  government,  we  ask  not  for  precedent  from  republicks 
alone — shew  us  in  the  modern  monarchies  of  Europe,  a 
stretch  of  tyranny  equal  to  this.”78  The  Salem  Gazette  was 
equally  indignant.  “If  this  is  not  despotic  power,  we  know 
not  what  is — for  Governor  Sullivan  to  determine  whether  the 
people  shall  eat  or  not,  and  who  shall  feed  them,  if  they  are 
permitted  to  eat ! !  !”79  ^ 

Grain  licenses  were  compared  to  papal  bulls  and  indul¬ 
gences80  and  Jefferson  was  lauded  as  a  mathematician  who 
could  not  only  foretell  an  eclipse,  but  produce  one,  “an 
eclipse  of  the  United  States,  which  he  has  contrived  to 
render  visible  and  almost  total.”81 


78  Quoted  in  the  Trenton  True  American  and  from  it  in  the  Republi¬ 
can  and  Savannah  Evening  Ledger,  Savannah,  Georgia,  April  30,  1808. 

77  The  same  privilege  was  extended  to  New  Hampshire. 

78  Connecticut  Courant,  May  25,  1808. 

78  Ibid.,  quoting  Salem  Gazette. 

80  Ibid.,  June  8,  1808. 

81  Ibid.,  June  22,  1808,  from  Hartford. 


176  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


The  somewhat  scattered  data  just  reviewed  reveal  a  far 
from  prosperous  condition  among  New  England  farmers  and 
shippers  in  the  summer  of  1808.  In  her  fisheries,  New  Eng¬ 
land  was  even  more  vulnerable.  The  grain  and  lumber  of 
the  Middle  States  would  be  little  the  worse  for  a  year  of 
seasoning.  The  cotton,  rice,  and  tobacco  of  the  South  might 
call  for  increased  barns  and  longer  credits.  But,  after  all, 
they  could  bide  their  market.  With  fish  it  was  otherwise. 
They  must  sell  or  spoil,  and  Europe  was  their  normal  market. 
The  following  table  of  fish  exports,  sufficiently  unromantic  in 
itself,  is  the  record  of  genuine  hardship  for  one  of  America’s 
simplest  and  sturdiest  groups,  the  brave  and  seldom  over¬ 
paid  fisherfolk : 


Fish.  Dried  or  Smoked. 

To  All  Parts  of  the  World  To  France  To  England  &  Col.8’ 


Quintals 


Quintals 


Quintals 


1807  473,924 

1808  155,808 


87,654  55,242 

16,144  26,998 


That  the  trade  survived  at  all  was  due  to  the  independence 
of  tough  old  salts  who  despised  the  laws  of  landsmen. 

An  economic  situation  so  generally  unfavorable  produced 
a  proportionate  recoil  in  politics.  Before  Congress  reas¬ 
sembled,  state  election  returns  showed  the  Federalists  in 
control  throughout  New  England.  Yet  there  were  several 
features  of  the  election  reassuring  to  the  Republicans.  In 
Massachusetts,  for  example,  though  the  Federalists  won  the 
legislature,  Governor  Sullivan  carried  the  state.  And  there 
seems  to  have  been  more  than  a  grain  of  truth  in  the  asser¬ 
tion  that  Republicans  lost  the  legislature,  not  because  of  the 
unpopularity  of  the  embargo,  but  because  many  towns  which 
would  have  given  a  safe  majority,  in  order  to  save  the  ex- 

82  An  address  of  Members  of  the  House  of  Representatives  of  the 
Congress  of  the  United  States.  To  their  Constituents  on  the  subject  of 
the  war  with  Great  Britain,  Hanover.  Printed  and  Sold  by  Charles 
Spear,  1812. 


NEW  ENGLAND  AND  THE  EMBARGO  177 


pense  of  salaries,  failed  to  send  representatives  to  the  legis¬ 
lature.83  Inequality  of  representation  between  Republican 
and  Federalist  towns  was,  according  to  the  Boston  Indepen¬ 
dent  Chronicle,  a  decided  factor  in  the  outcome.  Republi¬ 
can  towns  with  a  population  of  67,383  are  tabulated  as  send¬ 
ing  forty-six  representatives ;  while  Federalist  towns  totall¬ 
ing  only  33,000  sent  forty-seven.84 

In  New  Hampshire  also,  the  elections  indicate  a  curious 
reversal  of  the  political  norm.  As  a  backwoods  state,  the 
upcountry  should  have  been  Republican,  the  short  coast¬ 
line,  Federalist.  But  the  vote  from  the  leading  towns, 
Portsmouth,  Durham,  Lee,  New-Market,  Stratham,  Green¬ 
land,  Rye,  and  New-Castle  stood  1620  Republican  to  447 
Federalist,85  whereas  the  inland  districts  converted  the  total 
into  a  Federalist  majority.  From  which,  it  was  argued,  and 
plausibly,  that  the  embargo  was  not  responsible,  since,  on 
the  embargo  hypothesis,  the  coast  towns  should  have  been 
Federalist.  The  explanation  was  found  in  propaganda : 

To  prove  that  the  federal  success  in  New  Hampshire  was  not  the 
effect  of  any  real  pressure,  of  the  Embargo,  but  was  produced  only 
by  Embargo  clamor,  we  need  only  mention  that  in  almost  every  town 
near  the  sea-coast,  and  particularly  concerned  in  trade,  an  increased 
democratic  majority  was  given.  In  Portsmouth  the  majority  was 
vast  and  unexpected — and  surely  if  the  embargo  were  felt  severely 
in  any  part  of  the  State,  it  must  have  been  there.  The  Portsmouth 
Republicans  have  gained  immortal  glory,  and  deserve  the  applause 
of  every  American.86 

With  New  England  Federalists  returning  to  their  own, 
Connecticut  felt  entitled  to  a  little  boasting,  for,  of  all  her 
sisters  near  by,  she  alone  had  kept  the  faith.  As  the 
C  our  ant  expressed  it,  “Connecticut,  always  faithful  to  the 
true  interests  of  her  country,  has,  in  the  worst  of  times, 

83  Wilson  Cary  Nicholas  Papers.  Library  of  Congress.  Ezekiel 
Bacon  to  W.  C.  Nicholas,  Pittsfield,  Massachusetts,  June  1,  1808. 

81  The  Independent  Chronicle,  Boston,  May  30,  1808. 

85  Ibid.,  September  15,  1808. 

88  Ibid.,  September  15,  1808. 


178  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


successfully  resisted  democracy — She  has  stood  firm  while 
other  States  have  fallen  around  her.”  But  her  welcome  to 
the  erring  was  not  the  less  magnanimous.  ‘‘With  heart¬ 
felt  joy  we  congratulate  our  sister  States,  Massachusetts, 
New  Hampshire,  Vermont  and  Rhode  Island,  on  their  re¬ 
turns  to  their  first  love.  We  hail  them  as  worthy  and  beloved 
members  of  the  American  family.”87  Neighboring  states 
might  well  regard  Vermont,  at  any  rate,  as  veritably  a  brand 
snatched  from  the  burning,  so  loud  and  frequent  had  been 
her  protestations  of  loyalty  to  Jefifersonian  principles.88  As 
one  observer  remarked,  “New  York  and  Rhode  Island  have 
set  a  glorious  example — Massachusetts  is  treading  close  on 
their  heels — let  Vermont  and  the  other  New  England  States 
come  out  in  their  might,  and  the  Virginia  policy  of  destroy¬ 
ing  our  commerce,  will  perish  in  embryo.”89 

Even  while  the  issue  still  hung  in  the  balance,  the  pros¬ 
pect  of  New  England’s  return  to  the  pale  of  respectability 
awoke  the  Muse.  The  following  doggerel  is  a  fair  specimen 
of  not  the  worst  rhymes  turned  out.  It  is  represented  as  the 
lament  of  Selleck  Osborn,  a  poet  of  the  administration,  who, 
seeing  the  prospect  of  ruin,  bursts  into  melody: 

O  Jefferson!  with  deep  amaze, 

Thou’st  overset  our  cargo ; 

We’ve  nought  to  do  but  stand  and  gaze 
At  thy  own  curst  embargo. 

Old  Massachusetts’  o’er  the  dam, 

Vermont  is  just  a  going, 

Connecticut — a  stubborn  ram, 

Laughs  at  our  sad  undoing. 

Rhode  Island  too  has  run  adrift 

81  The  Connecticut  Courant,  September  28,  1808. 

88  Ibid.,  May  25,  1808,  quoting  Keene,  New  Hampshire,  May  14,  “From 
Vermont.” 

89  The  Connecticut  Courant,  May  25,  1808,  quoting  Keene,  New 
Hampshire,  May  14,  “From  Vermont.” 


NEW  ENGLAND  AND  THE  EMBARGO  179 


New  Hampshire  soon  will  follow, 

New  York’s  prepared  to  give  a  lift 
And  seize  us  by  the  collar. 

Alas !  the  times  are  very  hard, 

They’re  filled  with  nought  but  evil, 

Unless  we  better  work  our  card, 

’Twill  all  go  to  the  devil.90 

The  prose  equivalent  of  this  rhapsody  proclaimed  that: 

At  length  we  have  received  the  wished  for  good  news  from  this 
State  [Vermont].  The  embargo  party  are  Down-fallen,  we  trust 
like  Lucifer,  never  to  rise  again.  The  influence  of  office  would  not 
answer.  The  prostitution  of  a  batch  of  paper  money  banks  to  elec¬ 
tioneering  purposes  would  not  answer.  The  infernal  trick  of  im¬ 
puting  to  the  federalists  a  murder,  committed  by  a  notorious  and 
active  democrat  failed  of  success.  The  opposers  of  Executive  tyr¬ 
anny,  foreign  influence,  and  a  tribute-paying  Congress  have  com¬ 
pletely  triumphed.91 

Such  were  the  courtesies  of  victory! 

Some  account  has  now  been  taken  of  New  England 
sentiment  between  April  and  November,  1808.  To  this  sen¬ 
timent  Federalism  owed  a  new  lease  of  life.  By  gaining 
control  of  the  state  legislatures,  it  obtained  a  base  for  greater 
conquests,  a  fulcrum  for  operations  at  Washington.  But 
before  passing  to  New  England’s  share  in  the  Congressional 
debates  of  the  new  session,  let  us  examine  further  the  back¬ 
ground  of  New  England  sentiment,  upon  which,  after  all, 
Congressional  action  would  rest.  Here  also  lies  the  clew  to 
New  England  attitude  toward  the  extremists  of  the  Essex 
Junto,  who  favored  a  policy  of  independent  action  or  seces¬ 
sion.  No  verdict  upon  such  a  point  can  be  final  without 
reference  to  the  clergy,  who,  in  so  God-fearing  a  community 
as  New  England,  were  potent  moulders  of  opinion. 

In  the  Reverend  William  Bentley,  D.D.,  a  sturdy  theolo¬ 
gian  not  unwilling  to  carry  his  religion  into  politics,  Jefifer- 

80  The  Connecticut  Courant,  June  1,  1808. 

61  Ibid.,  September  28,  1808. 


180  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


son  possessed  a  useful  champion  against  the  fulminations  of 
rival  divines,92  who  beheld  in  the  President  the  new  anti- 
Christ  and  in  his  ideas  the  negation  of  all  dignity  and  virtue. 
Bentley’s  diary  shows  that  in  Church  circles  the  tide  against 
Jefferson  had  set  in  long  before  the  embargo  was  declared. 
In  September,  1805,  he  concludes  that  his  friendship  for  Mr. 
Jefferson  is  to  cost  him  dear.93  Four  months  later,  Bentley 
was  for  a  third  time  the  party  candidate  to  preach  the  elec¬ 
tion  sermon.  But  out  of  two  hundred  and  seventeen  votes, 
he  obtained  only  ninety-seven,  “a  less  number  than  at  any 
former  time.”94  He  denounced  the  mob  disorders  accom¬ 
panying  the  embargo;95  and  their  indirect  fomentor,  Timo¬ 
thy  Pickering,  he  anathematized  as  ‘‘the  man  that  was  a 
scourge  to  Washington  &  Adams  &  is  now  the  unfeeling  poli¬ 
tical  boot  of  political  opposition  to  Jefferson.”96  It  is  in 
the  religious  field,  however,  that  Bentley  is  best  informed, 
and  his  alignment  of  the  churches  throws  some  light  upon 
New  England  opinion.  Pillars  of  orthodoxy,  whether  Con¬ 
gregational  or  Romanist,97  were  quicker  to  take  offense  than 
Quakers,  Baptists,  and  Methodists,  who  appreciated  the 
mildness  and  toleration  of  the  administration.98  The 
Churches  and  the  politics  of  the  poor  man  felt  themselves 
akin.99 

Political  sermons  invited  their  own  rejoinders.  Thus 
when  the  rector  of  Trinity  Episcopal  Church  in  Salem  ven¬ 
tured  to  defend  British  conduct  in  the  Chesapeake  Affair  and 

“  The  Diary  of  William  Bentley,  D.D.,  III.  151,  April  14,  1805. 
“Party  have  found  that  they  profit  much  from  the  pulpit  declamations.” 

"Ibid.,  III.  192. 

"Ibid.,  Ill,  215,  February  15,  1806. 

85  Ibid.,  HI.  404-5,  December  24,  1808. 

"Ibid.,  III.  348,  March  10,  1808;  also  p.  350. 

"Ibid.,  III.  410,  January  22,  1809. 

98  Ibid. 

99  For  Baptist  approval  of  Jefferson,  see  The  Diary  of  William 
Bentley,  D.D.,  II.  409,  January  2,  1802. 


NEW  ENGLAND  AND  THE  EMBARGO  181 


to  belittle  American  methods  and  manners  in  the  months  that 
followed,  he  was  reminded  that  “Reason  and  experience 
forbid  us  to  expect  a  strict  and  perfect  adherence  of  unin¬ 
spired  clergy  to  the  example  of  their  heaven  taught  prede¬ 
cessors,  the  apostles ;  but  we  have  a  right  to  require  that 
they  should  not  be  diametrically  opposite.”100 

More  immediately  applicable  to  the  final  phase  of  the 
embargo,  was  a  Thanksgiving  sermon  of  Dr.  John  Lathrop, 
minister  of  the  Second  Church  in  Boston,  representative  of 
the  best  theological  opinion  in  an  excited  time : 

The  present  embarrassed  state  of  our  commerce,  the  threatening 
divisions  which  exist  among  the  people,  and  the  unhappy  conten¬ 
tion  in  which  our  government  is  engaged  with  the  greatest  powers 
of  the  earth,  are  circumstances  of  a  very  serious  nature,  and  such 
as  to  take  away  a  great  part  of  the  joy,  which  we  might  otherwise 
have  felt  on  this  festive  occasion. — We  rejoice  indeed,  but  we  re¬ 
joice  with  trembling.101 

The  reverend  speaker  concluded  his  discourse  with  an  esti¬ 
mate  of  the  state  of  the  nation,  admirably  judicious  and 
balanced : 

In  a  review  of  the  year,  which  has  passed  away  since  the  last 
general  thanksgiving,  we  find  many  reasons  for  gratitude  and 
praise.  Although  the  publick  aspect  of  our  country  is  now  serious 
and  alarming  we  yet  enjoy  peace.  Our  young  men  are  not  driven 
away  to  the  field  of  battle;  nor  are  our  old  men  driven  from  their 
houses  and  theirs  beds  by  an  invading  enemy. 

We  are  favoured  with  unusual  health,  and  the  fields  have  yielded 
an  abundance  of  meat.  Our  rulers  are  still  of  our  own  appointing 
and  we  still  possess  the  highest  privileges  of  religion. 

We  rejoice  that  God  rules  the  world  in  righteousness,  and  all 
his  ways  are  perfect.  Let  us  hearken  to  his  counsels.  Let  us  re¬ 
solve  to  be  good  subjects  of  his  Son  the  Redeemer;  we  may  then 
rest  assured,  that,  whatever  our  circumstances  may  be  in  the  pres¬ 
ent  world,  our  happiness  will  be  complete  in  heaven  forever. 
Amen.102 


100  The  Essex  Register,  Salem,  Massachusetts,  April  27,  1808. 

101  John  Lathrop,  D.D.,  We  Rejoice  with  Trembling ,  A  Discourse  De¬ 
livered  on  the  Day  of  Publick  Thanksgiving  in  the  State  of  Massachus¬ 
etts,  Dec.  1,  1808,  Boston,  1808,  p.  10. 

102  John  Lathrop,  We  Rejoice  with  Trembling,  p.  20. 


182  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 

Allowing,  then,  for  partisanship  among  the  clergy,  there 
is  at  any  rate  no  evidence  that  their  ideas  were  revolution¬ 
ary.  Such  extreme  measures  as  the  Junto  may  possibly  have 
contemplated  were  not  the  work  of  the  pulpit.  More  specta¬ 
cular  than  pulpit  declamation  were  anniversary  processions 
and  celebrations  for  denouncing  the  embargo.  But  even 
these  were  ebullitions  rather  than  conspiracies.  The  anni¬ 
versary  of  the  embargo  was,  of  course,  a  rare  oportunity  to 
press  its  lessons  home.  Parades  and  pageants  were  widely 
held.  That  at  Newburyport  is  a  fair  specimen.  Bells  were 
tolled  at  sunrise;  flags  in  the  harbor  were  half-masted; 
and  minute  guns  were  fired.  Bells  tolled  and  cannon  blazed 
at  noon,  and  again  at  four.  At  nine  A.M.  a  parade  of 
sailors,  “looking  each  of  them  a  ‘bloodless  image  of  despair’  ” 
marched  with  muffled  drums  and  crepe  on  arms  as  escort  to 
a  dismantled  ship,  “Her  yards  a  cock  bill,  a  bell  tolling  in 
her  bows,  and  her  masts  capped  by  inverted  cans,  denoting 
the  want  of  grog.”  She  carried  a  flag,  denoting  ship  in  dry 
dock,  bore  the  name  “O  grab  me” ,  and  was  commanded  by 
an  old  sailor,  who  perpetually  inquired,  “Which  way  shall  I 
steer?”  When  the  procession  reached  the  custom  house,  it 
found  “a  flag  representing  a  terrapin ;  his  head  in  most  digni¬ 
fied  retirement.”  The  piece  de  resistance  was  a  speech 
suited  to  the  times.  “It  zvent  from  the  heart,  it  reached  the 
heart.”  After  such  exertions  in  the  cause  of  Federalism,  it 
is  refreshing  to  learn  that  “These  honest  tars  afterwards 
dined  together  on  Clams.”103 

As  to  whether,  beneath  these  superficial  evidences  of 
discontent,  a  secession  movement  was  actually  under  way, 
opinion  varied.  The  Boston  Independent  Chronicle  (Repub¬ 
lican)  noted  the  existence  of  a  rabid  class  among  the  Feder¬ 
alists  willing  to  go  far  in  identifying  American  and  British 
interests,  even  to  the  extent  of  war  with  France: 

103  The  Connecticut  Courant,  December  28,  1808. 


NEW  ENGLAND  AND  THE  EMBARGO  183 


It  is  thought,  if  they  could  once  connect  this  country  with  Britain 
upon  their  own  terms,  they  would  introduce  monarchy  among  us, 
that  being  evidently  their  favorite  scheme  of  government.  A  por¬ 
tion  of  the  federalists  do  not  act  in  unison  with  the  Junto;  and  there 
actually  exists  at  this  moment  in  the  New  England  States  two 
classes  of  federalists,  as  distinct  in  their  sentiments  as  are  republi¬ 
cans  and  the  followers  of  Mr.  Pickering.104 

J.  B.  Varnum,  an  influential  congressman  from  Massa¬ 
chusetts,  admitted  that  “the  audatious  paragraphs  which 
appear  daily  in  the  public  newspapers ;  the  seditious  Resolu¬ 
tions  of  County  Convention — Essex,  the  Rebellious  Hand¬ 
bills  circulated  in  Newbury-Port ;  and  above  all  the  very 
Extraordinary  Statements  and  principles,  contained  in  the 
Instructions  and  Recommendations,  to  our  Members  in 
Congress,  by  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives,”  all 
lent  color  to  the  fear  of  revolt.  He  contended,  however, 
that  “the  Strong  Arm  of  the  Nation,  would  soon  convince 
the  deluded  projectors  of  their  mistake.”105 

John  Quincy  Adams  was  less  sanguine.  From  his  retire¬ 
ment,  Adams  watched  the  closing  session  of  the  embargo 
Congress  with  keenest  interest.  While  grateful  for  disasters 
averted,109  he  found  in  multiplying  difficulties  a  threat  to 
the  national  morale.  And,  once  the  people  should  fail  to 
sustain  the  embargo,  the  deadly  alternative  of  war  would 
present  itself.  If  undertaken  against  England,  war  would 
precipitate  the  deep  laid  plan,  for  such  it  seemed  to  him, 
of  New  England  to  dissolve  the  Union.107  War  with  France 
would  be  equally  prejudicial.  The  Federalists  would  approve 
the  idea,  but  thwart  its  prosecution.108 

Impossible  as  he  felt  a  retention  of  the  embargo  to  be,109 
when  alternatives  came  up  in  December  for  discussion,  he 

104  The  Independent  Chronicle,  Boston,  July  18,  1808.  Article  on  The 
Essex  Junto. 

105  William  Eustis  Papers,  Library  of  Congress,  J.  B.  Varnum  to  Wil¬ 
liam  Eustis,  December  5,  1808. 

10<’  The  Writings  of  John  Quincy  Adams,  III.  246,  November  15,  1808. 

107  Ibid.,  III.  248-249,  to  Ezekiel  Bacon,  November  17,  1808. 

708  Ibid. 

'"Ibid.,  Ill,  250,  November  17.  1808;  also,  III,  273,  283. 


184  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


warned  against  the  adoption  of  anything  rash.110  What¬ 
ever  change  might  be  adopted  should  allow  an  outward 
vent  for  passions  hitherto  concentrated  upon  themselves.111 
This  being  so,  the  stubborn  resistance  of  Republican  leaders 
to  even  a  hint  of  change  seemed  to  Adams  wretched  oppor¬ 
tunism,112  a  wilful  playing  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy. 
New  England,  which  was  so  well  organized  for  trouble, 
would  fall  a  prey  to  “projectors  of  Disunion,  of  French  war, 
and  of  British  alliance.”113  Adams  had  in  mind  the  Tories 
of  his  day,  and  no  modern  radical,  cataloguing  the  crimes 
of  capital,  could  draft  a  more  ringing  indictment  than  Adams 
of  the  “system”  as  it  worked  in  1808 : 

Consider  [he  tells  Ezekiel  Bacon]  complications  of  the  case : 
Two  or  three  file  leaders  of  disappointed  ambition,  hopeless  of  con¬ 
sequence  under  the  present  national  union  and  building  their  castles 
of  personal  aggrandizement  upon  a  separation  and  a  British  alliance. 
Under  these  file  leaders,  an  organized  concert  of  banks  and  other 
monied  corporations  holding  great  numbers  of  secondary  characters 
in  a  state  of  dependence,  by  a  return  of  discount  days,  and  thus 
commanding  their  inaction,  if  not  their  assistance.  A  legislature 
perfectly  under  their  guidance.  A  state  judiciary,  of  which  you 
must  think  what  I  cannot  say.  A  militia  so  commanded  as  at  least 
not  likely  to  oppose  much  obstacle  to  their  views,  and  a  plan  long 
since  formed  to  seize  the  first  favorable  opportunity  to  divide  the 
State,  and  set  up  a  New  England  confederacy.  What  an  engine  in 
the  hands  of  these  people  is  a  system  of  restriction  which  turns  all 
political  humors  of  your  political  body  inward.114 

Of  Pickering  and  his  followers,  he  goes  on  to  say: 

The  sources  of  their  influence  are  numerous  and  powerful,  and  there 
is  but  one  possible  motive  which  can  deter  them  from  proceeding 
to  the  last  extremities,  in  case  of  war  with  England.  That  motive 
is  fear.  They  are  as  selfish  and  timid  as  riches  can  make  them, 

110  The  Writings  of  John  Quincy  Adams,  III.  257,  December  5,  1808. 

111  Ibid.,  III.  262,  December  8,  1808. 

113  Edmund  Quincy,  Life  of  Josiah  Quincy,  p.  146. 

113  The  Writings  of  John  Quincy  Adams,  III.  273,  December  19,  1808. 
See  also,  III.  279,  “if  a  Measure  is  clearly  for  the  interest  of  the  Nation, 
the  Government  will  reject  it.”  December  27,  1808. 

111  The  Writings  of  John  Quincy  Adams,  III.  278,  December  21,  1808. 
See  also,  III.  263-264;  III.  284-285;  III.  287-288. 


NEW  ENGLAND  AND  THE  EMBARGO  185 


and  in  the  hour  of  danger  will  shrink  from  their  own  doctrines, 
leaving  bolder  and  more  desperate  characters  to  take  their  place.115 

Some  allowance  must  be  made  for  Adams  as  a  political 
storm  centre,  inclined  perhaps  to  exaggerate  the  wickedness 
of  his  foes.  But  his  opinion  is  one  of  the  weightiest  argu¬ 
ments  as  to  the  Essex  conspiracy.  It  is  probable  that  in  her 
theoretical  protest  Massachusetts  went  farther  than  any  other 
state.116  But  Connecticut  came  equally  close  to  decisive 
action.  It  may  be  urged  that  the  state  of  armed  resistance 
in  northern  Vermont  and  on  the  Maine  coast  was  rebellion  in 
essence.  But  the  men  involved  were  in  no  formal  sense 
the  spokesmen  of  their  state.  Their  defiance  of  revenue 
officers  was  nothing  more  than  rioting.  And  rioting,  while 
it  often  features  revolutions,  never  expresses  their  real  sig¬ 
nificance.  Resistance  to  the  extent  implied  in  revolution  or 
secession  presupposes  a  legal  or  at  least  a  quasi-legal  formu¬ 
lation  of  principles.  This  is  what  the  General  Assembly  of 
Connecticut  provided  in  February,  1809.  Its  declaration 
may  well  be  compared  with  the  Virginia  and  Kentucky  Reso¬ 
lutions,  the  chief  previous  land-marks  of  the  secession  move¬ 
ment  in  the  United  States  : 

Connecticut.  General  Assembly,  1809. 

An  address  of  the  General  Assembly,  to  the  People  of  Con¬ 
necticut. 

The  members  of  the  General  Assembly  .  .  .  have  .  .  . 

decided,  that  in  such  a  crisis  of  affairs,  it  is  right,  and  has  become 
the  duty  of  the  legislative  and  executive  authorities  in  the  State,  to 

115  The  Writings  of  John  Quincy  Adants,  III.  285,  December  26,  1808. 

u*  The  high  tide  of  Massachusetts  protest  was  the  "Report  of  a  Com¬ 
mittee  of  the  House  of  Representatives  Respecting  certain  Military 
Orders  issued  by  His  Honor  Levi  Lincoln,  Lieutenant  Governor,  and 
Commander  in  Chief  of  the  Commonwealth  of  Massachusetts  with  the 
Documents  referred  to  in  the  same.”  The  Act  of  January  9,  1809,  was 
declared  “in  many  respects  unjust,  oppressive  and  unconstitutional,  and 
not  legally  binding  on  the  citizens  of  this  State.”  Such  being  the  case, 
Lincoln’s  summons  to  the  militia,  in  violation  of  certain  clauses  of  the 
State  Constitution  was  an  abuse  of  power,  for  “the  militia  cannot  legally 
be  employed  by  the  President  of  the  United  States,  or  by  any  person  em¬ 
powered  by  him,  till  they  have  been  called  forth  in  the  mode  which 
Congress  had  previously  prescribed.”  Report,  p.  7. 


186  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


withold  their  aid,  and  co-operation,  from  the  execution  of  the  act,117 
passed  to  enforce  more  effectually  the  embargo  system.  .  .  . 

While  it  is  the  duty  of  the  Legislature  to  guard  the  sovereignty  of 
the  State,  and  your  rights  from  encroachment,  it  continues  to  be 
your  interest  and  duty,  as  peaceable  citizens,  to  abstain  from  all 
resistance,  against  acts,  which  purport  to  be  laws  of  the  United 
States.  Be  advised  to  seek  none  but  constitutional  relief.  Your 
character,  for  steady  and  firm,  but  peaceable  and  orderly  conduct, 
is  a  sure  pledge,  that  you  will  pursue  this  course . 

We  forbear  to  express  the  imminent  danger,  to  which  we  fear, 
not  only  our  constitutional  rights,  but  those  of  all  the  people  of  the 
United  States,  are  exposed  from  within  and  without.  May  heaven 
avert  the  danger,  and  preserve  to  us,  our  privileges,  civil  and  relig¬ 
ious,  etc.  John  Cotton  Smith,  Speaker  H.  of  R.,  Johnathan  Trum¬ 
bull,  Governor.118 

It  was  to  obtain  redress  and  guarantees  in  a  constitu¬ 
tional  manner  that  the  General  Assembly  in  special  session 
drew  up  the  following  resolutions,  February  23,  1809: 

Resolved,  That  to  preserve  the  Union,  and  support  the  Consti¬ 
tution  of  the  United  States,  it  becomes  the  duty  of  the  legislatures 
of  the  States,  in  such  a  crisis  of  affairs,  vigilantly  to  watch  over 
and  vigorously  to  maintain,  the  powers  not  delegated  to  the  United 
States,  but  reserved  to  the  states  respectively,  or  to  the  people,  and 
that  a  due  regard  to  this  duty,  will  not  permit  this  Assembly  to 
assist,  or  concur  in  giving  effect  to  the  aforesaid  unconstitutional 
act,  passed  to  enforce  the  embargo. 

Resolved,  that  this  Assembly  highly  approve  of  the  Conduct  of 
his  Excellency  the  Governor,  in  declining  to  designate  persons  to 
carry  into  effect,  by  the  aid  of  military  power,  the  act  of  the  United 
States,  enforcing  the  Embargo,  and  that  his  letter  addressed  to  the 
Secretary  for  the  department  of  War,  containing  his  refusal,  to 
make  such  designation,  be  recorded  in  the  public  records  of  this 
State  as  an  example  to  persons,  who  may  hold  places  of  distin¬ 
guished  trust,  in  this  free  and  independent  republic. 

Resolved,  That  persons  holding  executive  offices  under  this  State, 
are  restrained  by  the  duties  which  they  owe  this  State,  from  afford¬ 
ing  any  official  aid  or  cooperation  in  the  execution  of  the  act  afore¬ 
said  :  and  that  his  Excellency  the  Governour  be  requested,  as  com¬ 
mander  in  chief  of  the  military  force  of  this  state,  to  cause  those 
resolutions  to  be  published  in  general  orders ;  And  that  the  secretary 
of  this  state  be  and  he  is  hereby  directed  to  transmit  copies  of  the 
same  to  the  several  sheriffs  and  town  clerks. 

Resolved,  That  his  Excellency  the  Governour,  be  requested  to 
communicate  the  foregoing  resolution  to  the  President  of  the  United 
An  Act  Strengthening  the  enforcement  of  the  Embargo. 

“8  P.  5  of  the  printed  “Address.” 


NEW  ENGLAND  AND  THE  EMBARGO 

States,  with  an  assurance  that  this  Assembly  regret  that  they  are 
thus  obliged  under  a  sense  of  paramount  public  duty,  to  assert  the 
unquestionable  right  of  this  State  to  abstain  from  any  agency  in  the 
execution  of  measures  which  are  unconstitutional  and  despotic. 

Resolved,  That  this  Assembly  accord  in  sentiment  with  the  Sen¬ 
ate  and  House  of  Representatives  of  the  Commonwealth  of  Massa¬ 
chusetts,  that  it  is  expedient  to  effect  certain  alterations  in  the 
Constitution  of  the  United  States ;  and  will  zealously  cooperate  with 
that  Commonwealth  and  any  other  of  the  States,  in  all  legal  and 
constitutional  measures  for  procuring  such  amendments  to  the  Con¬ 
stitution  of  the  United  States  as  shall  be  judged  necessary  to  ob¬ 
tain  more  effectual  protection  and  defense  for  commerce ;  and  to 
give  to  the  commercial  states  their  fair  and  just  consideration  in  the 
union,  and  for  affording  permanent  security,  as  well  as  present 
relief,  from  the  oppressive  measures  under  which  they  now  suffer. 

Resolved,  That  his  Excellency  the  Governour  be  requested  to 
transmit  copies  of  the  foregoing  resolution  to  the  President  of  the 
Senate,  and  Speaker  of  the  House  of  Representatives  in  the  Com¬ 
monwealth  of  Massachusetts,  and  to  the  legislatures  of  such  of  our 
sister  States,  as  manifest  a  disposition  to  concur,  in  restoring  to 
commerce  its  former  activity,  and  preventing  the  repetition  of 
measures  which  have  a  tendency,  not  only  to  destroy  it,  but  to  dis¬ 
solve  the  union,  which  ought  to  be  inviolate. 

General  Assembly  Special  Session  February  1809 
John  Cotton  Smith 

Speaker  of  the  House  of  Representatives, 

Johnathan  Trumbull 
Governor.119 

While  the  anti-embargo  sentiment  — alrpn^Lz_wp11  rlevel- 
Qped  during  the  summer,  was  thus  gaining  momentum, 
Congress  was  once  more  in  session.  John  Quincy  Adams 
was  absent,  but  most  of  the  prominent  figures  of  the  previ¬ 
ous  session  returned,  besides  several  notable  additions. 
Pickering,  for  one,  came  back  full  of  zeal  against  the  em¬ 
bargo.  He  reiterated  the  old  point  that  the  Orders  in  Coun¬ 
cil  were  unknown  when  the  embargo  was  first  passed120  and 
scored  the  haste  in  its  enactment.121  He  repelled  the  insinu¬ 
ation  that  he  was  under  British  influence,122  though  he  pic- 

118  Special  Session  of  Connecticut  General  Assembly,  Hartford,  Febru¬ 
ary  23,  1809,  pp.  7-8. 

120  Charles  W.  Upham,  The  Life  of  Timothy  Pickering,  IV.  144. 

131  Ibid.,  IV.  145. 

i22Ibid„  IV.  146. 


JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


tured  American  commerce  as  not  seriously  damaged  by  the 
aggressions  of  either  Great  Britain  or  France.123 

As  he  and  his  friends  gained  headway,  Pickering  ridi¬ 
culed  the  government  plea  for  yet  a  little  longer  trial  of  the 
embargo.  He  pictured  Napoleon  striding  like  a  colossus 
through  Spain.  “.  .  .  If  heaven  permits  this  sad  catas¬ 
trophe  .  .  .  what  then?  Are  we  to  join  his  arms; 
and  by  conquering  Canada  and  Nova  Scotia — prepare  those 
countries  with  our  power  for  a  new  master?  and  hasten  the 
glorious  period  when  to  the  lofty  titles  of  Emperor  of 
France  and  King  of  Italy  and  Protector  of  the  Confedera¬ 
tion  of  the  Rhine  shall  be  added  that  of  Emperor  of  the  Two 
Americas?  That,  Sir,  will  be  the  natural  course  of  things 
if,  as  some  have  wished,  the  British  navy  were  destroyed.”124 
Delay  was,  in  fact,  the  last  thing  he  meant  to  countenance. 
The  “imposture”125  must  be  laid  bare,  and  “the  great  body 
of  the  people”  freed  from  “the  most  miserable  and  mischiev¬ 
ous  delusion.”126  An  ingenuous  admission,  this,  that  some 
Americans  found  the  embargo  not  so  insupportable  after  all. 
If  Pickering  can  open  their  eyes,  he  avows  it  will  be  the 
most  important  service  of  his  forty  years  in  politics.127 
He  defied  the  tongue  of  malice  to  turn  him  from  his 
course.  For  the  accomplishing  of  this  purpose,  he  proposed 
to  gather  materials  for  a  history  of  the  embargo,  which 
should  set  forth  Jefferson  as  the  chief  of  sinners,128  whose 
only  rivals  were  the  insidious  French.129 


123  Charles  W.  Upham,  The  Life  of  Timothy  Pickering,  IV.  146. 

124  Ibid.,  IV.  153,  December  21,  1808. 

126  B.  C.  Steiner,  Life  and  Correspondence  of  James  McHenry,  I.  550. 
Pickering  to  McHenry. 

126  Charles  W.  Upham,  The  Life  of  Timothy  Pickering,  IV.  156,  Janu¬ 
ary  8,  1809. 

121  Ibid. 

128  B.  C.  Steiner,  Life  and  Correspondence  of  James  McHenry,  Picker¬ 
ing  to  J.  Wagner,  I.  551,  January  19,  1809. 

129  Ibid. 


NEW  ENGLAND  AND  THE  EMBARGO  189 


Ideas  like  these  could  be  amplified  ad  libitum  from 
Pickering’s  speeches  before  the  Senate.  But  details  would 
only  confirm  the  portrait  of  a  belated  Puritan,  narrow  but 
resolute,  full  of  his  high  calling  to  lighten  the  darkness  of 
others.  To  this  Puritan  in  politics,  New  England  was  the 
all-in-all.  Salvation  was  for  the  elect  and  chosen,  among 
whom  Jefferson  and  his  wicked  rout  could  claim  no  place. 

In  Joseph  Story,  Massachusetts  sent  a  different  and  a 
saner  type.  It  was  his  first  session,  and  he  took  his  seat 
in  December,  1808,  just  when  the  country  was  stinging  from 
Canning’s  rebuff  to  the  American  appeal  for  mutual  con¬ 
cessions.  At  first  he  shared  the  official  opinion  that  we 
owed  this  slap  “to  the  false  impression  made  upon  the  British 
cabinet  by  our  own  citizens,  their  exaggeration  of  discontent 
in  America  having  strengthened  the  British  will  to  resist.”130 
Further  reports  from  home  soon  convinced  him,  however, 
that  popular  discontent  would  not  be  trifled  with,  and  he 
accepted  non-intercourse  as  an  objectionable  but  necessary 
substitute.  Republican  though  he  was,  Story  felt  that  the 
interest  not  only  of  his  section,  but  of  the  party  demanded 
a  right  about  face.  Personal  conferences  with  Giles,  Nicho¬ 
las,  and  Campbell,131  who  sought  to  hold  him  steadfast  in 
the  faith,  and  examination  of  reports  and  statistics  of  the 
damage  wrought  in  England,  failed  to  convince  him  that 
the  embargo  deserved  a  longer  trial.  He  was  doubtless  clear¬ 
sighted  in  breaking  the  party  leash.132  But  his  defection  was 
the  signal  for  the  collapse  of  embargo  support.  Although 
Story  was  absent  from  Washington  when  the  final  vote  was 
taken,133  to  him  more  than  to  any  other  person,  Jefferson 
attributed  the  abandonment  of  his  pet  measure.134  By  one 

130  Wm.  W.  Story,  Life  and  Letters  of  Joseph  Story,  I.  173,  December 
31,  1808;  also  I.  191,  December  24,  1808. 

131  Ibid.,  I.  185,  187. 

™Ibid.,  I.  184. 

133  Ibid.,  I.  185,  187. 

134  Ibid.,  I.  184-185. 


V190)  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 

of  the  ironies  of  politics,  it  was  reserved  for  a  staunch 
Republican  and  friend  of  the  administration  to  achieve  what 
the  fiery  diatribes  of  Pickering,  Quincy,  and  other  Federal¬ 
ists  had  failed  to  bring  about.  For  this,  Story  was  never 
forgiven  by  the  retiring  President.135  The  rift  thus  created 
rejoiced  their  foes.  Not  even  the  most  dyed-in-the-wool 
Federalist  could  begrudge  anti-embargo  laurels  to  a  Repub¬ 
lican.  Josiah  Quincy,  for  one,  viewed  with  a  fine  compla¬ 
cency  the  “dreadful  distraction  in  the  enemy’s  camp,”136 
but  so  strong  was  the  spell  cast  by  Jefferson  that,  even  with 
victory  in  sight,  his  opponents  could  scarce  trust  their  senses. 
So  Quincy,  writing  to  his  wife  as  late  as  February  third 
on  the  occasion  of  a  skirmish  won,  warns  her  that  “the 
wand  of  that  magician  is  not  broken. — But  I  hope  his  power 
is  drawing  to  an  end  in  this  world.”137  A  few  days  later, 
his  hopes  were  rising.138  But  even  when  victory  finally 
came,  he  failed  to  grasp  its  full  significance.  On  what 
should  have  been  aTlay  of  triumph,  he  complained  of  Jeffer¬ 
son,  that  “His  intrigues  have  prevailed.  Non-Intercourse 
will  be  substituted  for  Embargo.  The  Non-Intercourse  bill 
passed,  81  ayes,  40  nays,  all  the  Federalists  voting  against 
the  bill  except  Taggart  and  Livermore.”139  Thus  New 
England,  in  the  very  act  of  imposing  upon  Jefferson  the 
deepest  humiliation  of  his  career,  failed  to  comprehend  the 
completeness  of  her  conquest.  The  embargo  having  failed, 
non-intercourse  would  be  little  more  than  nominal. 

The  debates  in  Congress  which  led  to  this  result  were 
marked  by  no  special  eloquence  or  novelty  of  principle. 
The  speakers  were  rather  taking  an  inventory  of  where  the 
country  stood  after  a  year  of  embargo.  England,  it  was 

“Wm.  W.  Story,  The  Life  and  Letters  of  Joseph  Story,  I.  187. 

138  Edmund  Quincy,  The  Life  of  Josiah  Quincy,  p.  185. 

137  Ibid.,  p.  185,  February  3,  1809. 

138  Ibid.,  185,  February  8,  1809. 

139  Ibid.,  185,  February  29,  1809. 


NEW  ENGLAND  AND  THE  EMBARGO  191 


argued,  had  demonstrated  her  independence  of  our  markets, 
thanks  partly  to  smuggling  from  Vermont  and  elsewhere. 
She  had,  moreover,  gained  new  fields,  like  those  in  Spain 
and  her  colonies,  the  more  readily  because  of  our  failure 
to  compete.  As  for  ourselves,  misery  was  sufficiently  evident 
in  the  poor  law  statistics  of  Connecticut  and  in  the  political 
somersault  throughout  New  England.  Jefferson  came  in 
for  a  bit  of  fresh  invective.  “In  this  way  our  Chief  Magis¬ 
trate  performs  his  duty.  A  storm  is  approaching;  the  cap¬ 
tain  calls  his  choice  hands  upon  deck;  leaves  the  rudder 
swinging ;  and  sets  the  crew  to  scuffle  about  the  alterna¬ 
tives.”140  Republican  congressmen  fared  no  better  than 
their  leader.  Some  merit  was  conceded  to  the  embargo  as  a 
precautionary  step.  But  its  enforcement  had  violated  the 
dearest  rights  of  security  from  search  and  their  guaranty  in 
the  Fourth  Amendment.  Speakers  were  at  some  pains  to 
clear  New  England  from  the  imputation  of  intended  seces¬ 
sion.  But  the  impotence  of  a  government  which  permitted 
Rhode  Island  militiamen  to  defy  their  own  officers  and 
Massachusetts  citizens  to  substitute  State  for  federal  law 
was  roundly  scored. 

The  final  decision  came  on  February  27,  as  already 
noted,  and  by  a  vote  of  eighty-one  to  forty.  This  line  of 
cleavage  should  have  separated  the  friends  from  the  enemies 
of  the  embargo,  with  New  Englanders  and  their  commercial 
allies  for  ayes  and  only  the  staunchest  henchmen  of  the  retir¬ 
ing  President  for  nays.  But  the  facts  were  less  simple. 
Irreconcilables  from  New  England,  as  well  as  fire-eaters 
from  other  states,  had  fought  the  embargo  too  bitterly  to 
welcome  a  substitute  like  non-intercourse,  which  might 
prove  equally  disastrous. 

Nevertheless,  though  some  New  Englanders  refused  to 
recognize  their  victory,  their  section  had  won  its  case.  And 

M0  Annals  of  Congress,  XIX.  755-763. 


W' 


JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


r:: 


this,  notwithstanding  the  sectional  cleavage  already  typical 
of  American  politics,  had  been  accomplished  rather  by  the 
eneral  breakdown  of  embargo  support  elsewhere  than  by 
any  formal  alliance  with  South  or  West.  The  centrifugal 
influence  of  economic  discontent  broke  up  the  political  cohe¬ 
sion  of  Jefferson’s  machine.  To  New  England  the  case 
seemed  simple.  Ships  idle  and  crews  scattered  sufficed  for 
those  who  refused  to  grapple  with  the  merits  of  a  bad  peace 
or  a  worse  war.  But,  in  addition  to  the  positive  damage 
of  customary  profits  forfeited,  there  was  the  negative  dis¬ 
traction  of  new  opportunities  unseized.  While  New  Eng¬ 
land  merchantmen  were  straining  at  their  hawsers,  Old  Eng¬ 
land’s  fleets  were  courting  trade  from  Spanish  colonies  just 
bursting  their  European  yoke.  And,  in  proportion  as  glow¬ 
ing  prospects  in  South  America  reconciled  England  to  actual 
losses  in  North  America  and  strengthened  her  will  to  ignore 
the  embargo,  by  so  much  did  the  vision  of  an  El  Dorado 
fading  into  mirage  before  a  fleet  which  never  sailed  chafe 
the  very  soul  of  New  England,  sick  of  present  losses  and 
fearful  of  those  to  come. 

Nor  did  the  grieving  merchants  draw  much  consolation 
from  the  field  of  national  honor.  Replying  to  the  argu¬ 
ment  that  the  embargo  spared  us  from  the  humiliation  of  ship 
seizures  and  the  consequent  alternatives  of  war  or  dishonor, 
the  spokesmen  of  New  England  urged  that  the  taint  was 
incurred  by  our  very  refusal  to  trade,  our  surrender  of  the 
ocean  paths  being  a  cringing  submission  to  the  might  of 
lawless  tyrants.  Even  the  merit  of  saving  us  from  war  was 
denied,  because  New  England  traders,  safe  in  any  case  from 
the  casualties  of  war,  were  inclined  to  magnify  their  own 
losses  and  to  minimize  the  cost  of  war  itself. 

In  the  New  England  view,  then,  the  administration  had 
ruined  the  old  commerce,  signed  away  our  birthright  on  the 
sea  at  the  moment  when  the  opening  of  South  America 


NEW  ENGLAND  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


193, 


offered  a  new  avenue  for  expansion,  and  betrayed  the  na¬ 
tional  honor  by  a  surrender  of  fundamental  and  inalienable 
rights  in  preference  to  fighting  for  their  support.  From 
holders  of  these  views,  the  country  would  seem  entitled  to  a 
constructive  program,  fitted  to  the  greatness  of  the  emer¬ 
gency  and  free  from  the  disadvantages  of  a  condition  which 
no  one,  either  in  or  out  of  power,  pretended  to  find  com¬ 
fortable.  If  New  England  had  actually  come  forward  with 
such  a  program,  her  record  for  patriotism  would  be  spared 
a  bar  sinister.  But  the  politicians  preferred  to  gloat  over 
the  trap  which  the  embargo  was  spreading  for  their  foes.  It 
was  easier  to  criticize  than  to  construct.  Let  the  Republi¬ 
cans  find  their  own  way  out. 

In  so  far  as  New  England  Federalists  did  suggest  alter¬ 
natives^  they  were  twoj_a  novel  form  offiaissez  faire  and 
on-intercourse.  The  former  was  a  naive  offer  to  commit  the 
shipping  interests  to  their  own  risks.  Freedom  of  trade 
should  be  restored,  with  the  definite  understanding  that 
losses  and  seizures  should  not  involve  the  government  as 
the  sworn  protector  of  American  life  and  property.  Ship¬ 
owners  were  declared  to  be  capable  of  estimating  their  own 
risks,  and,  on  the  basis  of  individual  responsibility,  it  was 
urged  that,  if  commerce  continued  to  stagnate,  its  decline 
could  no  longer  be  attributed  to  the  government.  On  the 
other  hand,  if  the  situation  warranted  a  resumption  of 
traffic,  it  was  a  shame  to  reject  the  profits.  Moreover,  if 
practical  seamen  lacked  the  wit  to  scan  the  probabilities  of 
international  politics,  those  very  clever  gentlemen,  the  agents 
of  marine  insurance,  were  trusted  to  regulate  the  outflow  of 
shipping  by  means  of  their  control  of  rates.  The  doctrine 
fitted  well  with  current  economic  theory.  It  adapted  the 
laissez  faire  of  the  classical  school,  already  beginning  to 
play  its  great  role  in  England,  to  the  extreme  individualism 
of  a  new  continent,  where  each  shifted  for  himself,  and  of  a 


194  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 

section  and  class  whose  members  attributed  most  of  their 
misfortunes  to  the  operations  of  a  central  government.  It 
utterly  ignored,  however,  the  most  elementary  principle  of 
politics;  namely,  that  it  is  the  first  duty  of  a  government  to 
protect  its  citizens.  It  is  difficult  to  credit  the  sincerity  of 
experienced  politicians  who  could  advocate  a  scheme  so 
ruinous  to  the  interests  of  their  section  and  the  honor  of  the 
country. 

Non-intercourse,  though  at  first  sight  more  plausible, 
was,  when  analysed,  almost  equally  specious  as  a  solution  for 
the  national  embarrassments.  It  pretended  to  face  facts 
squarely.  These  were,  that  Great  Britain  and  France  were 
the  offenders  and  that  it  was  folly  for  us  to  punish  our¬ 
selves  and  the  rest  of  the  world  by  way  of  retaliation.  Cut 
off  trade  with  George  III  and  Napoleon,  and  we  should 
still  have  employment  for  our  seamen,  profits  for  our  traders, 
and  the  credit  of  upholding  our  marine.  Superficially  this 
plan  had  merit.  It  apparently  opened  the  door  to  profit 
and  honor.  But  in  reality  it  abandoned  the  advantages 
of  the  embargo  and  risked  the  menace  of  war  without  afford- 
mg  any  real  compensation.  In  the  first  place,  any  settlement 
which  left  our  merchantmen  free  to  trade  meant  non-inter¬ 
course  only  in  name,  because,  even  if  the  letter  of  the  law 
were  adhered  to,  France  and  Great  Britain  could  secure  their 
full  American  stock  through  neutral  intermediaries.  Thus 
the  coercive  element  of  the  embargo  would  be  wholly  sacri¬ 
ficed.  Its  protective  principle  would  be  jeopardized  by  allow¬ 
ing  our  vessels  to  roam  at  will,  subject  to  the  whim  of 
British  and  French  courts  of  admiralty,  whose  decisions  had 
frequently  been  tested  and  found  biased.  This  carried  with 
it  the  added  danger  of  a  naval  war,  for  which  even  New  Eng¬ 
land  could  not  have  deemed  us  prepared,  since  at  no  time 
did  her  discontent  with  the  embargo  urge  her  to  the  logic 
of  war  as  its  only  real  substitute. 


LEW  ENGLAND  AND  THE  EMBARGO 

rtheless,  when  New  England  found  enough  allies' 
among  the  commercial  and  agricultural  elements  of  the  other 
states  to  overthrow  the  obnoxious  embargo,  non-intercourse 
was  offered  as  the  most  dignified  substitute.  Jefferson  and 
the  embargo  followed  each  other  into  retirement,  each  to 
be  succeeded  by  a  compromise;  the  one  by  a  President  who 
had  signified  in  advance  his  assent  to  a  settlement  agreeable 
to  the  commercial  interests ;  the  other  by  a  law  feeble  in  its 
very  essence  but  preserving  the  outward  _semblance_  of  a 
defiance  toward  the  lion  of  the  sea  and  the  tiger  of  the  land. 

Toward  this  emasculation  of  the  embargo  the  purpose 
of  New  England  had  been  steadfastly  directed.  In  the  pro¬ 
cess,  the  Federalists  had  recovered  three  Republican  states. 
They  had  weakened  the  allegiance  of  New  England  Repub¬ 
licans  to  the  Jeffersonian  machine.  They  had  played  upon 
the  discontent  of  commercial  classes  elsewhere  and  had  capi¬ 
talized  the  resentment  of  agricultural  interests  at  the  sight 
of  successive  crops  piling  up  with  no  market  in  prospect. 
Even  as  the  ejnhaxgo  hit  New  England  hardest  of  all  the 
sections,  by  so  much  was  her  reaction  to  it  the  most  vigor¬ 
ous.  To  New  England,  most  of  all,  belongs  the  credit  or 
the  discredit  of  the^  repeal  of  the  embargo.  The  part  she 
played  has  been  justified  again  and  again.  But  as  long 
as  the  possibility  remains  that  wise  regulations  of  commerce 
may  avert  wars,  so  long  will  the  action  of  New  England 
in  1808  and  1809  lie  open  to  the  charge  of  selfish  section¬ 
alism  and  blind  heedlessness  of  larger  issues.  The  embargo 
was  originally  conceived  as  a  preventive  of  war.  Its  trial, 
to  be  adequate,  demanded  perseverance  through  a  number 
of  years.  This  was  not  granted,  and  upon  New  England 
rests  the  onus  of  a  diplomatic  defeat  which  non-intercourse 
by  no  means  concealed.  The  embargo  was  not  allowed  to 
avert  war.  Non-intercourse  was  incapable~of  doing  it.__Thus, 
in  the  irony  of  events,  her  sponsorship  of  non-intercourse  was 


196  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


to  urge  New  England,  along  with  the  rest  of  the  Union,  in 
the  course  of  a  few  years,  into  the  War  of  1812,  when 
New  England  was  to  learn  that  war  suited  her  even  less 
than  embargo  and  was  to  forfeit  even  the  political  gains  she 
had  won  by  the  embargo’s  defeat. 


CHAPTER  VII 


THE  MIDDLE  STATES  AND  THE  EMBARGO 
Toward  the  embargo,  as  toward  many  other  issues,  the 


The  line  between 


Middle 


approval  and  opposition  was  not  fast  drawn.  Lying  at  the 
heart  of  the  older  Union,  the  Middle  States  had  sympathies 
common  to  both  their  northern  and  their  southern  neigh¬ 
bors,  as  well  as  interests  peculiarly  their  own.  Thus  their 
mercantile  marine  was  a  link  with  New  England,  while  their 
staple  crops  were  a  bond  with  the  South.  At  the  same  time, 
manufacturers  already  possessed  a  foothold  which  made  the 
Middle  States  the  natural  beneficiary  of  the  stimulus  which 
the  embargo  itself  was  to  bring. 

In  respect  to  a  marine  and  to  staple  crops,  New  York 
was  typical  of  the  section.  To  the  extent  of  her  great  ship¬ 
ping  interest,  her  sympathies  lay  naturally  with  New  Eng¬ 
land.  On  her  long  Canadian  boundary,  moreover,  the  natural 
temptations  to  smuggling  were  multiplied  by  British  in¬ 
ducements  to  evade  the  embargo.  In  addition,  she  was  loath 
as  any  southern  state  to  pile  up  successive  crops  against  a 
market  day  which  might  never  come.  But  these  discourage¬ 
ments  were  compensated  by  the  advantage,  first,  of  rescuing 
her  shipping,  and  then,  of  harvesting  such  gains  as  growing 
manufactures  might  offer.  A  strong  party  machine  exercised 
a  steadying  influence,  and  DeWitt  Clinton,  Republican  boss 
of  the  State  of  New  York,  though  not  a  devotee  of  the  Vir¬ 
ginia  dynasty,  was  not  the  man  to  split  his  party  by  an  open 
break  with  the  national  leaders. 

Economic  distress  was,  however,  immediate.  Early  in 
January,  Moss  Kent  wrote  to  his  famous  brother,  Chancellor 
Kent,  from  Champion  in  the  western  part  of  the  state,  that: 


JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 

this  part  of  the  country  begin  to  feel  the  embarrassing  effects  of  the 
embargo.  It  has  destroyed  the  market  for  their  produce,  particularly 
pot  and  pearl  ashes  which  is  their  principal  dependence.  In  case  of 
a  war  with  Great  Britain  I  calculate  on  emigrating  towards  the 
Hudson  as  my  services  will  not,  probably,  be  wanted  in  this  part  of 
l'-4he_  frontier.1 

But  the  same  general  region  of  western  New  York  spon¬ 
sored  the  most  contradictory  declarations  as  to  the  effect  of 
the  embargo.  A  petition  from  Ontario  County,  dated  Octo¬ 
ber  10,  1808,  and  signed  by  1,365  names,  laments  that  “in 
no  branch  of  agricultural  pursuit  do  we  find  our  customary 
profits,”  and  grieves  that  the  bustling  industry  of  a  pioneer 
community  was  giving  place  to  “a  constrained  and  sullen 
inactivity,”  rendered  in  no  way  more  endurable  by  numer¬ 
ous  evidences  of  a  sudden  prosperity  across  the  Canadian 
line.2  Yet,  in  face  of  this  well  considered  statement  of  griev¬ 
ances  in  Ontario,  a  correspondent  of  Jefferson  could  write 
from  the  neighboring  county  of  Niagara  that : 

.  .  .  with  respect  to  the  embargo  little  difference  of  opinion  ex¬ 

ists  in  this  quarter.  With  few  exceptions,  it  is  considered,  both  as 
to  its  origin  and  duration  the  wisest  measure,  which  the  administra¬ 
tion  under  past  and  present  circumstances  could  have  resorted  and 
adhered  to. 

The  more  optimistic  view  prevailed  at  Albany,  for  the 
state  senate,  on  January  31,  1809,  passed  a  resolution  con¬ 
demning  the 

.  .  .  most  unremitted  and  reprehensible  attempts  which  are  mak¬ 

ing  with  uncommon  industry  and  malignity  and  by  every  art  of  mis¬ 
representation  to  enfeeble  and  destroy  the  exertions  of  the  general 
government  in  vindicating  our  national  rights  and  honor  by  endeav¬ 
oring  to  alienate  the  affections  of  the  people  by  opposing  the  author¬ 
ity  of  the  laws  and  by  menacing  a  dismemberment  of  the  Union.3 

The  legislature  declared  itself  “fully  satisfied  that  the  con¬ 
duct  of  the  national  government  has  been  calculated  to  secure 

1  James  Kent  Papers,  Library  of  Congress,  Vol.  III.  Moss  Kent  to 
Chancellor  Kent,  Champion,  New  York,  January  10,  1808. 

2  Petition  of  Ontario  County,  New  York,  to  the  United  States  Con¬ 
gress,  October  10,  1808. 

’Jefferson  Papers,  Library  of  Congress,  January  26,  1809. 


MIDDLE  STATES  AND  THE  EMBARGO  199 


the  resources  to  preserve  the  peace  to  maintain  the  honor  and 
to  promote  the  interests  of  this  country.”4 

Wherever  the  balance  lies  between  these  conflicting  opin¬ 
ions,  and  it  must  be  admitted  that  the  pessimists  had  prob¬ 
ably  the  weight  of  argument,  there  was  at  least  some  com¬ 
pensation  in  an  awakening  of  manufactures.  In  a  season 
when  opponents  of  Jefferson  and  his  policies  could  see  no  ray 
of  cheer,  the  pew  holders  of  St.  George’s  Chapel,  in  New 
York,  were  sufficiently  prosperous  to  install  a  five  thousand 
dollar  organ  built  by  the  Messrs.  Geibs,  of  their  own  city, 
who,  it  may  be  added,  had  “just  completed  a  very  elegant 
and  splendid  organ  which  is  now  erected  at  Salem  in  Dr. 
Barnard’s  house  of  worship.”5  The  clothing  industry  was 
encouraged  by  premiums  on  the  introduction  of  merino 
sheep.6  And  the  raw  products  thus  favored  by  legislative 
bounty  needed  not  to  go  to  Connecticut  for  manufacture  in 
Colonel  Humphreys’  mills,  as  there  was  at  Poughkeepsie  a 
plant,  less  extensive  to  be  sure  than  the  Colonel’s,  which 
manufactured  an  article  of  similar  quality  running  in  value 
to  eight  dollars  a  yard.7  Some  activity  was  manifest  in  the 
iron  mines  of  northern  New  York.8  Similar  progress  was 
noted  in  tin  manufactures,  one  entrepreneur  in  the  latter 
urging  his  claim  to  patronage  on  the  basis  that : 

as  every  citizen,  who  by  his  genius  and  industry,  aids  in  perpetuating 
the  independence  of  his  country,  has  a  claim  on  the  community  for 
their  patronage,  the  subscriber  presumes  that  the  liberality  of  his 
fellow  citizens  will  enable  him  to  persevere  in  his  present  under¬ 
takings.9 

While  the  embargo  was  modifying  the  economic  life  of 
the  people,  the  politicians  were  not  idle.  Jefferson  no  sooner 

4  Jefferson  Papers.  State  of  New  York,  Senate,  January  31,  1808. 

8  The  Repertory  (Boston),  June  17,  1808. 

8  Ontario  Repository,  quoted  by  Federal  Gasette  and  Baltimore  Daily 
Advertiser. 

7  The  Diary  of  Daniel  Mulford.  Poughkeepsie,  September  3,  1808. 

8  The  Repertory  (Boston),  September  27,  1808. 

“The  Public  Advertiser,  New  York,  April  25,  1808. 


200  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


made  known  his  intention  to  retire  into  private  life  than 
the  question  of  succession  stirred  New  Yorkers  into  potential 
opposition  to  the  Virginia  dynasty.  Of  this  movement  Gov¬ 
ernor  Clinton  was  the  natural  leader,10  and  James  Cheetham 
its  chief  spokesman.  But  even  Federalists,  who  would  have 
rejoiced  at  schism,  doubted  its  likelihood,11  for  only  the 
closest  unity  among  New  Yorkers  would  have  withstood  the 
Virginia  machine,  and  unity  was  conspicuously  lacking.  As 
Chancellor  Kent  reminded  his  brother  in  July,  1808:  “The 
news  from  New  York  is  that  the  Democrats  are  all  by  the 
ears.  Cheetham  has  been  publicly  denounced  by  two  ward 
general  meetings  and  DeWitt  Clinton  goes  down  with 
him.”12  The  following  philippic  against  Cheetham  bears 
witness  to  Republican  discord  in  a  manner  leaving  little  to 
the  imagination : 

James  Cheetham.  This  is  the  wretch  who  has  the  unblushing  im¬ 
pudence  to  speak  of  himself  as  a  man  of  character,  of  gentlemanly 
deportment,  &c.  This  same  being,  who  on  the  files  of  his  own 
paper,  stands  recorded  as  an  unprincipled  calumniator,  a  registered 
liar,  libeller  and  assassin  of  private  character. 

From  this  rather  mild  beginning,  the  attack  warms  to  some 
heat,  reminding  the  reader  of  “how  lost,  even  to  the  honors 
of  the  halter  and  the  gibbet,  must  the  man  be,  who  does  not 
stand,  in  the  estimation  of  the  public,  in  point  of  character, 
at  least  upon  a  level  with  James  Cheetham.”13 

But  if  there  were  quarrels  among  the  Republicans,  and 
if  the  Clintons  showed  no  reluctance  to  capitalize  for  their 
own  benefit  the  unpopularity  of  Virginia  measures,  the  party 
nevertheless  retained  sufficient  cohesion  to  preserve  its  local 

10  Wilson  Cary  Nicholas  Papers.  Library  of  Congress.  J.  Nicholas 
to  W.  C.  Nicholas.  Albany,  February,  1808.  “I  think  there  is  little 
doubt  that  the  ruling  party  here  [New  York]  expect  something  to  grow 
out  of  inconveniences  of  the  embargo  favorable  to  them”,  etc. 

u  The  Balance,  Hudson,  New  York,  January  5,  1808. 

“James  Kent  Papers,  Vol.  III.  Chancellor  Kent  to  his  brother. 
Albany,  July  7,  1808. 

13  The  Public  Advertiser,  New  York,  August  6,  1808. 


MIDDLE  STATES  AND  THE  EMBARGO  201 


ascendancy.  The  governor  of  the  state  undertook  personally 
to  refute  the  charge  that  the  embargo  represented  a  sub¬ 
mission  to  French  influence.14  And  the  Republicans  of  the 
county  and  city  of  New  York  adopted  6trong  resolutions  ap¬ 
proving  the  embargo  and  promising  aid  in  its  enforcement.15 
The  New  York  Republicans  united  in  an  appeal  “to  the 
Republicans  of  the  United  States”  to  hold  together  and  de¬ 
clared  their  unbounded  indignation  over  the  tactics  of  the 
opposition,  serving  as  they  did  only  to  increase  the  obstinacy 
of  the  belligerents  and  to  hinder  the  success  of  our  own 
diplomacy.16 

Such  solidarity  as  the  Republicans  were  able  to  maintain 
was  in  face  of  much  discontent  among  the  people,  especially 
the  frontiersmen.  There  were  numerous  violations  of 
the  embargo  and  much  sympathy  for  offenders  along  the 
Canadian  boundary.  But  discontent  was  not  confined  to 
these  informal  outlets,  however  disconcerting.  Anti-embargo 
New  Yorkers  possessed  in  Barent  Gardenier  an  intrepid 
spokesman,  a  veritable  fire-eater.  There  was  in  the  man  a 
certain  nobility  of  character,  well  displayed  in  a  duel  which 
his  rabid  utterances  provoked.  But  in  an  age  when  duelling 
was  rampant,  this  final  test  of  his  convictions  was  less  re¬ 
markable  than  his  very  curious  defense  of  Josiah  Quincy  for 
refusing  to  do  what  he  himself  had  done.  He  shamed  the 
southern  leaders  for  baiting  Quincy  into  a  duel  which  Quin¬ 
cy’s  own  moral  code  and  that  of  Massachusetts  forbade.  In 
the  courage  to  defend  another  for  not  fighting,  Gardenier 
showed  a  finer  spirit  than  in  his  fearlessness  on  the  field  of 
honor.  His  own  qualities,  as  well  as  the  morbid  political 

14  The  Palladium.  Frankfort,  Kentucky,  April  7,  1808. 

15  Ibid.,  October  20,  1808.  This  or  a  similar  demonstration  was  re¬ 
ferred  to  in  Congress  as  proof  of  the  loyalty  of  New  York.  Annals  of 
Congress,  XVIII.  2078. 

16  Ibid.,  October  27,  1808.  Contrast  this,  however,  with  the  petition 
of  Third  Ward,  February  6,  1809,  against  interfering  with  transportation 
of  provisions  and  necessary  supplies.  Annals  of  Congress,  XIX.  1779. 


202  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 

atmosphere  of  the  times,  are  displayed  in  a  speech  which 
ascribed  our  entire  foreign  policy  to  French  influence,  an 
extreme  example  of  the  kind  of  suspicion  that  poisoned  the 
early  political  controversies  of  America.  “It  does  appear 
to  me,  sir,  that  we  are  led  on,  step  by  step,  but  by  an  unseen 
hand.  We  are  urged  forward  by  a  sort  of  spell,  to  the  ruin 
of  our  country.”  When  Gardenier  named  Napoleon’s  as 
the  unseen  hand,  a  tumult  arose,  but  the  speaker  was  allowed 
to  proceed,17  though  not  to  escape  the  consequences  of  his 
zeal.  He  was  challenged  by  George  W.  Campbell,  of  Tenn¬ 
essee,  severely  wounded,  and  for  several  weeks  was  an  in¬ 
valid.  But  he  returned  to  his  seat  in  Congress  with  ideas 
unchanged,  their  expression,  however,  a  bit  less  wild.  He 
talked  thereafter  less  of  foreign  influence  and  more  of  do¬ 
mestic  injuries,  defending  in  particular  the  northern  New 
Yorkers  for  their  traffic  with  Canada.18 

The  chief  effect  of  Gardenier’s  outburst  was  to  eliminate 
him  from  the  reckoning.  His  place  was  to  some  extent 
taken  by  Josiah  Masters,  a  man  of  similar  views  but  less 
impetuous  expression,  who  wished  the  embargo  wholly  re¬ 
moved  before  the  adjournment  of  Congress  in  April.  His 
remedy  for  maritime  troubles  was  to  arm  the  merchant  ves¬ 
sels  and  let  them  give  a  good  account  of  themselves.  A  show 
of  force  on  our  part  would  bring  France  and  Great  Britain 
both  to  their  senses.19 

This  policy  was  not  adopted,  and  when  the  New  York 
delegates  returned  from  the  summer  recess,  they  renewed 
their  attacks  with  a  hostility  which  seems  excessive,  in  view 
of  other  evidences  of  sentiment  in  their  state.  I  Gardenier, 
once  more  in  harness,  declared  that  the  embargo  and  non¬ 
importation  acts  were  tantamount  to  war.20  But  when  it  came 

17  Annals  of  Congress,  XVII.  1652-1656. 

18  Ibid.,  XVIII.  1705-1706. 

18  Ibid.,  XVIII.  2110. 

10  Ibid.,  XIX.  826. 


MIDDLE  STATES  AND  THE  EMBARGO 

to  a  vote  on,  “Resolved,  That  the  United  States  can  not, 
without  a  sacrifice  of  their  rights,  honor,  and  independence, 
submit  to  the  late  edicts  of  Great  Britain  and  France,’’21  he 
and  William  Hoge,  of  Pennsylvania,  were  the  only  nega-_ 
tives  against  one  hundred  and  thirty-six  affirmatives.  ^~Per- 
haps  the  two  were  more  sincere  than  the  one  hundred  and 
thirty-six,  for  many  of  these  warriors  of  the  council  cham¬ 
ber  were  soon  voting  for  a  submission  which  no  disguise 
concealed. 

When  the  administration  asked  Congress  to  put  teeth 
in  the  embargo  which  would  render  evasion  more  difficult 
and  dangerous,  Josiah  Masters  commandeered  a  vengeance, 
“which  will  hurl  you  down  into  that  detestable  and  abomin¬ 
able  place  where  the  worm  never  dies  and  the  fire  is  not 
quenched.”22  He  credited  the  executive  with  good  inten¬ 
tions  at  best,  but  not  with  wisdom,  called  the  embargo  and 
non-intercourse  paper  threats,  and  even  insinuated,  but  with  a 
caution  inspired  by  Gardenier’s  recent  experience,  that  Amer¬ 
ica  was  a  tool  of  France.23  His  caution  was  perhaps  need¬ 
less,  for  opposition  to  the  embargo  in  December,  1808,  and 
January,  1809,  was  less  dangerous  than  once  it  had  been. 
The  heresy  of  one  year  had  become  the  orthodoxy  of  the 
next,  and  Gardenier  himself  was  less  of  an  outlaw.  His  was 
at  best,  however,  a  negative  and  destructive  genius.  For 
constructive  statesmanship  he  seems  to  have  shared  the 
general  aversion  among  Federalists  at  this  period,  but  he 
liked  to  ferret  out  weak  points  in  the  government’s  position. 
When  sentiment  finally  veered  toward  a  repeal  of  the  em¬ 
bargo  and  the  substitution  for  it  of  non-intercourse  with 
Great  Britain  and  France  only,  Gardenier  ridiculed  a  policy 
which  rendered  shipping  precarious  and  then  released  the 

21  Annals  of  Congress,  XIX.  853. 

*  Ibid.,  XIX.  938. 

22  Ibid.,  XIX.  991-993. 

21  Ibid.,  XIX.  1262-126 3.  January  31,  1809. 


204  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 

ships.24  On  this  point  he  carried  with  him  but  two  dele¬ 
gates  from  New  York.  The  remaining  thirteen  voted  with 
the  majority  in  Congress  for  a  submission  which  should 
preserve  at  least  the  semblance  of  dignity. 

Less  important  than  New  York  in  every  way,  New  Jersey 
pteok  a  less  conspicuous  position  on  the  embargo.  But  the 
two  states  had  one  very  striking  resemblance  in  the  fact  that 
while  both  remained  true  to  their  essential  Republicanism 
“'and  both  upheld  the  state  and  national  tickets  of  their  party, 
each  found  its  most  eloquent  spokesman  in  the  party  of  the 
opposition.  New  Jersey’s  decision  in  the  presidential  elec¬ 
tion  was  correctly  forecast  early  in  the  summer,  when  a 
good  Republican  of  Trenton  asserted  that: 

our  political  prospect  is,  in  this  State  as  favorable  as  at  any  past 
period.  The  Republicans  to  a  man,  and  many  federalists,  approve 
the  embargo,  and  the  correspondent  measures.  On  the  subject  of 
the  presidential  election,  there  is  no  division  of  sentiment  in  the 
Republican  party ;  all  are  decidedly  for  Madison.25 

But  a  letter  in  October  announcing  the  victory  admits  that 
the  contest  was  not  easy : 

I  have  just  time  to  inform  you,  for  the  gratification  of  the  Whigs 
of  New  York,  and  the  dismay  of  the  Tories,  that  REPUBLICAN¬ 
ISM  has  completely  triumphed  in  New  Jersey,  and  that  in  both 
branches  of  the  legislature,  there  will  be  a  democratic  majority. 
The  Tories  made  a  dreadful  struggle,  and  we  had  to  combat  all  the 
federal  lawyers,  British  pensioners  and  agents ;  but  thank  God,  the 
Whigs  were  as  ready  to  oppose  them  now  as  in  the  American 
revolution. 

Of  fifty-three  members  in  the  legislature,  the  Whigs  secured 
a  majority  of  seven.26 

Much  of  the  local  color  in  the  campaign  which  led  to 
this  result  is  imbedded  in  some  rather  spirited  doggerel, 
which  originally  graced  the  pages  of  the  Trenton  True 
American : 

“The  Universal  Gazette,  Washington,  D.  C.,  July  14,  1808.  Extract 
of  a  letter  dated  Trenton,  New  Jersey. 

26  The  Public  Advertiser,  New  York,  October  18,  1808.  To  the  Edi¬ 
tors,  Newark,  October  18,  1808. 


MIDDLE  STATES  AND  THE  EMBARGO  205 


THE  EMBARGO 

There’s  knaves  and  fools,  and  dupes  and  tools, 
Debas’d  enough  to  argue, 

That  every  ill  the  people  feel, 

Is  owing  to  The  Embargo. 

Does  some  loose  tongue,  like  a  clapper  hung, 
Delight  in  constant  dinging, 

The  Embargo  well  supplies  the  bell 
Against  which  to  be  ringing. 

Do  party  men  incline  to  pen 
A  false  and  foolish  farr’go, 

No  other  themes  so  fruitful  seem 
As  “Jefferson’s  d - d  Embargo.” 

To  pelf  and  power  would  villains  soar, 

Mid  uproar  and  confusion; 

With  hearts  well  pleas’d,  the  Embargo  seiz’d 
To  work  the  dire  delusion. 

Should  Hessian  fly  our  wheat  destroy, 

Or  granaries  crawl  with  weevil, 

The  Embargo’s  curst  in  language  worst, 

As  source  of  all  the  evil. 

Does  wind  or  wave  or  watery  grave 
Consign  ship  crew  and  cargo, 

’Tis  chance  but  some  in  visage  grum, 

Ascribe  it  to  the  Embargo. 

Does  cold  or  heat,  or  drought  or  wet, 

Work  hay  or  harvest’s  ruin 
’Tis  made  appear  as  noon-day  clear, 

’Tis  all  the  Embargo’s  doing. 

Or  should  our  crops  exceed  our  hopes, 

Right  round  about  they  dare  go, 

And  in  a  trice,  the  lessen’d  price 
Is  charged  upon  the  Embargo. 

Should  boat  or  ship  lose  tide  or  trip 
By  gale,  or  ice,  or  freshet, 

The  Embargo  ’tis,  puts  all  amiss, 

And  merrily  they  curse  it. 

Do  vermin  bold  on  trees  lay  hold, 

And  make  their  limbs  quite  bare  go, 

’Tis  ten  to  one  the  mischief  done 
Is  saddled  on  the  Embargo. 


206  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 

Has  drunken  swab  or  idle  drab, 

Become  forlorn  and  needy, 

Both  he  and  she  will  find  a  plea, 

“Embargo,”  always  ready. 

Is  buck  or  blade  bankrupt  in  trade, 

By  sloth  or  vice  or  folly. 

He’s  not  to  blame — the  fault  and  shame 
Rests  on  the  Embargo  wholly. 

Does  some  vile  knave,  his  cash  to  save, 

Pay  all  his  debts  with  paper ; 

“The  Embargo  laws”  are  made  the  cause, 

And  loud  he’d  rant  and  vapor. 

But  though  such  knaves  and  fools  and  slaves 
Paint  it  a  frightful  scare-crow, 

The  good  and  wise  their  arts  despise, 

And  cling  to  the  Embargo. 

They  know  it  keeps  from  pirate’s  grips, 

Our  vessels,  crews  and  cargoes; 

Which  were  they  lost,  would  much  more  cost 
Than  half  a  score  Embargoes. 

They  know  that  this  most  punishes 
The  nations  that  oppress  us ; 

While  it  involves  our  injur’d  selves 
In  least  and  few’st  distresses. 

They  know  that  that  would  cost  us  more 
Monthly  than  this  does  yearly; 

While  every  blow  some  blood  must  flow 
From  kin  or  friends  lov’d  dearly. 

Then  let  who  will,  to  work  our  ill, 

Against  it  lie  and  argue; 

Columbia’s  sons,  in  loudest  tones 

Will  laud  THE  WISE  EMBARGO. 

— “Jersey  Blue.”2,1 

The  jaded  Muse  may  well  have  winced  at  verses  such  as 
these.  But  when  sung,  as  recommended,  to  “Yankee 
Doodle,”  “Moggy  Lawder,”  or  the  “Vicar  of  Bray,”  they 

27  The  Independent  Chronicle.  Boston,  October  27,  1808.  Quoting 
from  the  Trenton  True  American. 


MIDDLE  STATES  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


no  doubt  aided  the  chorus  to  fight  the  good  fight  and  keep 
the  faith.  The  more  solid  opinion  of  New  Jersey  found  its 
expression  in  the  debates  of  Congress.  In  James  Sloan, 
the  state  was  represented  by  a  man  of  wit;  in  Henry  South¬ 
ard,  by  a  man  of  sense.  Sloan’s  first  sally  upon  the  embargo 
question  was  in  reply  to  Key,  of  Maryland.  Key  had  been 
pouring  forth  at  endless  length  a  most  lugubrious  picture 
of  the  sad  fate  of  his  constituents.  Sloan  reduced  it  to  an 
epigram:  “I  discovered  only  this  solid  argument  in  all  he 
said:  that  the  constituents  of  some  gentlemen  have  power 
to  evade  the  law,  while  his  have  not.”28 

Sloan  took  a  higher  flight  when  he  attempted  an  allegory 
along  the  lines  of  Josiah  Quincy’s  famous  parable  of  the 
young  man  and  the  birds  of  paradise.  Sloan’s  dramatis 
personae  were  an  orchard  and  some  pruners,  Congress  being 
the  latter ;  the  country,  the  former : 

Suppose  I  employ  a  man  a  number  of  days  to  regulate  my  orchard, 
do  I  authorize  him  to  cut  it  down  ?  Certainly  not.  There  is  a  power 
given  to  commissioners  of  this  city  to  regulate  the  markets ;  have 
they,  therefore,  a  right  to  prohibit  them  ?  I  contend  not ;  they  are 
appointed  to  keep  them  in  order  and  improve  them.29 

Similarly,  Congress  was  created  to  regulate  and  cherish,  not 
to  destroy.  Yet  the  embargo  was  proving  the  great  ; 


destroyer.  And,  though  Sloan  voted  for  it  twice,  he  could 
not  stomach  its  third  and  revised  version.30 

Once  converted  to  the  opposition,  Sloan  advanced  into 
the  enemy  lines  and  tackled  the  general  himself.  Jefferson, 
in  his  long  career,  had  written  much  which  he  doubtless 
believed  at  the  time,  but  which  could  hardly  be  expected  to 
fit  all  occasions.  When  Sloan  dragged  forth  the  Notes  on 
Virginia,  written  in  the  eighteenth  century,  to  show  that 

28  Annals  of  Congress,  XVIII.  2126. 

29  Ibid.,  XIX.  572-573. 

20  Ibid.,  XIX.  573. 


JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


Jefferson  ought  to  be  acting  on  its  principles  in  the  nine¬ 
teenth,31  his  method  was  clever,  but  hardly  fair. 

With  much  less  pretense  of  rhetoric,  but  more  of  optim¬ 
ism  and  constructive  thinking,  Southard  called  attention  to 
the  good  which  the  embargo  had  already  accomplished,  to 
the  infant  industries  it  had  established,  now  “rapidly  pro¬ 
gressing  to  perfection,”  and  to  the  probability  that  it  would 
have  accomplished  its  whole  purpose  in  six  months  if  the 
American  people  had  given  it  loyal  support.  But  this  they 
had  withheld,  and,  in  Southard’s  judgment,  it  would  not 
pay  to  prolong  the  experiment.  He  even  preferred  March 
to  June  as  the  date  for  its  repeal.32  It  was  men  like  South¬ 
ard,  friends  of  the  embargo,  not  its  enemies,  who  finally 
sealed  its  doom. 

Among  the  Middle  States, ^E)eHware  was  the  most  hostile 
embargo .  There  was,  of  course,  within  the  state  a 
Republican  faction,  and  “a  very  numerous  and  respectable 
Meeting  of  the  Democratic-Republican  Citizens  of  New 
Castle  County”  drew  up,  as  late  as  September  3,  1808,  reso¬ 
lutions  highly  laudatory  of  the  embargo.33  The  faithful  at 
Wilmington  even  went  so  far,  in  February,  1809,  as  to  as¬ 
sure  Thomas  Jefferson  that: 

had  such  honorable  generous  principles  [as  theirs]  universally  pre¬ 
dominated  the  shackles  imposed  upon  our  commerce  would  before 
this,  we  believe,  have  been  removed,  and  peace  and  prosperity  would 
again  have  resumed  their  sway  over  our  country.34 

Testimony  such  as  this  is  offset,  however,  by  an  em¬ 
phatic  denunciation  of  the  embargo,  signed  by  four  hundred 
and  fifty-six  citizens  of  Smyrna  and  its  vicinity,  prepared 
after  the  law  had  been  in  effect  over  a  year,  as  well  as  by 
the  more  significant  fact  that  the  entire  delegation  from 

31  Annals  of  Congress,  XIX.  928.  December  27,  1808. 

33  Ibid.,  XIX.  1307-1308. 

33  Broadsides.  Library  of  Congress,  Vol.  8. 

34  Jefferson  Papers.  Wilmington,  Delaware,  February  2,  1809. 


MIDDLE  STATES  AND  THE  EMBARGO  [209 


Delaware  consistently  opposed  the  embargo  in  Congress.35 
Senator  White  opposed  the  passage  of  the  law.36  His 
colleague,  Bayard,  joined  him  in  opposing  the  various  amend¬ 
ments  designed  to  render  it  effective.37  And,  in  the  House, 
Van  Dyke,  the  sole  delegate  from  Delaware,  was  too  hostile 
to  any  sort  of  restriction  even  to  vote  for  the  act  which 
repealed  the  embargo.  Delaware  was  a  commercial  center 
and  a  stronghold  of  Federalism.  She  could  not  anticipate 
the  boom  in  manufactures  which  was  to  compensate  her 
neighbor,  Pennsylvania,  for  present  sufferings,  but  she  did 
realize  that  the  embargo  was  a  god-send  to  Federalism, 
which  had  been  perishing  for  a  real  issue  with  the  Republi¬ 
cans.  Delaware  was  the  little  man  with  the  one  idea.  Penn¬ 
sylvania  was  too  rich  and  varied  to  be  so  confined. 

Even  as  the  Middle  States  were  the  pivot  for  the  entire 
seaboard,  so  their  own  keystone  was  the  State  of  Pennsyl¬ 
vania.  As  the  Middle  States  decided,  so  went  the  Union. 
Theirs  was  the  balance  of  power  between  North  and  South. 
The  balance  within  the  balance  belonged  to  Pennsylvania, 
and  at  the  heart  of  Pennsylvania  lay  the  decisive  influence 
of  Philadelphia,  The  conflict  of  sentiment  in  that  city 
offers,  therefore,  an  important  clew  to  the  sources  of  na¬ 
tional  action  throughout  the  period  of  the  embargo. 

In  so  far  as  Philadelphia  was  rich  and  commercial,  a 
proper  nursery  for  Federalists,  her  merchants  were  necea>*- 
sarilv  hostile  to  the  embargo.  "  Their  petitions  against  its 
enforcement  proving  unavailing,  they  shared  in  the  general 
stagnation  of  trade ;  and,  save  as  they  were  individually  able 
to  recoup  their  fortunes  by  ventures  outside  their  usual 
field,  they  and  all  the  seamen  whom  they  employed  felt  the 
pinch  of  the  times. 

36  Jefferson  Papers.  Petition  from  Smyrna,  Delaware. 

38  Annals  of  Congress,  XVIII.  51.  For  hostile  speeches  by  him,  see 
also  ibid.,  XIX.  55,  59. 

"  Ibid.,  XVIII.  63. 


210  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 

It  is  not  surprising,  therefore,  that  Philadelphians  were 
among  the  first  to  seek  a  loophole  for  evading  the  new  legis¬ 
lation.  Undaunted  by  their  former  experience  with  Con¬ 
gress,  they  now  came  forward  with  a  second  petition,  this 
time  for  a  grant  of  clearance  papers  to  those  vessels  already 
in  cargo  when  the  embargo  act  was  published.38  To  grant 
this  would  have  liberated  from  three  to  four  hundred  vessels 
in  the  various  ports  of  the  country,  in  contravention  of  the 
entire  purpose  of  the  act,  and  Congress,  after  but  slight 
debate,  tabled  this  petition  also  by  the  decisive  vote  of  ninety- 
one  to  sixteen.39 

These  two  experiences  with  Congress  practically  ended 
direct  action  on  the  part  of  the  merchants.  They  did,  how¬ 
ever,  make  one  further  protest,  this  time  not  against  the 
embargo  itself,  but  against  an  exception  to  it,  permitted  by 
the  President  in  his  executive  capacity.  A  certain  Chinese, 
who  claimed  to  be  a  great  mandarin  of  Canton,  by  imposing 
upon  the  credulity  or  the  internationalism  of  the  President, 
had  obtained  permission  to  proceed  in  a  vessel  to  Canton, 
and  there  to  load  a  return  cargo.  This  was  too  much  for 
plain  American  citizens  who  had  no  flowing  robes  and  pea¬ 
cock  feathers  wherewith  to  unlock  the  gates  of  commerce, 
and  a  group  of  Philadelphia  merchants  wrote  to  Albert 
Gallatin,  the  secretary  of  the  treasury,  their  opinion  of  the 
transaction.  They  assured  the  secretary,  in  the  first  place, 
that  men  of  mandarin  rank  never  emigrated  from  the  Celes¬ 
tial  Empire  and,  in  the  second,  that  several  of  their  own 
number  had  lived  in  Canton  and  personally  knew  this  soi- 
disant  mandarin  to  be  a  person  of  no  consequence.  “To 
some  of  us  he  is  known  only  as  a  petty  shopkeeper  in  Canton, 
utterly  incapable  of  giving  a  credit;  and  to  the  remainder  he 

“  Annals  of  Congress,  XVIII.  1272. 

39  Ibid.,  XVIII.  1275.  Of  the  approximately  eight  hundred  thousand 
tons  of  American  shipping  in  1808,  Pennsylvania,  i.e.,  Philadelphia,  pos¬ 
sessed  86,723.  Cf.  Richmond  Enquirer,  December  17,  1808. 


MIDDLE  STATES  AND  THE  EMBARGO  211 


is  altogether  unknown ;  which  would  not  be  the  case  were  his 
character  and  standing  in  any  degree  respectable.”  They 
considered  him  an  impostor  and  a  tool  in  the  hands  of  others 
and  allowed  the  government  to  realize  that  it  had  been 
duped.40 

These  formal  communications  from  rich  and  conserva¬ 
tive  merchants  were  not  the  only  anti-embargo  protests  which 
emanated  from  Philadelphia.  Thomas  Leiper,  a  friend  of 
Jefferson,  described  for  the  latter’s  benefit  the  hardships  of 
poor  flatboatmen  under  regulations  compelling  a  bond  of 
$300  a  ton  for  little  sloops  in  the  coastwise  trade ;  $9,000, 
therefore,  for  a  vessel  of  30  tons,  worth  all  told  no  more 
than  $300.  In  the  case  in  point,  the  owner  had  only  a  half 
interest,  and  Leiper  exclaims  : 

Nine  Thousand  Dollars,  is  this  reasonable ,  is  this  just  to  require  a 
man  his  bond  to  follow  his  lawful  business  for  Nine  Thousand  Dol¬ 
lars  who  is  only  worth  One  Hundred  and  Fifty — But  he  must  give 
it  too  for  his  all  is  in  the  Flatt  and  he  most  [Ac]  keep  soul  of  Body 
together  abstracted  from  his  being  able  to  pay  for  his  other  half  of 
his  Flat.41 

On  no  other  class  in  the  community  did  the  embargo 
weigh  more  heavily  than  on  the  officers  of  merchant  ships, 
men  bred  to  the  sea  as  a  profession,  who  could  not  lightly 
turn  to  the  first  new  work  that  offered.  Their  complaint 
is  full  of  pathos.  In  terms  the  most  respectful,  they  urge 
Jefferson  to  keep  their  situation  near  his  heart,  “that  means 
may  be  had  to  prevent  our  Families  beging  there  [jz’c] 
subsistance.”  As  for  themselves,  they  declare,  ‘‘We  become 
irksome  to  our  friends;  and  no  means  by  which  we  can  sub¬ 
sist  left  us.”42 

The  common  sailors,  too,  were  wretched  enough,  and  one 
can  not  but  commiserate  them.  In  one  sense,  however,  their 

w  Jefferson  Papers.  To  Albert  Gallatin,  August  10,  1808. 

41  Ibid.  Thomas  Leiper  to  Jefferson.  Philadelphia,  January  27,  1808. 

42 Ibid .  Philadelphia  petition  of  August  10,  1808.  See  also  a  similar 
petition  of  August  8,  1808. 


1 


JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


situation  was  less  serious  than  that  of  their  officers,  because 
they  had  less  to  surrender  in  leaving  the  sea  and  might  have 
been  expected  to  adjust  themselves  with  less  difficulty  to  the 
lot  of  a  laborer  on  land.  Be  that  as  it  may,  their  actual  con- 


on  was  wretched  enough.43 


LShip  owners,  ship  captains,  common  seamen,  and  long- 
remen,  like  the  protege  of  Leiper,  of  necessity  bore  the 
|  full  burden  of  the  embargo.  Yet  their  sufferings  may  be 
"admitted  without  seriously  affecting  the  question  of  Phila¬ 
delphia’s  prosperity  in  1808,  which  would  depend  upon  the 
welfare  of  many  classes,  not  of  one.  That  the  city  was  far 
from  presenting  one  unbroken  front  of  misery  is  plain  from 
the  United  States  Gazette  of  October  8,  1808,  which,  though 
an  opposition  paper  endeavoring  to  make  out  the  worst  pos¬ 
sible  case,  reluctantly  admitted  even  a  certain  degree  of  pros- 
t — -perity.  Said  the  Gazette  : 

The  Embargo  has  as  yet  produced  comparatively  little  inconven¬ 
ience  in  this  city  and  its  neighborhood.  During  the  last  winter,  we 
began  to  suffer  from  the  domiciliary  visits  of  labourers,  in  forma 
pauperis,  who  could  not  find  employment  and  were  obliged  to  beg ; 
but,  generally,  the  stores,  laid  in  by  poor  men  before  the  embargo, 
were  sufficient  “to  keep  want  from  their  doors”  until  the  spring 
opened ;  since  when,  the  unexampled  improvements  in  our  city  have 
given  constant  employment  to  eight  or  ten  thousand  of  them.44 


To  preserve  the  proper  tone  of  opposition  gloom,  the  Gazette 
predicted  a  hard  winter,  as  soon  as  frost  suspended  these 
building  operations.  Meanwhile,  the  fact  would  not  down 
that  Philadelphia  was  in  the  midst  of  a  wholly  unprecedented 
boom. 

A  rather  playful  explanation  of  this  era  of  construc¬ 
tion,  involving  the  building  of  possibly  one  thousand46  new 
houses  at  Philadelphia  alone  in  the  single  year  of  the  em- 

43  Jefferson  Papers.  Thomas  Truman,  of  Philadelphia,  to  Jefferson, 
November  14,  1808. 

44  United  States  Gazette,  Philadelphia,  October  8,  1808. 

44  Annals  of  Congress,  XIX.  100-03. 


MIDDLE  STATES  AND  THE  EMBARGO  213 


bargo,  attributes  it  to  the  prosperity  of  the  Philadelphia  law¬ 
yers.  To  these  virtuous  citizens  the  embargo  brought  a 
blessing  in  disguise.  The  very  act  which  restrained  com¬ 
merce  multiplied  marine  lawsuits,  the  effect  of  which  upon 
the  gentry  of  the  bar  is  humorously  described  by  Horace 
Binney,  one  of  its  own  distinguished  ornaments : 

The  stoppings,  seizures,  takings,  sequestrations,  condemnations, 
all  of  a  novel  kind  unlike  anything  that  had  previously  occurred  in 
the  history  of  maritime  commerce — the  consequence  of  new  prin¬ 
ciples  of  national  law,  introduced  offensively  or  defensively  by  the 
belligerent  powers — gave  an  unparalleled  harvest  to  the  bar  of 
Philadelphia.  No  persons  are  bound  to  speak  better  of  Bonaparte 
than  the  bar  of  this  city.  He  was,  it  is  true,  a  great  buccaneer  and 
the  British  followed  his  example  with  great  spirit  and  fidelity,  but 
what  distinguished  him  and  his  imitators  from  the  pirates  of  former 
days  was  the  felicitous  manner  in  which  he  first,  and  they  after¬ 
wards,  resolved  every  piracy  into  some  principle  of  the  law  of  na¬ 
tions,  newly  discovered  or  made  necessary  by  new  events ;  thus  cov¬ 
ering  or  attempting  to  cover  the  stolen  property  by  the  veil  of  the 
law.  Had  he  stolen  and  called  it  a  theft,  not  a  single  lawsuit  could 
have  grown  out  of  it.  The  under-writers  must  have  paid  and  have 
been  ruined  at  once  and  outright.  But  he  stole  from  neutrals  and 
called  it  lawful  prize;  and  this  led  to  such  a  crop  of  questions  as  no¬ 
body  but  Bonaparte  was  capable  of  sowing  the  seeds  of.  For  while 
he  did  everything  that  was  abominable,  he  always  had  a  reason  for  it, 
and  kept  the  world  of  the  law  inquiring  how  one  of  his  acts  and  his 
reasons  for  it  bore  upon  the  policy  of  insurance,  until  some  new 
event  occurred  to  make  all  that  they  had  previously  settled  of  little 
or  no  application.  In  many  instances  the  insurance  companies  got 
off ;  in  others,  though  they  failed,  it  was  after  a  protracted  campaign 
in  which,  contrary  to  campaigns  in  general,  they  acquired  strength 
to  bear  their  defeat.  In  the  mean  time,  both  in  victory  and  defeat, 
and  very  much  the  same  in  both  events,  the  lawyers  had  their  re¬ 
ward.46 

It  is  hardly  necessary  to  remark  that,  although  Philadel¬ 
phia  lawyers  were  reaping  a  harvest  that  has  made  their 
name  a  byword  for  shrewdness  and  success,  this  could  not 
represent  a  net  gain  to  the  community.  The  real  expansion 
of  Philadelphia  lay  in  industrial  enterprise,  and  progress  in 
this  direction  appears  to  have  more  than  compensated  for 
commercial  losses. 

“  Charles  Chauncey  Binney,  Life  of  Horace  Binney,  pp.  60-61. 


/'"N 

(^m)  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 

In  the  very  nature  of  things,  the  embargo  proved  a  stim¬ 
ulus  to  manufactures,  and  nowhere  was  this  stimulus  more 
•  promptly  felt  than  in  Philadelphia.  Manufactures  were  of 
course  not  unknown  before  1808,  but  in  that  year  they  as¬ 
sumed  an  altogether  fresh  variety  and  significance.  The 
Philadelphia  Price  Current  devoted  to  them  an  article  which 
produced  a  local  sensation,  and  which  the  editor  at  once  for¬ 
warded  to  Jefferson  “to  prove  that  by  the  Presidents  origi¬ 
nating  partial  deprivations,  he  had  ultimately  bestowed  on 
his  country  immense  and  imperishable  benefits.”47 

The  inclosure,  which  must  have  given  keenest  satisfac¬ 
tion  to  the  harassed  Jefferson,  is  here  quoted  in  full  notwith¬ 
standing  its  length,  as  proof  conclusive  of  the  manufactur¬ 
ing  impetus  of  the  period : 


AMERICAN  MANUFACTURES 
The  following  new  American  Manufactures,  we  quote  with 
pleasure,  as  an  evidence  of  public  spirit,  and  a  sure  pressage  of 
future  prosperity  and  independence. 

Floor  Cloth  Carpets  of  any  size  with  or 


without  border  per  sq.  yard 

$2.25 

The  same  with  three  colours 

2.00 

Manufactured 

The  same  with  two  colours 

1.75 

by 

The  same  with  one  colour 

The  patterns  are  in  great  variety  and  the 

1.50 

John  Dorsey 

colours  bright,  hard  and  durable. 

Cotton  Bagging,  per  yd.  50  cts  Apply  to  Maclure  &  Robertsons. 
Printed  Calicoes  (war’d  fast  colours) 
pr  yd. 

4—4 - 25  a 


Shawls  assorted 


Bed  spreads 


9— 8  per  shawl 

4— 4  do. 

5— 6  do.  50  a 

10- 4 


$1. 


20c 

27 

21 

32 

58 


Manufactured 

by 

John  Thoburn 
&  Co. 


EARTHEN  WARE 

Yellow — Tea  Pots,  Coffee  Pots  and  Sugar 
Boxes  per  doz.  $3. 

Assorted  Ware  per  doz.  $1.25 

Red — Tea  Pots,  Coffee  Pots  and  Sugar 
Boxes  per  doz.  $2.50 


Manufactured 

by 

Binney  & 
Ronaldson. 


"Jefferson  Papers.  Editor  of  the  Philadelphia  Price  Current  to 
Jefferson,  November  7,  1808. 


MIDDLE  STATES  AND  THE  EMBARGO  215 


GLASS 

WARE 

Green  hlf  gall.  Bottles  per  doz 

$2. 

Do.  quart  Do 

do 

1 

Green  hf.  gall.  Jars. 

do 

2 

Manufactured 

Do.  quarts  Do 

do 

1. 

by 

White  hlf.  gall.  Jars 

do 

7.50 

T.  Harrison 

Do.  quart  Do 

do 

3.75 

&  Co. 

Green  Pocket  Bottles 

do 

80 

Glass  per  pound 

do 

50 

Windsor  Soap  per  lb. 

35 

Manufactured 

Fancy  do.  per  dozen 

$2  a  3. 

by  W.  Lehman, 

Sealing  Wax  per  lb. 

50  cts.  $3 

W.  Smith  &  Son. 

White  Lead  per  cwt. 

$17  a  18 

Manufactured 

Red  Lead  do 

15 

by  Dr.  Joseph 

Litharge  do 

15 

Strong. 

This  extensive 

Shot  B  B  B  la  12  cwt 

$11. 

Manufactory 

Do.  S  G  G  and  Buck 

13 

(Paul  Beck’s) 

Bar  Lead 

10.50 

goes  into  opera- 

tion  this  day. 

Manufactured  by 

Shot  B  B  B  10  per  cwt 

$12. 

Bishop  &  Sparks. 

Do.  Goose  and  Buck 

10.50 

Bar  Lead 

Floor  Cloths  per  square  yard 

$1.75 

Apply  at  Domes- 

Do.  do  do 

2  a  2.25 

tic  Manufactory. 

Cotton  Flannel  per  yard 

47 

Acet.  Distillat . 

...gall 

$  60 

Acid  Muriatic . 

. lb 

Aq.  Fortis  dup . 

45 

Alcohol  . 

. gall 

2. 

Aq.  Amon  c  Cale . 

. lb 

20 

- — - -c  Tart . 

22 

Calomel  Crud . 

1.90 

- Ppt  . 

.  2.10 

Camphor  Refin . 

Ether  Vitriol . 

.  1.75 

Liq.  Anod.  Min.  Hoff..., 

. 75 

Lunar  Caustic . 

. oz.  1.50 

Merc.  Corros.  Sublim..., 

.  1.50 

Ol.  Vitriol  . 

. 15 

Sp.  Nitri  Dulc . 

.  34 

— Vitrirol  Dulc  . 

.  75 

— Salis.  Volat.  Arom . 

.  75 

— Nitri  Fortis . 

— Vinos.  Rect.  G.  P.  Proof . 

. gall.  1.50 

— Turpentine  . 

.  40 

Patent  Green  . 

. lb  67 

216  1  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


Vermilion  . lb  1.50 

Tartar  Emetic  .  lb  1 

Vitriol  Roman  . .  25 

Varnish  Bright  . gall 


Manufactories  of  various  other  articles  are  in  operation,  and  sev¬ 
eral  rapidly  progressing;  we  could  not,  however,  for  the  present 
number  ascertain  with  precision  the  just  denomination  of  articles  or 
their  quotation,  but  shall  soon  increase  our  paper  so  as  to  embody 
them  in  the  general  prices  of  Domestic  Articles,  and  for  that  pur¬ 
pose  invite  communications ,48 

It  will  have  been  noticed  that  white  lead  receives  men¬ 
tion  in  this  Price  Current  of  November,  1808.  Yet,  three 
months  later,  in  February,  1809,  William  Dalzell  of  Phila¬ 
delphia,  apparently  ignorant  of  the  output  of  Doctor  Strong, 
sent  Jefferson  “a  sample  of  I  believe  the  first  White  Lead 
ever  manufactured  in  the  U.  States.”  He  -com  pi  irrigated 
the_Bxesident  on  the  wisdom  of  thejembargo  as  the  measure 
which  was  making  possible  the  industrial  growth  on  every 
hand,  arid  concluded  with  a  fervent  hope  that  Congress  would 
adopt  the  one  means  which  could  insure  permanence  to  these 
.infant  industries,  namely  a  protective  tariff.49 

Curiously  enough,  neither  Dalzell  nor  the  Price  Current 
speaks  of  the  heavier  manufactures  depending  upon  iron  and 
steel.  But  an  advertisement  in  Duane’s  paper,  the  Aurora, 
supplies  the  missing  evidence : 

AMERICAN  MANUFACTURES 

The  acting  committee  of  the  society  of  Iron-mongers,  of  the  city 
of  Philadelphia,  give  notice,  that  agreeable  to  a  resolution  of  the 
society,  they  will  receive  proposals  for  manufacturing  any  of  the 
following  articles,  to  wit : 

Cast  WAGGON  BOXES,  neatly  ground  inside. 

Cast  SAD  IRONS,  made  agreeable  to  the  Dale  co.  patterns,  and 
neatly  ground  to  the  face  and  edges. 

FRYING  PANS  with  long  handles. 

PLAIN  IRONS,  Socket  and  Firmer  CHIZELS  and  GOUGES, 
Carpenters  ADZES,  FILES,  RASPS,  STEELYARDS  and 
HOES. 

“Hope’s  Philadelphia  Price  Current  and  Commercial  Record  in  Jef¬ 
ferson  Papers. 

“Jefferson  Papers.  Wm.  Dalzell  to  Jefferson,  Philadelphia,  Febru¬ 
ary  10,  1809. 


MIDDLE  STATES  AND  THE  EMBARGO  217 


The  proposals  must  be  in  writing,  stating  the  probable  quantity 
that  can  be  furnished  within  a  stated  period  with  their  price,  deliv¬ 
ered  in  this  city,  and  in  all  cases  to  be  accompanied  with  samples. 
Application  to  be  made  to  either  of  the  subscribers.50 

The  wording  of  this  advertisement  is  obscure,  it  must 
be  granted,  casting  some  doubts  as  to  whether  the  articles 
were  to  be  manufactured  in  Philadelphia  or  elsewhere.  It 
is  clear,  however,  that  a  society  of  ironmongers  existed,  and 
the  presumption  is  strongly  in  favor  of  their  being  in  active 
business. 

From  time  to  time,  the  Aurora  contained  other  adver¬ 
tisements  bearing  witness  to  still  greater  diversity  in  Phila¬ 
delphia  manufactures.  Thus  machines  for  repairing  wea¬ 
vers’  reeds,51  felting  superior  to  the  imported,52  satinets, 
muslinets,  cotton  stripes,  bed  tickings,53  Germantown  stock¬ 
ings,  socks,  and  gloves,  fleecy  hosiery,  and  cotton  and  woolen 
yarns,54  all  contributed  to  American  self-sufficiency,  and  to 
the  enrichment  of  their  entrepreneurs. 

It  is  thus  apparent  that  Philadelphia  prosperity  in  1808 
was  not  a  mere  shifting  of  wealth  from  merchants  to  their 
lawyers,  but  a  genuine  progress,  resting  on  an  active  and 
diversified  industrial  basis.  As  Charles  Jared  Ingersoll 
summarized  it : 

Who  that  walks  the  streets  of  Philadelphia,  and  sees,  notwith¬ 
standing  a  twelve  months  stagnation  of  trade,  several  hundred  sub¬ 
stantial  and  elegant  houses  building,  and  the  labouring  community 
employed  at  good  wages,  who  reads  at  every  corner  advertisements 
for  workmen  for  factories  of  glass,  of  shot,  of  arms,  of  hosiery 
and  coarse  cloths,  of  pottery  and  many  other  goods  and  wares;  who 
finds  that  within  the  last  year  rents  have  risen  one-third,  and  that 
houses  are  hardly  to  be  had  at  these  prices ;  that  land  is  worth,  as 
Mr.  Brougham  observes,  much  more  than  it  is  in  Middlesex ;  in  a 
word,  who  perceives,  wherever  he  goes,  the  bustle  of  industry  and 

"  Aurora,  Philadelphia,  March  21,  1808. 

51  Ibid.,  April  14,  1808. 

“  Ibid.,  June  3,  1808. 

63  Ibid.,  October  18,  1808. 

M  Ibid.,  November  2,  1808. 


218  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 

the  smile  of  content;  who,  under  such  circumstances,  that  is  not  too 
stupid  to  perceive,  and  too  prejudiced  to  believe  when  he  does  per¬ 
ceive,  can  doubt  the  solid  capital  of  this  country?55 

Nicholas  Biddle  also,  though  he  has  less  to  say  about  the 
embargo  and  its  effects  than  one  would  expect  from  so  im¬ 
portant  a  man  of  affairs,  confirms  Ingersoll’s  estimate  of 
Philadelphia  prosperity.  Writing  to  a  friend  in  Paris,  he 
says : 

You  would  scarcely  recognize  Philadelphia,  so  much  has  it 
grown  and  improved.  Among  your  former  acquaintances,  Cad- 
walader  is  always  here  and  prospering.  His  wife  has  just  presented 
him  with  a  third  child.  Chauncey  is  making  a  fine  fortune,  and 
surely  no  one  deserves  it  more  than  he.  As  for  politics,  our  actual 
position  is  not  the  most  agreeable.  The  embargo  presses  heavily 
on  the  people,  but  it  has  been  put  in  execution  without  difficulty, 
and  as  the  people  is  very  sane,  the  session  of  Congress  soon  to  meet 
will  be  peaceably  awaited.  In  spite  of  this  the  embargo  appears  to 
have  wrought  some  change  in  New  England,  where  the  elections 
have  terminated  in  favor  of  the  Federalists.  There  is  even  an  ap¬ 
pearance  .  .  .  that  the  Government  of  the  United  States  will 

pass  once  more  into  the  control  of  the  Federalist  Party,  or  at  least 
that  the  embargo  will  be  raised  before  very  long.  In  all  these  mat¬ 
ters  I  do  not  mingle.  After  my  long  absence,  it  is  impossible  to 
become  a  very  zealous  partisan,  and  I  am,  occupying  myself  with 
my  profession.56 

Interesting  testimony  this,  as  to  the  possibility  of  living 
in  1808  without  worrying  over  the  embargo,  its  wisdom,  or 
its  consequences,  although  no  Philadelphian  could  quite  ig¬ 
nore  the  prosperity  his  own  city  was  harvesting. 

If  confirmation  of  these  estimates  of  Ingersoll  and  Biddle 
is  needed,  it  is  to  be  found  in  a  communication  of  William 
Short,  a  friend  of  Jefferson,  to  the  President.  Short  pos¬ 
sessed  a  handsome  fortune  and,  like  Biddle,  would  have  seen 
little  to  recommend  in  the  embargo  had  it  proved  as  ruinous 
as  its  enemies  alleged.  He  wrote  : 

“  Charles  Jared  Ingersoll,  A  View  of  the  Rights  and  Wrongs,  Power 
and  Policy  of  the  United  States  of  America  (1808),  p.  49. 

M  Nicholas  Biddle  Papers.  Library  of  Congress.  I.  1775-1809.  Nich¬ 
olas  Biddle  to  Mr.  J.  M.  de  la  Grange,  September  26,  1808. 


MIDDLE  STATES  AND  THE  EMBARGO  219 


And  this  City  [Philadelphia]  has  really  acted  as  the  government 
could  wish  on  the  subject  of  the  embargo — I  speak  of  those  who  are 
considered  as  of  opposition  politics  &  who  are  numerous — They 
frequently  &  publicly  speak  their  determination  to  support  it,  &  if 
on  a  jury  to  punish  with  rigor  the  violators  of  it.  I  have  more  than 
once  heard  it  affirmed  &  not  contradicted,  that  if  the  merchants  of 
this  City  were  assembled;  confined  to  Federalists  alone,  nine  out  of 
ten  would  approve  the  embargo,  &  of  the  Tenth  disapproving,  most 
of  them  would  be  men  without  capital.57 

But  the  best  test  of  the  economic  situation,  better  than 
the  enthusiasm  of  Ingersoll  and  Short  or  the  contentment 
of  Biddle,  was  the  state  of  political  parties  in  1808.  Eco¬ 
nomics  and  politics  are  so  interrelated  that  if  commercial 
stagnation  had  proved  ruinous  to  any  considerable  propor¬ 
tion  of  the  citizens,  popular  discontent  would  have  registered 
itself  in  the  overthrow  of  the  Republican  machine.  Nothing 
of  the  sort  occurred.  The  state  legislature  passed  a  resolu¬ 
tion  most  reassuring  to  Federal  authorities.58  And,  although 
the  campaign  for  the  Governorship  in  1808  was  warmly 
fought,  the  Federalists  thinking  that  they  had  even  made  in¬ 
roads  upon  the  Irish  vote,59  which  already  by  tradition 
belonged  to  the  Republicans,  nevertheless  the  final  victory 
for  Snyder  and  the  party  of  Jefferson  was  decisive,  the 
Republican  majority  being  “immense,”  to  use  the  language 
of  an  enthusiastic  contemporary.60  As  one  of  the  Presi¬ 
dent’s  correspondents  in  Philadelphia  stated  it : 

A  stranger  from  reading  our  antirepublican  newspapers,  might  have 
anticipated  a  different  issue,  but  we  are  sound  to  the  core.  We 
believe  the  General  Government  has,  by  its  measures,  consulted  our 
true  interests,  and  we  wished  in  the  day  of  election  to  express  that 
sentiment  in  the  strongest  possible  terms.62 

In  Congress,  the  Pennsylvania  delegation  was  not  wholly 
united,  ^-©ne- of  its  members,  William  Hoge,  was  irrecon- 

61  Jefferson  Papers.  William  Short  to  Jefferson,  August  27,  1808. 

68  American  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  III.  294,  295. 

United  States  Gazette,  October  8,  1808. 

"°  The  Palladium,  Frankfort,  Kentucky,  November  3,  1808. 

“  Jefferson  Papers.  Elijah  Griffith  to  Jefferson.  Philadelphia,  Novem¬ 
ber  14,  1808. 


220  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 

cilable,  being  the  only  one  in  December,  1808,  to  vote  with 
Barent  Gardenier  of  New  York  for  a  frank  submission  to 
the  edicts  of  Great  Britain  and  France.62  But  his  colleague, 
Smilie,  who  led  the  pro-administration  forces  of  the 
state,  made  in  the  early  debates  a  strong  speech  on  be¬ 
half  of  the  embargo63  and  consistently  maintained  his 
position.64  The  Pennsylvania  record  varied  only  slightly 
between  the  eleven  to  five  with  two  not  voting,  for  the 
original  embargo  act  of  December  18,  1807, 65  and  the  ten 
to  six  with  two  not  voting,  for  the  non-intercourse  act,  which 
succeeded  it  on  February  27,  1809. 

Whatever  the  temptation  to  oppose  the  embargo,  con¬ 
gressmen,  at  least  from  Philadelphia,  were  not  allowed  to 
forget  the  favor  it  enjoyed  among  the  people  back  home. 
As  some  staunch  defenders  of  the  administration  expressed 
it: 

We  behold  in  a  temporary  suspension  of  our  commerce  an  eph¬ 
emeral  &  doubtful  evil,  producing  a  great,  a  growing  &  a  lasting 
good.  We  see  arising  out  of  this  cause  the  prolific  sources  of  our 
internal  wealth  explored  &  with  industry  &  ability  directed  thro’ 
channels,  which  while  they  benefit  the  enterprising,  enrich  our  coun¬ 
try  with  solid  wealth  &  make  her  more  independent  &  happy.66 

When,  in  January,  1809,  the  friends  of  embargo  were  called 
for  a  last  rally  in  its  defence  for  the  passage  of  amendments 
which  would  make  its  operation  iron-clad,  Philadelphians, 
at  least  the  numerous  element  among  them  whom  a  share 
in  the  industrial  prosperity  previously  alluded  to  served  to 
strengthen  in  their  fidelity  to  party,  lent  their  fullest  measure 
of  support. 

In  Philadelphia,  it  may  be  admitted,  the  ruin  of  powerful 
commercial  interests  brought  a  real  and  somewhat  wide- 

®  Annals  of  Congress,  XIX.  853. 

93  Ibid.,  XVIII.  1710. 

“Ibid.,  XIX.  574. 

65  Journal  of  the  House  of  Representatives,  VI.  320-321. 

"Jefferson  Papers.  “Delegates  of  the  Democratic  Republicans  of 
the  City  of  Philadelphia”  to  Jefferson,  March  1,  1808. 


MIDDLE  STATES  AND  THE  EMBARGO  221 


spread  distress.  But  there  much  more  than  in  many 
other  localities  subject  to  similar  commercial  losses,  men 
found  compensation,  and  frequently  much  more  than  com¬ 
pensation,  in  the  development  of  large-scale  industrialism. 
On  this  basis  was  reared  the  superstructure  of  building 
operations  which  made  Philadelphia  the  wonder  of  the 
times  and  at  least  one  great  commercial  center  to  which 
Jefferson  could  point  for  the  vindication  of  his  system. 
A  prosperity  in  which  so  many  types  of  citizens  parti¬ 
cipated  encouraged  political  constancy  and  served  to  hold 
in  the  Republican  household  of  faith  a  state  whose  de¬ 
fection  would  have  been  peculiarly  embarrassing  at  a  time 
when  Federalism  was  regaining  so  much  lost  ground  in  New 
England. 

Conditions  in  Maryland  bore  some  striking  resemblances 
to  those  in  Pennsylvania,  though  in  the  aggregate  they  were 
probably  less  favorable.  As  in  Pennsylvania,  the  impetus 
given  to  manufactures  was  marked.  At  the  very  outset,  a 
committee  headed  by  William  Patterson,  of  Baltimore,  in¬ 
vited  all  persons  who  possessed  any  knowledge  of  cotton 
or  woolen  manufactures  to  aid  in  turning  this  to  practical 
account.67  A  considerable  demand  arose  for  shares  in  a 
company  projected  for  the  purpose.68  The  zeal  for  manu¬ 
factures  extended  to  shoes.69  Wool  carding  also  came  into 
its  own,70  and  foundations  were  laid  for  extensive 
enterprise. 

How  the  commercial  community  of  Maryland  responded 
to  the  embargo  is  illustrated  by  two  letters  of  William  Pat¬ 
terson,  written  a  little  more  than  six  months  apart,  to  Wilson 

67 Republican  Watch  Tower.  New  York,  January  8,  1808.  From 
Baltimore,  January  2. 

68  The  Independent  Chronicle.  Boston,  February  25,  1808. 

60  The  Baltimore  Evening  Post,  May  7,  1808. 

70  Federal  Gazette  and  Baltimore  Daily  Advertiser,  August  24,  1808. 
Inserted  August  12,  1808. 


222  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


Cary  Nicholas,  a  Virginia  delegate  in  Congress.  In  May  he 
declared  that : 

.  .  .  every  thinking  man  in  the  community  be  him  [.we]  Repub¬ 

lican  or  Federalist  sees  and  knows  the  propriety  and  necessity  of 
the  embargo,  yet  all  will  not  give  it  their  support  and  many  will  try 
to  mislead  the  ignorant  in  order  to  give  ground  to  the  Federal  party, 
it  is  very  desirable  that  it  should  be  continued  until  the  powers  at 
war  shall  feel  the  necessity  of  changing  their  conduct  towards  us, 
but  I  have  my  doubts  and  fears  that  the  people  of  this  country  have 
not  sufficient  virtue  and  perseverance  to  wait  this  event — all  the 
vessels  belonging  to  my  House  have  completed  their  voyage  and 
are  now  in  port  to  the  number  of  twelve  in  all,  most  of  the  vessels 
in  the  East  India  trade  have  returned  so  that  there  is  now  very 
little  American  property  at  sea.71 

It  thus  appears  that  by  May,  1808,  Patterson  and  the 
great  merchants  of  his  class  had  already  experienced  what¬ 
ever  benefits  the  embargo  had  to  offer.  What  followed  was 
chiefly  its  burdens.  These  drew  from  Patterson  in  Decem¬ 
ber  the  complaint  that  “it  is  every  day  becoming  more 
and  more  unpopular  and  if  continued  will  bring  about  a 
revolution  in  the  government  and  perhaps  a  Civil  War,  at 
any  rate  it  must  throw  the  government  into  the  hands  of 
the  Federalists.”72  For  an  influential  Republican  writing 
to  one  of  his  own  party  in  Congress,  Patterson  makes  the 
rather  astonishing  admission  that  “circumstanced  as  we  are 
it  is  vain  to  talk  of  national  honor  for  that  has  been  sacri¬ 
ficed  in  too  many  instances  already  and  it  is  now  too  late 
to  regain  it.  Unanimity  and  the  safety  of  the  country  are 
now  the  great  object  to  be  considered.”73 

Severe  as  this  indictment  appears,  it  is  nevertheless  the 
judgment  of  a  friend.  The  real  virus  of  mercantile  opinion 
found  vent  in  personal  flings  at  Jefferson,74  while  extreme 

71  W.  C.  Nicholas  Papers.  Wm,  Patterson  to  W.  C.  Nicholas,  May 
11,  1808. 

n  Ibid.  Same  to  same.  December  1,  1808. 

73  Ibid. 

74  The  North  American  and  Mercantile  Daily  Advertiser.  Baltimore,. 
June  6,  1808.  Quoting  Jackson’s  Marine  Register  for  June  3rd  in  a 


MIDDLE  STATES  AND  THE  EMBARG 


Federalists  in  Baltimore  went  even  so  far  as  to  rejoice  at 
threatening  secession  in  New  England.  The  following  “com¬ 
munication”  to  a  Baltimore  newspaper  indicates  at  least  an 
attempt  to  feel  out  the  position  of  Maryland  Federalists  on 
such  a  contingency : 


The  political  intelligence  from  the  great  Atlantic  States,  if  it 
do  not  warrant  an  entire  confidence  that  the  golden  principles  of 
FEDERALISM  have  revived  in  full  vigor  and  health,  at  least  in¬ 
structs  us  that  the  fatal  Embargo  law  threatens  fearful  ruin  to  the 
tottering  cause  of  democracy.  The  good  and  powerful  portion  of 
the  people  are  prepared  constitutionally  to  rise  up  in  their  strength 
against  the  destructive  policy  of  our  rulers.  Let  democracy,  and 
her  treacherous  hand-maid,  French  Influence  stand  aghast,  brood¬ 
ing  over  their  own  iniquities.  The  guilty  may  escape  retributive 
vengeance  for  a  while,  but  Justice  will  overtake  them  yet.  Though 
majestic  in  her  mien,  and  bold  in  her  approach,  she  will  steal  anon 
upon  her  trembling  victim,  and  point  with  peculiar  emphasis  at  the 
faithless  friends  of  their  country.75 

But  the  most  formidable  expression  of  revolt  was  the 
declaration  of  the  Baltimore  Federal  Republican  concerning 
“Mr.  Giles’s  Bill,”  in  which  the  doctrines  of  the  Virginia  res¬ 
olution  were  invoked  to  show  that  by  exercising  powers  never 
delegated  by  the  states,  the  federal  government  had  dis¬ 
solved  the  civil  compact.  The  Giles  Bill  was  a  force  bill,  ac¬ 
cording  to  the  Republican,  and  the  government  would  do 
well  to  refnember  that  “a  law  which  is  to  be  enforced  at  the 
point  of  the  bayonet  will  bring  on  a  struggle  which  may  ter¬ 
minate  in  the  overthrow  of  the  government.  Our  rulers  are 
answerable  for  the  issue.”76 


Maryland  representatives  in  Congress  were  more  sensi¬ 


tive  to  the  commercial  disadvantages  of  the  embargo  than  to 
its  manufacturing  advantages.  This  was  the  more  natural 

comment  upon  the  failure  of  a  single  ship  that  day  to  enter  or  leave 
New  York,  Philadelphia,  or  Baltimore.  “We  shall  be  consoled,  however, 
for  all  this  temporal  privation,  by  lectures  on  the  ‘Revolt  of  Nations 
From  the  Empire  of  Morality’  by  a  PHILOSOPHER  who  has  not  vio¬ 
lated  more  than  one-half  of  the  Decalogue.” 

75  Ibid.,  May  16,  1808. 

76  The  Connecticut  Courant.  January  18,  1809.  Quoting  from  the 
Baltimore  Federal  Republican. 


224  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


among  men  who,  living  outside  of  their  state,  could  not  wit¬ 
ness  in  person  the  awakening  in  cotton,  woolen,  and  other 
manufactures ;  while  commercially  they  were  well  aware  that 
Maryland  was  in  a  situation  to  bear  the  full  brunt  of  the 
embargo.  For  unrestricted  commerce  her  location  was  ad¬ 
vantageous,  but  when  the  embargo  sealed  her  front  door, 
she  had  no  back  door  for  escape.  Northern  New  England 
and  New  York  had  a  Canadian  outlet.  Trans- Alleghany  and 
the  far  South  touched  the  Mississippi  and  Florida,  with  their 
lucrative  possibilities  for  smuggling.  It  was  quite  otherwise 
with  Maryland,  and  her  isolation  moved  her  to  self-pity.77 
Perhaps,  though,  a  hundred  per  cent,  administration  would 
have  left  no  loop-hole  for  the  one  hundred  thousand  barrels 
of  flour,  which  John  Randolph  declared  with  gusto  were 
smuggled  out  of  Baltimore.78 

The  argument  for  uniformity  would  have  gained  in  dig¬ 
nity  if  clothed  in  an  appeal  for  uniform  self-sacrifice  and 
patriotism.  But  Key  reduced  it  to  an  absurdity  by  basing 
his  opposition  to  the  embargo  on  the  inability  of  his  consti¬ 
tuents  to  evade  it.79  Like  Josiah  Quincy,  Key  was  an  advo¬ 
cate  of  laissez-faire.  He  would  allow  the  merchants  to 
manage  their  own  business,  trusting  them  to  impose  a  volun¬ 
tary  embargo  whenever  risks  outran  profits.  If  the  mer¬ 
chants  themselves  were  not  clever  enough  to  determine  this, 
the  insurance  companies  would  do  it  for  them.  “I  would, 
therefore,  confide  to  them  the  commerce  of  our  country  in 
the  exportation  of  our  produce,  unshackled  by  an  embargo 
law.”80  He  anticipated  events  by  a  year  when,  in  despair  of 
justice  from  either  France  or  England,  he  recommended 

"  Annals  of  Congress,  XVIII.  1706.  Philip  B.  Key:  “Our  laws  should 
be  uniform;  at  present  large  portions  of  our  country  have  an  outlet  for 
commerce  and  the  embargo  law  operates  as  a  bounty  to  that  part  of  the 
community  at  the  expense  of  the  remainder.” 

™Ibid.,  XVIII.  2239. 

78  Ibid .,  XVIII.  2119. 

80  Ibid.,  XVIII.  2122. 


MIDDLE  STATES  AND  THE  EMBARGO  225 


commerce  only  with  the  rest  of  the  world.81  But,  with  a 
curious  inconsistency,  though  he  declared  war  to  be  prefer¬ 
able  to  embargo,  he  refused  his  vote  to  the  act  enabling 
Jefferson  during  the  summer  recess  of  Congress  to  suspend 
the  operation  of  the  embargo,  subject  to  certain  contingen¬ 
cies.  “I  cannot  consent,”  said  Key,  “that  the  destinies  of  my 
country,  that  its  laws  shall  be  suspended  on  the  will  of  any 
individual,  however  preeminent  in  virtue,  dignified  in  station, 
or  covered  with  the  mantle  of  public  opinion.  The  more  his 
merit,  the  greater  the  danger.”82 

When  Congress  reconvened,  Maryland  spoke  with  more 
than  one  voice.  S.  Smith  took  the  cheerful  view  that  Liver¬ 
pool  would  soon  be  clamoring  for  saner  counsels  in  Britain. 

On  our  side,  he  declared  that  border  smuggling  was  less  ex¬ 
tensive  than  it  was  rumored  to  be.  Altogether,  he  bade  the 
Senate  be  of  good  heart.83  Key,  however,  continued  in  the 
voice  of  lamentation.  Picturing  the  entire  Union  in  a  com¬ 
petition  of  suffering,  he  demanded  the  prize  for  Maryland. 

In  this  he  represented  commercial  sentiment,  for  in  Mary¬ 
land,  unlike  Pennsylvania,  commerce  cast  the  deciding  vote 
as  against  manufactures,  which,  however  promising,  were 
still  immature.  And  that  vote,  whether  expressed  in  the  cor¬ 
respondence  of  William  Patterson  or  the  furious  diatribes  of 
the  Federalist  press,  became  increasingly  hostile  to  the 
embargo. 

In  reaching  this  point  of  view,  Maryland  was  in  harmony 
with  her  sisters.  With  distinct  individual  differences  as  to 
the  incidence  of  the  embargo,  the  states  of  the  Middle  group  \ 
shared  in  varying  degree  the  stimulus  to  manufactures  and 
the  demoralization  of  commerce  imposed  by  the  times.  J 
Collectively,  the  burden  of  their  experience  impelled  them  to 
vote  out  the  embargo — and  to  vote  in  its  emasculated  sub- 

81  Annals  of  Congress,  XVIII.  2123. 

83  Ibid.,  XVIII.  2124-2125. 

63  Ibid.,  XIX.  147,  150,  159. 


— .  s 


JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 

stitute  of  non-intercourse  with  Great  Britain  and  France.  In 
vain  did  friends  of  the  embargo  point  to  its  deadly  effect 


upon  Great  Britain.84  In  vain  were  smugglers  and  traitors 
held  up  to  the  execration  of  their  fellow  citizens.85  Public 
opinion,  which  had  sustained  the  embargo  in  its  initial  stages 
and  upheld  it  with  tolerable  firmness  through  nine  months 
of  increasing  pressure,  even  to  the  enforcing  act  of  January, 
1809,  finally  succumbed.  As  the  embargo  grew  more  intoler¬ 
able  and  its  success  appeared  less  certain,  the  pendulum 
swung  from  rigid  government  control  to  extreme  individual 
freedom,  and  the  readiest  means  was  sought  for  restoring 
our  commerce  without  too  blatant  a  confession  of  defeat. 

This  drift  in  opinion  the  Middle  States  shared  with  their 
neighbors,  and  in  the  vote  of  February  27,  1809,  which 
finally  overthrew  the  embargo  and  replaced  it  by  a  non-inter¬ 
course  act,  the  Middle  States  cast  the  following  ballot:  New 
York,  13  to  3  and  1  not  voting;  New  Jersey,  5  to  0;  Dela¬ 
ware,  0  to  1 ;  Pennsylvania,  10  to  6  with  2  not  voting ;  Mary- 
-Jand,  7  to  1.  Ohio  cast  her  single  vote  in  the  negative.86 

The  Middle  States  thus  spoke  decisively.  Theirs  was  the 
balance  of  power.  Without  their  suffrance,  the  embargo 
could  not  endure.  One  may  regret,  but  not  condemn  their 
decision.  The  embargo  was  a  sublime  experiment  carried  out 
under  impossible  conditions.  A  stronger  nationalism  was 
needed  if  the  country  was  to  give  the  unanimous  support  es¬ 
sential  to  success.  In  Congress  itself  a  different  type  of 
statesmanship  was  required  from  that  which  passed  current 
in  1809.  The  practical  politician  governed  then  as  now  and 
made  sad  work  of  it.  Yet,  in  so  far  as  the  nation  did  uphold 
it,  the  embargo  pointed  toward  a  brighter  world  where  wars 
should  be  no  more.  Viewed  as  a  commercial  device  for  res¬ 
cuing  shipping  and  humbling  a  foe,  the  embargo  was  sordid 


81  The  Palladium.  Frankfort,  Kentucky,  October  27,  1808. 

85  Ibid.,  August  18,  1808.  Quoting  the  National  Intelligencer. 
88  Annals  of  Congress,  XIX.  1541. 


MIDDLE  STATES  AND  THE  EMBARGO  227 


enough.  Viewed  as  a  substitute  for  war,  it  assumes  the 
dignity  of  one  of  the  most  enlightened  plans  and  consistent 
efforts  ever  directed  toward  world  peace.  But  amid  the 
losses  and  discomforts  of  the  time  it  was  not  easy  to  see  or 
to  keep  the  vision,  and  if  the  Middle  States,  like  their  sisters, 
failed  at  last  to  do  so,  they  deserve  more  credit  for  what  they 
did  than  censure  for  what  they  failed  to  do. 


CHAPTER  VIII 


THE  SOUTH  AND  THE  EMBARGO 

There  remains  to  consider  in  this  survey  of  America 
under  the  embargo  that  section  which  possibly  suffered 
the  most,  but  which  certainly  complained  the  least.  It  was 
at  the  hands  of  her  own  favorite  son  that  the  South  received 
the  well  nigh  fatal  thrust.  Yet  so  confiding  was  she  in  his 
wisdom  and  goodness  that  the  truth  was  slow  in  dawning 
that  the  section  and  its  hero  were  both  sinking  in  a  common 
ruin.  The  wound  was,  in  fact,  so  deep  that  hemorrhage  was 
internal,  and  a  contemporary  observer  would  have  beheld 
more  immediate  destitution  among  the  fishermen  of  New 
England  than  among  the  tobacco  planters  of  the  Eastern 
Shore.  But  for  New  England  the  future  held  in  store  a 
new  prosperity,  whereas  for  the  Old  South  such  benefits 
were  long  deferred. 

Generally  speaking,  the  agricultural  South  suffered  less 
immediate,  but  greater  permanent  loss  from  the  commercial 
restrictions  of  1808  than  did  a  region  so  wholly  given  over 
to  commerce  as  was  New  England.  In  comparison  with  the 
Middle  States,  moreover,  her  opportunities  to  recuperate  by 
manufactures  were  slight,  although  this  was  not  at  first 
realized.  The  South,  then,  suffered  absolutely  as  much  as 
her  neighbors,  and  relatively  more. 

That  the  South  paid  no  mere  lip  service  to  the  politico- 
economic  program  of  her  hero,  Jefferson,  is  apparent  from 
many  sources.  Heavy  losses  were  the  measure  of  devo¬ 
tion.  They  were  felt  at  once.  Before  the  embargo  had 
been  in  effect  two  weeks,  a  Virginian  from  Charlottesville 
wrote  to  a  correspondent  in  Richmond  that : 


THE  SOUTH  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


229 


This  Embargo  will  ruin  this  state  if  it  continues  long,  they  talk  of 
Locking  up  the  Courts  of  Justice,  to  save  the  Country  from  dis- 
truction  (sic),  in  12  hours  after  the  news  of  the  Embargo,  flour 
fell  from  5j4$  to  2y2.  at  this  place,  and  Tobacco  from  5/2  to  3$ 
and  everything  in  proportion,  &  god  only  knows  the  result.1 

Imports  fell  similarly,  a  writer  of  the  same  week  noting  that, 
at  Norfolk,  “Liverpool  salt  which  sold  at  a  Dollar  some  days 
since  may  now  be  hot.  at  85  cents. — Turks  Island  has  also 
declined.”2  The  downward  price  trend  was  general,  and 
the  Charleston  Courier  derived  a  truly  Federalist  satisfac¬ 
tion  from  the  situation: 

What  the  effects  of  this  act  will  be  abroad  we  are  to  learn  here¬ 
after,  but  those  which  it  is  producing  at  home  we  begin  to  feel,  and 
pretty  sharply  Rice,  which  some  weeks  since  sold  briskly  at  5 
dolls.  50  cents  is  now  nominally  worth  but  1  dollar  75  cents;  Black 
seed  Cotton  has  fallen  from  34  cents  to  22  a  25  and  no  sale,  and 
Corn  is  down  to  56  cents. 

The  North  Carolina  price  current  says  Flour  is  down  to  2  dolls. 
25  cents  the  barrel,  and  Tobacco  to  2  dolls.  56  cents  the  cwt.  In 
Maryland  it  has  occasioned  a  resolution  being  offered  for  closing 
the  courts  of  that  State.  Such  is  the  beginning  of  the  Embargo 
measure,  but  what  will  be  the  end?3 

North  Carolina,  even  more  dependent  upon  exports  than 
her  neighbors  north  and  south,  felt  the  pinch  acutely.  A 
table  of  prices  at  which  her  leading  products  sold  in  May 
sufficiently  explains  her  predicament : 

Blessed  effects  of  the  Embargo.  The  sacrifices  which  are  now 
making  of  property  upon  executions  are  dreadful.  The  following 
rate  given  me  during  my  attendance  upon  Bladen  Court,  by  gentle¬ 
men  of  undoubted  veracity,  who  were  eye-witnesses,  will  convey 
some  idea  of  it. 

White  oak  h  hd.  staves-per  M.  3  dollars  33  cents.  Uniform 
price  before  the  Embargo  25  to  30  dollars. 

Rice  per  bushel,  19  cents — before  the  embargo,  1  dollar. 

A  moderately  good  horSe,  3  dollars  50  cents. 

‘The  William  Taylor  Papers,  Library  of  Congress.  John  Kelly  to 
Wm.  Taylor,  Charlottesville,  January  6,  1808. 

2  W.  C.  Nicholas  Papers,  Library  of  Congress.  Moses  Myers  to  W. 
C.  Nicholas,  Norfolk,  January  3,  1808. 

8  The  Connecticut  Courant,  February  17,  1808,  quoting  from  the 
Charleston  Courier. 


239  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 

Tar  per  barrel  45  cents — before  the  embargo,  from  1  dollar  75 
cts  to  2  dolls. 

50  acres  of  land  lying  on  the  north  east  side  of  the  North  West 
river,  and  bounded  by  the  river,  18  dollars. 

Shingles  per  M  30  cents — before  the  embargo  2  dollars- 

A  cow  and  yearling  11  shillings. 

8  head  of  hogs,  1  dollar  7  cents.4 

Economic  prostration  of  the  sort  just  indicated  underlay 
a  petition  from  Lincoln  County,  North  Carolina,  in  Decem¬ 
ber,  1808,  praying  Congress  to  repeal  the  embargo,  “or  if 
that  should  be  found  to  be  unsafe  or  impolitick  that  you 
should  modify  said  laws  in  such  a  manner  as  to  permit  the 
vessels  of  all  nations  without  partiality  freely  to  trade  and 
Carry  off  our  produce  where  they  please  at  their  own 
risque.  .  .  .”5 

Distress  was  so  general  in  Virginia  that  a  moratorium  on 
debts  was  decided  upon.  Even  before  a  law  was  enacted, 
however,  creditors  were  forced  to  adopt  a  policy  closely 
bordering  upon  it.  Thus  a  citizen  of  Albemarle  County 
wrote  in  January,  1808: 

The  times  are  such  that  I  cannot  think  of  obliging  any  person  to 
sell  produce  at  this  time,  to  pay  me  money —  However  I  think  I 
have  a  right  to  Interest  on  the  money  that  I  ought  now  to  receive.6 

Before  three  months  were  past  action  had  been  taken 
for 

at  the  last  session  of  the  Virginia  assembly  they  revived  the  old 
Replevin  law  in  consequence  of  the  Embargo:  and  if  you  press  a 
law  process  the  Debtor  can  replevy  on  you  for  12  months  unless 
you  will  take  property  at  three-fourths  of  its  value,  which  would 
be  a  bad  Business,  when  we  want  money.7 

More  radical  than  moratorium  or  replevin  was  the  sus¬ 
pension  of  all  legal  process  in  civil  suits : 

4  The  Connecticut  Courant,  May  11,  1808,  quoting  from  the  North 
Carolina  Minerva. 

5  Petition  of  sundry  inhabitants  of  Lincoln  County  in  the  State  of 
North  Carolina,  20th  December,  1808. 

6  W.  C.  Nicholas  Papers.  R.  Lindsay  to  W.  C.  Nicholas,  Albemarle 
County,  January  21,  1808. 

'Wm.  Taylor  Papers.  John  Kelly  to  Wm.  Taylor,  Charlottesville, 
Virginia,  April  15,  1808. 


THE  SOUTH  AND  THE  EMBARGO 

The  accounts  from  the  General  Government  is  alarming — as  also 
this  State  Legislature  [Virginia].  I  am  told  they  are  about  to 
stop  all  proceedings  on  Judgments,  and  the  County  Courts  Since 
the  Embargo,  have  taken  the  liberty  to  make  Laws,  and  not  execute 
those  regularly  made — for  in  nearly  all  counties,  a  set  of  the  mag¬ 
istrates  meet  and  adjourn  the  Court  Immy.  and  will  not  suffer  any 
Business  to  be  done — this  is  alarming  to  Creditors  and  will  in  all 
probability  from  the  delay  of  Justice  lessen  the  Value  of  there 
Claims,  in  some  instances — for  the  Law  of  this  State  between  Deb¬ 
tors  and  Creditors  is  much  in  favr.  of  the  former,  and  this  delay 
of  Justice  gives  them  time  to  inger  [Ac]  the  latter  or  Lessen  the 
Value  of  his  Claim  by  some  fraudulent  act,  which  is  frequently 
practiced.8 

It  is  apparent  to  anyone  who  compares  southern  condi¬ 
tions  such  as  these  with  the  similar  unprosperous  conditions 
in  New  England  that  the  South  bore  a  burden  of  loss  which 
would  have  justified  her  in  recriminations  against  the  gov¬ 
ernment  as  bitter  as  any  which  emanated  from  New  England. 
Yet,  in  their  attitude  toward  the  Administration,  the  two  sec¬ 
tions  were  poles  apart.  On  the  hypothesis  of  purely  econ¬ 
omic  motivation,  their  attitude  should  have  been  almost  iden¬ 
tical.  But  in  New  England  a  large  share  of  the  political 
intelligence  lay  with  the  men  of  the  opposition.  The  “best 
minds”  of  the  South,  on  the  other  hand,  were  by  tradition 
or  by  association  at  the  service  of  the  Virginia  dynasty  and 
its  great  chief,  Jefferson;  and  their  loyalty  was  proof  against 
the  buffets  of  a  world  out  of  joint. 

The  loyalty  of  the  South  as  a  whole  to  Jefferson, 
and  to  a  measure  which  spelled  ruin  to  its  warmest  sup¬ 
porters,  is  really  touching,  though  of  course  it  need  not  be 
supposed  that  either  loyalty  or  losses  were  uniform  through¬ 
out  so  vast  a  region.  In  large  sections  of  the  South,  in  fact, 
hope  and  confidence  were  sustained  in  the  face  of  evident 
loss  and  distress  by  a  belief  that  rising  manufactures  would 
offset  declining  agriculture  and  commerce.  For  the  South 

8  Wm.  Taylor  Papers.  Wm.  Murray  to  Wm.  Taylor,  Fauquier  Court 
House,  January  2,  1809.  See  also  W.  C.  Nicholas  Papers,  Joseph  C. 
Cabell  to  W.  C.  Nicholas,  Richmond,  January  31,  1809. 


:3 


JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


was  not  beyond  the  reach  of  influences  which  marked  the 
year  1808  as  a  distinct  turning  point  in  the  economic  history 
of  the  United  States.  In  the  South,  there  was  less  hostility 
to  manufactures  than  in  New  England,  but,  on  the  other 
hand,  less  progress  than  in  either  New  England  or  the  Middle 
States.  The  South  did  not  at  once  recognize  its  limitations 
as  a  manufacturing  section,  but  entered  upon  an  industrial 
'-^program  with  hopes  not  easily  abandoned.  Just  as  New 
England  was  not  fully  converted  to  a  high  tariff  and  the 
protection  of  industry  at  the  expense  of  commerce  until  the 
tariff  of  1824,  so  the  South  was  almost  equally  belated  in 
recognizing  that  opposition  to  a  tariff  must  be  her  steadfast 
policy  in  view  of  the  hopelessness  of  obtaining  for  herself  the 
peculiar  benefits  which  tariffs  were  seen  to  confer  upon 
manufactures. 

These  early  hopes  were  finally  discovered  to  be  vain,  but 
in  spite  of  the  fact  that  nearly  a  century  was  to  elapse  before 
the  South  became  in  any  true  sense  a  manufacturing  country, 
it  is  of  interest  to  examine  the  basis  upon  which  false  hopes 
were  so  much  earlier  reared.  For  many  Southerners  believed 
firmly  in  1808  that  new  sources  of  prosperity  would  com¬ 
pensate  for  those  which  were  forfeited  by  the  embargo. 
And  every  indication  of  manufacturing  enterprise  was 
heralded  by  the  press  as  a  happy  augury  for  the  South.  The 
Richmond  Enquirer  lost  no  time  in  urging  that : 

Above  all  things,  household  manufactures  are  the  most  profitable 
and  useful  objects  Tor  this  country.  It  was  computed  in  the  year 
1790  that  they  were  worth  at  least  twenty  millions  of  dollars.  If 
so,  they  are  now  worth  thirty-five  millions,  for  our  population  was 
then  four,  and  is  now  seven  millions  of  persons.  Our  women  should 
all  learn  to  spin,  card,  weave,  dye,  and  manufacture,  in  the  various 
modes  for  flax,  hemp,  cotton  and  wool.  We  may  not  have  open 
markets  abroad  for  years,  and  our  planters  will  want  the  aid  of 
our  manufactures  to  keep  up  the  price  of  their  produce,  and  to 
furnish  supplies.9 

*  The  Richmond  Enquirer,  February  26,  1808. 


THE  SOUTH  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


233 


High  hopes  were  entertained  of  a  company  to  be  estab¬ 
lished  at  Petersburg,  Virginia,  with  a  capital  of  fifty  thous¬ 
and  dollars.  A  modern  trust  could  scarcely  aspire  to  a  more 
varied  production  than  was  contemplated  by  this  pioneer 
venture  in  the 

Carding  and  Spinning  of  Cotton  and  Wool;  Fulling,  Weaving  of 
Cotton  Shirtings,  Cambricks,  Dimities,  Ginghams,  Nankeens,  Ker¬ 
seymeres,  Velvets,  Velveteens,  Patent  Cords,  Duroys,  Grandurells, 
Ticking,  Hosieries  and  all  other  articles  of  cotton  and  wool. — And 
also  manufacture  of  Iron  Ware,  such  as  Nails,  Hoes,  Spades, 
Scythes,  &c.  &c.  or  such  of  the  said  enumerated  articles  as  the 
society  shall  from  time  to  time  find  to  be  the  most  productive,  and 
as  the  calls  for  consumption  may  demand.10 

The  suggestion  of  the  Enquirer,  or  more  probably  the 
example  of  Petersburg,  brought  it  about  that  Richmond,  con¬ 
servative  and  commercial,  soon  caught  the  contagion,  for 

By  the  last  advice  from  Richmond,  the  inhabitants  are  about  to 
hold  a  meeting  for  the  laudable  purpose  of  promoting  the  establish¬ 
ment  of  manufactories,  in  imitation  of  Philadelphia,  Baltimore, 
Pittsburg,  Petersburg,  and  other  towns  in  the  United  States,  where 
the  influence  of  England  is  rendered  harmless  by  the  superior  virtue 
of  the  citizens.11 

Constructive  effort  of  the  sort  involved  in  these  new  ven¬ 
tures  was  the  best  possible  safeguard  against  melancholy 
over  commercial  or  agricultural  losses.  And  the  National 
Intelligencer,  an  organ  of  the  administration,  congratulated 
the  country  on  the  progress  being  made.  After  alluding  to 
the  considerable  activity  in  New  England  and  the  Middle 
States,  it  pays  its  respect  to  the  infant  industries  of  Virginia : 

In  Petersburg  Twenty-five  thousand  dollars  have  been  subscribed 
in  a  day. 

In  Richmond,  under  the  most  intelligent  and  patriotic  auspices, 
a  capital  of  half  a  million  is  to  be  engaged  in  this  object. 

In  short  the  patriotic  flame  appears  to  be  fed  throughout  the 
whole  union  by  an  inexhaustible  fuel. 

10  The  Universal  Gazette,  Washington,  D.  C.,  May  5,  1808. 

“The  Public  Advertiser,  New  York,  June  3,  1808. 


234  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 

Already  it  is  computed  that  at  least  five  millions  of  dollars  have 
been  devoted  to  manufactures  in  the  past  six  months ;  a  capital 
competent  to  the  furnishing  manufactured  articles  to  the  amount  of 
at  least  ten  millions. 

Britain,  seeing  what  is  already  done,  will  anticipate  what  will 
happen  if  she  persist  in  her  injustice;  she  will  see  that,  five  years 
hence,  we  shall  not  need  a  tenth  part  of  the  manufactured  goods 
we  now  receive  from  her.12 

But,  for  Richmond  at  least,  fact  fell  short  of  fancy.  The 
corporation  so  hopefully  launched  went  no  further  than  the 
promotion  stage,  and  became  an  object  of  derision  to  un¬ 
sympathetic  Federalists.  Thus  the  Richmond  Virginian  : 

Manufacturing !  It  will  be  remembered  by  the  people  that  a 
committee  recommended  the  subscribing  of  300,000  dollars  to  carry 
this  project  into  effect. 

From  this  it  was  natural  to  expect  that  they  who  could  foresee 
so  many  advantages  would  certainly  have  opened  their  purse  most 
liberally. 

They  met — they  conferred — they  subscribed!  But  how  much? 
Altogether,  not  as  much  as  one  of  these  distinguished  patriots  re¬ 
ceives  yearly  for  mismanaging  affairs  at  the  armory:  and  what  is 
more,  he  is  a  Bell-Wether  among  them. 

This  scheme  might  do  to  gull  the  credulous  people,  but  it  is  not 
good  enough  for  the  knowing  ones  of  Richmond.13 

More  or  less  incidental  testimonials  bear  witness  to  a 
systematic  encouragement  of  manufactures  outside  of  Vir¬ 
ginia.  Thus  an  advertisement  in  the  Charleston  Courier 
indicates  something  more  than  a  universal  approbation  of 
child  labor.  It  may,  in  fact,  suggest  something  beyond 
merely  domestic  manufactures ; 

WOOL  is  wanted  for  the  manufactory  at  the  Orphan-House,  which 
will  be  purchased  in  any  quantities,  by  the  Steward  of  that  Institu¬ 
tion — Orphan  House,  Charleston,  5th  March  1808 .14 

u  The  National  Intelligencer,  Washington,  D.  C.,  June  27,  1808.  “Of 
a  total  capital  of  $500,000,  $200,000  are  to  be  reserved  for  the  state.  We 
are  glad  to  find  men  of  all  parties  warmly  interested  in  the  plan.” 

18  The  Richmond  Virginian,  quoted  in  the  American  Citizen,  New 
York,  August  17,  1808. 

14  The  Charleston  Courier,  March  10,  1808. 


THE  SOUTH  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


235 


Also,  a  Homespun  Company  in  Charleston  attained  at  least 
the  stock  selling  stage,  proving  interest  if  not  progress: 

.  .  .  Many  persons  having  already  subscribed  lists  for  the  pro¬ 

motion  of  a  Homespun  Company,  they  may  conceive  such  subscrip¬ 
tion  as  entitling  them  to  shares  in  the  above  company. — To  avoid 
misunderstanding  on  this  head,  they  are  informed  that  no  person 
can  be  considered  as  a  stockholder  in  the  said  company,  unless  they 
subscribe  with  the  commissioners,  and  pay  down  two  dollars  on  each 
share  they  subscribe  for.15 

Further  information  concerning  this  Homespun  corpor¬ 
ation  reveals  that : 

The  establishment  of  the  South  Carolina  Homespun  Society,  has 
been  agreed  upon  at  Charleston,  S.  C.,  its  capital  to  consist  of  150,- 
000  dollars,  divided  into  15,000  shares  at  10  dollars  each,  1,000  of 
which  is  to  be  reserved  for  the  legislature.  A  committee  has  been 
appointed  to  receive  subscriptions  of  stock,  and  an  address  deliv¬ 
ered  to  the  citizens  of  that  state,  signed  by  the  venerable  and  patri¬ 
otic  historian  Ramsay.  The  object  of  the  institution  is  “domestic 
manufactures” — American.16 

While  South  Carolina  was  promoting  her  woolens  and 
homespuns,  North  Carolina  also  could  boast  a  new  industry, 
inaugurated  under  high  hopes : 

We  have  pleasure  in  stating  that  Mr.  Gules  of  Raleigh  (North 
Carolina)  has  established  a  paper  mill  on  an  extensive  scale.  It  is, 
we  believe,  the  first  which  has  been  erected  in  that  state,  and  to 
which  we  wish  the  fullest  success.17 

With  the  Atlantic  states  concerning  themselves  chiefly 
with  textiles,  notwithstanding  the  varied  program  of  the 
Petersburg  promoters  and  the  enterprise  at  Raleigh  just 
cited,  the  inland  state  of  Kentucky  also  achieved  considerable 
progress  industrially.  Here  the  manufacture  of  gunpowder 
held  prominent  place.  A  Kentucky  correspondent  of  David 
Porter  wrote  in  May  of  1808: 

Gun  Powder  is  already  manufactured  by  small  manufacturers  in 
several  places  of  Kentucky  which  are  furnishing  a  part  of  the  sup- 

15  Ibid.,  August  10,  1808. 

16  The  Universal  Gazette,  Washington,  D.  C.,  September  8,  1808. 

17  The  Washington  Expositor,  October  8,  1808. 


236  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 

plies  necessary  to  the  War  Department  but  for  want  of  Salt  Petre 
and  of  Capital  the  manufacturers  are  working  only  on  a  small  scale. 
Nevertheless  as — great  deal  of  Salt  Petre  can  be  had  from  the  Mis¬ 
souri  I  have  no  doubt — great  deal  more  than  at  present  shall  be 
manufactured  as  soon  as  Manufacturers  shall  meet  a  convenient 
encouragement. 

The  Manufacturing  of  Canvass  has  been  tried  at  Lexington  this 
4  or  5  years  ago  but  did  not  succeed.  I  did  never  inquire  on  the 
causes  of  that  ill  success  but  I  am  daring  to  attribute  it  to  several 
causes :  want  of  a  good  and  well-understood  plan  previous  to  the 
execution ;  want  of  Economy  in  the  execution  want  of  sufficient 
capital  and  want  of  proper  hands  but  I  have  no  doubt  that  should  an 
industrious  Man  be  sure  of  a  generous  price  from  the  Government 
for  every  good  piece  he  could  make  that  sort  of  Manufactory  would 
be  soon  up,  and  would  give  rise  to  many  others.  Our  hemp  is  as 
good  as  any  other  in  the  world  and  good  Spinners  and  Weavers 
could  be  procured  now  great  deal  more  easy  than  4  or  5  years  ago.18 

Promising  or  unpromising  as  southern  manufactures  ap¬ 
peared  to  contemporaries — and  it  depended  on  the  optimism 
or  conservatism  with  which  men  viewed  the  commercial 
situation  and  the  possibilities  for  its  relief — the  net  gain  to 
manufactures  in  the  accepted  sense  of  the  word  was  slight, 
although  this  was  not  fully  apparent  until  after  1816,  as  we 
know  from  southern  sentiment  toward  a  protective  tariff. 
But,  in  one  respect  at  least,  southern  industry  was  enormous¬ 
ly  stimulated  by  the  stern  necessities  of  the  times.  The 
slaves,  not  to  mention  their  masters,  must  be  clothed,  and 
household  manufactures  in  spinning  and  weaving,  crude  but 
sufficient,  arose  to  the  emergency.  Thus  Ellis  and  Allan, 
leading  merchants  of  Richmond,  wrote  to  one  of  their  busi¬ 
ness  correspondents  in  November,  1808,  that  “ 
the  Sales  of  Goods  is  very  much  curtailed  this  fall,  people  are 
Struggling  to  manufacture  at  home,  and  it  is  astonishing 
what  quantities  have  been  fabricated.  .  .  .”19 

The  Enquirer  elaborated  the  same  thought : 

18  David  Porter  Letter  Book,  1807-1808,  September  7-June  15.  MS. 
in  the  Library  of  Congress,  J.  A.  Tarascon  to  David  Porter,  May  11, 
1808. 

“  Ellis  and  Allan  Papers,  Library  of  Congress.  Ellis  &  Allan  to  J. 
Heathcote  &  Company,  November  5,  1808. 


THE  SOUTH  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


v23v 


We  have  been  favored  by  a  gentleman  of  Amelia  with  a  variety  of 
beautiful  specimens  of  Virginia  Manufacture. — Every  day’s  experi¬ 
ence  convinces  us,  that  the  looms  of  our  households  are  adequate 
to  the  supply  of  many  cheaper  and  excellent  substitutes  for  the 
Manufactures  of  Europe. 

Among  these  specimens,  is  a  piece  of  Carpeting,  of  cotton  warp 
and  yarn  filling,  whose  figure,  texture  and  dyes,  are  worthy  of  imi¬ 
tation — one  of  cotton  bed-ticking,  much  cheaper  than  those  for  sale 
in  our  stores — some  specimens  of  negro  cloathing  [Ac]  for  the  win¬ 
ter,  one  of  which  is  cotton  warp,  filled  in  with  doubled  and  twisted 
threads  of  wool,  much  warmer  and  cheaper  than  the  negro  cottons 
of  our  stores — and  some  beautiful  specimens  of  dimitty. 

To  bring  these  and  other  articles  to  great  maturity,  it  is  only 
necessary  to  turn  the  Public  Spirit  of  Virginia  a  little  more  in  this 
direction.  We  have  a  plenty  of  labor  and  a  superabundance  of  some 
of  the  raw  materials.  The  present  political  state  of  this  country  is 
eminently  propitious  to  these  manufacturing  improvements.20 

Though  household  manufactures  do  not  fully  qualify  a 
section  to  rank  as  manufacturing  in  the  accepted  sense;  even! 
more,  possibly,  than  the  factory  system,  they  enlisted  the 
workers  in  a  constructive  movement  for  economic  indepen- 
dence.  The  spinners  and  weavers  of  the  plantation  houses 
might  feel  a  livelier  sense  of  contest  with  a  power  whose 
imports  were  forsworn  than  would  the  mill  worker  or  the 
capitalist  under  a  more  impersonal  regime.  And  it  is  within 
the  bounds  of  probability  that  the  intensive  development  of 
household  industry,  marking  the  period  of  the  embargo, 
contributed  in  no  small  degree  to  the  firmness  and  stability 
which  characterized  southern  sentiment  throughout  the  crisis. 

For  the  South,  then,  the  chief  result  of  the  manufactur¬ 
ing  impetus  of  1808  was  not  the  speculative  and  only  partial 
development  of  capitalistic  production,  hut  rather  the  large 
extension  of  a  system  of  household  manufactures,  familiar 
since  colonial  times.  Nevertheless,  even  the  hope  of  success 
had  important  consequences.  Politically,  the  South  was  en¬ 
couraged  in  her  immediate  loyalty  to  the  embargo  and  in  a 
harmony  of  interest  with  the  manufacturing  sections  of  the 
country  which  aided  the  growth  of  American  nationalism 


20  The  Richmond  Enquirer,  December  27,  1808. 


238 


JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


and  which  did  not  break  down  until  that  harmony  was  dem¬ 
onstrated  to  be  illusory. 

Economically,  the  failure  of  her  hopes  to  materialize  was 
a  disaster  to  the  South.  It  meant  that  many  of  her  older 
sections  were  condemned  to  poverty,  until  the  extreme  de¬ 
mand  for  slaves  in  the  Lower  South  offered  the  sickening 
profits  of  the  inland  slave  trade.  It  thrust  upon  the  South 
an  economic  isolation  which  placed  her  at  the  mercy  of 
tariff  walls  erected  for  the  benefit  of  her  neighbors  and 
fostered  a  feeling  that  she  and  her  peculiar  institution 
were  a  land  apart.  Had  it  not  been  for  an  extraordinary 
expansion  in  cotton,  destined  soon  to  carry  southern 
energy  and  industry  into  the  inland  empire,  the  entire  South 
would  have  found  herself  hopelessly  crippled,  as  indeed 
the  older  tidewater  sections  of  Virginia  actually  were,  by 
the  embargo  and  the  subsequent  commercial  decline  in  the 
years  between  1808  and  the  War  of  1812. 

The  preceding  synopsis  of  economic  conditions  would 
prove  misleading  if  the  South  of  1808  were  regarded  as  en¬ 
tirely  homogeneous.  For  such,  in  fact,  was  not  the  case. 
Individual  interest  and  preference  divided  men  upon  the 
embargo,  much  as  they  had  once  been  divided  concerning 
the  Revolution,  and  were  yet  to  be  over  Civil  War.  There 
were,  it  is  true,  fem  broad  _f actors  of  division.  Commerce  f 
was  limited  to  a  few  ports  like  Charleston  and  Savannah, 
and  manufactures,  other  than  household,  as  we  have  seen,  X 
scarcely  existed.  But  agriculture  was  a  unifier,  and,  indus-  % 
trially,  a  region  of  staples  such  as  cotton,  tobacco,  and  rice, 
which  relied  for  labor  upon  so  distinctive  an  institution  as 
slavery,  possessed  an  outward  appearance  of  unity,  an  ap¬ 
pearance  which  was  to  a  considerable  extent  reality,  in  as 
much  as  economic  interests  and  political  view-points  are  first 
cousins.  But  historically  the  South__had  never  consented 
|n  unity ■,  Tidewater  itself  had  seen  many  a  battle  between 


THE  SOUTH  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


the  ins  and  the  outs.  And  the  up-country  could  always  be 
relied  upon  to  fight  the  shore,  whether  in  Pennsylvania  or  the 
Carolinas. 


Class  distinction  divided  where  economic  solidarity  > 
should  have  unified.  In  Richmond  and  Charleston  the  old 
aristocracy  was  impotently  intrenched  behind  the  barricades 
of  Federalism.  Everywhere  the  real  political  game  was 
fought  for  control  of  the  Republican  party.  Here  Jefferson 
and  his  henchmen  had  ruled  almost  without  dispute  since  the 
great  election  of  1800,  which  brought  the  party  into  power. 

A  flag  of  rebellion  had,  it  is  true,  been  raised  over  the  Miss¬ 
issippi  question  and  the  Yazoo  claims.21  And  the  “Quids,” 
as  the  disaffected  Republicans  were  called,  were  to  seize  upon 
the  approaching  retirement  of  Jefferson  as  occasion  for  set¬ 
ting  up  Monroe  as  a  “pretender”  in  opposition  to  Madison, 
the  candidate  of  “legitimacy.”22  But  in  1807  Jefferson  was 
unquestionably  the  master  of  his  party.  The  embargo  which 
he  sponsored  went  through  as  a  party  measure.  Its  sup¬ 
port  became  an  act  of  faith  for  all  good  Republicans,  though 
of  course  not  all  southerners  could  be  reckoned  among  the 
faithful. 

Taking  into  account  the  differences  between  hill  country 
and  tidewater,  between  commercial  aristocrat  and  planter 
liberal,  and  keeping  in  view  the  battle  for  party  control 
among  Republicans  themselves,  one  appreciates  a  complexity 
in  the  southern  attitude  which  would  be  incomprehensible  if 
the  South  were  dismissed  as  simply  an  agricultural  section, 
with  little  to  lose  from  commerce  destroyed,  and  able,  while 
letting  her  crops  pile  up  in  their  barns,  to  await  with  perfect 
composure  such  a  change  in  British  and  French  policies  as 
would  comport  with  American  dignity. 

21  See  A.  J.  Beveridge,  Life  of  John  Marshall,  II,  and  Wm.  P.  Trent, 
Southern  Statesmen  of  the  Old  Regime,  p.  131. 

22  C.  H.  Ambler,  Sectionalism  in  Virginia,  1776-1861,  p.  90;  also  Wm. 

E.  Dodd,  John  Taylor,  in  the  John  P.  Branch  Historical  Papers  of 
Randolph  Macon  College,  II.  230. 


JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


On  the  contrary,  the  South  was  a  battle-ground  of  con-^ 

/tending  forces,  grouped  about  patriotism  and  personal  loy¬ 
alty  on  the  one  side  and  economic  self-interest  on  the  other. 
Here,  as  elsewhere,  individual  self-interest  was  mostly 
hostile  to  the  embargo,  inasmuch  as  no  element  in  the 
community,  with  the  possible  exception  of  the  lawyers,  who 
were  reaping  a  growing  harvest  of  cases,  and  the  very  few 
manufacturers  whose  industries  it  fostered,  could  be  said 
to  derive  any  profit  from  the  measure.  Such  gains  as  the 
embargo  insured  were  national  and  political,  and  even  these 
were  hotly  denied  both  in  and  out  of  Congress.23 

Up  to  this  point,  I  have  sketched  the  economic  back¬ 
ground  of  southern  attitude  with  but  an  occasional  glance 
at  the  political.  Let  us  now  examine  the  political  activity 
of  the  South  in  1808,  with  only  occasional  references  to  its 
economic  background.  But  first  a  word  as  to  the  general  ef¬ 
fect  of  their  losses  and  misfortunes  upon  the  spirit  of  the 
southern  people.  For  political  action  depends  not  upon 
losses  and  misfortunes  as  such,  but  rather  upon  their  effect 
on  the  morale  of  the  people.  From  what  has  been  said,  it 
should  be  evident  that  the  South  had  nothing  to  gain  from 
the  embargo.  Yet  such  is  human  nature  that  the  states,  more 
'^particularly  those  at  the  South,  long  vied  with  one  another 
in  their  courage  under  losses.24  The  embargo,  which  was 
originally  advanced  as  a  peaceful  substitute  for  war,  stimu¬ 
lated  some,  at  all  events,  of  the  virtues  most  conspicuous 
on  the  battlefield.  South  Carolina,  especially,  boasted  of  her 
willingness  to  endure  all  things  even  unto  the  end.  Planters 
made  the  best  of  straightened  circumstances.  No  other  state 
turned  more  energetically  to  household  manufactures.  Wool 


23  Mrs.  St.  Julian  Ravenel,  Life  and  Times  of  William  Lowndes,  p.  77. 

21  Jefferson  Papers.  Governor  Pinckney  of  South  Carolina  to  T. 
Jefferson,  January  2,  1809.  “.  .  .  By  the  average  of  the  sales  last 

year  the  planters  of  this  State  lost  one  with  another  fifty  per  centum 
and  yet  you  hear  of  no  grumbling  among  us,  but  a  few  very  few  indeed, 
violent  federalists.” 


THE  SOUTH  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


241 


was  conserved  as  never  before,  and  interest  awakened  in  a 
native  sheep  supply.  Cotton  and  tobacco  vied  in  protestations 
of  loyalty  to  a  scheme  of  things  as  ruinous  to  the  one  as  to 
the  other,  and,  as  the  second  crop  followed  the  first  into  the 
barns  of  the  planters  rather  than  the  warehouses  of  factors, 
the  merit  in  patience  and  long  suffering  merely  grew  the 
greater.25 

For  the  unscrupulous,  there  was  some  relief,  to  be  sure, 
in  an  illicit  trade,  made  doubly  profitable  by  the  absence  of 
competition.  Considerable  quantities  of  cotton  and  to¬ 
bacco  did  reach  England,  notwithstanding  a  general  loyalty 
to  the  embargo.  Thus,  between  the  fervor  of  self-sacrifice 
among  patriots  and  the  profits  of  smuggling  among  traitors, 
the  tidewater  section,  with  the  exception  of  a  small  party 
which  was  frankly  commercial  and  Federalist,  supported  the 
embargo. 

In  the  up  country  and  beyond  the  mountains,  different 
conditions  obtained.  The  “Quids,”  for  example,  drew  much 
of  their  support  from  the  Blue  Ridge,  among  the  smaller 
farmers  deprived  of  their  customary  market.  In  Kentucky, 
also,  the  embargo  encountered  some  opposition,  one  of  the 
leaders  of  which  was  Matthew  Lyon,  who,  though  personally 
indebted  to  Jefferson  for  the  greatest  favors,  had  become  a 
Mississippi  River  magnate  since  his  removal  from  Vermont 
and  a  mepiber  of  a  class  that  found  little  to  praise  in  a  law 
which  kept  shipping  at  anchor.  But  just  as  the  “best  people” 
in  Virginia  upheld  the  embargo  from  a  distinct  esprit  de 
corps,  so  their  kindred  in  the  Blue  Grass  gave  the  embargo 
just  the  support  which  it  had  a  right  to  expect  from  gentle¬ 
men,  and  Kentucky  papers  like  the  Frankfort  Palladium 
featured  as  choice  tidbits  rich  morsels  of  London  gossip  over 
British  discomfiture  at  the  embargo.26 

26  Mrs.  St.  Julian  Ravenel,  op.  cit.,  pp.  75-77. 

"  Palladium ,  July  14,  1808. 


242  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 

In  some  of  its  larger  outlines,  southern  attitude  toward 
the  embargo  has  now  been  sketched.  But  the  arena  on 
which  these  various  viewpoints  found  their  liveliest  expres¬ 
sion  was  the  floor  of  Congress,  and  no  study  of  southern 
sentiment  toward  the  embargo  is  complete  without  refer¬ 
ence  to  Congressional  debates  and  votes.  The  only  South¬ 
erner  among  the  little  group  of  six  “wilful  men”  in  the 
Senate  who  dissented  to  the  original  passage  of  the  embargo, 
was  Crawford  of  Georgia.27  But  in  the  House,  southern 
opposition  was  more  vigorous.  In  a  vote  of  eighty-two  to 
forty-four,  the  South  furnished  its  full  proportion  of  nega¬ 
tives.28  The  “Quids”  in  Virginia  mustered  four  opposing 
votes,  including  that  of  John  Randolph.  From  Kentucky, 
Matthew  Lyon  was  one  of  two  nonjurors.  But  the  chief 
stronghold  of  southern  dissent  lay  in  the  less  developed  areas 
of  Georgia  and  North  Carolina.  From  South  Carolina 
no  opposition  vote  was  actually  cast,  although  one  absent 
member  afterwards  went  on  record  as  at  first  opposed.29 
Her  merchants,  however,  were  among  the  first  to  petition 
Congress  for  relief  from  the  law’s  effect,  on  the  plea  that 
certain  slave  ships,  which  took  out  clearing  papers  just  after 
the  embargo  was  passed,  should  not  be  detained  in  port. 
Their  petition,  very  properly,  was  ignored.  And,  human 
nature  being  what  it  is,  southern  interest  never  greatly  con¬ 
tributed  to  the  success  of  New  England’s  petitions  for 
special  concessions  to  her  fisheries.  It  lent  an  equally  deaf 
ear  to  Philadelphia  petitions  identical  with  that  of  the 
Charleston  merchants.30 

When  loopholes  in  the  embargo  became  evident,  Con¬ 
gress  concerned  itself  with  amendments  to  render  it  effective. 
Original  opponents  now  found  their  opportunity  to  line  up 

27  Annals  of  Congress,  XVIII.  51. 

28  Ibid.,  XVIII.  1222. 

28  Ibid.,  XVIII.  1651. 

20  Ibid.,  XVIII.  1243,  1246,  1272,  1274,  1385. 


THE  SOUTH  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


243 


with  the  party.  One  of  these  latter,  though  announcing  offi¬ 
cially  his  conversion,  still  did  what  he  could  to  relieve  cotton 
planters  from  the  burden  of  bonding  coastwise  cargoes,  seem¬ 
ingly  unconscious  that  leniency  of  this  sort  would  encourage 
extensive  cotton  shipments  to  England  at  the  very  time  when 
stricter  enforcement  was  the  prime  embargo  need.31  The 
danger  was  recognized  by  Troup,  of  Georgia,  who,  for  his 
own  state,  apprehended  disgrace  if  ships  were  allowed  to  sail 
without  bond;  for,  in  that  event,  “Savannah  would  be  made 
the  depot  of  the  Eastern  and  Middle  States,  and  thence  pro¬ 
duce  would  be  conveyed  in  boats  to  St.  Augustine.”32  In 
that  way  Georgia  would  be  as  much  the  rendezvous  for 
smugglers  to  Florida  as  Vermont  and  New  York  were  for 
those  to  Canada. 


31  Annals  of  Congress,  XVIII.  1651-52. 

32  Ibid.,  XVIII.  1652.  See  also  The  Madison  Papers,  Library  of  Con¬ 
gress.  Anonymous  to  the  Governor  of  East  Florida,  copy  forwarded  to 
the  Secretary  of  State. 

To  his  Excellency  the  Governor  of  E.  Florida.  May  it  please  your 
Excellency. 

The  existing  embargo  in  the  United  States,  which  has  been  laid  on 
for  great  political  purposes,  of  which  your  excellency  has  doubtless  been 
apprised,  has  been  evaded  in  many  instances  in  St.  Mary’s  river. 

The  method  usually  pursued  to  effect  this,  is  to  conduct  the  vessel, 
employed  in  this  treacherous  commerce,  into  the  river  in  ballast ;  load 
her  on  the  Spanish  side  of  the  river  out  of  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
United  States ;  then,  under  the  pretext  of  clearing  out  for  the  Havannah 
they  sail  with  the  cargo  for  a  British  port. 

The  British  possessions  being  supplied  from  the  United  States  by 
this  legerdemain,  the  effects  of  the  embargo,  which  it  was  hoped  might 
contribute  to  bring  that  nation  to  reason  are  so  far  frustrated. 

From  the  recent  detection  of  this  procedure  it  may  be  presumed  that 
our  government  is  not  yet  acquainted  with  it.  Your  excellency  will 
therefore  excuse  an  individual  for  recommending  the  circumstance  to 
your  wisdom  and  patriotism. 

Your  humble  servant 

Savannah  10  April,  1808. 

To  James  Madison  Esq. 

Sir,  The  person  who  drafted  the  original  of  the  within,  which  is 
gone  on  to  St.  Augustine,  thought  it  might  not  be  amfss  to  apprise  you 
of  the  step  which  he  has  taken  for  the  public  good — his  name  is  unim¬ 
portant.” 

[James  Madison,  Miscellaneous,  1762-1837.] 


244  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


Much  bitterness  was  injected  into  the  debate  by  the 
accusation  of  Barent  Gardenier  of  New  York  that  the  em¬ 
bargo  and  its  enabling  acts  were  dictated  by  Napoleon.  At 
this  the  South  felt  especially  affronted.  One  of  her  delegates, 
G.  W.  Campbell,  of  Tennessee,  paid  his  respects  to.  Gardenier 
“as  the  mere  conduit  used  by  those  behind  the  screen  to  con¬ 
vey  these  groundless  slanders  to  the  public — the  common 
trumpeter,  who  gives  no  importance  to  what  he  makes  pub¬ 
lic,  except  what  is  derived  merely  from  the  place  he  occu¬ 
pies,  or  the  duties  assigned  him  to  perform.”33  One  is  not 
surprised  that  a  duel  followed.  Campbell  was  an  easy  victor, 
returning  at  once  to  his  seat  in  the  House.  Gardenier  stay¬ 
ed  at  home  for  weeks,  nursing  serious  wounds. 

On  the  whole,  the  ill  temper  of  Gardenier  proved  a  boom¬ 
erang  to  his  cause.  The  reaction  was  more  than  the  enraged 
challenge  of  Campbell.  It  was  rather  the  conversion  of 
cooler  heads,  such  as  Alexander  of  North  Carolina  and  Bibb 
of  Georgia.  Nor  was  the  Gardenier  position  strengthened 
by  the  somewhat  incoherent  support  of  Matthew  Lyon.  On 
the  whole,  throughout  the  first  two  months  of  its  existence, 
the  embargo  was  gaining  adherents,  especially  in  the  South. 
In  a  vote  of  ninety-seven  to  twenty-two  for  the  March 
amendment  strengthening  the  embargo,  only  two  southern 
states  contributed  to  the  negative:  North  Carolina  and  Ken¬ 
tucky,  with  two  votes  each.34  Thus,  when  the  long  session 
ended,  the  South  had  swung  into  almost  complete  unity  on 
the  chief  measure  before  the  country. 

Some  southern  support  could,  nevertheless,  be  enlisted 
on  behalf  of  a  motion  now  made  for  an  immediate  repeal  of 
the  embargo,  a  motion  which  failed  by  twenty-four  to  eighty- 
four.35  But  debate  focused  chiefly  upon  what  policy  Con¬ 
gress  should  authorize  the  President  to  pursue  during  its  own 

33  Annals  of  Congress,  XVIII.  1672. 

34  Ibid.,  XVIII.  1712. 

35  Ibid.,  XVIII.  1853. 


THE  SOUTH  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


245 


recess.  The  fiery  Campbell  offered  a  resolution  granting 
complete  freedom  of  action  to  the  executive  in  the  event  that 
European  developments  permitted  a  removal  of  the  em¬ 
bargo.36  The  debate  which  followed  showed  that  southern 
Congressmen  possessed  a  considerable  knowledge  of  British 
conditions,  including  a  fair  estimate  of  John  Randolph  as  a 
factor  in  moulding  British  opinion  as  to  conditions  in  Ameri¬ 
ca.  Randolph’s  proposal  of  war  as  a  release  from  embargo 
was  ridiculed,  and  his  opposition  to  the  President’s  freedom 
of  action  during  the  recess  was  ascribed  quite  justly  to  a 
petty  jealousy,  which  would  load  Jefferson  with  blame  for 
the  embarrassments  of  the  embargo  and  deny  him  the  credit 
for  its  relaxation.37 

There  was  danger  that  such  a  resolution  as  Campbell’s 
would  simply  advertise  our  desire  to  end  the  embargo.  And, 
in  view  of  British  losses  and  injuries  from  the  embargo  and 
the  new  prosperity  in  American  manufactures,  this  was  no 
time  for  weakening.  Campbell  himself  saw  the  force  of  this 
consideration  and  endeavored  to  combat  it  by  reminding 
Congress  that  under  no  circumstances  should  the  embargo 
be  removed  while  its  provocation  remained.38 

The  motion  to  bestow  upon  the  executive  broad  powers 
of  initiative  during  the  Congressional  recess  converted  the 
embargo  into  a  rival  of  the  Louisiana  Purchase  for  the  dis¬ 
tinction  of  extending  government  operations  into  regions 
not  prescribed  by  the  Constitution.  But  neither  party  made 
strict  or  loose  construction  much  of  an  issue  in  this  instance, 
since  each  had  its  own  reasons  for  discarding  the  embargo. 
The  Republicans  were  uncomfortably  aware  of  what  a  party 
liability  the  embargo  was  proving.  The  Federalists  were 
too  eager  to  escape  its  rigors  to  waste  much  scrutiny  upon  the 
means  of  release.  Thus,  once  again,  as  in  1803,  the  South 

36  Annals  of  Congress ,  XVIII.  2091,  also  XIX.  588-589. 

37  Ibid.,  XVIII.  2108,  2132. 

**Ibid.,  XVIII.  2139. 


246  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


was  a  party  to  proceedings  running  counter  to  its  own  strict 
construction  theories. 

Opinions  varied,  however,  in  detail.  As  usual,  there 
were  those  who  would  straddle  the  issue.  Rowan,  of  Ken¬ 
tucky,  for  example,  warned  sententiously  against  the  danger 
of  erecting  despotisms  by  progressive  concessions  of  power, 
but  favored  the  particular  concession  in  question.39  Ran¬ 
dolph  found  the  debate  simply  an  opportunity  for  a  general 
tirade  against  the  embargo  and  all  its  consequences,  present 
and  future.  Williams,  of  South  Carolina,  on  the  other  hand, 
urged  even  more  stringent  application  of  the  embargo 
through  more  severe  regulations  for  revenue  inspection. 
When  the  vote  was  finally  taken  empowering  Jefferson  to 
suspend  the  embargo  at  discretion  if  conditions  in  Europe 
warranted,  the  South  contributed  only  five  of  the  twenty-six 
votes  in  opposition.  To  all  intents  and  purposes,  Jefferson, 
in  the  spring  of  1808,  was  master  of  a  “Solid  South.” 

In  the  interval  of  seven  months  before  Congress  reassem¬ 
bled  the  members  had  abundant  opportunity  to  test  the  senti¬ 
ment  of  their  constituencies.  And,  notwithstanding  the  in¬ 
creasing  irksomeness  of  the  embargo  and  the  failure  of  nego¬ 
tiations  looking  toward  its  abandonment,  the  speeches  of 
southern  Congressmen  during  November  and  December  con¬ 
firm  the  patience  with  which  their  section  supported  the  em¬ 
bargo.  They  recognized  that  it  had  not  produced  all  the 
good  effects  anticipated,  but  clung  to  the  hope  that  persever¬ 
ance  would  win.  They  described  their  own  sufferings  as 
endured  for  the  sake  of  a  New  England  commerce  which 
could  never  be  of  any  real  concern  to  themselves.  As  Pope, 
of  Kentucky,  expressed  it: 

The  people  I  represent  are  an  agricultural  people,  and  I  ask  the 
gentlemen  of  what  importance  it  is  to  them  whether  their  produce  is 
carried  in  foreign  or  American  vessels?  For  what  are  the  agricul¬ 
tural  people  now  suffering,  but  to  maintain  our  maritime  rights: 

39  Annals  of  Congress,  XVIII.  2233,  2234. 


THE  SOUTH  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


247 


Sir,  we  are  willing  to  discard  all  calculations  of  profit  or  loss,  and 
make  a  common  cause  with  our  brethren  of  other  States  in  defense 
of  our  national  rights  and  independence.40 

A  still  clearer  expression  of  sectional  consciousness,  pro¬ 
phetic  too  of  the  future,  was  Crawford’s  contention  that  the 
states  which  called  themselves  commercial  were  in  reality 
manufacturing  and  would  find  in  the  embargo  merely  a  new 
source  of  prosperity.  For  the  South,  on  the  other  hand,  which 
could  not  share  in  the  new  field  of  manufactures,  the  em¬ 
bargo,  if  long  continued,  would  spell  nothing  but  ruin.  “It 
is  impossible  for  us  to  find  a  market  for  our  produce  but 
by  foreign  commerce;  and  whenever  a  change  of  the  kind 
alluded  to  is  made,  that  change  will  operate  to  the  injury 
of  the  Southern  States  more  than  to  the  injury  of  the  com¬ 
mercial  States  so  called.”41 

A  less  extended  view  of  the  case  enlarged  upon  the  secu¬ 
rity  to  property  for  which  the  embargo  deserved  credit,  and 
declared  that  the  only  losers  by  it  were  merchants  who  traded 
on  the  capital  of  others  and  whom  it  was  not  a  bad  idea 
after  all  to  deprive  of  a  chance  to  make  something  out  of 
nothing.42  The  farmer,  it  was  admitted,  might  seem  to 
be  a  loser,  but  former  high  prices  had  caused  him  to  over¬ 
work  his  land,  to  which  present  stagnation  would  afford  a 
much  needed  rest. 

While  southern  politicians  were  thus  attesting  their  loy=A\ 
alty  to  the  embargo,  the  iron  of  discontent  was  sinking  deeper  1  y* 
and  deeper  into  the  soul  of  New  England.  Her  leader^J — 
proposed  the  most  desperate  expedients  by  way  of  a  substi¬ 
tute,  urging  the  country  to  renounce  the  embargo  and  to 
determine  our  commercial  and  foreign  policy  solely  in  accor¬ 
dance  with  the  rates  of  marine  insurance.  If  risks  were  too 

40  Annals  of  Congress,  XIX.  49-50,  206,  659. 

41  Ibid.,  XIX.  66.  See  also  Hugh  A.  Garland,  Life  of  John  Ran¬ 
dolph,  p.  268. 

43  Ibid.,  XIX.  94.  Also  Edmund  Quincy,  op.  cit.,  p.  143. 


248  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


great,  insurance  would  be  prohibitive,  and  an  embargo  would 
result  automatically.  With  declining  risks,  insurance  rates 
would  drop  and  commerce  be  resumed  without  awaiting  the 
action  of  the  government.  Here  was  laissez  faire  run  riot, 
and  Giles,  of  Virginia,  the  administration  floor  leader  in  the 
Senate,  punctured  it  with  the  query:  “Sir,  if  we  repeal  the 
embargo  laws  without  any  substitute,  and  agree  to  trade 
under  the  British  Orders  in  Council,  what  would  be  the 
premium  of  insurance  on  our  national  character  and  national 
independence? — Sir,  cent  per  cent,  would  not  insure  them.”43 

Not  all  southerners  were  so  Spartan  as  their  leaders. 
Stories  were  rife  concerning  shipments  of  flour  and  tobacco 
from  Virginia  to  St.  Kitts.  Innuendoes  were  even  circulated 
to  the  effect  that  Jefferson  himself  profited  by  a  sudden  rise 
in  tobacco  prices  at  the  height  of  the  embargo,  a  charge  much 
easier  to  make  than  to  refute.  Cotton  had  fallen  from  an 
average  of  twenty  cents  down  to  eleven  and  rice  in  equal 
proportion.  With  two  crops  now  in  the  barn,  even  the 
most  resolute  would  pause  before  planting  a  third.  But, 
notwithstanding  some  discontent  and  backsliding,  it  was 
asserted  in  Congress  that  the  planters  are  “unanimously  un¬ 
willing  to  place  their  bales  of  cotton  in  one  scale  and  national 
honor  in  the  other.  They  are  unwilling  to  put  interest,  sor¬ 
did  interest  in  competition  with  the  national  independence, 
which  would  be  sacrificed  by  payment  of  the  tribute.”44 

To  uphold  the  spirit  of  the  South,  reports  were  circu¬ 
lated  of  misery  in  Great  Britain  far  outmatching  our  own. 
Indeed,  all  the  comfort  to  be  derived  from  this  supposed 
weakening  of  Great  Britain  was  needed  in  order  to  reas¬ 
sure  the  faithful,  for,  with  the  new  year,  the  embargo 
entered  upon  its  last  phase,  scoring  its  final  victory  in  Janu- 
ary,  1809,  when  the  House  by  a  vote  of  seventy-one  to 

43  Annals  of  Congress,  XIX.  226,  also  p.  791. 

“Ibid.,  XIX.  286,  602-604,  598,  658. 


THE  SOUTH  AND  THE  EMBARGO 

thirty-two  put  through  the  final  enforcement  bill.  Once 
again  the  South  stood  by  its  colors,  contributing  to  the  oppo¬ 
sition  only  a  sprinkling  and  scattered  vote,  and  that  mostly 
of  the  chronic  sort,  as  their  earlier  ballots  had  demon¬ 
strated.45 

This  was  the  final  effort  on  behalf  of  the  embargo. 
Men  began  to  fear  that  secession,  long  smouldering  in  New 
England,  might  actually  come  about.  Within  another 
,  month,  debate  was  centering  no  longer  upon  a  strengthening 
of  the  law,  but  upon  the  proper  date  for  its  repeal.  As  a 
symptom  of  the  sudden  change  of  heart,  the  position  of 
D.  R.  Williams,  of  South  Carolina,  is  illuminating.  He 
had  all  along  manifested  toward  the  embargo  a  sort  of  rug¬ 
ged  honesty.  He  now  gave  it  as  his  opinion  that  smug¬ 
gling,  defiance  of  law,  and  sectionalism  had  brought  about 
a  condition  which  admitted  of  but  these  alternatives :  either  a 
drastic  enforcement  of  the  embargo  at  the  cost  of  civil  war, 
or  else  its  abandonment — “choosing  not  to  enforce  the  law 
with  the  bayonet,  I  thought  it  proper  to  acknowledge  to  the 
House  that  I  was  ready  to  abandon  the  embargo. — I  will 
repeat  it — and  I  could  weep  over  it  more  than  over  a  lost 
child.”46 

With  a  tacit  acknowledgment  that  the  embargo  was 
doomed,  debate  turned  gradually  to  available  substitutes. 
John  Randolph,  for  his  part,  wanted  none.  “Shall  a  man 
refuse  to  be  cured  of  a  cancer  unless  you  will  provide  him 
with  a  substitute?”*1  Sentiment  in  New  England  leaned  to¬ 
ward  non-intercourse.  And  more  than  one  southerner  de¬ 
claimed  against  New  England’s  conversion  to  the  passive 
obedience  of  non-intercourse,  after  thundering  for  a  year  past 
against  the  embargo  as  a  surrender  of  our  national  rights. 

45  Annals  of  Congress,  XIX.  1024. 

MIbid.,  XIX.  1236-1238;  also  Branch  Papers,  II.  297-298. 

"Ibid.,  XIX.  1338. 


( 


250 j  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


But  if  embargo  was  objectionable  to  many  and  non-inter- 
^  course -to  some,  the  real  alternative  of  war  was  far  from 
^  popular.  Matthew  Lyon,  forgone,  was  a  consistent  opponent 
of  the  measure.  Yet  he  was  staunch  against  war  as  a  sub¬ 
stitute,  quoting  Falstaff  on  “What  is  honor?  A  word.  What 
is  that  word?  Honor.  What  is  that  honor?  Air.  What  hath 
it?  He  that  died  on  Wednesday.”48 

The  actual  facts  of  near  secession  in  New  England  and 
the  still  unachieved  submission  of  Old  England  rendered 
some  change  of  policy  essential.  The  logic  of  the  case  called 
for  war,  and,  if  the  embargo  must  be  abandoned,  war  was 
the  preference  of  the  administration.  But  the  country,  which 
would  have  welcomed  war  eighteen  months  earlier  when  the 
Chesapeake  was  attacked,  had  so  long  been  taught  to  regard 
the  embargo  as  a  substitute  for  war  that  its  martial  spirit 
had  waned.  Besides,  war  against  both  France  and  Great 
\j/_ Britain  was  as  impracticable  now  as  when  the  embargo  was 
first  adopted. 

Aside  from  war  and  non-intercourse,  there  was  one  alter¬ 
native;  namely,  to  abolish  all  restrictions  and  go  on  as  if 
British  Orders,  French  Decrees,  and  American  Embargo  had 
never  been  issued.  Outside  of  a  few  New  Englanders,  John 
Randolph  was  almost  the  sole  advocate  of  this  policy.  His 
argument  was  as  picturesque  as  his  personality : 


We  have  trusted  our  most  precious  interests  in  this  leaky  vessel 
[the  embargo]  ;  and  now.  by  way  of  amendment,  we  are  going  to 
bore  additional  holes  in  this  machine,  which  like  a  cask,  derives  all 
of  its  value,  if  it  have  any,  from  being  water-tight.  From  some 
notion  of  honor  or  dignity,  quite  incomprehensible  to  me,  we  are  to 
stick  to  this  thing ;  it  is  to  be  hung  around  our  necks,  or  to  be  trailed 
after  us  like  a  canister  tied  to  the  tail  of  a  miserable  persecuted 
dog.49 


Randolph  could  still  amuse,  but  he  could  no  longer  influ¬ 
ence.  The  non-intercourse  bill  defied  the  shafts  of  his  ridicule 
48  Annals  of  Congress,  XIX.  1412. 

48  Ibid.,  XIX.  1465-1466.  See  also  Edmund  Quincy,  op.  cit.,  p.  143;  also 
Branch  Papers.  III.  p.  55. 


THE  SOUTH  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


251 


and  parsed  the  House  on  February  27,  1809,  by  a  vote  of 
eighty-one  to  forty,  in  which  the  South  abandoned  the  com¬ 
parative  unanimity  which  had  governed  her  counsels  upon 
the  embargo,  and  split  hef  vote.  Some  doubtless  voted  for 
the  new  measure  because  they  really  desired  it ;  others,  as  the 
only  obtainable  substitute  for  the  embargo,  short  of  complete 
surrender.  On  the  other  hand,  some  among  the  nay’s  may 
have  been  proclaiming  their  loyalty  to  a  lost  cause.  Others 
felt  non-intercourse  itself  too  severe.  Considerations  of  this 
sort  may  serve  in  part  to  account  for  the  vote  which  sealed 
the  final  verdict  of  the  South  and  of  the  nation  upon  the 
embargo. 

Nevertheless,  when  the  South  embarked  with  her  sister 
states  upon  non-intercourse,  she  was  destined  to  vindicate 
the  foresight  of  one  of  her  own  representatives,  ]~Gj  W. 
Campbell,  who  declared  that  non-intercourse  would  work  only 
to  her  disadvantage.  The  embargo  bore  with  approximate 
equality  upon  all  the  states,  said  Campbell.  Non-intercourse 
would  penalize  the  southern  and  western  states  in  favor  of 
the  eastern,  which  would  enjoy  almost  the  whole  commerce 
of  the  country  without  competition  and  could  develop  their 
manufactures  at  the  expense  of  the  agricultural  interest: 

Foreign  goods  being  excluded,  the  manufacturing  States  would 
furnish  the  rest  of  the  Union  with  their  manufactured  goods  at 
their  own  prices.  Hence  the  nonintercourse  would  operate  partially 
against  the  Southern  and  Western,  and  completely  in  favor  of  the 
Eastern  States,  and  hence  the  most  cogent  reasons  I  have  yet  dis¬ 
covered  why  the  Eastern  gentlemen  are  almost  to  a  man  in  favor 
of  it.50 

Thus  a  survey  of  the  South  in  1808  confirms  the  impres¬ 
sion,  which  time  was  only  to  strengthen,  that  economic  sec¬ 
tionalism,  though  not  universally  realized  at  this  period,  was 
already  a  determining  factor  in  the  industrial  life  of  Amer¬ 
ica.  The  embargo  and  its  emasculated  substitute  deserve  at- 

“  Annals  of  Congress,  XIX.  1483-1484. 


JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


tention  as  measures  of  great  influence  in  intensifying  those 
differences,  which  from  their  very  nature  could  only  go  on 
i  increasing.  The  failure  of  the  embargo  to  develop  a  real 
system  of  capitalistic  manufactures  at  the  South  placed  her 
at  an  economic  disadvantage  as  against  first  the  Middle 
States  and  later  New  England.  For  the  growth  of  manu¬ 
factures  in  the  northern  states  enlisted  their  interest  in  a 
succession  of  tariffs,  which  the  South  came  more  and  more 
bitterly  to  oppose.  This  very  opposition  increased  her  iso¬ 
lation  and  weakened  her  sense  of  nationalism,  with  conse¬ 
quences  which  were  indeed  far-reaching.  So  that  it  is  not 
too  much  to  say  that  the  developments  of  1808  constituted 
one  of  the  links  in  the  chain  finally  leading  to  Civil  War. 


CHAPTER  IX 


BRITISH  POLITICS  AND  THE  AMERICAN  EMBARGO 

The  personal  experiences  of  Jefferson  with  the  embargo, 
together  with  the  effect  of  its  enforcement  upon  the  vari¬ 
ous  sections  of  the  United  States,  have  already  suggested 
the  influence  of  the  measure  upon  the  powers  against  which 
it  was  aimed.  But  the  extent  of  this  influence  and  the 
degree  to  which  it  approximated  or  failed  to  approximate 
the  hopes  of  Jefferson,  its  author,  warrant  a  closer  analysis 
of  the  effects  of  the  embargo  in  both  England  and  France. 
This  holds  true  more  especially  for  England,  since  Eng¬ 
land’s  own  blockade  of  France  accomplished  more  than  our 
embargo  alone  could  have  effected.  An  examination  of  the 
results  of  the  embargo  upon  political  thinking  and  economic 
activity  in  England  is,  therefore,  essential  to  a  proper  esti¬ 
mate  of  Jefferson  and  his  policy,  whereas  the  correspond¬ 
ing  influence  upon  France  is  of  rather  less  significance  and 
may  be  dismissed  with  a  briefer  treatment. 

The  American  policy  of  Great  Britain  in  1808  was 
part  of  a  general  system  of  foreign  relations  whose  philo¬ 
sophy  dates  from  the  mercantilism  of  the  early  empire  and 
whose  manifestations  were  interwoven  with  the  great  war 
against  Napoleon.  As  yet  American  independence  was  ^ 
recognized  only  upon  land.  At  sea  the  overbearing  exer¬ 
cise  of  the  right  of  search,  even  to  the  halting  of  a  warship 
near  a  home  port,  and  the  impressment  of  sailors,  represented 
an  abuse  of  power  not  consistent  with  independence.  In  i 
fact,  limitations  upon  the  freedom  of  the  seas  exposed 
America  to  the  same  disadvantages  as  those  under  which 


[  253  ] 


254  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 

the  colonies  had  labored  when  navigation  acts  could  interdict 
the  most  profitable  routes  of  trade.1 

For  this  shortsighted  and  ungenerous  policy,  resentment/ 
toward  the  war  for  independence  was,  in  part,  responsible/ 
Jealousy  fanned  the  flame  when  America  proved  herself  best 
qualified  of  all  the  neutrals  to  reap  the  golden  harvest  await¬ 
ing  those  who  feed  while  others  fight.2  But  the  keynote  of 
the  times  was  self-preservation.  The  great  war  of  1793  to 
1815  was  a  death  grapple  of  giants,  in  which  measures  were 
passed  from  immediate  necessity  and  with  little  reference  to 
the  law  of  nations,  to  the  rights  of  neutrals,  or  even  to  ulti¬ 
mate  self-interest. 

By  1805,  Great  Britain  was  utilizing  her  sea  power  to 
cut  off  importations  from  enemy  colonies,  and  American 
vessels  plying  between  West  Indian  or  other  colonies  and 
ports  under  Napoleon’s  control  were  confiscated.  A  tem¬ 
porary  relief  came  in  1806  with  the  death  of  Britain’s  great 
war  minister,  William  Pitt.  The  reins  of  power  descended 
upon  Charles  James  Fox,  a  known  friend  of  America,  and 
the  brief  period  of  his  administration,  from  January  to 
September,  1806,  witnessed  a  relaxation  favorable  to  neu¬ 
trals.  The  coast  of  Europe  from  the  mouth  of  the  Seine  to 
Ostend  remained,  nevertheless,  under  a  general  blockade,  and 
traders  from  enemy  ports  were  excluded  from  Brest  clear 
to  the  Elbe  River. 

Meanwhile,  on  the  Continent,  the  power  of  Napoleon 
was  reaching  its  zenith.  The  battle  of  Jena  had  made  him 
master  of  Prussia.  Overtures  from  Alexander  indicated 

1  This  only  semi-independent  position  of  the  United  States  was  recog¬ 
nized  by  British  merchants.  Cf.  a  letter  from  Wm.  Murdock,  London, 
July  24,  1808,  quoted  by  the  National  Intelligencer  and  the  Frankfort, 
Kentucky,  Palladium,  November  3,  1808. 

2  The  Edinburgh  Reviezv,  XII.  243,  April,  1808.  “Neither  the  gov¬ 
ernment  nor  the  populace  of  this  country  have  forgiven  America  for 
having  made  herself  independent ;  and  the  lowest  calumnies  and  grossest 
absurdities  are  daily  employed  by  a  court  faction  to  keep  alive  the  most 
vulgar  prejudices.” 


BRITISH  POLITICS  AND  EMBARGO  255 


peace  in  the  East,  and  the  tyrant  of  the  land,  now  free  of 
opposition,  confronted  the  mistress  of  the  seas.  Accord-j 
ingly,  in  November,  1806,  Napoleon  issued  the  Berlin  De-' 
cree.  Intended  as  retaliation,  it  quite  outstripped  the  British 
blockade  in  its  defiance  of  neutral  rights.  The  blockade  by 
Great  Britain  was  at  least  partially  effective.  The  actual 
presence  of  large  British  naval  forces  was  the  justification 
for  what  the  law  of  nations  has  always  recognized,  the  right 
of  a  belligerent  actually  to  exclude  the  ships  of  neutrals 
from  ports  under  blockade.  Not  so  with  Napoleon’s  paper 
decree.  A  sweep  of  the  imperial  pen  was  far  from  being 
a  genuine  blockade  of  the  British  Isles,  capable  of  rendering 
all  American  or  other  neutral  traders  with  Great  Britain 
legally  subject  to  capture.  Warships  could  alone  give  legal 
sanction  to  so  sweeping  a  measure,  and  warships  Napoleon 
did  not  have.  His  Berlin  Decree  might  have  been  mere 
sound  and  fury,  had  not  Britain  herself  lent  it  real  effect  by 
her  own  measures  of  reprisal. 

These  were  the  celebrated  Orders  in  Council  of  Janu¬ 
ary  7  and  November  11,  1807. 3  They  were  the  device  of 
the  Duke  of  Portland’s  ministry,  which  succeeded  to  the 
helm  after  a  lenient  Catholic  policy  and  an  injudicious  man¬ 
agement  of  the  treasury  had  overthrown  the  short-lived  gov¬ 
ernment  of  Lord  Grenville  and  his  “ministry  of  all  the  ta¬ 
lents.’’  Under  the  new  administration,  the  foreign  port¬ 
folio  fell  to  George  Canning,  the  disciple  of  Pitt,  and  the 

3  Hist.  MSS  Comm.,  Fortescue  MSS,  p.  143,  November  7,  1807.  “In 
mine  of  yesterday,  I  omitted  to  mention  that  a  long  proclamation  is 
preparing  and  will  be  immediately  issued,  to  put  all  the  coasts  and  col¬ 
onies  of  nations  at  war  with  us  under  a  general  blockade.  This  is  to  be 
grounded  on  Buonaparte’s  proclamation,  on  the  effect  which  he  is  giving 
to  it,  and  on  the  acquiescence  of  other  countries  in  that  mode  of  hostili¬ 
ties.  It  is  evident — that  it  removes  the  principal  motive  which  the 
Americans  might  have  had  for  remaining  at  peace  with  us ;  and  it  is 
equally  evident  that  it  increases  at  the  moment,  the  difficulties  and  dis¬ 
tresses  of  our  manufactures”,  etc. 


256  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


policy  sponsored  by  him  was  one  of  vigor.1 * * 4  That  this 
increased  as  months  rolled  by  appears  in  the  character  of  the 
two  proclamations.  That  of  January  merely  forbade  neu- 
trals  to  trade  between  the  ports  of  France  and  her  allies 
or  dependencies.  That  of  November,  Jn_ admitted  violation 
of  international  law,5  created  a  paper  blockade  of  all  ports 
under  French  contro).  In  excuse,  it  was  urged  that  France 
had  already  set  the  example.  But  the  rigors  of  this  Novem¬ 
ber  Order  were  to  be  remitted  to  all  neutral  vessels  which 
stopped  first  at  English  ports  and  paid  a  British  import  duty. 
Armed  with  a  certificate  of  this  virtuous  act,  the  neutral 
might  proceed  whithersoever  he  would,  even  into  the  harbors 
of  France.  It  only  remained  for  Napoleon  to  declare  that 
ships  submitting  to  the  Orders  were  lawful  prey,  and  neutral 
commerce  in  Europe  would  cease.  This  he  did  by  the  Milan 
Decree  of  December,  1807.  It  was  under  these  circum¬ 
stances  that  the  United  States  enacted  the  embargo  law.6 * 8 
In  the  very  complicated  situation  thus  presented,  it  is  of 
interest  to  trace  the  various  currents  of  opinion  which  con¬ 
tended  for  mastery  in  British  politics. 

Inasmuch  as  the  policy  which  sponsored  the  Orders  found 
the  support  necessary  to  continue  them,  it  may  be  assumed 
that  the  majority  of  the  nation  was  committed  to  their  inter- 

1  The  opposition  lost  no  opportunity  to  ridicule  this  vaunted  vigor.  Cf. 

Hist.  MSS  Comm.,  Fortescue  MSS,  p.  158.  Auckland  to  Grenville,  De¬ 
cember  9,  1807.  “I  am  sure  that  much  of  the  mischief  might  have  been 
avoided  by  a  system  of  more  sense  and  less  vigour.  I  really  see  no 

reasonable  chance  of  emerging  with  honor  or  even  with  safety  from 

the  situation  in  which  we  are  placed.”  See  also  ibid.,  pp.  143,  155. 

5  For  British  definition  of  rights  of  blockade  under  international  law, 
cf.  Edinburgh  Review,  XII.  229-230,  April,  1808.  “That  a  general 
blockade  of  ports  not  actually  watched  or  invested  is  contrary  to  the  law 

of  nations  and  totally  ineffectual  as  against  neutrals  is  settled  by  the 
uniform  decisions  of  our  own  courts,  even  in  the  present  war.”  The 

writer  then  refers  to  Charles  Robinson,  Admiralty  Reports,  I.  154.  The 
reference  is  careless.  I.  92-94  is  more  in  point. 

8  Hist.  MSS  Comm.,  Fortescue  MSS,  p.  158,  December  9,  1807. 
Auckland  to  Grenville.  “In  the  present  temper  of  the  United  States  it 
seems  probable  that  they  will  enter  into  the  struggle  of  self  privation 
and  will  suspend  the  commerce  which  we  profess  to  interrupt.” 


BRITISH  POLITICS  AND  EMBARGO  257 


est.  Such  a  view  would  ignore,  however,  the  opposition, 
which  in  Parliament  was  vigorous,  notwithstanding  the  fact 
that  the  proletariat,7  the  class  on  whom  the  Orders  and  Em¬ 
bargo  chiefly  bore,  was  not  as  yet  represented  at  West¬ 
minster.  Division  of  opinion,  therefore,  was  presumably 
more  even  than  parliamentary  majorities  would  indicate.  Let 
us  consider  first  opinion  favorable  to  the  government. 

As  the  first  aggressive  successor  to  the  war  ministry  of 
William  Pitt,  the  government  was  certain  of  the  royal  sup¬ 
port,  on  nothing  more  cheerfully  bestowed  than  upon  anti- 
American  measures.  And  Parliament  opened  in  1808  particu¬ 
larly  warm  in  its  expression  of  attachment  to  the  sovereign. 
The  moderation  of  his  Majesty’s  conduct  in  apologizing  for 
the  Chesapeake  Affair  was  lauded  ;8  the  wisdom  of  his  refusal 
to  permit  “the  question  which  has  arisen  out  of  this  Act  to 
be  connected  with  any  Pretensions  inconsistent  with  the 
Maritime  Rights  of  Great  Britain,”  was  extolled,  and  his 
unceasing  efforts  “to  preserve  the  Relations  of  Peace  and 
Friendship  between  the  Two  Countries’’  were  proclaimed.9 

Having  testified  to  its  loyalty,  Parliament  proceeded  to 
more  serious  business.  In  the  debates  which  followed  con¬ 
cerning  the  merits  and  wisdom  of  the  Orders  in  Council, 
the  government  insisted  upon  their  retaliatory  nature,  em¬ 
phasized  French  culpability  for  any  infraction  of  inter¬ 
national  law,  and  represented  the  Orders  as  the  knell  of 
French  commerce.  Through  Lord  Hawkesbury,  the  min¬ 
istry  alleged  that  the  American  embargo  was  decreed  prior 
to  any  possible  knowledge  of  the  Orders  in  Council,10  a 

7  Henry  Adams,  History  of  the  United  States,  IV.  330.  “Probably 
at  least  five  thousand  families  of  working  men  were  reduced  to  pauper¬ 
ism  by  the  embargo  and  the  decrees  of  Napoleon,  but  these  sufferers, 
who  possessed  not  a  vote  among  them  and  had  been  in  no  way  party 
to  the  acts  of  either  government,  were  the  only  real  friends  whom  Jef¬ 
ferson  could  hope  to  find  among  the  people  of  England.” 

8  Journals  of  the  House  of  Lords,  XLVI.  409,  b,  January  21,  1808. 

8  Ibid. 

10  Hansard,  Parliamentary  Debates,  1st  Ser.,  X.  1241,  March  22,  1808. 


258  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


prime  point,  to  grant  which  would  be  to  deprive  the  critics  of 
their  sharpest  arrow,  since  no  evils  arising  from  the  embargo 
could  be  logically  imputed  to  a  measure  which  it  antedated.11 

This  argument,  though  rung  in  all  its  changes  by  the 
speakers  for  the  government,  counts  for  little  when  the 
facts  which  surrounded  the  action  of  the  American  Con¬ 
gress  between  December  eighteenth  and  twenty-second  are 
correctly  viewed.12  But  the  ministry  had  more  than  a 
purely  technical  basis  for  action.  Napoleon  must  be  fought 
with  his  own  weapons,  and,  if  America  suffered,  why  should 
she  not?  In  its  whole  attitude,  then  and  afterwards,  the 
government  was  typically  and  stubbornly  British.  Disaster 
beat  vainly  against  it.  Even  the  debacle  of  Sir  John  Moore 
at  Corunna  served  only  to  temper  the  national  steel.  The 
Marquis  of  Buckingham,  a  member  of  the  opposition,  wrote: 

I  have  no  idea  that  it  will  produce  on  the  King’s  mind  any  one  im¬ 
pression  save  that  of  increased  obstinacy  which  he  will  call  firmness, 
and  to  his  ministers,  it  will  only  suggest  the  increased  necessity  of 
standing  by  each  other.  And  this  course  will  succeed  to  them  as 
long  as  the  present  Parliament  lasts,  who  will  most  certainly  sup¬ 
port  the  King’s  footman  if  he  should  be  put  at  the  head  of  the 
Government.13 

11  Canning  pressed  this  same  point  with  energy  throughout  the  con¬ 
troversy.  Cf.  his  letter  to  Pinkney  of  November  22,  1808,  in  American 
State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  III.  239. 

u  See  Henry  Adams  (Ed.),  Documents  Relating  to  New  England 
Federalism,  p.  188.  “The  first  decision  of  a  French  tribunal  condemning 
an  American  vessel  and  cargo  under  the  Berlin  decree,  and  an  unofficial 
account  of  the  British  Order  in  Council  of  11th  November,  1807,  were 
received  by  Mr.  Jefferson  on  the  17th  December,  1807.” 

See  also  The  Writings  of  John  Quincy  Adams,  III.  186,  January  10, 
1808;  also  III.  197;  and  III.  282-3.  John  Quincy  Adams  III.  186,  to 
Governor  Thomas  Sullivan,  January  10,  1808.  "There  was  all,  but  offi¬ 
cial  intelligence  that  the  British  king  had  issued  a  retaliatory  proclama¬ 
tion  to  counteract  that  of  France  and  of  equal  extent,”  III.  197.  “It  is 
indeed  true  that  these  orders  were  not  officially  communicated  with  the 
President’s  message  recommending  the  embargo.  They  had  not  been 
officially  rceived.  But  they  were  announced  in  several  paragraphs  from 
London  and  Liverpool  papers  of  the  10th,  11th  and  12th  of  November, 
which  appeared  in  the  National  Intelligencer  of  18th  December.”  Also 
the  Edinburgh  Review,  XIV.  447-448. 

Grenville  took  the  same  view  as  John  Quincy  Adams.  Cf.  Hansard, 
Parliamentary  Debates,  1st  Ser.,  X.  1280,  March  29th,  1808. 

13  Hist.  MSS  Comm.,  Fortescue  MSS,  p.  273,  January  25-31,  1809. 


BRITISH  POLITICS  AND  EMBARGO  259 


The  ministry  really  was,  however,  on  strong  ground. 
Confident  of  the  temper  of  the  country,  and  certain  of  its 
majority,  it  was  wedded  to  a  policy  which  it  believed  to  be 
dictated  by  necessity,  and  which  it  saw  no  occasion  to 
abandon.  The  embargo  might  be  working  hardship  upon  the 
country  and  creating  corresponding  ammunition  for  The  op- 
position.  But  what  the  opposition  magnified  at  home,  the 
ministry  exploited  abroad.  It  could  match  poverty  and  dis¬ 
content  in  the  cotton  districts  with  similar  poverty  and  more 
highly  organized  discontent  in  New  England.  Far  from 
repenting,  therefore,  Mr.  Canning  indulged  in  one  of  his 
most  tantalizing  satires,  when,  in  September,  1808,  after 
nine  months  of  the  embargo,  he  assured  Mr.  Pinkney,  the 
American  minister  at  London,  that : 

His  Majesty  would  not  hesitate  to  contribute  in  any  manner  in  his 
power,  to  restore  to  the  commerce  of  the  United  States,  its  wanted 
[Mr]  activity:  and  if  it  were  possible,  to  make  any  sacrifice  for  the 
repeal  of  the  embargo,  without  appearing  to  deprecate  it  as  a 
measure  of  hostility,  he  would  gladly  have  facilitated  its  removal 
as  a  measure  of  inconvenient  restriction  upon  the  American  people.14 

u  American  Stale  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  III.  231-232,  September 
23,  1808.  For  a  sober  and  commonsense  verdict  on  Canning’s  facetious¬ 
ness,  see  Hist.  MSS  Comm.,  Fortescue  MSS,  p.  277.  Buckingham  to 
Grenville,  February  12,  1809.  “I  enclose  to  you  my  proxy  on  your 
American  question,  hoping  sincerely  that  you  will  grapple  to  the  fullest 
extent  with  Mr.  Canning’s  epigrammatic  letter  to  Mr.  Pinkney  which 
states  distinctly  the  present  course  of  proceeding  towards  America,  as 
necessary  for  the  purpose  of  showing  that  England  can  do  without  that 
branch  of  commerce !  an  assertion  very  questionable  in  point  of  fact,  and 
highly  indecorous  even  if  true.  Her  embargo  has  proved  a  very  im¬ 
portant  and  ruinous  measure,  and  I  verily  believe  her  nonintercourse 
bill  will  be  equally  insufficient  as  a  measure  of  offence  to  us,  or  of  secur¬ 
ity  to  her;  but  this  does  not  change  the  question  as  to  the  folly  of  our 
Orders  in  Council,  or  as  to  the  insanity  of  Canning’s  refusal  to  negotiate, 
which  ultimately  must  bring  us  to  a  state  of  actual  war,  in  which  our 
commercial  interests  all  over  the  world  have  everything  to  lose,  and  in 
which  we  can  gain  nothing.” 

See  also  Memoirs  of  the  Court  and  Cabinets  of  George  III,  IV.  293. 
Mr.  T.  Grenville  to  the  Marquis  of  Buckingham,  December  31,  1808. 
Canning  in  his  reply  to  Pinkney  "rests  his  objection  entirely  upon  the 
ground  that  if  we  adopt  this  proposal  of  conciliation,  Bonaparte  will 
say  we  did  it  because  we  could  not  abide  the  pressure  of  the  embargo ; 
so  that  the  American  and  English  merchants  are  gravely  told  that  their 
-ware-houses  are  shut  and  their  commerce  is  suspended,  not  from  any 


260  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


Canning’s  flippancy,  when  related  to  the  general  situa¬ 
tion,  is  intelligible  enough.  To  him  the  Orders  were  but 
an  incident  in  the  war  against  Napoleon;  their  American 
reaction,  only  a  by-product.  And  a  letter  written  by  one 
of  his  political  enemies,  in  its  subordination  of  the  American 
situation  to  other  considerations,  really  sustains  the  foreign 
minister.  “Les  grands  poissons  mangent  les  petits.  The 
Spanish  anxieties  have  swallowed  up  all  attention  to  the 
mad  mismanagement  respecting  Sweden  and  America;  and 
under  this  impression,  I  do  not  plague  you  with  some  long 
letters  from  America  and  from  Ireland,  which  have  been 
transmitted  to  me  from  Liverpool  respecting  the  sufferings 
of  the  linen,  cotton  and  other  trades.”15  It  thus  appears 
that  whatever  their  economic  significance,  from  a  political 
point  of  view  these  local  discouragements  were  decidedly 
secondary. 

Irrespective  of  logic,  the  Orders  existed  by  the  determined 
will  of  a  powerful  government.  Yet  with  a  vigorous  and 
intelligent  opposition  making  these  same  Orders  the  theme 
of  its  constant  attack,  more  than  a  simple  fiat  lex  was  need¬ 
ful.  The  government  was  obliged  to  defend  its  course.  The 
ablest  defence  of  the  Orders  in  Council  was  put  forth  in 
March,  1809,  by  James  Stephen,  just  after  the  embargo  had 
been  voted  out  of  court.  Inasmuch  as  Orders  and  Embargo 
had  both  been  operative  for  more  than  a  year,  the  speaker 
possessed  some  perspective  as  to  conditions  at  the  time  of 
their  imposition  as  well  as  information  as  to  their  progress 
and  results.  Stephen’s  speech  is  entitled  to  consideration 
as  an  honest  exposition  of  the  point  of  view  held  by  the 
British  Ministry. 

object  of  interest  or  hostility  between  America  and  England,  but  for 
fear  that  Bonaparte  should  interpret  our  reciprocal  conciliation  into  a 
confession  of  uur  being  Unable  to  stand  against  the  American  embargo" 
is  not  this  below  par  lor  a  sixth  form  boy.'"’ 

15  Hist.  MSS  Comm.,  Fortescue  MSS,  p.  270.  Auckland  to  Grenville, 
January  1,  1809. 


BRITISH  POLITICS  AND  EMBARGO  261 


Though  ready  to  “do  much,  very  much,  to  avoid  a  quar¬ 
rel  with  America,”  Stephen  held  that  it  would  have  been 
oolish  to  “avoid  it  at  the  expense  of  ruin  to  our  manu- 
actures,  to  our  commerce,  and  our  maritime  power.”16 
Te  argued  that  it  was  idle  to  display  any  sentimental  leni- 
ncy  for  a  power  which  was  so  slow  to  resent  the  aggres¬ 
sions  of  France,  so  swift  to  retaliate  against  the  measures 
of  Britain.17  And  the  contention  that,  although  the  Berlin 
)ecree  preceded  the  Orders  of  November  in  point  of  time, 
ts  enforcement  was  delayed  until  both  were  practically 
ynchronous,18  he  refuted  by  citing  the  case  of  the  Horizon. 
This  American  vessel,  seized  in  a  French  port  in  September, 
1807,  was  only  one  of  many  proofs  that  the  Berlin  Decree 
was  in  actual  operation  against  America,  notwithstanding 
he  evasions  of  the  French  Minister  of  Marine19  and  the 
hypocrisies  of  Talleyrand20  in  affirming  that  America  was 
excepted  from  its  incidence.  He  contended  that  for  at  least 
wo  months  before  the  Orders  were  promulgated  the  Berlin 
Decree  was  an  active  menace  to  the  commerce  of  America  as 
well  as  that  of  Britain,  and  that  it  was  idle  to  pretend  that 
such  a  condition  was  unknown  in  Downing  Street  when 
he  Orders  were  finally  determined  upon.  “It  is  not,  there- 
ore,  on  the  case  of  the  Horizon,  or  any  other  particular 
captures,  that  our  justification  rests.  We  stand  on  a  much 
oroader  ground,  in  respect  of  the  actual  injury  sustained, 
f  actual  precedent  injury  was  necessary  to  justify  our  retali¬ 
atory  Orders.”21 

Moreover,  in  Stephen’s  opinion,  the  retaliation  was  not 
n  itself  vindictive.  “We  did  not  punish  neutrals,  as  has 
been  alleged,  for  the  Enemy’s  injustice;  we  only  prevented 

19  The  Speech  of  James  Stephen,  March  6th,  1809,  p.  47. 

"Ibid.,  p.  78. 

18  Hansard,  Parliamentary  Debates,  1st  Ser.,  X.  1280,  March  29,  1808. 

18  The  Speech  of  James  Stephen,  March  6,  1809,  p.  62. 

20  Ibid.,  p.  64. 

21  Ibid.,  p  57, 


262  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 

them  from  trading  freely  with  a  power  which,  in  violation 
of  the  rights  of  their  neutrality,  prohibited  them  from  trad¬ 
ing  with  us.”22 

In  the  judgment  of  its  friends,  the  policy  was  thus,  from 
its  very  inception,  amply  justified.  As  time  wore  on,  it 
became  imperative.  Indeed,  by  an  odd  turn  of  reasoning, 
Stephen  showed  that  the  Orders  were  a  necessary  compje- 
rjienttothe  embargo  itself,  equivalent  to  an  overseas  enforce¬ 
ment  of  American  law  upon  vessels  which  had  eluded  Ameri- 
can  port  authorities.: 

The  American  government,  in  resorting  to  a  general  Embargo,  took 
a  measure  which  was  certainly  to  a  great  degree  efficient.  It  is 
executed  in  the  ports  of  America  by  the  municipal  authorities  on 
shore.  But  when  an  Embargo  as  to  France,  or  as  to  any  particular 
country  is  spoken  of,  it  is  evident  that  though  the  term  is  retained, 
the  practical  nature  of  the  measure  is  entirely  changed.  It  becomes 
a  law,  not  against  sailing  from  the  ports  of  America,  but  against 
proceeding  to  certain  parts  of  Europe.  The  violations  of  it  are 
acts  not  done  at  home,  but  abroad:  acts  not  passing  under  the  eye  of 
the  American  port  officers,  and  not  capable  of  being  prevented  by 
their  authority,  or  by  the  aid  of  the  civil  magistrate.23 

It  may  be  noted  that  this  sophistry  proved  equally  serviceable 
to  Napoleon  when  he  undertook  to  seize  the  American  ves¬ 
sels^  in  his  ports. 

Having  established  to  his  own  satisfaction  the  wisdom 
and  necessity  of  the  original  Orders  in  Council,  Stephen 
proceeded  to  justify  their  continuance  in  force  after  America 
had  offered  to  bargain  for  their  removal.  He  contended  that 
the  overtures  of  Jefferson  looking  to  a  cessation  of  the  em¬ 
bargo  in  return  for  a  repeal  of  the  Orders  were  a  scheme 
to  get  something  for  nothing.  Remove  the  embargo,  and 
non-importation  would  still  remain.  Great  Britain  would 
recover  those 

imports  from  the  United  States,  which  the  American  people  are  dis¬ 
tressed  by  withholding,  and  the  want  of  which  is  now  ascertained 

22  The  Speech  of  James  Stephen,  March  6,  1809,  p.  59. 

53  Ibid.,  p.  82. 


BRITISH  POLITICS  AND  EMBARGO  263 


to  be  harmless  to  us  and  our  colonies;  but  the  greater  part  of  our 
export  trade  to  America  would  still  have  remained  prohibited.  This 
was  too  plainly  Mr.  Jefferson’s  design,  for  no  offer  is  made  to  repeal 
the  Non-importation  Act,  nor  is  any  power  to  remove  that  offensive 
obstacle  to  harmony  between  the  two  countries,  to  be  found  in  Mr. 
Pinckney’s  instructions.24 

This  being  the  case,  the  offer  of  the  Americans  to  withdraw 
their  embargo  only  too  well  merited  the  satire  which  Mr. 
Canning  bestowed  upon  it.  Far  from  sacrificing  inter¬ 
national  good  will  to  the  temptation  of  an  epigram,  Mr. 
Canning  was  playing  into  the  hands  of  the  New  England 
opposition,25  by  giving  them  a  new  weapon  to  use  against 
their  misguided  government.26 

The  situation  demanded  strong  remedies.  The  embargo 
was  no  light  matter.  In  the  opinion  of  many  Britons  and 
of  not  a  few  Americans,  it  amounted  to  an  alliance  between 
Jefferson  and  Napoleon.  In  Stephen’s  synopsis: 

If  then  the  neutral  rights  of  America  are  invaded,  as  with  all  due 
deference  for  General  Armstrong’s  authority,  I  maintain  they  clearly 
are,  by  the  seizure  of  her  ships  in  the  ports  of  France,  for  having 
merely  called  at,  or  being  destined  to,  a  port  in  the  British  dominions, 
the  effects  of  the  wrong,  and  of  the  submission  to  it  by  the  Amer¬ 
ican  Government,  are,  to  us  at  least,  of  no  trivial  kind.  They  give 
effect  to  a  plan  concerted  for  our  destruction,  and  which  otherwise 
could  not  possibly  succeed.27 

Or,  to  put  the  matter  in  even  less  unmistakable  language : 

In  a  word,  Sir,  the  public  law  maintained  by  the  President  of 
America  is  this:  The  sea  is  the  only  place  of  possible  offence  to 

24  The  Speech  of  James  Stephen,  March  6,  1809,  p.  89. 

25  Ibid.,  p.  78. 

26  William  Pinkney,  The  Life  of  William  Pinkney,  p.  192.  “There  is 
an  opinion  here,  that  we  are  likely  to  become  a  divided  people,  when  a 
rupture  with  Great  Britain  is  in  question ;  but  this  opinion  is  founded 
upon  such  American  publications  as  those  in  a  Boston  paper,  signed 
‘Pacificus’  and  upon  some  pamphlets  and  private  letters  of  a  similar 
character,”  January  7,  1808.  See  also  ibid.,  p.  213,  September  7,  1808. 
“They  are  so  misled  in  this  country  as  to  suppose  that  the  Embargo 
has  already  produced  very  formidable  discontent  in  America,  and  I  am 
mistaken  if  the  government  has  not  been  inclined  to  calculate  upon  that 
discontent  in  various  ways,  and  at  least  to  give  it  a  trial.”  Also  ibid., 
p.  241. 

27  The  Speech  of  James  Stephen,  March  6,  1809,  p.  97. 


264  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 

neutral  powers,  because  the  sea  is  governed  by  England ;  on  the 
Continent  everything  is  lawful,  because  the  Continent  is  in  the 
hands  of  Buonaparte.28 

The  speech  from  which  the  previous  quotations  were 
taken  is  a  model  of  clear  thinking.  It  is  perhaps  the  most 
convincing  expression  of  the  state  of  mind  which  dominated 
British  opinion  throughout  the  period  of  the  embargo.  It 
is  not  the  highest  or  broadest  possible  concept  of  the  duties 
and  opportunities  of  the  mistress  of  sea  power  in  her  rela¬ 
tions  with  neutrals  in  one  of  the  most  harassing  of  naval 
wars.  But  it  is  perfectly  intelligible.  And,  as  we  trace  the 
more  generous  and  probably  more  correct  views  of  the  op¬ 
position,  it  is  needful  to  remember  that  the  ideas  which 
Stephen  grouped  together  were  the  ideas  which  actually 
shaped  the  policy  of  the  government. 

The  opposition,  in  stating  its  side  of  the  case,  was  ham¬ 
pered  by  the  need  for  caution,  because,  after  all,  it  was 
British,  and  should  disaster  impend,  the  safety  of  the  state 
would  compel  a  united  front.  Its  strength  lay  chiefly  in  the 
ability  of  its  leaders.  Though  but  a  qualified  success  as 
prime  minister,  Lord  Grenville  possessed  the  wit  to  discover 
and  the  eloquence  to  proclaim  the  follies  of  his  successor. 
Liberal  opinion  dwelt  chiefly  with  the  Whigs,  and  the  ex- 
minister  retained  about  him  a  group  of  gifted  men,  not 
unworthy  to  be  called  an  “opposition  of  all  the  talents,”  so 
that,  when  challenged  by  the  legal  knowledge  of  Lord 
Erskine  and  Lord  Liverpool  or  confronted  by  the  sound 
sense  of  Lord  Auckland,  with  Lord  Grey  and  Lord  Hol¬ 
land29  as  weighty  reserves,  the  measures  of  the  government 

28  The  Speech  of  James  Stephen,  March  6,  1809,  p.  104. 

29  A  letter  from  Lord  Holland  to  Mr.  Pinkney  deserves  reprinting. 
“London,  June  1,  1808.  Dear  Sir: — From  fear  that  you  might  have 
thought  what  I  said  to  you  about  your  boy  a  mere  matter  of  form,  I 
write  again  to  you  after  I  have  talked  it  over  with  Lady  Holland,  to  say 
that  if  we  are  to  encounter  the  misfortune  of  a  war  with  America,  and 
upon  leaving  this  country,  you  should  wish  your  son  to  pursue  his  edu¬ 
cation  here,  Lady  Holland  and  myself  beg  to  assure  you,  that  without  the 


BRITISH  POLITICS  AND  EMBARGO  265 


faced  analysis  by  some  of  the  keenest  minds  in  England. 
Moreover,  the  great  reviews,  the  Edinburgh  and  the  Quar¬ 
terly,  as  well  as  an  important  section  of  the  press,30  could 
be  relied  upon  to  keep  the  opinions  of  liberals  before  the 
public.31 

The  Whigs  early  foresaw  that  the  Orders  in  Council 
offered  strategic  opportunities  as  the  opening  wedge  in  a 
general  attack.  “It  branches  into  all  the  more  important 
interests  external  and  internal ;  and  we  have  many  advan¬ 
tages  in  it.”32  They  made,  therefore,  a  most  lugubrious 
analysis  of  the  situation.  The  Orders  spelled  the  decline  of 
British  commerce,  the  prostration  of  Lancashire  manufac¬ 
tures,  and  war  with  America,33  such  a  war  as  would  thereby 
complete  “the  combination  of  the  whole  world  against  our 
country.”34  The  Edinburgh  Review 35  summed  up  the  case 

least  inconvenience  to  us,  we  can  take  care  of  him  during  the  holidays ; 
and  between  them  ascertain,  that  he  is  going  on  properly  and  give  you 
all  the  information  you  would  require  upon  the  progress  of  his  studies, 
state  of  his  health,  &c.  I  only  entreat  you  to  adopt  this  plan,  if  other¬ 
wise  agreeable  and  convenient,  without  scruple,  as  I  assure  you  we 
should  not  offer  it  if  we  did  not  feel  pleasure  in  the  prospect  of  its 
being  accepted.”  Pinkney,  The  Life  of  William  Pinkney,  p.  60. 

30  Cf.  Bell's  Weekly  Messenger,  quoted  by  the  Frankfort,  Kentucky, 
Palladium  for  April  29,  1808.  See  also  Palladium  for  October  27,  1808. 

31  Pinkney,  The  Life  of  William  Pinkney,  p.  198.  “.  .  .  the  dis¬ 
cussions  (through  the  Liverpool  papers  and  others)  by  which  the  vital 
importance  of  American  connection  and  intercourse  (and  even  of  that 
American  trade  which  their  late  orders  would  injudiciously  crush),  has 
been  demonstrated  to  all.” 

32  Hist .  MSS  Comm.,  Fortescue  MSS,  p.  173,  January  18,  1808. 
Auckland  to  Grenville. 

33  Ibid.,  p.  164,  January  1,  1808.  “It  is  a  silly  supposition  on  the  part 
of  those  who  persuade  themselves  that  a  country  will  not  go  to  war 
because  it  is  evidently  contrary  to  her  interests  to  go  to  war.”  Also  ibid., 
p.  178,  February  12.  “Private. — Mr.  Eden  has  seen  Mr.  Pinkney,  who 
privately  thinks  that  the  discussions  must  end  in  war;  and  has  no  ac¬ 
count  in  any  of  his  letters  of  the  instruction  which  Mr.  Monroe  is  to 
bring  him.  You  will  see  in  the  papers  the  President’s  message  on  the 
Orders  in  Council.”  Also  p.  179. 

34  Hansard,  Parliamentary  Debates,  1st  Ser.,  X.  933,  March  8,  1808. 

35  The  influence  of  the  Edinburgh  Review  upon  the  thinking  public  is 
alluded  to  by  Charles  Jared  Ingersoll,  A  View  of  the  Rights,  etc.,  p.  46, 
“To  these  lights,  the  Edinburgh  reviewers  and  the  evidence  of  the  most 
respectable  merchants  before  Parliament,  and  Lord'  Grenville’s  speeches, 


266  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 

in  a  pungent  critique  of  British  mistakes.36  It  acquitted 
America  of  acquiescence  in  the  French  usurpations37  and 
defended  submission  to  search  by  French  vessels  and  the 
possession  of  a  certificate  of  non-British  origin  of  cargo 
as  innocent.  It  warned  Britons  that  the  loss  of  American 
trade  would  bring  auxiliary  misfortunes  not  then  apparent, 
one  of  which  would  be  the  permanent  stimulus  of  American 
manufactures.  It  forecast  that  the  government  would  wholly 
fail  in  its  main  object  of  inciting  revolution  against  Napoleon 
and  would  succeed  only  in  alienating  the  sympathies  of  the 
Americans. 

Two  chief  points  of  attack  are  here  foreshadowed:  on 
the  one  hand,  commercial  and  industrial ;  on  the  other, 
diplomatic.  The  commercial  interests  at  stake  were  in  them¬ 
selves  very  great,  and  with  them  was  bound  up  the  ques¬ 
tion  of  foreign  exchange,  which  was  sure  to  be  complicated 
by  any  interference  with  the  American  balance,  to  disturb 
which  would  mean  the  outward  movement  of  gold.  Precise¬ 
ly  this  happened,  and,  at  a  time  of  unprecedented  financial 
stress,  the  operations  of  the  exchequer  were  hampered  by 
a  rise  in  gold  from  eight  shillings  per  ounce,  in  1807,  to 
one  hundred  and  ten  shillings  per  ounce  in  1813. 38 

A  serious  rise  in  the  price  of  gold,  besides  embarrassing 
the  treasury,  would  precipitate  discontent  among  the  masses 
through  the  low  price  for  wages  and  commodities.  Such 
discontent  did,  in  fact,  arise,  for  distress  among  the  work¬ 
ing  classes  was  widespread,  especially  in  the  industrial  dis- 

gave  an  effulgence  of  authenticity  that  flashed  conviction  upon  the  Eng¬ 
lish  nation,  and  was  reflected  back  on  their  ministers,  who  have  ever 
since  been  more  circumspect  than  they  were  before  in  their  deportment 
towards  this  country.” 

36  The  Edinburgh  Review,  April  1808,  XII.  230-245,  especially  article 
on  “Baring  and  others  on  the  Orders  in  Council.” 

37  See,  also,  Hist.  MSS  Comm.,  Fortescue  MSS,  p.  151,  November 
25,  1807. 

38  G.  W.  Porter,  The  Progress  of  the  Nation  (ed.  F.  W.  Hirst),  p. 
499. 


BRITISH  POLITICS  AND  EMBARGO  267 


tricts  of  the  north,  which  depended  largely  upon  American 
supplies.39 

In  an  effort  to  make  political  capital  out  of  these  embar¬ 
rassments,  the  Whigs  kept  a  close  eye  upon  conditions  in 
America.  They  weighed  the  relative  influence  of  Anglo¬ 
philes  and  Gallophiles ;  attended  the  disputes  over  the  slave 
trade  suppression,  Yazoo  lands,  and  Spanish  policy;  and 
noted  the  growing  opposition  within  the  Democratic-Repub¬ 
lican  ranks,  which  culminated  in  the  “Quid”  determination 
to  break  the  Jeffersonian  succession  in  favor  of  Monroe. 
In  their  survey  of  American  political  life,  they  exaggerated 
the  importance  of  John  Randolph  and  his  views.  The 
striking  figure  of  the  Virginia  eccentric  lent  a  glamour  to  his 
utterances  out  of  all  proportion  to  their  importance,  and  the 
foremost  periodical  of  the  day,  the  Edinburgh  Review,  con¬ 
descended  to  analyse  his  opinions : 

The  speech  of  Mr.  Randolph  is  certainly  the  production  of  a  vigor¬ 
ous  mind.  It  abounds  in  plain  and  striking  statements,  mixed  with 
imagery  by  no  means  destitute  of  merit,  though  directed  by  an 
exceedingly  coarse  and  vulgar  taste.  But  his  arguments  and  opin¬ 
ions  are  of  more  importance  than  his  rhetorical  pretensions ;  for  he 
speaks  the  sentiments  of  a  respectable  party  in  the  United  States.40 

Analysis  of  Randolph’s  speech  revealed  his  unity  with 
the  New  England  Anglophiles  and  contributed  to  that  extent 
in  misleading  Great  Britain  as  to  the  actual  American  point 
of  view.  In  1807,  Randolph  was  for  avoiding  a  rupture  with 
England  on  the  ground  that  American  interests  were  really 
less  endangered  in  1806  than  in  1793.  He  held  “that  the 
only  barrier  between  France  and  a  universal  dominion  be¬ 
fore  which  America  as  well  as  Europe  must  fall,  is  the 

Pinkney,  The  Life  of  William  Pinkney,  p.  224.  “The  embargo  and 
the  loss  of  our  trade  are  deeply  felt  here,  and  will  be  felt  with  more 
severity  every  day.  The  wheat  harvest  is  likely  to  be  alarmingly  short, 
and  the  state  of  the  continent  will  augment  the  evil.  The  discontents 
among  their  manufacturers  are  only  quieted  for  the  moment  by  tem¬ 
porary  causes.  Cotton  is  rising  and  soon  will  be  scarce.” 

40  The  Edinburgh  Review,  October,  1807,  XI.  2,  3. 


268  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


British  navy.”  He  riddled  the  inconsistency  of  those  who 
would  bluster  at  England  and  truckle  to  Spain.  He  paid  his 
respects  to  the  clamorous  traders  of  the  seaport  towns — men 
“who  cannot  properly  be  said  to  belong  to  America” — 
and  he  dwelt  upon  the  ruin  which  would  follow  a  war  with 
England,  sufficient  to  make  “even  the  present  champions  of 
neutral  rights  repent  of  their  violence,  in  six  months  after 
they  should  drive  the  government  into  war.”41  For  a  man 
who  held  such  views  in  1807  to  come  round  to  their  opposite 
in  180842  was  a  useful  object  lesson  to  Whig  politicians  in 
the  deplorable  effect  of  the  Orders  in  Council  upon  Ameri¬ 
can  sentiment. 

The  diplomatic  aspect  of  the  Orders  was  quite  as  menac¬ 
ing  as  the  industrial.  It  involved  the  danger  of  war  with 
the  United  States,  because  to  subject  American  ships  to 
British  port  duties  before  allowng  them  to  proceed  added 
just  the  insult  to  injury  which  would  and  did  insure  retalia¬ 
tion,  and  thereby  constituted  a  blunder  of  the  first  magni¬ 
tude.  The  pressure  of  the  Napoleonic  wars  was  drawing 
toward  a  climax.  Great  Britain  stood  alone  in  Europe.  Her 
traditional  diplomacy  of  backing  a  coalition  of  weaker  na¬ 
tions  against  the  dominant  military  power  of  the  Continent 
had  been  shattered  by  the  humiliation  of  Austria,  the  con¬ 
quest  of  Prussia,  the  occupation  of  Spain  and  Portugal, 
and  the  peace  between  Napoleon  and  Russia.  The  principal 
weapons  still  in  British  hands  were  an  army  of  observation 
in  Spain,  the  achievements  of  which  were  not  as  yet  conspi¬ 
cuous,  and  the  command  of  the  seas.  The  latter  was  scarce¬ 
ly  threatened,  it  is  true,  by  even  a  naval  war  with  America. 
But  sound  statesmanship  would  conciliate  America  as  a 
possible  ally  on  the  one  element  promising  ultimate  victory, 
rather  than  force  her  into  a  hostility  best  calculated  to  pro- 

41  The  Edinburgh  Review,  October,  1807,  XI.  2,  3. 

42  Hist.  MSS  Comm.,  Fortescue  MSS,  January,  1808,  p.  164. 


BRITISH  POLITICS  AND  EMBARGO  269 


mote  Napoleon’s  objects.  By  alienating  the  last  friendly 
neutral,  Great  Britain  was  multiplying  her  enemies  at  a 
time  when  division  or  subtraction  would  have  yielded  better 
results. 

In  addition  to  the  practical  argument  which  has  been 
already  outlined,  the  Whig  opposition  possessed  a  certain 
sanction  in  British  constitutional  procedure  itself.  Apart 
from  their  international  significance,  the  Orders  in  Council 
represented  a  wartime  tendency  apparent  in  the  politics  of 
more  recent  days.  War  inevitably  requires  a  strengthening 
of  the  executive,  which,  in  England,  means  its  emancipation 
from  parliamentary  control.  Even  so  vital  a  decision  as 
that  to  seize  the  Danish  fleet  and  bombard  Copenhagen  was 
purely  executive.  Parliament  debated  it  afterward,  and  then, 
to  the  credit  of  the  nation,  made  a  vigorous  protest.  But  it 
was  already  a  fact  accomplished.  It  was  much  the  same  with 
the  Orders  in  Council.  They  were  issued  in  November  under 
ministerial  responsibility,  and  not  debated  by  Parliament 
until  January.  Facing  an  accomplished  fact,  in  an  hour 
of  national  crisis,  Parliament  did,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  sus¬ 
tain  the  government,  but  the  opposition  could  assume  the 
approval  of  conservative  believers  in  government  by  King, 
Lords,  and  Commons. 

Finally,  the  sadly  ignored,  but  not  wholly  forgotten, 
domain  of  international  law  contributed  its  quota  to  the 
argument  of  the  opposition.  It  is,  in  fact,  a  striking  feature 
of  the  debates  on  the  Orders  in  Council,  that  among  all 
the  arguments  of  expediency,  at  a  time  when  might  stalked 
abroad  with  mailed  fist,  perhaps  the  most  interesting  discus¬ 
sion  which  the  whole  question  elicited  was  one  of  abstract 
international  law.  Baron  Erskine  in  this  connection  de¬ 
serves  the  credit  for  a  championship  of  neutral  right  which 
accords  with  the  best  traditions  of  justice.43  He  maintained 

43  Hansard,  Parliamentary  Debates,  1st  Ser.,  X.  934-964,  March  8, 
1808. 


270  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 

repeatedly  that  the  law  of  nations  is  an  integral  part  of 
the  law  of  the  land,  and  declared  that  no  state  by  its  indi¬ 
vidual  action  can  alter  or  dispense  with  the  law  of  nations. 
He  upheld  the  right  of  neutral  nations  to  all  the  freedom 
of  commerce  granted  by  the  law  of  nations,  though  for 
belligerents  he  justified  the  right  of  effective  blockade,  and 
defended  the  visitation  of  neutrals  and  the  search  for  con¬ 
traband.  With  respect  to  America  in  particular,  he  found 
that  her  neutral  position  would  have  been  indeed  compro¬ 
mised  had  she  acquiesced  in  French  usurpation  of  her  rights, 
for  this  would  have  rendered  her  accessory  to  one  belligerent 
against  another.  But  the  protests  of  General  Armstrong  at 
Paris  had  insured  American  neutrality. 

Lord  Erskine  saw  in  formal  treaties  the  only  legal  depar¬ 
ture  from  the  law  of  nations.  It  was  on  this  point  that  he 
grounded  the  right  of  search.  Following  Lord  Liverpool, 
he  placed  the  British  doctrine  that  free  bottoms  do  not  make 
free  goods,  upon  the  strict  basis  of  international  law.  Amer¬ 
icans  and  other  neutrals  had  sought  to  subvert  these  by 
treaties.  Well  and  good  for  those  participating.  But  so 
long  as  England  refused  to  enter  into  such  an  agreement, 
she  stood  rock  strong  upon  international  law.  He  erected 
a  telling  argument  upon  this  foundation.  Since  England 
derived  such  immense  advantages  from  the  law  of  nations, 
her  cherished  right  of  search  being  solely  dependent  thereon, 
self-interest  urged  a  respect  for  the  law  in  its  entirety.  “For 
if  we  take  upon  ourselves  to  alter  the  public  law  to  suit  our 
own  convenience  without  the  consent  of  other  nations,  what 
is  to  prevent  other  nations  standing  upon  our  own  example, 
from  returning  back  the  new  principle  upon  us?”44 

Once  more  quoting  Liverpool,  he  deprecated  the  growing 
disrespect  towards  Grotius,  Puffendorf,  Bynkershoek,  Vattel, 
and  other  codifiers  of  international  principles,  and  defending 

44  Hansard,  Parliamentary  Debates,  1st  Ser.,  X.  955,  March  8,  1808. 


BRITISH  POLITICS  AND  EMBARGO  271 


the  sacredness  of  the  law,  he  denied  the  right  of  King  or 
even  Parliament  to  amend  it.  Only  an  emergency  could  jus¬ 
tify  the  King  in  an  embargo,  or  in  similar  acts,  for  the  rights 
of  neutrals  had  been  sacred  since  their  recognition  by  Magna 
Carta45  and  by  the  statutes  of  early  kings.46  Therefore,  he 
moved  resolutions  against  the  violation  of  these  ancient 
rights  by  the  recent  Orders  in  Council. 

The  economic,  diplomatic,  constitutional,  and  legal  argu¬ 
ments  which  have  just  been  indicated  as  the  arsenal  of  the 
opposition,  were  called  into  active  play,  and  though  it  is 
matter  of  history  that  the  ministry  stood  its  ground,  the  peo¬ 
ple  gritted  their  teeth,  and  the  Orders  were  enforced,  yet 
the  very  stubbornness  of  the  British  forms  an  interesting 
study  in  national  psychology,  one  that,  on  the  whole,  is  more 
flattering  to  the  resolution  than  to  the  intelligence  of  John 
Bull. 

To  one  Englishman,  at  least,  Lord  Holland,  the  contest 
demonstrated  that  Great  Britain  learned  nothing  and  for¬ 
got  nothing.  He  condemned  British  policy  as  an  ill-omened 
survival  of  the  spirit  which  had  caused  the  Revolution.  He 
lamented  that  there  were  any  “persons  determined  to  revive 
that  principle  of  American  revenue  which  lost  that  country 
forever  to  Great  Britain.’’47  He  regarded  it  as  beyond 
measure  deplorable  that  England  was  forfeiting  American 
good  will  at  the  very  time  when  it  was  most  needed  as  a 
counterpoise  to  Napoleonic  aggression.  He  suggested  the 
desirability  of  America  as  an  ally  “whilst  G.  Britain  held 
the  balance  between  the  new  and  the  old  world  and  enjoyed 
all  those  immense  advantages  which  must  result  from  such 
a.  commanding  situation.  The  measures  of  ministers,  how- 

45  Thirtieth  chapter. 

“Edward  III  and  Richard  II. 

47  Hansard,  Parliamentary  Debates,  1st  Ser.,  X.  1272,  March  29,  1808. 
Holland  also  blamed  Canning  for  the  failure  of  the  earlier  Monroe- 
Pinkney  negotiations  which  resulted  in  a  treaty  so  unsatisfactory  that 
Jefferson  refused  to  present  it  to  Congress.  See  ibid.,  p.  1273. 


272  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


ever,  forbad  [Me]  this  pleasing  prospect,  and  threatened  us 
with  a  war  with  those,  from  whose  increasing  prosperity  we 
might  otherwise  derive  the  most  solid  advantages.”48 

Notwithstanding  its  failure  to  win  Parliament~by  these 
melancholy  considerations,  the  opposition  received  from  the 
British  public  a  livelier  response  than  it  had  anticipated. 
Discontent  became,  in  fact,  too  rampant  for  the  opposition 
to  sponsor.  Moreover,  the  growing  tension  with  America 
threatened  political  isolation  to  those  who  doubted  British 
wisdom.  The  political  scene  shifted,  too,  with  unexpected 
opportunities  for  British  advantage  in  Spain  and  her  colo¬ 
nies.  So  that,  by  May  of  1808,  the  leaders  of  his  Majesty’s 
opposition  showed  marked  symptoms  of  hedging.  They  were 
seeking  to  extricate  themselves  with  whatever  they  might 
preserve  of  dignity,  consistency,  and  due  regard  for  the 
witnesses  whom  it  had  formerly  served  their  purpose  to 
summon  before  Parliament. 

An  interesting  file  of  correspondence  illumines  this 
strategic  retreat.  The  confidential  adviser  of  Lord  Gren¬ 
ville  wrote  on  May  third  that : 

from  a  due  regard  to  the  merchants  and  manufacturers  who  came 
so  handsomely  forward  on  the  subject  of  the  Orders  in  Council,  we 
ought  to  have  a  solemn  and  efficient  debate.  We  are  on  excellent 
grounds  in  that  business,  and  I  know  that  the  Ministers  are  em¬ 
barrassed  by  it.  They  would  have  got  rid  of  it  if  America  had 
gone  to  war,  at  present  they  are  in  a  dilemma ;  they  must  either 
retract  an  absurd  measure  in  the  maintenance  of  which  they  are 
committed ;  or  they  must  risk  operation  with  increasing  distresses 
to  the  trade,  manufactures,  and  revenue,  to  a  degree  which  will  at 
last  awaken  the  whole  empire  from  a  stupid  apathy.49 

The  same  counsellor  reiterated  his  conviction  that : 

.  .  .  we  cannot,  with  due  regard  to  our  own  consistency,  suffer 

the  session  to  close,  without  exhibiting  so  strong  a  case  as  the 
merchants  have  established.  More  especially  as  I  have  reason 
(from  the  best  authority)  to  believe,  that  the  hope  of  any  early 

48  Hansard,  loc.  cit.,  pp.  1275-1276,  March  29,  1808. 

49  Hist.  MSS  Comm.,  Fortescue  MSS,  p.  198,  Auckland  to  Grenville, 
May  3,  1808. 


BRITISH  POLITICS  AND  EMBARGO  273 


accommodation  with  the  United  States,  which  was  for  a  moment 
entertained,  has  quite  disappeared.50 

Consistency  never  appears  so  dear  as  when  her  flight  is 
imminent,  and  the  solicitude  which  Lord  Auckland  here 
manifested  prepares  us  for  his  next  admission: 

Still  I  quite  agree  with  you  that,  under  the  apparent  circumstances 
of  the  two  countries,  we  cannot  debate  the  subject  [Orders  in  Coun¬ 
cil]  to  advantage;  and  yet,  having  had  so  many  preliminary  dis¬ 
cussions  with  confessed  advantage  in  argument  and  in  truth,  and 
having  called  to  our  bar  so  many  respectable  individuals  who  have 
established  a  case  of  great  strength  against  the  Orders  in  Council,  I 
certainly  feel  that  we  ought  to  avoid  every  possible  imputation  of 
deserting  so  good  a  cause.  If  you  can  suggest  any  decorous  and 
consistent  mode  of  getting  out  of  this  dilemma,  I  shall  personally  be 
most  glad  to  take  my  final  leave  of  the  session  next  Friday.51 

He  went  on  to  say  that  the  ministry  was  equally  desirous  of 
avoiding  debate,  some  of  its  members  being  disposed  even 
to  withdraw  the  Orders.  He  thought  he  found  in  the  delay 
of  the  quarterly  reports  from  the  treasury  a  loophole  of 
excuse  for  action  postponed  : 

Might  not  our  object  be  attained  with  due  decorum  before  the  debate 
on  Friday  next  by  my  taking  notice  that  the  accounts  of  the  5th 
April,  for  which  I  heretofore  moved,  have  not  yet  been  given;  I 
could  then  move  them  again  in  a  form  to  obviate  the  pretended 
cause  of  delay;  and  I  could  throw  out  a  few  remarks  which  might 
lead  you  to  postpone  for  the  present,  the  intended  motion  for  an 
address,  on  the  fair  presumption  that  the  Ministers  are  endeavour¬ 
ing  by  negotiation  or  otherwise  to  get  rid  of  measures  so  obviously 
ruinous  to  trade  and  revenue.52 

The  above  citations  are  a  revelation.  Superficially, 
they  denote  a  flabby  and  pusillanimous  vacillation  on  the 
part  of  the  best  minds  in  the  country.  But  at  heart  they  are 
the  incarnation  of  nationalism.  British  policy  might  be  un¬ 
just,  but  British  pride  demanded  that  it  be  enforced.  And 
the  Whigs,  like  Pilate,  felt  inclined  to  wash  their  hands  of 

60  Hist.  MSS  Comm.,  Fortescue  MSS,  p.  200,  May  18,  1808. 

“l  Ibid.,  p.  201.  Auckland  to  Grenville,  May  25,  1808. 

"  Ibid.,  May  25,  1808,  Auckland  to  Grenville. 


274  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 

all  responsibility.  “The  prosperity  of  the  whole  kingdom 
is  likely  to  be  destroyed  by  that  mad  measure  of  the  Orders 
in  Council;  but  nobody  cares  about  it,  and  we  have  per¬ 
formed  a  thankless  duty.”53 

So  long,  however,  as  they  continued  in  force,  the  Orders 
remained  a  natural  target  for  the  opposition.  The  attack  was 
accordingly  renewed  the  following  year.  Parliament  de¬ 
bated  the  wisdom  of  renewing  American  intercourse,  and 
resolutions  were  introduced  which  laid  great  stress  upon 
America’s  refusal  to  submit  to  the  French  Decrees,  “which 
acquiescence  was  the  only  ground  on  which  any  Right  could 
accrue  to  His  Majesty  to  interrupt  the  innocent  Commerce 
of  a  Neutral  Power.”54  The  commercial  losses  due  to  the 
embargo  were  represented  as  “particularly  calculated  in  the 
present  Crisis,  to  assist  the  Designs  of  our  Enemies,”55  and 
a  prayer  was  offered  for  a  speedy  resumption  of  intercourse. 
A  warm  debate  failed  to  pass  the  resolution,  and  the  nation 
remained  committed  to  a  policy  which,  in  the  words  of  a 
modern  Englishman,  “served  indeed  only  to  give  efficacy  to 
the  paper  blockade  of  Napoleon,  against  which  the  whole 
trading  community  of  the  world  would  have  been  arrayed 
but  for  the  notable  expedient  of  the  British  government.”58 

The  political  life  of  Great  Britain  during  the  American 
embargo  reveals,  as  the  preceding  pages  have  suggested,  a 
rather  formidable  opposition,  at  least  in  theory,  to  the 
Orders  in  Council  and  their  consequences,  but  an  opposition 
distinguished  by  clear  thinking  rather  than  by  resolute  action. 
The  explanation  for  such  quiescence  is  to  be  found  in  the 
peril  of  the  times.  The  members  of  the  opposition  were 
Englishmen  and  patriots,  and  their  country  was  shadowed  by 

53  Hist.  MSS  Comm.,  Fortescue  MSS ,  p.  206,  June  20,  1808. 

54  Journals  of  the  House  of  Lords,  XLVII.,  50,  a,  February  17,  1809. 

55  Ibid. 

56  G.  W.  Porter,  The  Progress  of  the  Nation  (ed.  by  F.  W.  Hirst), 
1912. 


BRITISH  POLITICS  AND  EMBARGO  275 


the  greatest  danger  since  the  Armada.  With  the  empire  at 
stake,  minor  issues  counted  little.  The  menace  of  Napoleon 
united  the  nation.  Differences  of  opinion  were  subordinated 
to  unity  of  action.  When  Great  Britain  made  it  a  point 
of  honor  to  uphold  the  Orders  in  Council  as  long  as  the 
Berlin  and  Milan  Decrees  remained  in  force,  calculations  of 
prudence,  the  wisdom  of  making  friends  rather  than  enemies, 
the  moral  impetus  of  international  law,  were  all  sacrificed 
to  an  imaginary  retaliation  against  Napoleon.  Add  to  na¬ 
tional  policy  the  personal  animus  of  a  ministry  unwilling 
to  see  its  pet  measure  discredited,57  and  only  the  direst 
economic  distress  could  be  expected  to  turn  the  scale.  But 
distress  of  such  magnitude  would  scarcely  develop  within 
one  year.  Only  an  equal  doggedness  in  America  could  put 
the  issue  to  a  fair  test,  and  signs  were  multiplying  that 
America  suffered  from  divided  counsels.  With  these  con¬ 
siderations  in  mind,  the  repeated  defeat  of  resolutions  aimed 
against  the  Orders  in  Council  is  not  surprising. 

51  The  Life  and  Correspondence  of  Rufus  King,  V.  99.  F.  Baring  to 
Rufus  King,  June  3,  1808.  .  .  .  “Unfortunately  there  is  a  degree  of 
false  shame  which  induces  many  to  persist  in  error,  rather  than  to 
acknowledge  it,  and  if  the  late  administration  with  ‘all  the  talents’  did 
not  succeed,  it  must  be  admitted  that  their  successors  did  not  posses 
[sic]  that  superior  intellect  which  enables  great  men  to  overcome 
prejudices.” 


CHAPTER  X 


BRITISH  INDUSTRY  AND  THE  AMERICAN  EMBARGO' 

When  Congress  voted  the  embargo,  recalled  our  ships,, 
and  forbade  them  to  leave  port,  it  forged  a  two-edged  weap¬ 
on.  Its  ostensible  purpose  was  protective.  The  Berlin  De^ 
cree  and  the  Orders  in  Council  made  neutral  sailing  precari¬ 
ous.  The  Milan  Decree,  soon  to  be  published,  made  it  well- 
nigh  impossible.  Prudence  demanded  the  recall  of  our 
shipping  before  it  fell  into  French  or  British  hands.  And; 
as  a  prudential  measure,  the  embargo  met  with  little  oppo¬ 
sition,  even  in  New  England,  where  it  was  soon  to  drive 
men  to  the  brink  of  secession.  As  a  measure  of  caution, 
however,  its  limitations  were  obvious.  The  losses  from  ships 
at  anchor,  docks  abandoned,  and  sailors  dispersed,  might 
soon  equal  the  risks  of  enemy  capture.  In  face  of  economic 
disaster,  the  embargo  could  be  justified  only  as  a  weapon 
of  offense,  and  this  latter  object  came,  as  time  wore  on,  to 
be  more  fully  recognized. 

Strangely  enough,  the  efficiency  of  the  embargo  as  a 
weapon  of  offense  has  received  little  attention.  Its  political 
and  economic  reactions  on  America  have  been  studied,  but 
these  concern  its  defensive  aspect.  The  real  clew  to  the  suc¬ 
cess  of  the  embargo  as  a  substitute  for  war  lies  overseas. 
How  did  it  affect  the  nations  against  which  it  was  aimed? 
France  one  may  dismiss  with  a  word.  The  British  blockade 
needed  no  embargo  to  aid  its  operations  against  Napoleon. 
But  for  Great  Britain  the  situation  is  more  complex.  True,, 
the  embargo  did  not  secure  the  concessions  which  it  sought. 
Nevertheless,  it  exerted  a  decided  pressure  upon  industrial 
life  in  Great  Britain.  The  measure  of  British  distress 
is,  accordingly,  one  measure  of  American  political  wisdom, 


t  276  ] 


BRITISH  INDUSTRY  AND  EMBARGO  277 


1808.  On  the  other  hand,  to  ascribe  all  the  misfortunes 
of  British  industry  in  1808  to  American  causes  would  be 
illacious.  The  Berlin  and  Milan  Decrees  were  in  operation 
t  iroughout  the  year,  and  the  former  of  these  was  already 
/oducing  an  effect1  before  the  non-intercourse  law  was 
evived  by  America,  and  the  embargo  enacted.2 

British  trade  gave  signs  of  disorder  as  early  as  August, 
307. 3  Nor  did  conditions  improve  as  autumn  advanced. 
Vriting  in  October,  Lord  Auckland,  an  opponent  of  the 
overnment’s  policies,  drew  a  lugubrious  picture  of  com¬ 
merce  in  decay : 

am  told  by  the  best  Custom  house  and  mercantile  authorities  that 
ur  exports  are  almost  totally  suspended,  and  that  our  imports  are 
radually  contracting ;  that  orders  for  manufactures  are  revoking ; 
id  that  not  only  our  European  trade  is  checked,  but  that  the  de- 
and  of  goods  for  the  United  States  is  interrupted.  If  this  account 
hould  be  in  any  degree  accurate,  it  will  soon  affect  not  only  the 
jstoms,  but  the  excise,  and  will  also  be  followed  by  much  individual 
d  istress.4 

iome  weeks  later,  in  the  same  vein,  he  predicted  that  unless 
rosperity  revived  before  spring,  the  manufacturing  towns 
/ould  be  clamoring  for  peace.5  When  the  Orders  in  Council 
/ere  published,  he  renewed  his  laments.6  In  fact,  the  more 

1  It  may  be  added  that  this  effect  long  outlasted  the  repeal  of  the 
embargo.  See  A.  Andreades,  History  of  the  Bank  of  England,  p.  xviii. 

’Thomas  Tooke,  A  History  of  Prices  and  of  the  State  of  Circulation 
rom  1793  to  1837,  I.  290,  attributes  the  distresses  of  the  time  to  the 
ombined  effects  of  French  and  American  enactments. 

*  William  Smart,  Economic  Annals  of  the  Nineteenth  Century,  I. 
55.  See  also  The  Speech  of  James  Stephens,  Esq.,  in  the  Debate  in  the 
louse  of  Commons,  March  6,  1809,  on  Mr.  Whitbread’s  Motion,  Rela- 
ive  to  the  Late  Overtures  of  the  American  Government ,  with  Supple¬ 
mentary  Remarks  on  the  Recent  Orders  in  Council,  pp.  11,  28,  32,  56. 

*  Hist.  MSS  Comm.,  Fortescue  MSS,  p.  140,  October  16,  1807.  Lord 
Auckland  to  Lord  Grenville. 

6  Ibid.,  p.  143,  November  6,  1807.  Lord  Auckland  to  Lord  Grenville. 

*  Ibid.,  p.  147,  November  17,  1807.  “My  private  belief  is  that,  so  far 
as  our  manufacturers  are  interested,  the  whole  of  this  measure  will 
operate  to  diminish  still  further  the  diminished  export ;  and  that,  so  far 
as  our  West  Indian  embarrassments  are  concerned,  they  must  be  aggra¬ 
vated  by  a  system  which  tends  to  lessen  the  consumption  and  to  increase 
he  accumulation  of  foreign  sugars.” 


278  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


he  reflected  upon  the  Orders,  the  more  disastrous  they 
appeared.  Quoting  French  authority,  he  foresaw  that  the 
rupture  of  commerce  must  automatically  create  or  stimulate 
manufactures  among  former  customers  of  Great  Britain,7 
while  those  at  home  confronted  nothing  but  depression,  with 
distress  in  Yorkshire,8  and  general  discontent  among  manu¬ 
facturers  and  importers.9 

Since  opposition  thrives  best  on  discontent,  Lord  Auck¬ 
land,  as  a  party  man,  may  have  been  less  melancholy  than 
the  picture  he  paints.  Certainly  he  and  his  associates  set 
themselves  cheerfully  to  the  task  of  gleaning  party  advant¬ 
age  from  complaints  of  merchants10  and  the  petitions  of 
malcontents.11  But  discounting  exaggerations  and  the  lim¬ 
ited  perspective  of  merchants,  manufacturers,  and  noble¬ 
men  of  the  opposition,  it  still  appears  that  the  industrial 
situation  at  the  close  of  1807  offered  a  fair  trial  to  the 
embargo.  Debates  in  Parliament,  articles  in  the  reviews, 
and  private  correspondence  alike  testify  to  the  reality  of  its 
pressure. 

Adi  these  sources  indicate  that  centers  of  manufactures 
/  and  commerce  were  first  to  feel  the  embargo.12  The  critical 
period  came  with  the  turning  of  the  year.  Protests  arose 
from  Manchester,  Liverpool,  and  London.13  In  the  March 
debates,  Parliament  was  reminded  of  the  cries  of  dis¬ 
tress  on  all  sides  and  regaled  with  a  vision  of  Liverpool 


7  Hist.  MSS  Comm.,  Fortescue  MSS ,  p.  153,  November  28,  1807. 
“The  Moniteur,  September  25,  1806,  says,  ‘La  prohibition  des  marchan- 
dises  etrangeres  de  cotes  que  vient  d’  ordonner  le  Gouvernement  ne  con- 
tribuera  pas  peu  a  nous  faire  obtenir  le  resultat  si  desirable  de  fabriquer 
nous  memes  la  totalite  des  articles  dont  nous  avons  besoin.”  Also  ibid., 
p.  279,  February  15,  1809. 

8  Hist.  MSS  Comm.,  Fortescue  MSS ,  p.  155,  December  5,  1807. 

8  Ibid.,  p.  158,  December  9,  1807. 

10  Ibid.,  p.  181,  March  1-6,  1808. 

u  Ibid.,  p.  182,  March  14,  1808. 

“Hansard,  Parliamentary  Debates,  1st  Ser.,  X.  March  8,  1808. 

13  Journals  of  the  House  of  Commons,  LXIII.  400,  b,  417,  a. 


BRITISH  INDUSTRY  AND  EMBARGO  279 


once  more  a  village,  its  glory  departed.14  No  time  was 
lost  in  conveying  to  America  reports  of  unparalleled  distress 
in  the  manufacturing  districts.15  America  was  told  that 
many  laborers  at  one  time  accustomed  to  a  guinea  a  week 
were  now  reduced  to  sweeping  the  streets  or  begging  their 
bread.16  These  accounts  were  probably  exaggerated  to 
meet  the  taste  of  their  hearers,  since  wages — at  least,  nomi¬ 
nal  wages — had  been  rising  for  the  past  six  years17  and  for 
artisans,  at  any  rate,  approached  their  maximum  in  1808. 18 
But  discounting  partisan  exaggeration  and  propaganda,  the 
condition  of  British  labor  in  the  face  of  a  present  shortage 
of  the  harvest,  and  a  prospective  shortage  of  the  raw  material 
for  industry,  was  far  from  enviable.  Its  protests,  never¬ 
theless,  went  unheeded.  When  the  shipping  and  commer¬ 
cial  classes  even  welcomed  the  withdrawal  of  the  last  great 
neutral  from  competition,  the  miseries  of  a  disfranchised 
and  inarticulate  proletariat  could  not  be  expected  to  sway 
the  policy  of  the  cabinet.  rGiant  petitions  from  the  manufac¬ 
turing  centers  against  enforcing  the  Orders  in  Council 
accordingly  served  no  real  purpose  other  than  to  bolster 
American  morale.19  New  Yorkers  learned  in  July  of  riots 
in  old  Yorkshire  in  which  ten  thousand  weavers  cursed  the 
price  of  bread  and  demanded  higher  wages,  refusing  to  dis¬ 
perse  until  several  hundred  of  their  number  lay  dead  in  the 
streets.20  Sixty  thousand  looms  were  said  to  be  idle. 

14  Journals  of  the  House  of  Commons,  LXIII.  957. 

16  Frankfort,  Kentucky,  Palladium,  June  23,  1808,  quoting  the  Rich¬ 
mond  Enquirer.  London  Nezvs  of  March  20. 

”  Ibid.,  London,  March  23. 

17  William  Smart,  Economic  Annals  of  the  Nineteenth  Century,  I. 
182. 

18  Thomas  Tooke,  A  History  of  Prices  and  of  the  State  of  Circulation 
from  1793  to  1837,  I.  288. 

18  Frankfort,  Kentucky,  Palladium,  May  19,  1808.  “Extract  from  a 
letter  of  an  American  gentleman  in  London  to  the  Editors  of  the  Bos¬ 
ton  Chronicle,  dated  March  12,  1808.” 

20  Ibid.,  August  25,  1808.  “Latest  from  England.  From  the  New 
York  Gazette,  July  29.” 


280  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 

Though  later  reports  pointed  to  some  improvement  and  some 
pay  increases,  discontent  was  slow  to  subside21  and  ceased  to 
be  a  factor  only  when  political  developments  in  Spain 
brought  new  energy  and  hope  to  the  entire  industrial  life  of 
the  nation.22 

The  intensity  of  suffering  in  the  crowded  centers 
throughout  the  winter  of  1807  and  1808  finds  testimony 
more  convincing  than  such  rumors  and  hasty  observations 
as  made  their  way  to  America,  in  the  statistics  of  the  poor 
rate.  This,  in  Manchester,  rose  in  the  embargo  year  from  an 
average  of  four  thousand  pounds  to  no  less  than  forty- 
nine  thousand  pounds.23  And  the  government  gave  official 
recognition  to  the  state  of  the  country  by  a  pledge  to  dis¬ 
tinguish  the  victims  of  want  from  mere  trouble  brewers 
“in  any  measures  which  the  excesses  of  the  misguided  may 
compel  us  to  take.”24  It  is  unnecessary  to  claim  for  the 
embargo  the  sole  sponsorship  for  all  this  wretchedness,  in 
order  to  maintain  that  it  was  a  factor  with  which  the  British 
system  had  distinctly  to  reckon. 

The  growth  of  misery  and  discontent  was  hastened  by 
industrial  concentration  and  the  failure  to  diversify  indus¬ 
try.  This  was  as  apparent  in  the  colonies  as  in  the  mother 
country.  Specialization  in  industry  accounted  for  the  eco¬ 
nomic  sensitiveness  of  Lancashire.25  Specialization  in  agri¬ 
culture  was  responsible  for  a  similar  sensitiveness  in  the 

31  Frankfort,  Kentucky,  Palladium,  September  1,  1808,  quoting  Eng¬ 
land,  June  9. 

23  William  Smart,  Economic  Annals  of  the  Nineteenth  Century,  says: 
“It  is  significant  of  the  new  hope  that  the  petitions  for  peace  from  the 
manufacturing  towns,  where  there  was  considerable  distress,  at  once 
came  to  an  end.  After  May  [1808]  England  had  again  a  large  seaboard 
open  to  her  commerce.” 

33  Hansard,  Parliamentary  Debates,  1st  Ser.,  XII.  1170. 

34  Speeches  of  the  Rt.  Hon.  George  Canning,  II.  360,  361,  June  24, 
1808. 

25  Hist.  MSS  Comm.,  Foriescue  MSS,  p.  252,  December  28,  1808. 
Lord  Auckland  to  Lord  Grenville. 


BRITISH  INDUSTRY  AND  EMBARGO  281 


West  Indies.  Both  British  and  French,  these  islands  were  de¬ 
voted  to  the  growth  of  sugar.  The  entire  economic  life  of  the 
colonies  centered  in  a  maximum  production  of  one  staple, 
and  starvation  impended  whenever  food  imports  were 
threatened.  The  embargo  menaced  chiefly  the  French  West 
Indies,  because  British  sea  power  cut  off  normal  communi¬ 
cation  from  France.  It  was  believed  that  they  must 
surrender  to  Great  Britain  or  starve.26  But  the  prospect  of 
having  more  islands  to  feed  was  a  doubtful  blessing.  The 
requirements  of  feeding  her  own  impelled  Britain  to  a 
royal  proclamation27  exempting  from  interruption  neutral 
carriers  of  lumber  and  provisions  bound  for  the  colonies 
in  the  West  Indies  or  South  America,  even  where  the  ab- 
sense  of  clearance  papers  indicated  a  defiance  of  the  embargo. 

This  official  bid  to  American  lawlessness  was  followed 
by  an  act  of  Parliament  opening  the  door  to  that  free  trade 
between  America  and  the  West  Indies  which  was  not  to 
come  in  its  fullness  until  Van  Buren’s  time.  For  the  present, 
the  route  was  to  be  circuitous.  A  free  importation  of  rice, 
grain,  and  flour  was  invited  direct  “from  any  Foreign  Colo¬ 
nies  on  the  Continent  of  America.”28  Florida,  of  course, 
was  meant.  But  the  United  States  were  privileged  to  send 
goods  “into  the  British  Provinces  in  North  America”  for 
reexport  to  the  islands. 

Such  allurements  did  double  service.  They  opened  ports 
to  needed  goods  and  rallied  American  renegades  to  a  viola¬ 
tion  of  their  country’s  laws.  Among  these,  Aaron  Burr 
appears  in  a  characteristic  role.  The  peregrinations  of  Burr 
had  brought  him,  in  1808,  to  Nova  Scotia,  and  his  name 

20  Bell’s  Weekly  Messenger,  quoted  in  the  Frankfort,  Kentucky,  Pal¬ 
ladium,  April  29,  1808. 

37  Dated  Windsor,  April  11,  1808.  See  American  State  Papers,  For¬ 
eign  Relations,  III.  281. 

38  Journals  of  the  House  of  Commons,  LXIII.  466,  b,  June  17,  1808. 
See  p.  464  for  royal  assent,  June  23,  1808. 


282  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


was  associated  with  an  especially  alluring  bait  for  New  Eng¬ 
landers  chafing  under  commercial  fetters.  The  items  listed 
by  official  proclamation  as  welcome  in  the  ports  of  Nova 
Scotia  are,  at  any  rate,  worthy  of  Burr’s  capacity  as  a 
tempter — “staves,  plank  and  square  timber,  boards  and  scant¬ 
ling,  bread,  biscuit,  flour,  peas,  beans,  wheat,  barley,  oats, 
Indian  corn,  grain,  seeds,  and  meal  of  all  kinds;  also  tobacco, 
pitch,  tar,  turpentine,  salted  beef  and  pork,  bacon,  hog’s 
lard,  butter,  onions,  fruit,  etc.,  from  the  United  States  of 
America  and  from  the  Azores,  or  western  islands.”29 

Commercial  inducements  like  those  offered  in  the  West 
Indies  and  Nova  Scotia  proceeded  from  no  friendly  motive. 
But  with  the  data  at  hand  it  is  not  easy  to  determine  which 
of  two  arguments  prevailed,  the  pinch  of  necessity  or  a  will 
to  undermine  American  solidarity.  Doubtless  it  was  both. 
The  needs  of  the  West  Indies  were  real.  And  New  Eng¬ 
land  restiveness  was  well  known.  Whatever  the  object, 
the  opportunity  of  British  colonial  trade  was  a  distinct  con¬ 
cession  to  the  embargo. 

The  necessity  of  such  a  concession  was  less  apparent  in 
the  summer  than  in  the  early  spring  of  1808,  because  events 
which  no  one  could  foresee  when  the  embargo  was  laid  had 
shaped  themselves  toward  its  defeat.  These  centered  about 
the  Spanish  struggle  for  liberty.  Great  Britain,  as  the 
champion  of  Spanish  freedom,  was  the  heir  to  Spanish  com¬ 
merce.30  And  the  possibilities  of  an  El  Dorado  combined 
with  existing  high  prices,  due  to  a  threatened  curtailment 
of  needed  supplies,31  to  create  a  furor  of  speculation.  Credit 

”  Frankfort,  Kentucky,  Palladium,  August  4,  1808,  quoting  from  the 
A urora. 

30  A.  Andreades,  History  of  the  Bank  of  England,  p.  219. 

31  Thomas  Tooke,  A  History  of  Prices  and  of  the  State  of  Circulation 
from  1793  to  1837,  I.  292. 


BRITISH  INDUSTRY  AND  EMBARGO  283 


was  greatly  expanded,32  and  a  huge  exportation  of  goods 
created  the  appearance  of  an  economic  revival  not  warranted 
by  the  character  of  the  trade,  which  was  highly  speculative. 
Brazil  participated  in  this  commercial  boom,  and  a  traveler 
in  Rio  de  Janeiro  recorded  at  the  time : 

that  more  Manchester  goods  were  sent  out  in  the  course  of  a  few 
weeks  than  had  been  consumed  in  the  twenty  years  preceding ;  and 
the  quantity  of  English  goods  of  all  sorts  poured  into  the  city  was 
so  very  great  that  warehouses  could  not  be  provided  sufficient  to 
contain  them ;  and  that  the  most  valuable  merchandise  was  actually 
exposed  for  weeks  on  the  beach  to  the  weather,  and  to  every  sort  of 
depredation.  Elegant  services  of  cut  glass  and  china  were  offered 
to  persons  whose  most  splendid  drinking  vessels  consisted  of  a  horn, 
or  the  shell  of  a  cocoanut ;  tools  were  sent  out,  having  a  hammer  on 
the  one  side  and  a  hatchet  on  the  other,  as  if  the  inhabitants  had 
had  nothing  more  to  do  than  to  break  the  first  stone  that  they  met 
with,  and  then  cut  the  gold  and  diamonds  from  it ;  and  some  specu¬ 
lators  actually  went  so  far  as  to  send  out  skates  to  Rio  Janeiro.33 

This  sudden  activity  in  new  markets  communicated  itself 
to  the  more  stabilized  routes  of  commerce.  The  Baltic, 
Heligoland,  and  Malta  enjoyed  a  vast  increase  in  trade,  an  ex¬ 
tension  which,  according  to  Tooke,  “was  probably  greater 
and  more  sudden  within  the  two  years,  viz.,  1808  and  1809, 
than  had  ever  before  been  witnessed,  within  a  simi¬ 
lar  period.”34 

Home  industry  also  felt  the  ferment,  and  new  enter¬ 
prises  were  launched  in  excess  of  actual  requirements.  The 
public  was  invited  to  subscribe  for  shares  in  numerous  brew¬ 
eries,  distilleries,  “fire  offices,”  bridges,  and  canals.35  In 


33  A.  Andreades,  History  of  the  Bank  of  England,  p.  219. 

33  Thomas  Tooke,  A  History  of  Prices  and  of  the  State  of  Circulation 
from  1793  to  1837,  I.  276;  quoting  M’Culloch,  Principles  of  Political 
Economy,  2d  ed.,  p.  329. 

34  Thomas  Tooke,  Thoughts  and  Details  of  the  High  and  Lozv  Prices 
of  the  Last  Thirty  Years,  I.  101. 

35  Thomas  Tooke,  A  History  of  Prices  and  of  the  State  of  Circula¬ 
tion  from  1793  to  1837 ,  I.  277 . 


284  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


sum,  there  was,  in  the  sober  language  of  Thomas  Tooke,  “a 
great  briskness  in  the  general  circulation;  a  rapidity  in  the 
interchange  between  goods  and  money  or  credit,  which  is  an 
invariable  attendant  on  speculative  periods.”36 

That  the  embargo  contributed  to  this  era  of  speculation 
cannot  be  doubted.  It  shared  with  Napoleon’s  decrees  direct 
responsibility  for  a  reign  of  high  prices,37  in  view  of  the 
fears  which  Britons  entertained  that  imports  could  not 
be  relied  upon  to  replace  their  deficient  grain  harvest  and 
to  meet  the  requirements  of  manufactures.  It  furnished, 
at  the  same  time,  an  added  incentive  to  utilize  the  new 
Spanish  opportunities  as  an  offset  for  lost  markets  and  even 
aided  the  process  by  withdrawing  from  all  competition.  In 
this  way  the  embargo  contributed  to  its  own  defeat.  Its  sup¬ 
posed  victims  balanced  their  gains  with  their  losses  and  dis¬ 
covered  at  least  an  imaginary  credits  The  table  of  British 
exports  for  1808  shows  a  loss  of  £6,604,774  over  the  1807 
trade  to  the  United  States  and  a  gain  of  £6,152,448  over  the 
1807  trade  to  “America,  exclusive  of  the  United  States.”38 
Increased  trade  with  Canada  with  a  view  to  reexport  to  the 
United  States  doubtless  accounted  for  a  part  of  this.  But 
the  opening  of  South  America  manifestly  absorbed  a  large 
share. 

On  the  whole,  however,  it  would  appear  that  the  com¬ 
mercial  gains  from  the  embargo  were  fictitious. 3J  The  South 
American  trade  was  not  a  real  substitute  for  the  loss  of 
Great  Britain’s  best  customer.  Yet  it  came  at  the  psycholo- 

39  Thomas  Tooke,  Thoughts  and  Details  on  the  High  and  Low  Prices 
of  the  Last  Thirty  Years.  I.  103. 

31  Ibid.,  I.  99,  100. 

38  G.  R.  Porter,  The  Progress  of  the  Nation,  p.  479. 

38  One  evidence  of  this  is  the  increase  of  bankruptcies.  The  number 
rose  from  1362  in  1807  to  1433  in  1808,  and  declined  in  1809  to  1382. 
Thomas  Tooke,  Thoughts  and  Details  on  the  High  and  Low  Prices  of 
the  Last  Thirty  Years,  I.  219. 


BRITISH  INDUSTRY  AND  EMBARGO  285 


gical  moment  to  stiffen  resistance  to  Napoleon  and  Jefferson. 
A  better  index  of  the  effectiveness  of  the  embargo  is  afford¬ 
ed  by  manufactures,  especially  of  cotton,  the  most  character¬ 
istic  development  of  that  industrial  revolution  on  which 
British  power  was  founded.  Cotton  had  been  singled  out  for 
the  most  odious  provision  of  the  Orders  in  Council,  the  nine 
pence  a  pound  reexport  tax,  and  in  cotton  America  might 
enjoy  her  most  soul-satisfying  retaliation.  To  achieve  this, 
however,  she  must  exercise  patience,  inasmuch  as  the  British 
trade  faced  the  crisis  with  a  considerable  surplus.40  More¬ 
over,  in  the  event  of  its  long  continuance,  fresh  supplies  were 
anticipated  from  Turkey,  by  land  conveyance  through  Ger¬ 
many,41 — an  interesting  survival  of  a  mediaeval  trade  route. 
Better  still,  there  was  a  genuine  shortage  in  France,  which 
would  cripple  a  growing  industry.42  And  sound  British 
policy  would  discourage  any  cotton  export  to  fill  the  gap.43 
The  government  even  made  capital  of  the  well  intrenched 
position  of  the  cotton  trade,  boasting  that  there  were  more 
merchants  in  favor  of  than  opposed  to  the  Orders  in  Coun¬ 
cil.44  The  mustard  seed  of  truth  in  this  Utopia  was  the  rise 
in  raw  cotton,  which  necessarily  accompanied  the  cessation 
of  supplies.  Dealers  and  manufacturers  who  were  well  stocked 
would  naturally  support  any  measure  which  enhanced 
prices.45  Those  who  now  clapped  loudest  would  be  the  first 
to  groan  when  the  pinch  was  real. 

If  cotton  was  the  real  test  of  the  embargo,  its  solution 
would  depend,  not  upon  a  few  rich  speculators,  but  upon 

“Hansard,  Parliamentary  Debates,  1st  Ser.,  X.  1346,  April  8,  1808. 

41  Ibid.,  X.  1347. 

a  Ibid.,  X.  1349. 

43  Ibid.,  X.  1347. 

44  Ibid.,  X.  1349. 

45  For  a  biting  satire  upon  this  complacency,  see  the  Edinburgh  Re¬ 
view,  XIV.  445,  July,  1809. 


286  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


the  prosperity  of  the  rank  and  file.  Here  the  government 
boast  did  not  long  remain  uncontradicted.  Lord  Grenville,  a 
leader  of  the  opposition  forces  in  Parliament,  twitted  the 
optimists  with  their  failure  to  bring  forward  witnesses  in 
support  of  Liverpool  trade  and  Manchester  manufactures 
and  the  activity  of  the  shipping  industry.  Free  trade,  he 
declared,  was  the  true  solution  of  the  cotton  manufacture, 
of  raw  material  for  which  British  harbors  would  always 
insure  a  supply.46 

For  reasons  inherent  in  the  entire  industrial  and  political 
conditions  of  America,  the  most  effective  enforcement  of 
the  embargo  was  in  the  southern  states.  Hence  cotton  ship¬ 
ments,  even  discounting  a  certain  leakage  by  the  Amelia 
Island  route,  were  really  small.47  The  consequence  was  a 
rapid  inroad  upon  the  British  surplus  of  1807,  with  a  cor¬ 
respondingly  enhanced  respect  for  the  embargo.48  By  Sep¬ 
tember,  the  initial  supply  was  mostly  consumed,  and  the  ex¬ 
pectation  of  Brazilian  and  other  sources  demonstrated  to  be 
an  illusion.  Notwithstanding  these  adversities,  Britons  con¬ 
fided  in  American  avarice  to  break  the  deadlock.  “This  coun¬ 
try  has  always  considered  the  Americans  so  commercial  and 
so  avaricious  that  the  people,  when  two  crops  are  on  hand, 
would  force  their  government  to  permit  the  exportation  of 
it  on  any  terms.”49  But  American  docility  under  losses,  a 
surprise  to  the  British,  premised,  if  persisted  in,  “a  fair  ar¬ 
rangement  by  the  next  Spring.”50 

"Hansard,  Parliamentary  Debates,  1st  Ser.,  X.  1349-1351,  April  8, 
1808. 

47  Thomas  Tooke,  Thoughts  and  Details  on  the  High  and  Low  Prices 
of  the  Last  Thirty  Years,  I.  105,  gives  cotton  imports  into  Great  Britain 
as  bales : 

1807— 282,667  1808 — 168,138,  1809—440,382. 

48  Frankfort,  Kentucky,  Palladium,  November  17,  1808,  quoting  Phila¬ 
delphia,  October  27,  an  “Extract  of  a  letter  from  an  intelligent  American 
gentlemen  in  London  to  his  friend  in  this  city,  dated  September  17.” 

49  Ibid. 

60  Ibid. 


BRITISH  INDUSTRY  AND  EMBARGO  287 


The  diminishing  cotton  supply  was  reflected  in  price 
changes  of  moment,  proportioned  to  supply  and  demand. 
The  accompanying  tables  are,  accordingly,  complementary : 


Table  of  Imports  of  United  States  Cotton  into 
Liverpool,  1806-1451 


Bags 

Bags 

1806 . 

.  100,273 

1811 . 

.  97,626 

1807 . 

.  143,756 

1812 . 

.  79,528 

1808 . 

.  25,426 

1813 . 

.  18,640 

1809 . 

.  130,581 

1814 . 

.  40,448 

1810 . 

.  199,220 

Average  Annual  Cotton  Quotations  for  the  Same  Period52 

Uplands  (chiefly  American)  Surats  (East  Indian) 

d.  per  lb.  d.  per  lb. 

1806 . 

.  18N 

14J4 

1807 . 

.  14  34 

13 

1808 . 

.  22 

1934 

1809 . 

.  20 

18J4 

1810 . 

.  15  J4 

15 

1811 . 

.  12J4 

12 

1812 . 

. m 

14 

1813 . 

.  23 

17J4 

1814 . 

.  2934 

21 

The  importation  for  1808  exceeded  that  of  1813  by  only 
a  few  thousand  bags  and  is  interesting  testimony  to  the  com¬ 
parative  efficiency  of  commercial  embargoes  and  naval  wars. 
The  price  of  22d.,  quoted  in  1808,  is  a  50  per  cent,  rise  over 
1807,  and  even  this  is  given  only  as  an  average.  It  was  a 
clear  case,  too,  of  the  effect  of  the  embargo  as  distinct  from 


61  American  Historical  Review,  XXI.  No.  2,  January,  1916,  G. 
W.  Daniels,  “Cotton  Trade  under  the  Embargo,”  p.  278.  Another 
estimate  of  cotton  imports  into  Liverpool  gives  higher  totals,  but  leaves 
a  similar  conclusion.  See  Hist.  MSS.  Comm.,  Fortescue  MSS.,  p.  261, 
January  6,  1809.  Lord  Auckland  to  Lord  Grenville,  “It  appears  by  an 
account  which  I  received  yesterday  from  Liverpool  that  the  total  import 
of  cotton  wool  into  Great  Britain  for  1807,  was  282,448 ;  1808,  was 
168,138,  of  which  from  the  United  States  in  1807  was  171,023;  1808,  was 
37,672.”  Thomas  Tooke,  Thoughts  and  Details,  etc.,  I.  105,  gives  it 
168,138  bales,  but  as  a  great  falling  off. 

“Thomas  Ellison,  The  Cotton  Trade  of  Great  Britain,  p.  245. 


288  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 

the  decrees  of  Napoleon,  for  British  power  kept  open  the 
sea  lanes  and  insured  the  arrival  of  such  cotton  as  came  on 
to  the  world  market. 

Speculation  ran  wild,  and,  in  October,  cotton  touched 
three  shillings  and  even  three  shillings  two  pence  a  pound.53 
Manufacturers  disposed  to  keep  open  their  mills  were  at  the 
mercy  of  bulls  in  raw  materials  and  bears  in  finished  pro¬ 
ducts,  the  market  for  the  latter  being  overstocked.54  Over 
the  whole  unhealthy  structure  impended  a  veritable  sword 
of  Damocles,  the  ever  present  possibility  that  the  embargo 
might  be  removed.  Bad  now  for  the  entrepreneurs ;  worse 
then  for  the  speculators. 

The  condition  of  the  workingmen  was  equally  distract¬ 
ing.  Though  their  budgets  were  less  imposing,  their  prob¬ 
lem  was  not  less  baffling.  They  were  assigned  to  the  well 
known  fourth-dimension  formula:  “How  can  half  the 
wages  pay  twice  the  prices?”  Despairing  of  a  solution, 
they  humbly  informed  Parliament  that  they  “are  brought 
to  great  distress  by  the  reduction  of  their  wages,  and 
that  they  do  not  obtain,  upon  a  fair  average,  more  than 
one  half  the  wages  for  their  labour,  which  they  were 
paid  in  the  year  1792,  although  since  that  period,  the 
charges  for  food,  house-rent,  firing,  and  other  articles,  are 
nearly  doubled,  and  daily  on  the  increase.”55  To  relieve 
this  sad  condition,  Parliament  was  urged  to  fix  a  higher  wage 
rate  for  cotton  weaving.56  Tension  in  the  cotton  industry 
diminished  with  the  increasing  importations  during  1809, 
and  business  approached  its  norm.57 

‘3  “Extract  of  a  letter,  dated  Liverpool,  October  3,”  given  in  the 
Frankfort,  Kentucky,  Palladium,  for  January  12,  1809. 

54  Ibid. 

55  Journals  of  the  House  of  Commons,  LXIV.  95,  a,  February  24, 
1809. 

56  Ibid.,  LXIV.  95,  b,  February  27,  1809,  gives  a  similar  petition  from 
Scotland. 

”  American  Historical  Review,  XXL  No.  2,  p.  280,  January,  1916. 
Article  by  G.  W.  Daniels,  “Cotton  Trade  under  the  Embargo.” 


BRITISH  INDUSTRY  AND  EMBARGO  289 


In  the  linen  industry,  conditions  were  more  favorable, 
and  Ireland,  its  headquarters,  seems  to  have  enjoyed  a  pros¬ 
perity  comparable  with  that  which  the  Great  War  just 
terminated  has  brought  her.  A  contemporary  chart  shows 
progress  even  in  the  year  of  embargo  :58 


Year  Yards  exported 

1805  .  42,988,621 

1806  .  43,534,971 

1807  .  39,049,727 

1808  .  40,901,442 


It  is  scarcely  a  measure,  however,  of  embargo  efficiency. 
As  regards  linen,  America  possessed  no  such  complete  mono¬ 
poly  of  raw  material  as  in  the  case  of  cotton.  The  local 
supply  was,  nevertheless,  inadequate,59  and  “a  more  general 
cultivation  of  flax  and  hemp  was  urged.”60  Holders  of 
linen,  like  those  of  cotton,  enjoyed  a  sudden  rise  in  values. 
Indeed,  prosperity  in  the  industry  was  attributed  in  part 
to  “the  scarcity  of  flaxseed  arising  from  the  embargo,  and 
in  part  to  the  exportation  of  German  linens  having  been 
checked.”61  The  course  of  linen,  however,  exhibited  a  fur¬ 
ther  difference  from  that  of  cotton  in  that  for  the  latter 
curtailed  supplies  meant  speculative  profits  but  industrial 
unrest ;  while  with  the  former,  it  was  otherwise.  Pro¬ 
fits  rose,  but  not  their  unpleasant  corollary.  Does  not  the 
American  monopoly  of  cotton  suggest  the  explanation?  Ire¬ 
land  used  our  flax,  but  could  buy  elsewhere;  England  used 
our  cotton,  and  could  buy  little  elsewhere. 

88  Quarterly  Review,  I.  427,  May,  1809.  “An  account  of  the  quantity 
of  linen  cloth  exported  from  Ireland,  from  the  25th  of  March,  1776, 
to  the  5th  of  January,  1809,  inclusive.” 

“  Ibid.,  p.  428.  “America,  Riga,  and  the  Low  Countries  furnished 
flax  seed.” 

00  Quarterly  Review,  I.  427. 

“  Edinburgh  Review,  July,  1809,  XIV.  445,  446.  The  article  is  a  satire 
on  the  supposed  prosperity  of  Irish  linens. 


290  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 

The  British  food  situation  under  the  embargo  is  not 
easy  to  determine.  Population  estimates  vary  from  11,769,- 
725  to  17,444,91 1. 62  Privation  for  the  lower  estimate  would 
mean  starvation  for  the  higher.  The  annual  importation 
of  wheat  for  the  ten-year  average,  1801-10,  was  reckoned 
at  600,946  quarters,63  of  which  the  United  States  furnished 
the  principal  quota.  To  what  extent  would  the  deprivation 
of  this  inconvenience  the  population?  Very  little,  if  we  ac¬ 
cept  “a  very  small  fraction  above  a  peck”64  as  the  annual  im¬ 
port  per  capita.  And  this  might  be  more  than  offset  by  in¬ 
creased  production  at  home.  Land  enclosures  were  progress¬ 
ing  at  a  rapid  rate,  and  the  area  under  cultivation  increased 
by  7,350,577  acres  during  the  reign  of  George  III.65  Of 
these,  1,550,010  are  credited  to  the  period  1800-09,  and  in 
the  one  year,  1808,  ninety-two  bills  of  enclosure  became 
law.66  Altogether,  one  would  expect  Great  Britain  at  this 
early  date  to  be  almost  self-sufficing.  It  is  something  of  a 
surprise,  therefore,  to  meet  with  earnest  and  repeated  solici¬ 
tations  to  Parliament  to  stop  the  whiskey  business  lest  the 
country  be  brought  to  starvation. 

There  was,  nevertheless,  sufficient  ground  to  apprehend 
a  food  shortage,  the  more  so  in  view  of  the  difficulty  of 
covering  it  by  importation67  from  either  the  Continent  or 

62  See  G.  R.  Porter,  The  Progress  of  the  Nation,  pp.  176,  177.  For  a 
third  estimate  at  sixteen  and  one  half  millions,  see  Annals  of  Congress, 
Tenth  Congress,  Second  Session,  p.  877.  The  lowest  estimate  best 
accords  with  William  Smart,  Economic  Annals  of  the  Nineteenth  Cen¬ 
tury,  I.  138 — who  gives  8,870,000  for  the  year  1803. 

“For  a  larger  estimate,  see  Journals  of  the  House  of  Commons, 
LXIII.  386,  a,  May  31,  1808— 770,000  quarters. 

64  G.  R.  Porter,  The  Progress  of  the  Nation,  p.  1 77. 

65  Ibid.,  p.  188. 

66  Thomas  Tooke,  Thoughts  and  Details  on  the  High  and  Low  Prices 
of  the  Last  Thirty  Years,  III.  129. 

67  Ibid.,  III.  181.  To  cite  the  case  of  wheat  and  flour  only,  exports 
increased  from  24,365  quarters  in  1807  to  77,567  in  1808,  while  imports 
fell  from  400,759  quarters  to  81,466. 


BRITISH  INDUSTRY  AND  EMBARGO  291 


America.  The  crop  of  1807  left  no  surplus  to  tide  over  the 
wretched  harvest  of  1808,  which  was  ruined  by  phenomenal 
heat  followed  by  wet,  stormy  weather.68  If  widespread 
destitution  was  to  be  avoided,  restrictions  upon  the  distilleries 
were  only  a  matter  of  reasonable  precaution.69 

Western  Scotland  was  especially  urgent  in  pointing  to 
restrictions  upon  distilleries  as  the  one  sure  relief  from  dis¬ 
tress.70  Parliament  was  reminded  that  Paisley  and  the 
neighboring  towns  of  Renfrew  depended  upon  outside  sup¬ 
plies  the  greater  part  of  the  year.71  Similar  petitions  from 
Dumbarton  and  Kilmarnock  alleged  that  grain  prices  were 
rising  unconscionably  from  a  scarcity  of  oats  and  barley,  “so 
that  unless  the  consumption  by  Distillation  ceases  for  a  lim¬ 
ited  time,  the  most  alarming  consequences  are  to  be  appre¬ 
hended.”72 

Temperance  was  not  permitted  to  cloud  the  issue,  be¬ 
cause,  in  the  joint  interest  of  British  distillers  and  West 
India  planters,  energy  released  from  grain  and  malt  liquors 
was  to  be  transferred  to  rum.73  The  chief  opposition  to  grain 
economy  came,  therefore,  not  from  the  powerful  brewing 
and  distillery  barons,  but  from  the  landed  interest.74  The 
quarrel  lay  between  town  mouse  and  country  mouse.  And 
the  squires  brought  forth  the  rather  ingenious  sophistry 
that  wasteful  consumption  was  the  surest  stimulus  to  ade¬ 
quate  production.  They  trembled  for  their  country  when 

68  Thomas  Tooke,  Thoughts  and  Details  on  the  High  and  Low  Prices 
of  the  Last  Thirty  Years,  III.  68.  Also  ibid.,  I.  105. 

“Ibid.,  I.  216;  III.  177. 

,0  Thomas  Tooke,  A  History  of  Prices  and  of  the  State  of  Circulation 
from  1793  to  1837,  I.  267,  shows  that  the  1807  wheat  crop  was  poorer  in 
Scotland  than  in  England  or  Wales. 

11  Journals  of  the  House  of  Commons,  LXIII.  386,  May  31,  1808. 

” Ibid.,  LXVIII,  418,  b,  June  10,  1808,  from  Dumbarton;  and  ibid., 
p.  394. 

13  Ibid.,  LXIII.  394,  b,  June  1,  1808.  See  also  Thomas  Tooke, 
Thoughts  and  Details,  etc.,  III.  68. 

74  Edinburgh  Review,  XIII.  399,  January,  1809. 


292  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


they  thought  of  “the  dangerous  effect  which  this  measure 
must  have  in  discouraging  the  growth  of  corn;  being  like¬ 
wise  fully  convinced  that  the  best  resource  against  a  future 
scarcity  consists  in  encouraging  the  distillation  of  corn.”75 

Wiseacres  beheld  in  the  grain  restrictions  a  return  to  the 
type  of  government  interference  which  the  philosophy  of 
Adam  Smith  was  supposed  to  have  discredited  once  and  for 
all.  They  rose  to  denounce  this  flagrant  violation  of  laissez- 
faire.  Their  argument  was  simple:  If  the  price  of  grain 
rose  so  little  as  not  to  prevent  the  distiller  from  using  it, 
there  was  evidently  a  very  slight  degree  of  scarcity.  The 
moment  when  the  interest  of  the  country  required  a  stop¬ 
page  of  the  corn  distillery  and  the  moment  when  the  dis¬ 
tillers’  own  interest  would  have  stopped  it  must  coincide 
very  nearly.76  They  condemned  as  “vague  and  gratuitous” 
the  assertion  that  barley  was  dear,  defying  any  one  to  know 
when  it  was  really  so.  “The  price  has  advanced  no  doubt; 
but  if  the  supply  is  contracted,  ought  it  not  to  advance?”77 
They  admitted  that  the  worst  consequences  of  government 
action  would  not  develop,  because  confidence  in  the  power  of 
landowners  to  repeal  the  law  would  encourage  farmers  to 
their  usual  planting. 

Permanently  to  exclude  grain  from  the  distilleries  would 
breed  disaster,  because  its  production  would  diminish  by 
precisely,  or  perhaps  even  more  than,  the  470,000  quarters 
hitherto  consumed  in  spirits.78  At  this  point  in  the  argu¬ 
ment,  China  came  forward  as  the  horrible  example.  With 
naive  disingenuousness,  Britain’s  prosperity  was  attributed 
to  her  luxuries ;  China’s  indigence,  to  her  short  allowance  : 


75  Journals  of  the  House  of  Commons,  LXIII.  407,  a,  from  petitions 
submitted  by  Lincolnshire  and  Essex. 

'"‘Edinburgh  Review,  XIII.  398,  January,  1809. 

77 Ibid. 

78  Edinburgh  Review,  XIII,  399. 


BRITISH  INDUSTRY  AND  EMBARGO  293 


The  project  of  substituting  sugar  for  grain  in  our  distilleries  is 
calculated  to  bring  us  nearer  short  allowance — nearer  the  wretched 
situation  of  the  Chinese  than  we  hitherto  have  been,  by  a  quantity 
equal  to  the  maintenance  of  300,000  or  400,000  persons.  .  .  . 

Hitherto  a  bad  crop  might  prove  inconvenient — henceforth  it  may 
be  fatal.79 

While  the  Edinburgh  Review  was  fulminating  against 
this  sacrilege  to  laissez-faire ,  its  more  youthful  rival80  de¬ 
fended  a  regulation  which  inflicted  no  injury  upon  British 
farmers,  yet  saved  the  West  India  planters  from  ruin.81 
The  government  itself  took  the  broad  view.  Though  com¬ 
mitted  to  the  Orders  in  Council,  it  was  not  blind  to  their 
consequences  in  curtailed  supplies  of  food.  It  had  the  good 
sense  to  heed  the  petitions  of  consumers,  and  the  restrictions 
advocated  finally  became  law. 

When  one  reflects  that  the  food  shortage  of  1808  com¬ 
pelled  a  measure  which  all  the  submarines  in  the  World  War 
did  not  effect,  one  feels  a  new  respect  for  an  embargo 
which,  in  conjunction  with  Napoleon’s  measures  on  the 
Continent,  could  diminish  British  corn,  grain,  and  meal 
imports  from  £920,435  in  1807  to  £146,119  in  1808, 82  and 
over  the  protests  of  the  landed  gentry,  compel  distillers  to 
reorganize  the  “trade.” 


79 Edinburgh  Review,  XIII,  400. 

80  Quarterly  Review,  II.  14-18,  August,  1809.  Delay  of  the  article 
afforded  the  advantage  of  a  better  perspective. 

81 Edinburgh  Review,  XII.  95,  shows  that  the  relief  of  the  West 
Indies  was  short-lived. 

“  Journals  of  the  House  of  Commons,  LXIV.  Appendix  Al,  p.  548. 
This  reduction  would  seem  due  almost  entirely  to  the  embargo,  Napol¬ 
eon’s  Berlin  Decree  having  been  enforced  during  much  of  1807. 


Table  of  Imports  into  Great  Britain  from  the  United  States  for  the  Years  ending  January  5' 


294  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


Journals  of  the  House  of  Commons,  LXIV.  648.  Appendix. 


Table  of  Exports  from  Great  Britain  to  the  United  States  for  the  Years  ending  January  5' 


BRITISH  INDUSTRY  AND  EMBARGO 


295 


Journals  of  the  House  of  Commons,  LXIV.  648.  Appendix. 


296  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


Cotton  and  foodstuffs  were  not  the  only  hostages  de¬ 
tained  in  America  for  British  good  behavior.  The  accom¬ 
panying  tables  show  beyond  peradventure  the  pinch  in  Bri¬ 
tain,  and  the  self-restraint  of  America. 

As  previously  indicated,  however,  this  serious  loss  in  the 
export  trade  to  America  was  largely  compensated  for  else¬ 
where,  as  the  following  table  shows  :85 

v  Exports  to  Exports  to  Exports  to  Exports  to  Ammra'pvrln  Trunl 

Year  Europe  Africa  Asia  U.  S.  A.  siveofU.SA. 

1806  £11,363,635  £1,163,744  £2,937,895  £12,389,488  £10,877,968  £38,732,730 

1807  9,002,237  765,468  3,359,226  11,846,513  10,439,423  35,412,867 

1808  9,016,033  633,125  3,524,823  5,241,739  16,591,871  35,007,501 

The  table  of  imports,  representing  a  decline  of  £4,779,- 
424  (real  value)  in  the  year  of  embargo,  is  impressive  testi¬ 
mony  to  the  determination  of  the  American  executive.  But 
gains  in  other  directions  enabled  the  British  customs  to  close 
the  year  with  a  net  loss  of  imports,  from  Europe,  Africa, 
and  America,  of  only  £1,668, 633. 86  This  slight  effect  upon 
British  total  imports,  amounting  to  less  than  seven  per  cent, 
all  told,  really  explains  the  failure  of  the  embargo.  Couple 
this  with  a  net  loss  of  only  £405,276  in  exports  out  of  a 
total  trade  amounting  to  more  than  £3  £,000, 000,  and  the 
stability  of  British  commerce  is  evident.  It  is  not  easy  to 
see  how  even  a  total  cessation  of  American  exports,  an  ideal 
never  attainable  in  a  fallen  and  smuggling  world,87  could 


85  G.  R.  Porter,  The  Progress  of  the  Nation,  p.  479. 

89  Journals  of  the  House  of  Commons,  LXIV.  549,  and  p.  64,  for  a 
more  general  chart  of  imports  from  Europe,  Africa,  and  America.  The 
totals  for  the  years  1807,  1808,  and  1809  were  £25,089,136,  £25,453,149, 
and  £23,784,516  respectively.  For  an  interesting  chart  of  timber  imports, 
see  G.  R.  Porter,  The  Progress  of  the  Nation,  p.  425. 

87  Hist.  MSS  Comm.,  Fortescue  MSS.  N.  Vansittart  to  Lord  Auck¬ 
land,  enclosure  in  a  letter  to  Lord  Grenville  of  June  24,  p.  207.  “He 
[Irving]  afterwards  mentioned  that  for  some  weeks  past,  trade  had 
begun  to  be  more  brisk  than  it  had  been ;  and  that  in  particular  very  large 
shipments  were  making  to  America  by  old  and  established  houses.  He, 
however,  believed  they  cleared  out  for  Nova  Scotia,  and  not  for  the 


BRITISH  INDUSTRY  AND  EMBARGO  297 


have  achieved  its  object.  American  products  were  needed. 
They  were  essential  to  the  orderly  progress  and  expansion  of 
British  industry.  Their  absence  worked  hardship  in  vari¬ 
ous  industries  and  raised  the  price  of  food  to  the  toiler.  Yet 
Great  Britain  somehow  “carried  on.’’  Even  the  fresh  re¬ 
sources  of  a  new  continent  could  not  assure  to  America 
monopoly  control  against  a  power  whose  flag  sailed  every 
sea.88 

The  embargo  was,  however,  a  two-edged  sword,  and  if 
the  thrust  was  slightly  weak,  the  parry  proved  the  master. 
Vast  speculations  in  South  America  and  huge  smuggling 
operations  in  Canada  but  ill  concealed  the  fact  that  American 
isolation  barred  Great  Britain  from  her  richest  export  mar¬ 
ket  and  upset  the  balance  of  trade  in  a  manner  disconcerting. 
Goods,  British  and  Irish,  to  the  value  of  £12,389,488,  en¬ 
tered  America  in  1806.  A  slight  falling  off  was  apparent  in 
the  following  year.  But  in  1808  the  exports  shrunk  to 
£5,241,739,  appalling  tribute  to  the  embargo  as  an  engine  of 
commercial  wrath.  Nor  was  the  recovery  to  £7,258,500  in 
1809  wholly  satisfying,89  not  least  among  the  embarrass¬ 
ments  of  the  period  being  the  dislocation  of  foreign  ex¬ 
change,  a  condition  for  which  the  embargo,  if  not  wholly, 
was  at  least  partially  responsible. 


United  States ;  which  circumstance  confirms  what  we  have  seen  in  the 
American  papers  respecting  the  great  smuggling  in  the  Bay  of  Fundy.” 
See  also  the  Life  and  Correspondence  of  Rufus  King,  V.  144,  for  the 
same  idea. 

88  Hist.  MSS.  Comm.,  Fortescue  MSS.,  p.  223.  Lord  Auckland  to 
Lord  Grenville,  October  10,  1808.  “The  East  and  West  India  importa¬ 
tions  have  certainly  been  very  great ;  but  the  warehouses  are  filled  to 
the  brim,  and  the  duties,  therefore,  are  not  received.’’ 

89  G.  R.  Porter,  The  Progress  of  the  Nation,  p.  479.  But  see  Journals 
of  the  House  of  Commons,  LXIV.  Appendix  A,  p.  648,  for  totals  of 
1807,  £12,865,551;  1808,  £12,097.942;  1809,  £5,302,866;  and  Hist.  MSS 
Comm.,  Fortescue  MSS,  February  15,  1809,  p.  297,  where  loss  of  exports 
is  given  as  £6,000,000. 

Imports,  1,551,000. 


£7,551,000. 


298  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 

American  commerce  had  long  been  the  mainstay  of 
British  foreign  exchange.  Under  normal  conditions,  the 
direct  American  trade  supplied  Great  Britain  with  cotton, 
lumber,  flax,  and  tobacco.  But  America  was  still  more  im¬ 
portant  as  a  market,  and  the  balance  of  trade  was  high  in 
favor  of  Great  Britain.  The  contrary  was  true  on  the 
Continent.  It,  too,  looked  to  America  for  raw  materials  and 
staples,  but  had  never  secured  the  American  market  in 
turn.  The  reasons  for  this  are  well  known.  Colonial  Amer¬ 
ica  had  been  a  British  trade  monopoly,  and  ignorance  of  the 
importance  of  the  market,  unfamiliarity  with  American 
tastes  and  demands,  and  preoccupation  with  a  political  tur¬ 
moil  ever  since  1789,  had  debarred  Continental  Europe  from 
any  real  American  foothold.  The  consequences  of  this  for 
the  balance  of  trade  and  foreign  exchange  were  that  Great 
Britain,  with  a  margin  of  sales  to  America,  drew  for  pay¬ 
ment  upon  American  debtors  on  the  Continent,  adjusting 
the  balance  by  only  a  slight  transfer  of  gold.  To  disturb 
this  balance  would  mean  the  outward  movement  of  gold. 
Precisely  this  happened,  and  at  a  time  of  unprecedented 
financial  stress,  the  operations  of  the  exchequer  were  ham¬ 
pered  by  a  rise  in  gold  from  a  normal  of  80.?.  an  ounce  in 
1807  to  91.?.  in  1809;  97s.  6 d.  in  1811;  105.?.  in  1812;  and 
110.?.  in  1813. 90  So  serious  a  rise  in  the  price  of  gold  exer¬ 
cised  of  necessity  a  disturbing  influence  upon  wage  and  com¬ 
modity  prices  and  brought  home  to  the  working  man,  indi¬ 
rectly  it  may  be  admitted,  the  evils  of  the  embargo  and  of 
the  abnormal  commercial  relations  which  succeeded  it. 

The  export  and  import  tables  cited  in  this  chapter  were 
officially  printed  and  therefore  common  property.  Nor  was 
their  significance  ignored.  A  modern  statistician  estimates 
that,  from  1805  to  1807  inclusive,  America  absorbed  nearly 
one  third  of  British  exports.91  A  trade  of  such  magnitude 

80  G.  R.  Porter,  The  Progress  of  the  Nation,  p.  499. 


BRITISH  INDUSTRY  AND  EMBARGO  299 


interested  the  entire  nation,  and  its  peril  furnished  ammuni¬ 
tion  to  the  leaders  of  the  opposition,  eager  to  “convince  his 
majesty’s  ministers  of  the  ruinous  tendency”  of  the  Orders  in 
Council.92  Individual  quarters  were  compared  unfavorably 
with  those  of  the  year  preceding;93  reduced  imports  were 
traced  to  their  source  in  the  Orders  in  Council  ;94  and  dimin¬ 
ishing  exports,  bad  though  their  showing,  were  declared  to 
be  short  of  the  whole  truth,  since  Ireland  and  Scotland  were 
omitted — “giving  them,  therefore,  a  proportionate  share, 
the  diminution  of  our  commerce  may  fairly  be  estimated  at 
£14, 000, 000. ”95  By  the  opposition,  at  any  rate,  most  evils 
of  the  day  were  attributed  to  the  Orders,  such  responsibility 
for  them  as  belonged  to  the  Decrees  being  ignored.  Nor 
was  it  sufficiently  consoling  that  America  suffered  also,96 
though  the  vulgar  might  find  amusement  in  figure  juggling 
as  to  the  $48,000,000  supposed  American  damage.97 

With  estimates  of  loss  running  as  high  as  £14,000,000, 
it  is  apparent  that  the  pressure  of  the  embargo  was  serious. 
Indeed,  in  the  view  of  some,  only  a  series  of  fortuitous  cir¬ 
cumstances  averted  an  actual  catastrophe : 

We  allude  to  the  opening-  of  Spain  and  Portugal,  and  our  military 
expeditions  in  these  countries — the  struggle  made  by  Sweden,  and 
the  increased  communication  with  Brazil  and  Spanish  America — 
not  to  mention  the  fact  that  the  year  which  gives  this  amount  of  loss 
comprehends  the  period  when  shipments  were  made  on  both  sides, 
before  the  operation  of  the  embargo,  and  when  hazards  were  run 
by  neutral  adventurers,  upon  the  presumption  that  neither  of  the 
regulations  would  be  enforced  as  they  actually  were.  Had  it  not 
been  for  these  circumstances,  our  loss  of  trade  in  consequence  of 
the  Orders  would  probably  have  been  more  than  double  what  it 

81  Ibid.,  p.  497. 

“Hansard,  Parliamentary  Debates,  1st  Ser.,  XI.  708,  May  30,  1808. 
(See  also  Hist.  MSS  Comm.,  Fortescue  MSS,  p.  302,  April  14,  1809.) 

83  Ibid.,  p.  707,  May  30,  1808. 

"Ibid.,  p.  1129,  July  1,  1808. 

"Ibid.,  1st  Ser.,  XI.  780.  February  17,  1809.  (See  also  Edinburgh 
Reznew,  XIV.  450,  July,  1809.) 

88  Ibid.,  p.  708. 

87  Annual  Register,  1808,  pp.  85_,  86,  quoting  from  a  New  York  paper. 


300  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 

actually  was ;  and  this  boasted  cure  for  our  commercial  embarrass¬ 
ments  would,  in  all  probability,  have  reduced  our  whole  foreign 
trade  to  a  little  wretched  smuggling  in  Europe  and  America.98 

Thus  British  testimony  bears  witness  to  the  hardships 
imposed  by  the  embargo.  The  demoralization  of  the  cotton 
industry  and  the  desperate  measures  to  conserve  the  food 
supply  are  themselves  sufficient  proof  that  the  entire  economic 
balance  was  menaced.  Yet  the  embargo  wholly  failed  in 
its  political  purpose,  for  the  Orders  in  Council,  against 
which  it  was  aimed,  remained  in  force.  How  near  it 
came  to  achieving  its  end  can  never  be  known.  The  pre¬ 
cise  degree  of  economic  pressure  equal  to  conquering  a  proud 
people  defies  calculation ;  and  the  ability  of  any  single  nation 
to  impose  that  pressure  upon  the  mistress  of  the  seas  might 
well  be  doubted.  Certainly  no  nation  should  have  anticipated 
results  so  gigantic  within  one  year,  and  the  embargo  ex¬ 
pired  in  March,  1809.  Though  conditions  in  England  war¬ 
ranted  a  continuation  of  the  experiment,  America  lacked 
resolution  to  pursue  it  further. 

Many  factors  contributed  to  its  abandonment,  not  least 
of  which  was  the  psychological.  The  embargo  was  too  nega¬ 
tive.  The  British  blockade  of  Europe  was,  in  contrast,  posi¬ 
tive.  Britain’s  clutch  upon  Napoleon  was  not  a  mere  refusal 
to  ship  goods  to  his  coast ;  it  was  the  will  and  the  power 
to  prevent  others  from  doing  so,  either.  America  in  the 
nature  of  things  was  unprepared  to  take  similar  action  against 
Great  Britain.  Limited  to  a  passive  role,  she  played  it  with 
tolerable  efficiency,  but  gave  it  too  brief  a  trial.  Britain’s 
more  active  blockade  required  five  years  to  produce  results. 
These  came  at  length  with  the  general  uprising  of  a  starving 
Europe.  The  “Battle  of  the  Nations’’  testified  to  the  groan¬ 
ing  of  the  peoples  under  an  economic  yoke  almost  as  galling 
as  Napoleon’s  open  tyranny. 

M  Edinburgh  Review,  XIV.  450,  July,  1809. 


BRITISH  INDUSTRY  AND  EMBARGO  301 


Moreover,  the  British  blockade  of  Europe  was  openly 
belligerent.  It  enlisted  the  good  will  of  the  nation  in  a 
fight  for  existence.  For  this,  no  sacrifice  would  be  too 
great.  For  America,  the  contrary  held  true.  Self-denial 
is  heroic,  but  undramatic.  To  ruin  oneself  might  starve 
the  enemy,  but  his  injuries  were  to  be  imagined;  one’s  own 
were  real.  America  played  blindfold,  and  the  game  lacked 
spirit.  Besides,  there  were  none  of  the  prizes  of  aggressive 
action,  no  growing  merchant  marine  to  warm  the  dried  veins 
of  rich  old  merchants,  no  naval  heroes  “of  Baltic  and  of 
Nile’’  to  stir  the  pulse  of  youth. 

It  is  pleasant  to  turn  from  the  more  sordid  aspects  of 
Orders  and  embargo  to  the  virtues  they  called  forth.  On 
either  side  the  really  noteworthy  feature  of  the  embargo 
is  its  spiritual  contribution.  The  dogged  resolution  of  Eng¬ 
land,  firm  to  endure  all  things,  even  unto  the  end ;  the  ideal¬ 
ism  of  America,  willing  to  follow  Jefferson  in  a  grand  experi¬ 
ment  for  securing  the  honor  and  dignity  of  his  country  with¬ 
out  the  blood  cost  of  war,  shine  from  out  the  mistakes  and 
miseries  of  the  times  as  two  Anglo-Saxon  traits  of  endur¬ 
ing  greatness. 


CHAPTER  XI 


FRANCE  AND  THE  EMBARGO 

When  Napoleon  issued  the  decrees  which  drove  America 
into  the  ranks  of  his  enemies,  he  could  scarcely  have  har¬ 
bored  any  illusions  as  to  the  strength  of  American  friend¬ 
ship.  Whatever  this  may  have  been  originally,  the  neutrality 
of  Washington  and  the  vigor  of  Adams  had  shown  that 
American  policies  were  guided  by  living  issues  rather  than 
by  dead  memories,  nor  was  there  anything  in  the  record  of 
Jefferson  himself  to  indicate  that  sentiment  for  France  out¬ 
weighed  the  interest  of  America.  The  estimate  which  Adet 
had  transmitted  to  the  department  of  foreign  affairs  in  1796, 
on  the  occasion  of  Jefferson’s  election  to  the  vice-presidency 
had,  indeed,  proved  singularly  prophetic : 

I  have  been  brought  to  the  conclusion  in  this  connection,  Citizen 
Minister,  that  America  will  have  only  cause  for  congratulation  for 
having  summoned  this  man  to  the  second  place  in  the  State.  I  do  not 
know  whether,  as  I  am  assured,  we  shall  always  find  in  him  a  man  en¬ 
tirely  devoted  to  our  interests.  Mr.  Jefferson  loves  us,  because  he 
detests  England;  he  seeks  a  rapprochement  with  us,  because  he  dis¬ 
trusts  us  less  than  Great  Britain;  but  he  would  change  perhaps  to¬ 
morrow  from  a  sentiment  favorable  to  us,  if  to-morrow  Great 
Britain  should  cease  to  inspire  him  with  fears.  Jefferson,  although 
a  friend  of  liberty  and  of  science,  although  an  admirer  of  the  efforts 
which  we  have  put  forth  to  break  our  chains  and  dissipate  the  cloud 
of  ignorance  which  oppresses  the  hope  of  humanity,  Jefferson,  I 
say,  is  an  American,  and  by  just  so  much,  he  cannot  be  sincerely 
our  friend.  An  American  is  the  enemy  born  of  all  the  European 
peoples.1 

The  Napoleonic  decrees  were,  in  fact,  the  culmination  of 
a  growing  resentment  at  the  independent  Americanism  de¬ 
scribed  by  Adet.  France"  whose  original  help  to  the  American 
Revolution  rested  on  dynastic  and  European  aims,  expected 


1  American  Historical  Association,  Annual  Report,  1903,  II.  983, 
“Correspondence  of  French  Ministers,  1791-1797.” 


[  302  ] 


FRANCE  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


303 


from  the  nation  she  had  helped  to  found  a  gratitude  which 
nations  seldom  feel.  Experience  had  demonstrated  that 
America  was  as  fully  the  slave  of  self-interest  as  were  the 
powers  of  Europe.  But  truth  carried  with  it  the  sting  of 
disillusionment.2  In  their  term  of  power,  the  Federalists 
had  courted  mercantile  Britain  to  the  neglect  of  Jacobin 
France,  and  the  treaty  of  1778  had  become  a  dead  letter 
long  before  its  term  expired.  Even  where  her  own  interest 
seemed  to  demand  action,  America  had  been  passive.  The 
principle  that  free  ships  make  free  goods  was  her  most 
cherished  innovation  in  the  law  of  nations.  But  she  declined 
to  hazard  war  on  its  behalf.  And  the  Directory  only  com¬ 
plicated  matters  by  its  decision  to  treat  neutrals  in  whatever 
way  they  allowed  themselves  to  De  treated  by  England.  in 
1798,  war  itself  was  averted  only  by  thF  narrowest  "margin. 

On  becoming  First  Consul,  Napoleon  reversed  the  policy 
of  the  Directory.  He  hastened  to  propitiate  the  Americans. 
He  wished  to  enlist  them  as  more  active  champions  of  neutral 
rights  at  sea.  He  ceased  to  urge  the  treaty  of  1778,  grown 
illusory  in  practice.  His  real  solicitude  was  for  certain  prin¬ 
ciples  of  international  law.  These  he  deemed  indispensable 
and  in  October,  1800,  he  drafted  a  treaty  to  include  them. 

The  treaty  affirmed  the  principle  that  free  ships  make 
free  goods.  It  recognized  the  possibility  of  contraband  of 
war,  but  limited  the  items  to  a  specified  list  and  exempted 
food  stuffs.  One  provision  asserted  the  right  of  neutrals  to 
enter  all  ports  not  subject  to  a  real  blockade.  Neutral  mer¬ 
chantmen  must  recognize  the  right  of  search  save  when  in 
the  convoy  of  warships.  In  the  latter  case,  the  military  flag 
was  to  be  sufficient  guarantee  against  fraud.  In  becoming 
a  signatory  of  the  treaty,  America  was  to  obligate  herself 
to  a  defence  of  its  principles  against  their  infraction  by 

*  This  is  quite  elaborately  analyzed  by  M.  A.  Thiers  in  Histoire  du 
Consulat  et  de  I’Empire,  II.  125-127. 


304  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


England/^  Thus  almost  the  first  act  of  Napoleon’s  adminis- 
ration  was  a  move  to  align  America  with  himself  in  a  fu- 
ture  naval  war.  He  based  his  plan  on  the  identity  of  marir 
time  interests  between  the  two  powers.  His  terms  were 
-*»those  which  Americans  themselves  desired.  The  treaty 
was  signed,  but  its  terms  were  never  consummated. 

The  secret  lies  in  the  string  attached.  America  was  not 
yet  strong  enough  to  fight  for  any  principle  less  vital  than 
independence.  It  is  true  the  principles  which  Napoleon  was 
seeking  to  engraft  upon  international  law  were  very  dear  to 
America’s  heart.  Her  policy  was,  however,  to  secure  their 
adoption  by  treaty  with  individual  powers.  In  this  way  they 
would  at  last  become  integral  in  the  law  of  nations,  and 
America  greatly  the  gainer.  But  it  would  be  folly  to  mort¬ 
gage  the  future  and  jeopardize  our  national  existence  for  a 
non-essential.  To  America,  the  Napoleonic  scheme  merely 
pictured  an  ideal.  The  vision  of  the  freedom  of  the  seas 
was  attractive  to  a  weak  and  pacific  neutral,  but  it  was 
scarcely  a  matter  of  life  and  death,  and  this  an  ill-judged 
war  with  Great  Britain  might  be. 

Napoleon’s  own  self-interest  was  obvious.  He  had  every 
reason  to  wish  trade  unhampered.  If  Great  Britain  once 
recognized  the  freedom  of  the  seas,  the  lion’s  claws  were 
pared,  and  Napoleon  in  his  conquest  of  Europe  need  fear 
no  strangling  at  his  throat.  He  assumed  that  peaceful  Ameri¬ 
ca,  for  an  opposite  but  equally  cogent  reason,  would  crave  the 
same  untrammeled  commerce,.  Europe  needed  the  goods; 
America  needed  the  profits.  If  America  could  be  induced 
to  tight"  for  these  profits  under  the  guise  oT  solicitude  for 
righteous  principles jn  the  law  ETnationsTso  much  the  better 
for  Napoleon.  He  would  be  more  likely  to  have  his  miports. 
And  he  would  add  an  open  enemy  to  England. 

The  weak  link  in  the  scheme  was  Napoleon’s  false  esti¬ 
mate  of  American  common  sense  and  his  misconception  of 
M.  A.  Thiers,  L’Histoire  du  Consulat  et  de  I’Empire.  II  217- S 19 


FRANCE  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


305 


sectional  and  political  interests  within  the  states.  Commer¬ 
cial  America  might  desire  to  fight  for  her  rights,  but  pru¬ 
dence  forbade  too  great  a  risk.  Besides,  commercial  Ameri¬ 
ca  was  Anglophile,  and  willing  togo  far  in  submission  to 
British  desires  Much  of  America,  on  the  other  IFand7 
despised  commerce  altogether.  This  was  especially  true 
at  the  South.  Southern  men,  notwithstanding  sentiments 
which  were  Gallophile,  perceived  no  motive  of  self-interest 
urging  them  to  espouse  the  cause  of  France  for  the  sake  of 
Yankee  shippers.  Their  leader,  Jefferson,  it  might  be  added, 
had  adopted  economy  and  pacifism  as  guiding  principles. 
Thus,  as  the  century  opened,  all  the  dominant  forces  in 
America  wrought  for  peace.  To  overcome  this  triple  weight 
of  inertia  became  an  important  object  of  Napoleon’s  diplo¬ 
macy  from  1800  to  1807. 

The  sale  of  Louisiana  was  the  outstanding  manifestation 
of  Napoleon’s  desire  to  conciliate.  It  solved  the  western  prob¬ 
lem  by- removing  a  source  of  endless  friction  between  the 
United  States  and  France.  For  the  moment,  Jefferson  was 
justified  in  his  opinion  that  “Though  clouds  may  occasionally 
obscure  the  foreign  horizon  between  us,  yet  there  is  a  fund 
of  friendship  and  attachment  between  the  two  nations  which 
will  always  in  time  dispel  these  nebulosities.”4  By  removing 
this  source  of  friction  and  antagonism,  Napoleon  averted  the 
possible  danger  of  an  Anglo-American  alliance,  for  had  not 
Jefferson  said : 

The  day  that  France  takes  possession  of  New  Orleans  fixes  the  sen¬ 
tence  which  is  to  restrain  her  forever  within  her  low  water  mark. 
It  seals  the  union  of  two  nations  who  in  conjunction  can  maintain 
exclusive  possession  of  the  ocean.  From  that  moment  we  must  marry 
ourselves  to  the  British  fleet  and  nation.  We  must  turn  all  our 
attention  to  a  maritime  force  for  which  our  resources  place  us  on 
very  high  grounds.5 

*  The  Works  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  IX.  357,  March  16,  1802. 

’’Ibid.,  IX.  364,  April  18,  1802.  See  also  IX.  366.  Convincing  testi¬ 
mony,  this,  to  Adet’s  description  of  Jefferson’s  single-minded  Ameri¬ 
canism. 


306  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


Jefferson  knew  how  to  use  a  British  alliance  as  leverage 
against  France,  and  for  nearly  a  year  before  the  purchase 
he  dangled  it  as  a  nightmare  before  Napoleon.6  On  the 
administrative  side,  he  planned  to  pour  such  a  population 
into  the  western  country  that,  in  the  event  of  war,  Louisiana 
would  fall  into  our  lap,  an  easy  prize.7  But  thanks  to  the 
good  sense  of  Napoleon,  Jefferson  secured  his  inland  empire 
without  paying  the  price  of  war  or  of  European  entangle¬ 
ments.8 

If  Jefferson,  in  1803,  thought  that  the  Louisiana  pur¬ 
chase  had  secured  us  “the  course  of  a  peaceful  nation,”9 
which  had  only  to  bide  its  time  until  the  next  European  con¬ 
flict  should  toss  Florida  into  her  lap,10  he  was  taking  into 
account  only  our  progress  landward.  Our  outlook  seaward 
was  less  promising,  and,  in  1804  and  1805,  the  chief  danger 
to  maritime  security  seemed  to  emanate  from  France.  In 
1804,  Jefferson  was  reduced  to  the  melancholy  admission 
that  “We  cannot  be  respected  by  France  as  a  neutral  na¬ 
tion,  nor  by  the  world  ourselves  as  an  independent  one,  if 
we  do  not  take  effectual  measures  to  support,  at  every  risk, 
our  authority  in  our  own  harbors.”11 

Just  at  the  time  when  American  relations  with  France 
were  suffering  this  increased  strain,  the  tension  with  Great 
Britain  appeared  to  relax.  The  brief  ministry  of  Charles 
James  Fox  seemed  to  offer  promise  of  a  cordiality  long  un¬ 
known,  and  the  project  of  an  Anglo-American  alliance  in  the 
event  of  war  between  the  United  States  and  either  France 
or  Spain  was  agitated  once  more.12  In  August,  1805,  Jeffer- 

*  The  Works  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  IX.  386,  July  13,  1802;  IX.  437, 
February  1,  1803 ;  I.  372,  April  8,  1803. 

T  Ibid.,  IX.  464,  April  30,  1803. 

8  For  his  complacency  on  this  account,  see  his  paean  of  neutrality, 
ibid.,  X.  32,  October  4,  1803. 

8  Ibid.,  X.  28,  August  9,  1803. 

10  Ibid.,  X.  29. 

11  Ibid.,  X.  95,  August  15,  1804,  to  James  Madison. 

u  Ibid.,  X.  168,  August  4,  1805. 


FRANCE  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


307 


son  was  quite  feverish  about  it.  “I  am  strongly  impressed,” 
he  wrote  the  secretary  of  state,  “with  a  belief  of  hostile  and 
treacherous  intentions  against  us  on  the  part  of  France,  and 
that  we  should  lose  no  time  in  securing  something  more  than 
a  mutual  friendship  with  England.”13  Even  so,  he  preferred 
that  the  treaty  should  be  provisional,  should  operate  solely 
for  the  duration  of  the  existing  war  in  Europe,  and  then 
only  in  the  event  of  hostilities  between  the  United  States 
and  France  or  Spain.14  He  believed  that  a  knowledge  of 
the  mere  existence  of  such  a  treaty  would  bind  France  and 
Spain  to  keep  the  peace. 

But  autumn  frosts  soon  chilled  an  August  ardor.  By 
October,  Jefferson  was  congratulating  himself  that  an 
Anglo-American  entente  had  not  eventuated.  “It  would 
have  been  disagreeable,”  he  conceded,  “to  have  proposed 
closer  connections  with  England  at  the  moment  when  so 
much  just  clamour  exists  against  her  for  her  new  encroach¬ 
ments  on  neutral  rights.”15  It  was  the  fate  of  America  to 
encounter  only  rebuffs  from  either  belligerent.  Our  friend¬ 
ship  was  valued  as  little  as  our  hostility  was  feared.  There 
was  nothing  in  the  politics  of  1805  to  augur  American  at¬ 
tachment  toward  either  France  or  Great  Britain  except  as 
self-interest  might  later  direct. 

The  rift  in  the  clouds,  presaged  by  the  sympathy  of  Fox 
and  Jefferson,  closed  again  with  the  death  of  the  former, 
and,  under  the  Portland  ministry,  all  the  old  antagonisms 
revived.  Nevertheless,  the  pendulum  had  far  to  swing  be¬ 
tween  projected  alliance  and  actual  warfare.  The  same 
observers  who,  in  February,  1806,  predicted  that  America 
would  not  fight  either  Great  Britain  or  Spain,16  declared,  in 

13  The  Works  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  X.  171,  August  25,  1805. 

14  Ibid.,  X.  172-173,  August  27,  1805. 

15  Ibid.,  X.  179-180,  October  25,  1805.  To  W.  C.  Nicholas. 

16  “The  Correspondence  of  J.  A.  Bayard,”  in  Annual  Report  of  Amer¬ 
ican  Historical  Association,  1913,  II.  166.  See  also  pp.  168,  169,  Feb¬ 
ruary  25,  1806. 


308  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


March,  that  war  was  imminent.17  But  these  were  not  in 
the  confidence  of  the  administration.  At  the  moment  when 
they  were  scenting  war,  Jefferson  was  assuring  a  friend  that 
the  government  aspired  to  nothing  beyond  a  rigid  neutrality. 
“We  were  not  disposed  to  join  in  league  with  Britain,  under 
any  belief  that  she  is  fighting  for  the  liberties  of  mankind 
&  to  enter  into  war  with  Spain,  &  consequently  France. — We 
are  for  a  peaceable  accommodation  with  all  those  nations,  if 
it  can  be  effected  honorably.”18 

Six  years  had  now  gone  by  since  Napoleon’s  bid  for 
American  friendship,  and  the  net  result  of  these  six  years 
was  a  neutrality  surprisingly  genuine.  America  stood  alone, 
watchful  of  her  own  self  interest,  skeptical  of  European 
schemes.  Neither  France  nor  Great  Britain  could  bridge  the 
gulf  between  America  and  herself.  Each  lacked  the  wis¬ 
dom  to  convert  neutrality  into  friendship.  Soon  each  was 
to  rival  the  other  in  turning  honest  neutrality  into  bitterness 
and  rancor.  Neither  quite  appreciated  what  Jefferson  epito¬ 
mized  in  a  letter  to  Monroe  at  London,  which,  so  far  as  his 
words  go,  might  have  been  addressed  with  equal  propriety 
to  Armstrong  at  Paris.  Picturing  America’s  importance  to 
European  belligerents,  he  says : 

No  two  countries  upon  earth  have  so  many  points  of  common  in¬ 
terest  &  friendship ;  &  their  rulers  must  be  great  bunglers,  indeed, 
if,  with  such  disposition,  they  break  them  asunder.  The  only  rivalry 
that  can  arise  is  on  the  ocean.  .  .  .  We  have  the  seamen  & 

materials  for  50.  ships  of  the  line,  &  half  that  number  of  frigates ; 
and  were  France  to  give  us  the  money  &  England  the  disposition  to 
equip  them,  they  would  give  to  England  serious  proofs  of  the  stock 
from  which  they  are  sprung,  &  the  school  in  which  they  have  been 
taught;  and  added  to  the  effects  of  the  immensity  of  sea  coast  lately 
united  under  one  power,  would  leave  the  state  of  the  ocean  no  longer 
problematical.  Were,  on  the  other  hand,  England  to  give  the  money, 
&  France  the  disposition  to  place  us  on  the  sea  in  all  our  force,  the 
whole  world,  out  of  the  continent  of  Europe,  might  be  our  joint 
monopoly.  We  wish  for  neither  of  these  scenes.  We  ask  for  peace 

”  “The  Correspondence  of  J.  A.  Bayard,”  loc.  cit.,  p.  169,  March  16, 
1806. 

18  The  Works  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  X.  241,  March  22,  1806. 


FRANCE  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


309 


justice  from  all  nations;  &  vve  will  remain  uprightly  neutral  in 
f  ct,  tho’  leaning  in  belief  to  the  opinion  that  an  English  ascendancy 
the  ocean  is  safer  for  us  than  that  of  France.19 

The  vision  thus  conjured  up  by  Jefferson  embraced  a 
ore  distant  future  than  he  realized.  But  it  already  pos- 
■essed  enough  elements  of  truth  to  condemn  the  judgment 
any  European  who  deliberately  affronted  the  American 
cople.  And  when  America  was  finally  driven  away  from 
the  possibility  of  alliance  with  either  Great  Britain  or 
France20  and  forced  back  upon  a  neutrality  as  painful  as  it 
as  possibly  unnecessary,  European  statesmanship  proved 
self  inadequate.  Certainly  the  American  policy  of  Napo- 
leon  from  1800  to  1807,  despite  brilliant  high  lights,  failed 
of  its  objective,  and  this  failure  casts  discredit  upon  his 
statesmanship  as  a  whole.  Toward  America  herself  he  came 
to  feel  all  the  bitterness  of  one  who  has  failed. 

It  would  appear  that  Napoleon’s  approach  to  the  Con- 
nental  System,  which  so  completely  alienated  America,  was 
fortuitous  rather  than  designed.”21  He  inherited  it  from 
le  Revolution  and  the  Directory.  In  renewing  its  applica- 
on,  his  primary  objective  was  England.  The  American 
nplications  were,  in  Napoleon’s  estimation,  only  incidental, 
liven  when  Champagny,  his  minister  of  foreign  affairs,  called 
ttention  to  the  growing  demand  in  America  for  silk  and 
other  French  manufactures  and  reminded  him  of  the  interest 
elt  by  French  chambers  of  commerce  in  the  possibilities  of 
extending  the  trade,  Napoleon  overlooked  the  situation.22 
Certainly  his  decision  in  September,  1807,  respecting  a  de- 
nand  for  the  release  of  fifty  or  sixty  Americans  taken  on 
English  warships  and  detained  at  Lorient,  was  altogether 

16  Ibid.,  X.  263,  May  4,  1806. 

“Jefferson  was  so  irritated  with  England  following  the  Chesapeake 
\ffair  that  he  almost  inclined  to  a  French  alliance.  The  Works  of 
Thomas  Jefferson,  X.  483,  August  21,  1807.  To  T.  Leiper. 

21  Frank  Edgar  Melvin,  Napoleon’s  Navigation  System,  p.  10. 

22  Ibid.,  pp.  19-21. 


310  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


arbitrary.23  It  was  apparent  that  Armstrong’s  hopes  that 
the  general  rigor  of  the  Continental  System  would  be  relax¬ 
ed  in  favor  of  America  had  no  basis  in  fact.  And  his  declar¬ 
ation  to  Monroe,  in  July,  1807,  that  the  treaty  of  1800  had 
not  been  violated  was  unduly  optimistic.24 

America  as  a  neutral  had,  of  course,  a  vital  interest  in 
the  recognition  which  Napoleon  might  continue  to  accord 
to  neutral  flags.  The  Emperor’s  pronouncement  on  this 
question,  coming  only  a  week  after  the  decision  with  refer¬ 
ence  to  the  captives,  was  far  from  encouraging: 

In  the  actual  circumstances,  navigation  offers  all  sorts  of  difficulties. 
France  is  not  able  to  regard  flags  as  neutral  without  consideration. 
That  of  America  exposed  though  it  be  to  the  insults  of  England, 
has  a  kind  of  existence,  since  the  English  still  preserve  toward  it 
some  measure  of  regard  and  since  it  imposes  somewhat  upon  them. 
That  of  Portugal  and  that  of  Denmark  no  longer  exist.  The  flag 
of  the  small  cities  of  Germany  (Hanseatic)  whose  names  are 
scarcely  known,  has  been  subjected  by  the  English  to  whatever 
legislation  suits  their  convenience.  England  allows  it  entry  to  the 
ports  of  France  solely  as  under  her  dependence  and  trading  for  her 
interest.  It  is  necessary  to  propose  a  plan  of  a  decree  to  declare 
that  ships  which  enter  flying  these  flags  may  not  go  out  again,  and 
that  they  should  be  subjected  to  all  the  rigors  of  a  blockade.  For 
each  a  particular  instruction  and  legal  procedure  must  be  devised.25 

It  will  be  noticed  that,  in  projecting  this  drastic  code, 
Napoleon  made  some  exception  in  the  case  of  America. 
Something  of  the  same  solicitude  softened  his  determina¬ 
tion  to  deny  an  exequatur  to  an  American  consul  whose 
acceptance  of  British  honors  had  subjected  him  to  suspicion : 

Monsieur  de  Champagny,  my  intention  is  to  remove  the  exequatur 

from  Mr.  - ,  American  consul  at  Genoa.  He  wears  a 

Maltese  cross  which  the  English  have  given  him,  something  which 
is  contrary  to  the  American  Constitution,  and  this  is  otherwise  a 

23  Correspondance  de  Napoleon  Ier,  XVI.  No.  13102,  September  2, 
1807. 

24  Frank  Edgar  Melvin,  Napoleon’s  Navigation  System,  p.  37. 

25  Correspondance  de  Napoleon  ler,  XVI.  20,  No.  13135,  September  9, 
1807.  These  retaliatory  schemes  were  drawn  up  on  September  18th  but 
were  not  published  until  December.  See  American  State  Papers,  For¬ 
eign  Relations,  III.  261. 


FRANCE  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


311 


bad  case.  You  will  forewarn  the  Minister  of  the  United  States  of 
this  intention.  I  am  giving  orders  to  the  Minister  of  Police  to  re¬ 
move  Mr. -  from  Genoa.26 

And  in  November,  just  on  the  eve  of  the  British  Orders  in 
Council  of  the  eleventh,  Napoleon  underwent  a  spasm  of 
caution.  “The  English,”  he  informed  his  chief  of  police, 
Fouche,  “are  plotting  a  scheme  at  Moreau  for  involving  us 
with  the  United  States  of  America.  Care  is  needed  that  our 
newspapers  make  no  mention  of  this.”27  But  ten  days  more, 
and  this  veil  of  caution  was  thrown  to  the  winds,  while  Na¬ 
poleon  proceeded  to  berate  America  with  a  sarcasm  worthy 
of  Canning: 

Monsieur  de  Champagny,  reply  to  the  American  minister  that, 
since  America  allows  her  ships  to  be  visited,  she  is  adopting  the 
principle  that  the  flag  does  not  cover  merchandise,  that  since  she 
recognizes  the  absurd  laws  of  the  English  blockade,  she  consents 
that  her  vessels  be  constantly  halted,  returned  to  England  and 
thereby  turned  aside  from  their  navigation,  why  do  not  the  Amer¬ 
icans  endure  the  blockade  of  France?  Certainly  France  is  no  more 
blockaded  by  England  than  England  is  by  France.  Why  don’t  the 
Americans  suffer  equally  the  visit  of  French  war-ships?  To  be 
sure,  France  recognizes  that  these  measures  are  unjust,  illegal  and 
violative  of  the  sovereignty  of  nations.  But  it  is  incumbent  upon 
the  nations  to  resort  to  force  and  to  come  out  boldly  against  actions 
which  dishonor  them  and  encroach  upon  their  independence.28 

Napoleon’s  policy  was  frankly  to  force  America  into 
wanUBuT  to  accomplish  this  he  pursued  the  wrong  tack. 
Forh  ranee  to  heap  insult  and  injury  upon  the  victim  of 
British  insult  and  injury  was  merely  to  confirm  America  in 
hatred  of  both  antagonists.  Her  leaders  rightly  insisted  that 
the  embargo  to  which  America  was  driven  was  a  protest 
not  against  Britain  or  France  singly,  hut  against  “contem¬ 
poraneous  aggressions  of  the  belligerent  Powers,  equally 
unprovoked  and  equally  indefensible  on  the  presumed  ground 
of  acquiescence.”29  This  being  so,  “war  with  one  of  the 

M  Ibid.,  XVI.  67,  October  6,  1807. 

37  Ibid.,  XVI.  139,  November  5,  1807. 

28  Ibid.,  XVI.  165,  November  15,  1807. 

39  American  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  III.  261.  Also  III.  260. 


312  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 

belligerents,  only,  would  be  submission  to  the  edicts  and 
will  of  the  other;  and  a  repeal,  in  whole  or  in  part,  of  the 
embargo,  must  necessarily  be  war  or  submission.”30  Na¬ 
poleon  was  playing  too  vast  a  game  to  view  it  from  all 
angles,  but  his  American  policy,  by  driving  America  into  her 
only  recourse  under  the  circumstances,  played  into  the  hands 
of  England  by  increasing  the  effectiveness  of  the  blockade. 

_  The  pmhargp  which  Napoleon’s  own  edicts  invited  pro¬ 
duced  an  immediate  effect  to  which  even  the  larger  aspect 
of  his  policy  could  not  blind  the  Emperor.  And  the  confi¬ 
dence  expressed  in  his  instructions  of  January  12,  1808,  to 
Champagny,  that  America  would  move  with  docility  along 
the  path  he  marked  for  her,31  was  converted,  by  February, 
to  the  recognition  in  a  dim  sort  of  way  that  America  could 
not  be  bullied  into  partnership  with  him.32  It  was  then  that 
he  cast  about  for  motives  nearer  home  which  might  lure 

America  from  her  isolation.  He  thought  he  had  found  the 
jright  bait  in  Florida,  and  early  in  February,  1808,  he  offered 
Ito  secure  Florida  in  exchange  for  an  alliance.  The  instruc¬ 
tions  to  Champagny  are  sufficiently  explicit.  “Inform  the 
American  minister  verbally,  that  whenever  war  should  be 
declared  between  America  and  England,  and  when  in  conse¬ 
quence  of  this  war  the  Americans  should  push  troops  into 
the  Floridas  to  succour  the  Spaniards  and  repell  the  English, 
I  shall  be  pleased.  You  will  even  give  him  to  understand 
that  in  the  event  of  America’s  desiring  to  enter  upon  a  treaty 
of  alliance  with  me  and  to  make  common  cause,  I  shall  be 
pleased  to  intervene  with  the  Court  of  Spain  in  order  to  ob¬ 
tain  the  cession  of  the  same  Floridas  in  favor  of  the  Ameri¬ 
cans.”33 

30  American  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  III.  261. 

31  Correspondence  de  Napoleon  Ier,  XVI.  244,  January  12,  1808. 

32 American  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  III.  249,  February  8, 
1808.  Madison’s  instructions  to  Armstrong  describe  the  Napoleonic 
decree  as  “an  empty  menace.” 

33  Correspondance  de  Napoleon  Ier,  XVI.  301,  February  2,  1808. 


FRANCE  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


313 


Finding  America  deaf  to  blandishments,  Napoleon  revert¬ 
ed  to  threats  and  insults,  a  form  of  communication  more  na¬ 
tive  to  his  genius.  The  following  instructions  to  Cham- 
pagny  prove  that  his  hand  had  lost  none  of  its  cunning : 

Monsieur  de  Champagny,  it  is  necessary  to  write  to  the  American 
minister,  in  reply  to  his  letters  of  the  fourth  and  the  eighth,  that 
France  has  contracted  engagements  with  America,  has  negotiated 
with  her  a  treaty  based  on  the  principle  that  the  flag  covers  merchan¬ 
dise,  and  that  even  if  he  had  not  solemnly  proclaimed  this  principle. 
His  Majesty  would  proclaim  it  again;  that  His  Majesty  has  dealt 
with  America  independent,  not  with  America  in  chains;  that  if  she 
submits  to  the  decree  of  the  King  of  England  of  the  eleventh  of 
November,  she  thereby  renounces  the  protection  of  her  flag;  but 
that  if  the  Americans,  as  His  Majesty  cannot  doubt  without  impugn¬ 
ing  their  honor,  treat  this  as  an  act  of  war,  he  is  prepared  to  do 
justice  to  all.  In  all  the  possible  wars  in  which  other  maritime 
powers  than  France  find  themselves  involved,  His  Majesty  holds 
fast  to  his  principle  of  the  independence  of  the  flag,  and  does  not 
insist  upon  the  right  of  visit  on  any  vessel;  but  His  Majesty  al¬ 
ready  possesses  the  right,  and  this  right  is  the  fundamental  prin¬ 
ciple  of  his  public  law,  of  demanding  that  every  nation  maintain 
the  independence  of  its  flag,  all  the  sovereigns  being  guardians  of 
their  independence  and  of  their  sovereignty.34 

America  was  by  now  the  only  recognized  neutral,35 
Denmark  and  the  Hansa  Towns  no  longer  being  accounted 
such.  And  toward  America,  Napoleon  suffered  from  divided 
counsels.  The  Milan  Decree  of  December,  1807,  had  been 
followed  by  a  sequestration  of  neutral  shipping  in  French 
ports.  America  had  escaped  at  first,  but  for  a  few  days  only. 
When,  however,  Napoleon  changed  his  tactics  from  brow¬ 
beating  to  bribery,  he  planned  a  modification  of  the  naviga¬ 
tion  policy.  A  council  to  consider  this  was  summoned  for 
February  14,  1808.  But  just  before  it  met  news  arrived 
of  the  American  embargo;  and  Napoleon,  in  his  wrath, 
vowed  that  America  should  “be  compelled  to  take  the  positive 
character  either  of  allies  or  of  neutrals.36  The  intercessions 

54  Ibid.,  XVI.  319-320,  February  11,  1808. 

35  Frank  Edgar  Melvin,  Napoleon’s  Navigation  System,  p.  64. 

33  Ibid.,  p.  71. 


314  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


of  La  Fayette,  Marbois,  Talleyrand,  Fouche,  Cretet,  and 
Champagny  brought  Napoleon  once  more,  in  March,  1808, 
to  a  half  promise  of  relaxation  in  favor  of  the  United 
States.  But  before  the  month  was  out  he  had  reverted 
to  a  policy  of  harshness,  and,  in  April,  issued  the  Bayonne 
Decree,  in  which  he  asserted  that  in  seizing  American  ships 
he  was  merely  aiding  the  American  government  in  the  over¬ 
seas  enforcement  of  its  own  embargo.37 

The  irony  of  the  situation  was  not  lost  upon  the  arch¬ 
conspirator.  The  embargo  had  sealed  the  lips  of  official  pro¬ 
test  against  any  fate  meted  out  to  its  violators,  and  Napoleon 
took  advantage  of  this  restraint  to  boast  of  his  piracies 
against  American  shipping  as  only  a  friendly  assistance  to 
a  government  unable  to  punish  its  own  rebels.  “Inform 
the  American  minister,”  he  commanded  Champagny  on 
March  31,  “that  a  large  number  of  American  ships  laden 
with  colonial  products  pretend  to  be  coming  from  America, 
but  are  in  reality  hailing  from  London.  Every  ship  laden 
with  colonial  products  ought  to  be  confiscated,  because  the 

embargo  which  the  Americans  havejmposed  in  their  ports 

jpves  the  assurance  that  these  ships  do  not  come  from 

America.”38 

'^Napoleon  was  soon  to  learn  that  the  embargo  which  he 
satirized  so  mockingly  was  exposing  his  own  West  India 
possessions  to  utter  ruiin  The  disastrous  effects  of  the 
-  embargo  upon  the  ~~ British  West  Indies  have  been  noted 
elsewhere,  and  this  notwithstanding  British  control  of  the 
seas.  The  French  West  Indies,  lacking  such  an  advantage, 
were  even  more  exposed.  Napoleon  learned  the  situation 
while  at  Bordeaux  in  April,  1808.  He  determined  to  rescue 
his  colonies  by  convoys  undertaken  by  private  initiative  with 

37  Frank  Edgar  Melvin,  op.  cit.,  pp.  71-72. 

38  Correspondance  de  Napoleon  Ier ,  XVI.  459,  March  31,  1808.  See 
also  ibid.,  XVII.  60,  May  5,  1808;  ibid.,  XVII.  86,  May  10,  1808;  ibid., 
XVII.  205,  329,  364. 


FRANCE  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


315 


government  subvention.39  A  far  better  hope  for  their 
provisioning  lay,  of  course,  in  a  friendly  understanding  with 
the  United  States,  but  Napoleon  was  reluctant  to  admit  the 
necessity. 

In  the  diplomatic  duel,  Armstrong,  for  the  American 
government,  parried  French  attacks  by  asking  in  his  turn 
if  France  had  ever  squared  either  her  theory  or  her  practice 
with  the  principles  of  international  law,  or  had  ever  sought 
any  other  justification  for  her  conduct  than  American  ac¬ 
quiescence  in  British  measures?40  And  Madison  pointed  out 
the  advantages  which  France  would  gain  by  abandoning 
the  Decrees.  Great  Britain  would  either  have  to  follow 
suit,  thus  lifting  the  blockade,  or,  if  she  refused  to  do  so, 
would  stand  isolated  against  the  combined  power  of  France 
and  the  United  States.41  America,  in  her  turn,  was  baiting 
the  hook  for  an  alliance.  But  her  offer  to  restore  commerce 
proved  as  vain  as  Napoleon’s  offer  to  turn  over  Florida.43 
Diplomacy,  in  the  spring  and  summer  of  1808,  accomplished 
little  for  either  France  or  America.  Napoleon  clung  to  the 
idea  that  Great  Britain  would  ultimately  force  America  into 
war.  Meanwhile,  until  America  should  see  fit  to  defend  her¬ 
self,  he  did  not  propose  to  recognize  her  flag.  “We  recog¬ 
nize  no  flag  that  permits  itself  to  be  violated.  These  are  our 
principles!”  he  announced  in  May,  1808. 43 

General  Armstrong  found  his  position  most  discourag¬ 
ing.  But  in  August,  as  a  sort  of  last  effort,  he  made  strong 
representations  as  to  the  help  which  American  shipping 
could  render  to  France  herself,  if  allowed  to  ply  between 
French  and  British  ports.44  His  arguments  made  a  far 

39  Frank  Edgar  Melvin,  Napoleon’s  Navigation  System,  p.  55. 

40  American  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  III.  252,  April  2,  1808. 

41  Ibid.,  III.  252,  May  2,  1808;  also  III.  222. 

42  He  soon  repented  of  this  offer.  See  a  letter  to  Champagny  of 
June  21,  1808,  in,  Correspondance  de  Napoleon  Ier,  XVII.  326-327. 

43  Correspondance  de  Napoleon  Ier,  XVII.  121,  May  14,  1808.  To 
Joachim,  Grand  Due  de  Berg. 

“Frank  Edgar  Melvin,  op.  cit.,  p.  73. 


316  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 

deeper  impression  than  he  knew,45  though,  while  Napoleon 
was  revolving  them  thoroughly,  Armstrong,  with  no  inti¬ 
mation  of  any  prospective  modification  in  French  policy, 
wrote  in  great  dejection  to  Madison : 

We  have  somewhat  overrated  our  means  of  coercing  the  two  great 
belligerents  to  a  course  of  justice.  The  embargo  is  a  measure  cal¬ 
culated,  above  any  other,  to  keep  us  whole  and  keep  us  in  peace, 
but  beyond  this,  you  must  not  count  upon  it.  Here  it  is  not  felt, 
and  in  England  (in  the  midst  of  the  more  recent  and  interesting 
events  of  the  day)  it  is  forgotten. 

I  hope  that,  unless  France  shall  do  us  justice,  we  will  raise  the 
embargo,  and  make  in  its  stead  the  experiment  of  an  armed  com¬ 
merce.  Should  she  adhere  to  her  wicked  and  foolish  measures,  we 
ought  not  to  content  ourselves  with  doing  this ;  there  is  much,  very 
much  besides  that  we  can  do,  and  we  ought  not  to  omit  doing  all 
we  can,  because  it  is  believed  here  that  we  cannot  do  much,  and 
even  that  we  will  not  do  what  we  have  the  power  of  doing.46 

The  recommendation  of  Armstrong  did  eventually  con¬ 
tribute  to  the  modification  of  Napoleon’s  Continental  Sys¬ 
tem  through  the  granting  of  special  licenses  for  ships.47 
Napoleon  would  have  included  American  ships  among  those 
favored  in  this  manner  had  not  Armstrong  protested  that 
America  could  not  submit  to  foreign  licenses  for  the  high 
seas  trade.48  Armstrong’s  mission  thus  came  nearer  to  suc¬ 
cess  than  either  he  or  his  countrymen  knew.  The  same  was 
true  of  the  embargo  itself.  For,  notwithstanding  his  fun¬ 
damentally  false  attitude  toward  the  embargo  and  the  futil¬ 
ity  of  Franco- American  diplomacy  under  the  blockade, 
Napoleon  had,  after  all,  enough  intellectual  detachment  to 
perceive  the  wisdom  of  the  American  position  and,  where 
no  object  was  to  be  gained  by  insulting  the  United  States, 
even  to  praise  her  conduct.  Thus,  in  a  “Report  to  the  Em¬ 
peror,”  ostensibly  composed  by  Champagny,  but  really  the 


"Frank  Edgar  Melvin,  op.  cit.,  pp.  74-76. 

“American  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  III.  256,  August  30, 
1808. 

“  Frank  Edgar  Melvin,  op.  cit.,  p.  76. 

“Ibid.,  p.  101. 


FRANCE  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


317 


work  of  Napoleon  himself,  he  admits  that  “The  Americans,"] 
that  people  which  intrusts  its  fortune,  its  prosperity,  and 
almost  its  existence  to  commerce,  has  given  the  example  of 
a  great  and  courageous  sacrifice.  It  has  forbidden  itself, 
by  a  general  embargo,  all  commerce,  all  interchange,  rather 
than  submit  shamefully  to  that  tribute  which  the  English 
pretend  to  impose  upon  the  navigators  of  all  nations.”49 
And  in  a  speech  from  the  throne  delivered  at  the  opening  of 
the  Corps  Legislatif  on  October  25,  1808,  he  actually  paid 
a  tribute  of  homage :  “The  United  States  of  America  have 
preferred  to  give  up  commerce  and  the  sea  rather  than  to 
recognize  a  state  of  slavery  upon  those  elements.”50  J 

Had  Napoleon  based  his  earlier  course  of  action  upon 
these  fine  sentiments,  the  United  States  might  possibly  have 
become  his  ally,51  with  incalculable  effect  upon  the  Emperor’s 
own  destiny  and  that  of  Europe.  But  the  golden  opportunity 
passed  unseized.  Viewed  from  the  standpoint  of  France  and 
Continental  Europe,  the  embargo  is  not  a  testToT  endurance 
between  AmericarUshippers  and  European  consumers,  not 
even  a  step  in  the  evolution  of  a  new  law  of  the  seas,  but 

rather  an  episode  in  the  economic  and  finally  the  military 
and  political  downfall  of  Napoleon. 

49  Correspondance  de  Napoleon  ler ,  XVII.  485. 

60  Ibid.,  XVIII.  21,  October  25,  1808. 

51  H.  E.  Egerton,  British  Policy  in  Europe  to  the  End  of  the  19th 
Century,  p.  386,  concurs  in  this  opinion. 


CHAPTER  XII 


CONCLUSION 

In  the  light  of  the  preceding  chapters,  one  may  evaluate 
the  embargo  in  terms  not  necessarily  novel,  but  suggestive 
perhaps  of  a  fairer  estimate  of  its  place  in  Jeffersonian  philo¬ 
sophy  and  American  experience  than  it  has  received.  It  was 
apparent  from  the  outset  of  the  present  study  that  Jefferson, 
in  spite  of  various  inconsistencies,  was  essentially  pacific 
in  his  philosophy,  that  the  vicissitudes  of  his  pre-presidential 
career  did  not  swerve  him  from  this  underlying  basis  of 
thought,  but  rather  confirmed  him  in  the  idea  of  finding 
[means  to  combat  war  with  instruments  of  peace.  So  that 
when,  in  his  second  term  as  president,  provocation  for  war 
became  extreme,  the  weapon  lay  ready  forged  for  injuring 
our  foes  at  no  blood  cost  to  ourselves. 

I  The  urgency  of  the  crisis  and  the  vast  prestige  of  the 
President  carried  through  a  measure  which  created  its  own 
opposition.  And  the  personal  experience  of  Jefferson  in  en¬ 
forcing  his  favorite  legislation  is  an  ever  memorable  object 
lesson  in  the  tribulations  of  those  who  would  lead  mankind 
along  untrodden  paths.  The  patriotism  and  self-denial  of 
men  who  shared  the  President’s  vision,  and  the  disloyalty 
and  selfishness  of  men  who  failed  to  see  the  possibilities  of 
economic  pressure  as  a  substitute  for  war,  form  an  interesting 
background  against  which  the  harassed  Jefferson  appears 
at  his  unhappiest,  yet  at  his  best.  The  philosopher  became 
perforce  an  administrator;  while  the  excessive  love  of  popu¬ 
larity,  which  was  a  possible  blot  on  the  true  grandeur  of  his 
character,  yielded  place  to  a  stern  adherence  to  truth  as 
Jefferson  saw  it,  even  at  the  cost  of  what  had  long  been  the 
dearest  prize  of  his  career. 


[  318  ] 


CONCLUSION 


319 


In  surveying  the  economic  effects  of  the  embargo  in 
America,  it  would  be  rash  to  claim  a  new  point  of  view,  yet 
it  may  not  exceed  the  truth  to  assert  a  larger  increase  in 
manufacturing  than  has  been  generally  noted.  This  was 
most  evident  in  the  Middle  States,  was  apparent  also  in  New 
England,  and  was  so  exultantly  anticipated  in  the  South  that, 
temporarily,  its  effects  were  as  pronounced  there  as  elsewhere 
and  served  to  hold  at  least  the  Middle  States  and  the  South 
in  a  national  solidarity,  very  wholesome  as  a  counteractive 
to  New  England  separatism. 

The  European  aspects  of  the  Napoleonic  System  and  its 
circumvention  by  Great  Britain  have  been  so  exhaustively 
studied  that  a  fresh  examination  of  the  case  can  hardly  ex¬ 
pect  to  revolutionize  the  verdict.  Yet  a  student  who  ap¬ 
proaches  the  embargo  from  the  viewpoint  of  Jefferson  is 
pleased  to  find  that,  if  the  American  opposition  found  friends 
and  abettors  in  the  British  Government,  at  any  rate  the 
friends  of  the  embargo  in  America  could  count  for  aid 
upon  an  opposition  in  England  as  highly  placed  as  Pickering 
and  his  associates,  and  more  generous  and  intelligent  than 
they.  As  in  the  Revolution  American  patriots  were  really 
fighting  the  battles  of  Englsh  liberty,  so  in  1808  the  leaders 
of  his  Majesty’s  opposition  were  in  reality  better  Ameri¬ 
cans  than  the  misguided  followers  of  Timothy  Pickering. 

An  inquiry  into  the  economic  effect  of  the  embargo  in 
Great  Britain  also  serves  to  show  that  Jefferson  was  right 
in  the  major  premise  that  the  embargo  would  exert  an  ex¬ 
treme  pressure  upon  British  industry.  This  pressure  was, 
in  fact,  so  great  that  Jefferson’s  mode  of  calculating  is  vin¬ 
dicated,  notwithstanding  the  failure  of  the  embargo  to  pro¬ 
duce  the  political  results  anticipated.  The  reluctance  of 
America  to  give  embargo  an  adequate  trial  and  the  introduc¬ 
tion  of  wholly  unforeseen  elements  into  the  international  situ¬ 
ation,  as,  for  example,  in  the  British  adventure  in  Spain, 


320  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  I  MBARGO 


vitiated  the  conclusions  of  Jefferson,  but  failed  to  invalidate 
his  philosophy  and  method.  The  combination  of  present 
loss  of  exports  to  Britain’s  leading  customer  and  prospective 
surrender  of  a  permanent  market  to  that  customer’s  own 
growing  manufactures,  was  at  least  a  minor  anxiety,  even  to 
a  power  at  death’s  grapple  with  Napoleon. 

It  has  been  recognized  since  the  last  of  the  old  time 
Federalists  entered  into  rest  and  the  rancors  of  the  period 
melted  into  the  calm  of  history  that  Jefferson  entered  upon 
the  embargo  in  the  interest  not  of  France,  but  of  America. 
It  was  not  necessary  for  the  present  study  to  stress  a  point 
so  generally  assumed.  Nevertheless,  these  pages  bear  inci¬ 
dental  testimony  in  abundance  to  the  independence  of  the 
Jeffersonian  position,  for  the  more  clearly  the  embargo 
stands  forth  as  a  product  of  Jefferson’s  personal  experience 
and  philosophy,  the  more  self-evident  it  is  that  Jefferson 
was  not  the  dupe  and  tool  of  a  man  whose  whole  scheme  of 
existence  was  anthithetical  to  his  own,  and  whose  entire  char¬ 
acter  and  position  in  history  he  despised. 

In  Conclusion,  then,  one  may  claim  for  Jefferson  a  philo¬ 
sophical  consciousness  of  his  own  purposes  far  beyond  the 
mere  opportunism  of  seizing  any  means  to  evade  the  issue 
forced  by  the  Orders  and  Decrees.  And  one  may  still  avoid 
the  pitfalls  of  hero-worship  while  at  the  same  time  crediting 
a  sage  and  a  philosopher  with  a  forceful  adaptation  of  theory 
to  practice,  and  with  a  plan  which  came  near  enough  to  suc¬ 
cess  to  vindicate  its  sponsor  as  a  practical  statesman.  If 
Jefferson  is  not  to  rank  with  Sully  and  Wilson  as  an  origi¬ 
nator  of  grand  designs  and  leagues  of  nations  to  end  war, 
he  at  any  rate  deserves  high  rank  as  a  friend  of  man,  who 
used  the  means  at  hand  to  avert  a  primal  curse. 


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324  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


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INDEX 


Adams,  Henry,  comment  on  New 
England  and  Virginia,  126  n. 

Adams,  John,  expected  to  pur¬ 
sue  strong  foreign  policy,  23 ; 
disappoints  Jefferson  by  pro- 
British  attitude,  23 ;  preserves 
neutrality,  35  ;  previous  record 
on  embargo,  153-154;  no 
friend  of  Pickering,  154. 

Adams,  John  Quincy,  defeated 
for  senate,  102;  opponent  of 
Pickering,  153;  reasons  for 
stand  on  the  embargo,  154- 
155;  proves  knowledge  of 
Orders  in  Council  prior  to 
embargo,  155;  proposes  non¬ 
intercourse,  155,  seeks  to  in¬ 
fluence  Josiah  Quincy,  156; 
letter  to  Harrison  Gray  Otis, 
158;  sees  danger  to  morale, 
and  war  a  doubtful  good,  183- 
184;  not  returned  to  senate, 
187. 

Adet,  P.  A.,  report  on  Jefferson, 
302. 

Albany,  State  Senate  condemns 
opposition  to  embargo,  198. 

Albemarle,  Jefferson’s  resolution 
proposing  embargo,  47,  48. 

Alexander  I,  of  Russia,  appeal 
from  Jefferson,  51. 

Algerine  Question,  Jefferson 
seeks  solution,  14. 

Amiens,  Peace  of,  ends  first 
phase  of  European  War,  144. 

Annapolis,  Md.,  resolution  ap¬ 
proving  of  embargo,  134. 

Armstrong,  General  John,  as¬ 
serts  embargo  is  war  to  finish 
against  France,  119;  pessi¬ 
mistic  views,  120;  unduly 
optimistic,  310;  in  diplo¬ 
matic  duel  with  Napoleon, 


315;  discouraging  position, 
315;  pessimistic  on  embargo, 
316. 

Auckland,  Lord,  recedes  from 
his  position,  272-273;  pictures 
decay  of  British  commerce, 
277  and  n. 

Augusta,  Me.,  papers  report  dis¬ 
turbance,  167. 

Bacon,  Ezekiel,  influential  in  re¬ 
pealing  the  embargo,  140;  cor¬ 
respondent  of  J.  Q.  Adams, 
184. 

Baltic,  heavy  trade  in  1808,  283. 

Baltimore,  Federalist  approval 
of  possible  secession  in  New 
England,  223. 

Baptists,  moderate  attitude  to¬ 
ward  Jefferson,  180. 

Baring,  Alexander,  denounces 
Orders  in  Council,  65. 

Barnes,  J.,  Consul  at  Leghorn, 
favors  the  embargo,  55. 

Bayard,  Senator  James  A., 
(Delaware)  opposed  to 
strengthening  embargo,  209. 

Bayonne  Decree,  pretended  en¬ 
forcement  of  embargo,  314. 

Bentley,  William,  D.  D.,  friendly 
to  Jefferson,  180. 

Berlin  Decree,  issued  1806,  144, 
255;  proof  of  operation,  261. 

Biddle,  Nicholas,  testifies  to 
prosperity  in  Philadelphia, 
218. 

Binney,  Horace,  Philadelphia 
lawyer,  witty  as  to  embargo, 
213. 

Blockade,  of  1805,  144;  more  in¬ 
jurious  to  France  than  em¬ 
bargo,  253;  partially  effective, 
255 ;  of  Great  Britain  against 
Europe,  300-301. 


326 


INDEX 


Boston,  merchants  not  properly 
represented  by  Legislature, 
66;  Tories  threaten  insurrec¬ 
tion,  85 ;  hot-bed  of  sedition, 
104;  sufferers  complain,  127; 
heavy  loser  by  embargo,  149; 
merchants  complain,  150. 

Boston  Port  Bill,  leads  to  non¬ 
importation  agreement,  5. 

Bowdoin,  James,  sends  cheering 
news  from  England,  64-65; 
anticipates  results  from  em¬ 
bargo,  111;  doubts  American 
resolution,  112. 

Brazil,  trade  with  Great  Britain, 
283. 

Burr,  Aaron,  encourages  em¬ 
bargo  violation,  281-282. 

Burwell,  William,  reports  Vir¬ 
ginia  sentiment,  97. 

Cabot,  John,  staunch  Federalist, 
154. 

Campbell,  George  W.,  challenges 
Gardenier  to  duel,  202,  244; 
presents  resolution  on  execu¬ 
tive  freedom  of  action,  245 ; 
opposes  non-intercourse,  251. 

Canada,  large  contraband  trade 
with,  64. 

Canning,  George,  a  difficult  op¬ 
ponent,  114;  flippant  toward 
embargo,  114;  not  trusted  by 
Jefferson,  116;  his  foreign 
policy,  255-256;  penchant  for 
satire,  259-260;  courts  New 
England  Federalists,  263; 
blamed  for  failure  of  Mon- 
roe-Pinkney  negotiations, 
271  n. 

Champlain,  Lake,  scene  of  much 
smuggling,  67,  90,  102,  167 ; 
battle  between  smugglers  and 
revenue  officers,  167. 

Charleston,  S.  C.,  manufactures, 
234 ;  aristocracy  is  Federalist, 
239 ;  merchants  petition 
against  embargo,  242. 


Cheetham,  James,  opposes  Vir¬ 
ginia  Dynasty,  200;  severely 
satirized,  200. 

Chesapeake  Affair,  Jefferson’s 
proclamation  on,  28,  52;  con¬ 
firms  need  for  action,  55 ;  a 
national  insult,  60 ;  negoti¬ 
ations  unsuccessful,  157;  Brit¬ 
ish  action  defended,  180; 
fever  cooled  by  1809,  250; 
British  apology,  257. 

China,  a  horrible  example,  292- 
293. 

Church,  mostly  hostile  to  Jeffer¬ 
son,  180. 

Cincinnati,  Order  of  the,  op¬ 
posed  by  Jefferson,  12,  13. 

Claiborne,  Governor  Wm.  C.  C., 
(Louisiana)  correspondent  of 
Jefferson,  117. 

Clinton,  DeWitt,  Governor  and 
boss  of  New  York,  197;  op¬ 
poses  the  Virginia  dynasty, 
200. 

Coastwise-trade,  increase  in 
flour,  67. 

Commerce,  its  coercive  power, 
25. 

Congregationalists,  especially 
hostile  to  Jefferson,  180. 

Connecticut,  widespread  propa¬ 
ganda,  103 ;  consistently  Fed¬ 
eralist,  177-178;  leader  of 
anti-administration  coalition, 
185;  resolutions  of  General 
Assembly,  185-187. 

Constitution,  intrusts  war  pow¬ 
ers  to  legislature,  15;  strict  in¬ 
terpretation  strained  by  the 
Louisiana  Purchase,  17 ;  ex¬ 
ecutive  should  consult  legisla¬ 
tive,  19. 

Contraband,  provocative  of  war, 
19;  futility  recognized  in 
Prussian  treaty,  20;  an  incite¬ 
ment  to  neutrals,  42 ;  defined, 
50 ;  special  temptations  offered, 
64.  67,  76,  89 ;  food  exempted, 
303. 


INDEX 


327 


Cook,  Orchard,  commiserates 
poor  fishermen,  159. 

Cooper,  Thomas,  correspondent 
of  Jefferson,  26 ;  congratulates 
Jefferson  on  Republican  vic¬ 
tory  in  Pennsylvania,  109; 
argument  for  permanent  pro¬ 
tection,  134-135. 

Cotton,  prices,  70;  provisions  in 
Orders  in  Council,  285;  short¬ 
age  in  France,  285;  rising 
prices,  285 ;  statistics  as  to 
imports,  287  and  n. ;  specula¬ 
tion,  288. 

Crawford,  Senator  William  H., 
(Georgia)  original  opponent 
of  embargo,  242 ;  predicts  in¬ 
dustrialism  for  the  North, 
247. 

Cuba,  must  not  fall  into  strong 
hands,  118. 

Dalzell,  William,  sends  white 
lead  to  Jefferson,  216. 

Dearborn,  General  Henry,  urged 
to  be  in  readiness  for  trouble, 
85,  93. 

Debt,  National,  its  restriction 
advocated,  16. 

Delaware,  frequent  evasions  of 
embargo,  134;  hostile  to  em¬ 
bargo,  208 ;  congressional  dele¬ 
gation  opposes  embargo,  209. 

Directory,  French,  hostile  to¬ 
ward  America,  303. 

Distilling,  restrictions  urged, 
290,  291 ;  restrictions  adopted, 
293. 

Duane,  William,  forwards  news 
to  Jefferson,  92. 

Du  Pont  de  Nemours,  a  corre¬ 
spondent  of  Jefferson,  25. 

Edinburgh  Review,  opposed  to 
Orders  in  Council,  265 ;  de¬ 
fends  America,  266;  analyzes 
views  of  John  Randolph,  267. 

Ellis  and  Allan,  Richmond  mer¬ 
chants,  236. 


Embargo,  coercive  and  submiss¬ 
ive,  3;  fruit  of  long  maturing, 
4;  outcome  of  Chesapeake 
Affair,  29;  its  essential  mo¬ 
tivation,  29 ;  present-day  sig¬ 
nificance,  30;  evolutionary  out¬ 
growth,  30;  factor  in  the  law 
of  nations,  31;  proposed  in 
Resolution  of  Albemarle 
County,  48;  potent  weapon, 
51 ;  Presidential  message,  59- 
60;  advantages,  60;  amend¬ 
ments  needed,  60 ;  evasions  be¬ 
gin  early,  61 ;  stimulus  to 
manufactures,  62 ;  sure  to 
cease  with  peace,  71 ;  not  in¬ 
effective,  78;  not  to  be  jeop¬ 
ardized  by  the  coastwise  trade, 
79;  endangered  by  smuggling, 
89;  habitual  breaches  on  Ca¬ 
nadian  line,  92;  enthusias¬ 
tically  defended,  98;  approved 
in  New  Orleans,  100;  bears 
hard  on  Mississippi,  100;  hard 
on  England,  114;  supplies 
motive  for  Spanish  policy  of 
Jefferson,  118;  expectations 
not  yet  justified,  121 ;  likely 
to  be  a  failure,  122;  a  meas¬ 
ure  of  conservation,  125;  re¬ 
ceives  most  loyalty  at  the 
South,  126;  threatened  with 
defeat,  128;  upheld  at  An¬ 
napolis,  134;  repeal  inevitable, 
139;  repealed,  141 ;  upsets  New 
England’s  economic  fabric, 
145 ;  unpopular  with  mer¬ 
chants  and  ship  captains,  146- 
147 ;  excessive  burdens  of, 
149;  too  passive,  151;  peti¬ 
tions  against,  152;  accused  of 
aiming  at  Great  Britain,  157; 
violates  laissez-faire,  161 ; 
modifies  the  people’s  life,  199; 
satire  on  opponents  of,  205- 
206;  hardships,  211-212; 
stimulates  manufactures,  214; 
extends  powers  of  the  execu¬ 
tive,  245 ;  assures  security  of 


328  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


property,  247 ;  final  phase,  248- 
249;  intensifies  sectionalism, 
252 ;  issued  prior  to  knowledge 
of  Orders  [?],  258  and  n. ; 
exerts  pressure  abroad,  276, 
278 ;  arouses  protests,  278-279 ; 
success  affected  by  affairs  in 
Spain,  282-283 ;  its  effective¬ 
ness,  285 ;  causes  reduction  in 
distilleries,  293  ;  produces  seri¬ 
ous  effects,  297,  299,  300; 
calls  forth  virtues,  301 ;  pro¬ 
duces  serious  effects  in  France, 
312;  ruinous  to  French  West 
Indies,  314;  influences  Na¬ 
poleon’s  policy,  315;  an  epi¬ 
sode  in  the  downfall  of  Na¬ 
poleon,  317;  summary,  318- 
320. 

Enclosures,  increase  under 
George  III,  290. 

Eppes,  John  W.,  son-in-law  of 
Jefferson,  116. 

Erskine,  D.  M.,  conversation 
with  Jefferson,  114-115. 

Erskine,  Lord,  champions  legal 
rights  of  neutrals,  269-271. 

Essex  County,  Republicans  praise 
Jefferson,  130. 

Essex  Junto,  sends  emissaries 
of  discontent,  104,  105;  toys 
with  idea  of  secession,  179. 

Exports,  British,  statistical  ta¬ 
bles,  295,  296,  296  n„  297  n. ; 
largely  to  America,  298. 

Federalists,  use  embargo  for 
playing  politics,  110;  misjudge 
Republicans,  118-119;  strong¬ 
est  in  commercial  centers, 
145-146;  stronghold  in  Salem, 
147  n. ;  solicitude  for  farmers, 
150;  work  earnestly,  159; 
amused  by  law  violations  in 
Vermont,  168;  court  Great 
Britain,  303. 

Fisheries,  hard  hit  by  embargo, 
176. 


Florida,  source  of  friction  in 
1805,  27 ;  potential  spoils  from 
Spain,  ll7;  opportunities  for 
smugglers,  224;  bait  for 
French- American  alliance, 
312. 

Flour,  coast-wise  trade  mis¬ 
trusted,  75;  needed  in  New 
Hampshire,  76;  scarcity  may 
lead  to  riots,  85 ;  excessive 
issue  of  warrants,  89. 

Fox,  Charles  James,  death  la¬ 
mented,  28;  relaxes  the  block¬ 
ade,  254;  inaugurates  brief 
era  of  cordiality,  306;  sympa¬ 
thy  with  Jefferson,  307. 

France,  violates  neutral  rights, 
3 ;  threatened  in  1793  with 
blockade,  19;  likely  to  secure 
Louisiana,  25 ;  relations  re¬ 
main  awkward,  118;  harsh 
views  harbored  by  Napoleon, 
120;  aid  wins  American  Revo¬ 
lution,  130. 

Franklin,  Benjamin,  urged  to 
prevent  British-American  at¬ 
tack  on  West  Indies,  6. 

Freneau,  Peter,  congratulates 
Jefferson,  99. 

Gallatin,  Albert,  dreads  embargo, 
57;  prefers  non-importation 
or  even  war,  59;  notes  defici¬ 
encies  of  original  act,  60-61 ; 
disturbed  by  contraband  trade 
with  Canada,  64;  considers 
restrictions  on  coast-wise  trade 
too  onerous,  76;  notes  depar¬ 
ture  of  vessels  without  clear¬ 
ance  papers,  77 ;  mistrusts 
Sullivan  and  Pinckney,  78; 
reports  on  licenses  issued  by 
Sullivan,  80 ;  admits  other  li¬ 
censes  were  justified,  84;  loses 
confidence  in  the  embargo, 
84-85;  Treasury  circular,  85- 
86;  protests  against  licenses 
by  Sullivan,  87-88;  over-con¬ 
fident  of  levies  for  suppress- 


INDEX 


329 


ing  smuggling,  90-91 ;  re¬ 
quests  additional  support,  91 ; 
reports  zones  of  greatest 
danger,  92-93 ;  considers  Os¬ 
wego  as  in  state  of  insurrec¬ 
tion,  94;  effective  regulations, 
96 ;  complains  of  evasions  in 
Georgia,  131 ;  evolves  system 
of  bonded  ware-houses,  132; 
receives  memorial  from  Phila¬ 
delphia  merchants,  210-211. 

Gardenier,  Barent,  spokesman 
for  New  York  malcontents, 
201 ;  sees  French  influence  as 
motive,  202;  duel,  202;  re¬ 
turns  to  the  attack,  202-203; 
following  increases,  203;  em¬ 
bitters  debate  on  the  embargo, 
244 ;  a  boomerang,  244. 

Genet,  Citizen,  misconduct  of 
his  mission,  45,  46. 

George  III,  obstinacy,  258. 

Georgia,  words  and  acts  not  con¬ 
sistent,  131 ;  considerable  hos¬ 
tility  to  embargo,  242 ;  van¬ 
tage  ground  for  smuggling, 
243. 

Gerry,  Elbridge,  correspondent 
of  Jefferson,  23. 

Giles  Bill,  called  a  force  bill, 
223. 

Giles,  Senator  William  B.  (Vir¬ 
ginia),  punctures  supposed 
benefits  of  marine  insurance, 
248. 

Gold,  rising  price  of,  298. 

Granger,  Gideon,  Postmaster 
General,  62. 

Gray,  William,  rich  merchant 
loyal  to  embargo,  172-174. 

Grenville.  Lord,  short-lived  min¬ 
istry,  255 ;  leader  of  the  op¬ 
position,  264;  twits  govern¬ 
ment  on  its  policies,  286. 

Great  Britain,  atrocities  in 
Revolutionary  War,  6;  sup¬ 
posed  decay  of,  7 ;  declares 
grain  contraband,  20 ;  favor 
sought  in  1802,  25;  violates 


neutral  rights,  3 ;  restricts 
American  trade,  18;  alliance 
sought  in  1805,  28;  oppor¬ 
tunity  to  disavow  the  Chesa¬ 
peake  Affair,  28 ;  violates 
peace  of  1783,  39;  threatens 
paper  blockade  of  Napoleon, 
41 ;  seeks  to  cut  off  grain 
from  enemy,  45 ;  unlikely  to 
assent  to  “free  ships  make 
free  goods,”  50;  the  Chesa¬ 
peake,  52 ;  over-sanguine  as 
to  commercial  opportunities, 
112-113;  reputed  sufferings 
reassure  Americans,  248 ;  arti¬ 
ficial  prosperity  in  summer  of 
1808,  283-284;  seriously  af¬ 
fected  by  embargo,  300 ;  faces 
possible  Franco- American  at¬ 
tack,  315. 

Grotius,  Hugo,  pioneer  in  inter¬ 
national  law,  32. 

Gun-boats,  used  against  smug¬ 
glers,  64  and  n. 

Hammond,  George,  suggests  un¬ 
fortified  Canadian  line,  40- 
41 ;  interview  with  Jefferson, 
45. 

Hatfield,  Mass.,  petition  of  se¬ 
lect  men,  151-153. 

Hawkesbury,  Lord,  declaration 
as  to  embargo,  257-258. 

Heligoland,  heavv  trade  in  1808, 
283. 

Henry,  Patrick,  urged  to  con¬ 
sider  comfort  of  prisoners,  6. 

Higginson,  Stephen,  staunch 
Federalist,  155. 

Hill,  Mark  Langdon,  prominent 
merchant  accused  of  evading 
the  embargo,  171-172. 

Hoge,  William,  opposes  non¬ 
intercourse,  203;  favors  sub¬ 
mission  to  Orders  and  De¬ 
crees,  219-220. 

Holland,  Lord,  criticizes  Orders 
in  Council,  271. 


330  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


Horizon,  seized  by  Napoleon, 
261. 

Humphreys,  David,  believes 
commerce  will  influence  Brit¬ 
ish  policy,  56;  receives  Jeffer¬ 
son’s  order  for  suit  of  home- 
spun,  135;  leading  entrepre¬ 
neur,  164;  his  varied  inter¬ 
ests,  165-166. 

Imports,  British,  statistical  ta¬ 
bles,  294,  296,  and  296  n., 
29 7  n. 

Impressment,  a  vexatious  abuse, 
51 ;  its  settlement  prerequisite 
to  a  treaty,  52. 

Independence,  scarcely  a  reality 
in  1808,  253. 

Ingersoll,  Charles  Jared,  testi¬ 
fies  to  prosperity  of  Philadel¬ 
phia,  217-218. 

Insurance,  marine,  a  determinant 
of  commerce,  193. 

Internal  Improvements,  fostered 
by  Jefferson,  12. 

International  Law,  its  different 
eras,  32-33 ;  state  of  nature 
peaceful,  34;  importance  of 
American  neutrality  in  1793, 
35 ;  “free  ships  make  free 
goods,”  44,  50 ;  grain  not  con¬ 
traband,  45 ;  contraband  de¬ 
fined,  50. 

Ireland,  prosperous  in  1808,  289. 

Jay’s  Treaty,  struggle  concern¬ 
ing  ratification,  160. 

Jefferson,  Thomas,  approves  em¬ 
bargo,  3 ;  not  an  opportunist, 
4;  high  points  of  previous 
career,  5;  urges  Franklin  to 
avert  British-American  action 
against  French  West  Indies, 
6;  urges  Patrick  Henry  to 
generosity,  6;  threatens  re¬ 
taliation  against  British  pris¬ 
oners,  7 ;  ideas  of  military  dis¬ 
cipline,  7;  does  not  lose  sight 
of  liberalizing  institutions,  9; 
drafts  constitutions  for  Vir¬ 


ginia,  9;  draws  up  regulations 
for  ceremony  of  Washington’s 
farewell  to  Congress,  10; 
wants  peace  and  growth,  10; 
approves  a  navy,  1 1 ;  destined 
to  be  an  empire  builder,  11; 
adapts  ideals  to  facts,  12;  en¬ 
deavors  to  procure  commercial 
treaties,  12;  asks  Washington 
to  encourage  internal  im¬ 
provements,  12 ;  opposes  Order 
of  the  Cincinnati,  12,  13; 
minister  to  France,  13;  atti¬ 
tude  toward  the  Constitution, 
13-14;  attempts  to  solve  Al¬ 
gerine  question,  14,  15;  con¬ 
sistently  opposes  standing 
armies,  15;  predicts  great 
European  War,  15;  wants 
Paul  Jones  for  a  rear-ad¬ 
miral,  16;  defends  privateer¬ 
ing,  16;  dislikes  national 
debts,  16;  encourages  neu¬ 
trality,  17 ;  endorses  Prussian 
treaty,  17 ;  protests  seizure  of 
American  sailors,  19;  opposes 
contraband,  20;  favors  vigor¬ 
ous  assertion  of  neutral  rights, 
21 ;  values  cordiality  among 
diplomats,  22 ;  defends  export 
of  munitions,  22;  balances 
neutrality  with  care,  22 ;  or¬ 
ganizes  Republican  Party,  22; 
approves  election  of  John 
Adams,  23 ;  disapproves  anti- 
French  policy,  23;  mixed 
views  in  1798,  24;  inaugural 
address,  24;  letter  to  Thomas 
Paine,  24 ;  more  friendly  to¬ 
ward  Great  Britain,  25 ;  pa¬ 
cifism  culminates  in  Louisiana 
Purchase,  25 ;  neglects  navy, 
26;  dislikes  a  National  Bank, 
26;  early  attitude  toward  Na¬ 
poleonic  Wars,  27 ;  inclined  in 
1805  to  alliance  with  Great 
Britain,  28;  regrets  death  of 
Charles  James  Fox,  28;  reac¬ 
tions  to  Chesapeake  Affair, 


INDEX 


331 


28,  29 ;  reasons  for  espousing 
the  embargo,  29 ;  place  in  evo¬ 
lution  of  international  law, 
31 ;  acquaintance  with  interna¬ 
tional  law,  33  and  n. ;  views 
on  compact  theory,  34;  ideal¬ 
istic  realist,  36;  quotes  au¬ 
thorities  on  international  law, 
36,  38;  denies  British  right  to 
interest  on  debts,  40 ;  approves 
idea  of  unfortified  Canadian 
boundary,  41 ;  quotes  Vattel, 
43 ;  advocates  principle  of 
“free  ships  make  free  goods,” 
44;  endeavors  to  balance 
Great  Britain  and  France, 
45 ;  friendly  to  France,  45 ; 
achievements  at  the  State  De¬ 
partment,  46;  advocates  joint 
action  against  Barbary  pirates, 
46;  and  Resolution  of  Albe¬ 
marle  County,  47 ;  suggests 
commercial  retaliation,  48; 
Vice-President,  49;  defines 
contraband,  50 ;  sees  good  in 
Great  Britain,  50;  appeals  to 
Alexander  I,  51 ;  reaction  to 
Chesapeake  Affair,  52 ;  sum¬ 
mary  of  views  on  law  of  na¬ 
tions,  52-54;  hesitates  at  an 
embargo,  57 ;  message  on  em¬ 
bargo,  59-60;  piles  up  trouble 
for  himself,  60;  receives  com¬ 
plaints  on  the  embargo,  61,  62 
n. ;  unconvinced  of  embargo’s 
unpopularity,  63;  unfriendly 
toward  judiciary,  64;  receives 
personal  appeals  for  help,  64; 
states  underlying  philosophy 
of  the  embargo,  65 ;  insists  on 
free  movement  of  supplies  to 
Indians,  67 ;  subjected  to  petty 
annoyances,  71 ;  assets  for 
embargo  struggle,  73;  difficul¬ 
ties  of  his  task,  74 ;  proclama¬ 
tion  to  governors,  74;  letter 
to  Gallatin,  75;  makes  con¬ 
cessions  as  to  trade,  76;  trusts 
plain  people,  77 ;  circular  to 


collectors  of  ports,  77 ;  appli¬ 
cations  for  coasting  licenses  ex¬ 
ceed  expectations,  78 ;  praises 
circular  of  Gallatin,  79;  over¬ 
confident  in  Republican  gover¬ 
nors,  80;  loses  confidence  in 
Sullivan,  81 ;  supports  Roane 
against  Marshall,  84;  fears 
possibility  of  flour  riots,  85; 
tells  Dearborn  to  prepare  for 
trouble,  85 ;  renews  corre¬ 
spondence  with  Sullivan,  86; 
rebukes  excessive  issue  of  li¬ 
censes,  90;  overconfidence  in 
citizenry,  90;  calls  on  navy  to 
uphold  embargo,  91 ;  philoso¬ 
phy  severely  tested,  91 ;  a 
grim  administrator,  91-92;  de¬ 
spairs  of  full  enforcement,  92 ; 
dismisses  collector  at  New 
Bedford,  93  ;  sees  insurrection 
in  New  York,  94;  gains  ef¬ 
ficiency  as  administrator,  96; 
tests  Virginia  loyalty,  97 ; 
lauded  by  South  Carolina,  98; 
determined  to  enforce  the  law, 
99;  finds  support  in  South, 
101 ;  form  letter  replying  to 
petitions,  102;  grieved  by  de¬ 
fection  of  New  Hampshire, 
105;  astonished  at  coldness  of 
the  Quakers,  106-107;  thanks 
Wm.  Short  for  comforting  as¬ 
surances,  108;  interest  in  pros¬ 
perity  of  Philadelphia,  108- 
109;  retains  faith  in  plain 
people,  110;  doubtful  of  em¬ 
bargo’s  influence  on  England, 
111;  bides  the  outcome,  112; 
regrets  change  in  British  sen¬ 
timent,  113;  amicable  con¬ 
versation  with  Erskine,  114- 
115;  mistrustful  of  success, 
116;  sees  possible  expansion 
in  North  America,  116-117; 
anticipates  Monroe  Doctrine, 
117,  118;  friendly  in  cautious 
way  toward  Spain,  117-118; 
accused  of  truckling  to  Na- 


332  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


poleon,  118,  119;  imputation 
not  justified,  119;  optimistic 
as  to  outcome,  119-120; 
pleased  at  difficulties  of  Na¬ 
poleon,  120;  calls  Napoleon  a 
pirate,  121 ;  ends  period  of 
sole  responsibility  for  em¬ 
bargo,  122-123;  message  of 
December,  1808,  124-125; 

must  contend  for  his  ideals, 
126 ;  outlook  discouraging  but 
not  hopeless,  127-128;  frank 
letter  from  a  correspondent, 
131  n. ;  pleased  with  growing 
manufactures,  137 ;  anticipates 
Yankees  in  desire  for  New 
England  manufactures,  138; 
careful  as  to  rights  of  citi¬ 
zens,  138;  confident  embargo 
would  have  succeeded,  139- 
140 ;  foresees  the  end  of  em¬ 
bargo,  140;  retires  in  sadness, 
141  ;  estimate  of  place  of  em¬ 
bargo  in  his  career,  142; 
reputedly  pro-French,  147; 
courteous  toward  Pickering, 
156;  unwise  instructions  as  to 
Chesapeake,  157;  loose  con¬ 
structionist,  161 ;  full  au¬ 
thority  to  negotiate  by  vote 
of  April  25,  1808,  163;  vigor¬ 
ous  action  as  to  smuggling, 
167 ;  awkward  position  as  to 
revolt  in  Spain,  168 ;  sample 
screed  against  him,  169;  ef¬ 
forts  to  enforce  the  law,  169- 
170;  object  of  satire,  175; 
doggerel  directed  at  him,  178- 
179;  has  clerical  friend  in 
Bentley,  180;  never  forgives 
Joseph  Story,  190;  retires, 
195;  unfairly  cited,  208;  ap¬ 
plauded  by  Philadelphia  edi¬ 
tor,  214;  receives  sample  of 
white  lead,  216;  frequently 
insulted  in  newspapers,  222, 
223  n. ;  favorite  son  of  South, 
228,  231 ;  master  of  his  party, 
1807,  239;  master  of  Solid 


South,  spring  of  1808,  246; 
accused  of  profiting  in  to¬ 
bacco,  248 ;  accused  of  alliance 
with  Napoleon,  263 ;  embargo 
calls  forth  virtues,  301 ;  keeps 
America’s  interests  first,  302 ; 
temporary  friendship  for 
France,  305  ;  pits  Great  Britain 
against  France,  306;  disturbed 
by  European  outlook,  306 ; 
sees  possibility  of  Anglo- 
American  alliance,  306-307 ; 
changes  mind,  307 ;  desires 
neutrality,  308-309 ;  considers 
possibility  of  French  alliance, 
309  n. ;  summary  of  relations 
to  embargo,  318-320. 

Jones,  Paul,  desired  by  Jefferson 
as  rear-admiral,  16. 

Keene,  N.  H.,  reports  continued 
smuggling,  168. 

Kennebec,  Me.,  district  much 
disturbed,  167. 

Kent,  Chancellor,  reports  Demo¬ 
cratic  disaffection  in  New 
York,  200. 

Kent,  Moss,  describes  embargo 
losses  in  Western  New  York, 
198. 

Kentucky,  gun-powder  manufac¬ 
ture,  235-236;  opposition  to 
embargo,  241,  244;  Blue  grass 
upholds  embargo,  241. 

Key,  Philip  B.  (Maryland),  op¬ 
poses  the  embargo,  207 ;  advo¬ 
cate  of  laissez-faire,  224;  re¬ 
fuses  vote  to  permit  Jeffer¬ 
son’s  suspension  of  embargo, 
225. 

King,  William,  accused  of  evad¬ 
ing  embargo,  171 ;  repells  ac¬ 
cusation,  172. 

Labor,  British,  unhappy  condi¬ 
tion  of,  279,  288. 

La  Fayette,  Marquis  de,  in  com¬ 
mand  in  Virginia,  8. 

Laissez-faire,  early  statement, 
160-161,  and  passim;  the  New 


INDEX 


333 


England  ideal,  193;  accepted 
theory,  292,  293. 

Lancashire,  severely  hit  by  em¬ 
bargo,  280. 

Langdon,  John,  Governor  of 
New  Hampshire,  asserts  de¬ 
pendence  of  his  state  on  coast¬ 
wise  trade  in  flour,  76;  moder¬ 
ate  in  issue  of  grain  certifi¬ 
cates,  80-81 ;  loyal  to  embargo, 
105. 

Lathrop,  John,  D.D.,  Thanks¬ 
giving  Sermon,  181. 

Lead,  white,  new  manufacture 
in  1808,  136;  early  mention 
of,  216. 

Leiper,  Thomas,  describes  hard¬ 
ships  of  a  flat-boat  man,  211. 

Lincoln,  Levi,  Lieutenant  Gov¬ 
ernor  of  Massachusetts,  reas¬ 
sures  Jefferson,  68,  69;  esti¬ 
mates  as  to  state’s  need  of 
flour,  87 ;  assumes  responsi¬ 
bility  in  Massachusetts,  88; 
states  violence  of  Federalists, 
126. 

Linen,  unhampered  bv  embargo, 
289. 

Liverpool,  believed  to  be  unpros- 
perous,  70. 

Liverpool,  Lord,  upholds  the  law 
of  nations,  270. 

Livingston,  Robert,  correspond¬ 
ent  of  Jefferson,  25;  interview 
with  Napoleon,  120. 

Lloyd,  James,  defeats  John 
Quincv  Adams  for  senate, 
102. 

Louisiana,  prospective  cession 
by  Spain  to  France,  25; 
boundary  uncertain,  27 ;  evi¬ 
dence  of  conciliation  on  Na¬ 
poleon’s  part,  305 ;  sale  averts 
possible  Anglo-American  alli¬ 
ance,  305. 

Louisiana  Purchase,  contrary  to 
strict  interpretation  of  the 
constitution,  17 ;  supreme  out¬ 


growth  of  Jefferson’s  pacifism, 
25. 

Lusitania  Case,  precedent  in 
1793,  20. 

Lynn,  Mass.,  class-consciousness 
of  shoe-maker,  166. 

Lyon,  Matthew,  opponent  -  of 
embargo,  in  Kentucky,  241, 
242 ;  upholds  Barent  Garden- 
ier,  244 ;  against  war,  250. 

Madison,  James,  party  candidate, 
239. 

Malta,  heavy  trade  in  1808,  283. 

Manchester,  heavy  increase  in 
poor-law  burdens,  280. 

Manufactures,  encouraged  by 
Jefferson,  61 ;  progress  noted, 
62;  of  clothing  in  North 
Carolina,  67 ;  stimulated  by 
embargo,  137 ;  undertaken 
with  reluctance,  164;  plant  of 
Col.  Humphreys,  165-166;  va¬ 
rieties  in  Philadelphia,  214- 
216,  217 ;  great  expectations 
in  the  South,  232;  household 
advocated,  232 ;  extensive  pro¬ 
jects,  233-234,  235;  paper  mill 
at  Raleigh,  235 ;  extensive  in 
household,  236. 

Marblehead,  Mass.,  Republican 
victory,  159. 

Marine  Insurance,  considered  as 
a  panacea,  247-248. 

Maryland,  compared  with  Penn¬ 
sylvania,  221 ;  representatives 
in  Congress  dissatisfied  with 
the  embargo,  223-224 ;  exposed 
to  commercial  losses,  224 ;  not 
clearly  conscious  of  manufac¬ 
turing  opportunities,  225. 

Massachusetts,  legislature  ap¬ 
proves  embargo,  63 ;  seeks  to 
place  removal  of  federal  judi¬ 
ciary  under  President’s  con¬ 
trol,  64;  evidences  of  disap¬ 
proval  of  embargo,  66;  much 
opposition  in,  68;  traditionally 
opposed  to  commercial  restric- 


334  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


tions,  83  ;  extensive  smuggling, 
95 ;  elects  anti-embargo  sena¬ 
tor,  102;  legionary  brigade  is 
loyal,  129;  severely  hit  by 
Orders  and  Decrees,  145; 
burdened  beyond  her  share, 
149;  sends  anti -embargo  peti¬ 
tions,  152-153;  favors  non¬ 
intercourse,  156;  licenses  for 
coastwise  trade,  175;  Federal¬ 
ists  win  legislature,  176;  Gov¬ 
ernor  Sullivan  carries  State, 
176;  leads  in  theoretical  pro¬ 
tests,  185;  official  protests, 
185  n. ;  seeks  to  substitute 
State  for  Federal  law,  191. 

Masters,  Josiah,  desires  removal 
of  embargo,  202 ;  speech 
against  embargo,  203. 

Merino  Sheep,  encouraged,  199. 

Methodists,  moderate  attitude 
toward  Jefferson,  180. 

Mexico,  must  not  fall  into 
strong  hands,  118. 

Middle  States,  drift  to  manufac¬ 
tures,  125;  their  special  inter¬ 
ests,  197;  opinion  shifts  re¬ 
specting  embargo,  226;  the 
final  vote,  226;  a  verdict  on 
their  action,  227. 

Milan  Decree,  issued,  1807,  144 ; 
why  issued,  256;  followed  by 
sequestration  of  neutral  ship¬ 
ping,  313. 

Militia,  poor  reliance  in  war,  7, 
8;  worth  developing  in  1798, 
24;  a  rather  permanent  inter¬ 
est  with  Jefferson,  26. 

Mississippi,  friendship  somewhat 
qualified,  100;  possibilities  for 
smugglers,  224. 

Mississippi  River,  American 
right  to  navigate  defended,  38. 

Monroe,  James,  correspondent 
of  Jefferson,  25,  139;  at  Lon¬ 
don,  1807,  52;  despatches  ex¬ 
pected  to  predict  war,  57 ; 
sends  discouraging  report, 
114;  Doctrine  partially  antici¬ 


pated  in  1808,  117;  candidate 
of  the  “Quids,”  239;  letter 
from  Jefferson,  308. 

Moore,  Sir  John,  debacle  at 
Corunna,  258. 

M  u  1  f  o  r  d,  Daniel,  describes 
Humphreys’  plants,  164. 

Munitions,  right  to  export  is  de¬ 
fended,  22,  42. 

Napoleon,  harsh  sentiments  to¬ 
ward  America,  120;  consid¬ 
ered  by  Jefferson  a  pirate, 
121 ;  said  to  direct  American 
policy,  202 ;  master  of  the 
Continent,  254-255 ;  sophistry 
of,  262 ;  no  illusions  as  to 
America’s  friendship,  302;  re¬ 
verses  policy  of  Directory, 
303;  treaty  of  1800,  303-304; 
motives,  304;  averts  possibility 
of  Anglo-American  alliance, 
305 ;  fails  in  his  American  di¬ 
plomacy,  309 ;  comments  as  to 
neutral  powers,  310;  propen¬ 
sity  for  sarcasm,  311  ;  fails  to 
win  America’s  cooperation, 
311;  plays  into  England’s 
hands,  312;  threats  and  in¬ 
sults,  313;  seeks  to  force  the 
issue,  313;  pretends  to  be  en¬ 
forcing  the  embargo,  314; 
plans  relief  of  French  West 
Indies,  314-315;  appreciates 
America’s  position,  316-317. 

National  Bank,  disliked  by  Jeff¬ 
erson,  26. 

Nature,  Law  of,  peaceful,  22. 

Navy,  sponsored  by  Jefferson, 
11 ;  privateering  approved,  16; 
neglected,  26,  27 ;  victim  of 
economy,  91 ;  makes  captures, 
92  n. 

Neutral  Rights,  violated  by  Great 
Britain  and  France,  3. 

Neutrality,  expected  to  prove 
profitable,  16,  17 ;  needed  in 
1790,  18;  championed  by  Jef¬ 
ferson  in  1793,  21 ;  objection- 


INDEX 


335 


able  to  France,  22;  nicely  bal¬ 
anced,  22;  honestly  observed, 
27 ;  needs  new  definition,  30  ; 
profitable  to  the  United  States, 
35. 

New  Bedford,  Mass.,  collector 
dismissed,  93. 

Newburyport,  Mass.,  attack  on 
revenue  officers,  170;  anti-em¬ 
bargo  celebration,  182 ;  rebel¬ 
lious  hand-bills,  183. 

New  England,  drift  to  manufac¬ 
tures,  125  ;  described  by  Henry 
Adams,  126  n. ;  affected  by 
Old  England,  128;  three  states 
Federalized,  130;  less  averse 
than  supposed  to  embargo, 
134-135;  merchants  consider 
secession,  135;  manufactures 
advocated  by  Jefferson,  138; 
traditional  economic  interests, 
143 ;  continued  under  Repub¬ 
lic,  144;  severely  hit  by  Orders 
and  Decrees,  145;  becomes 
Republican  in  1800,  146;  ac¬ 
cepts  Virginia  dynasty,  146; 
prefers  Great  Britain  to 
France,  147;  concurs  in  em¬ 
bargo,  148;  wishes  mitigation 
of  its  rigors,  156;  debates 
commerce  versus  agriculture, 
160;  scene  of  conflicting 
forces,  163;  manufactures  is 
key  to  future,  164;  discerns 
French  influence,  168;  mer¬ 
chants  are  cynical,  174-175; 
poverty  among  farmers  and 
shippers,  176;  worse  poverty 
among  fishermen,  176;  sup¬ 
posed  intention  to  dissolve 
the  Union,  183;  Pickering’s 
fatherland,  189;  cannot  com¬ 
prehend  her  victory,  190;  dis¬ 
contented,  192;  unprepared  for 
naval  war,  194 ;  hardest  hit  by 
the  embargo,  195 ;  forfeits  po¬ 
litical  gains,  196;  advocates 
desperate  expedients,  247-248; 


secession  feared,  249 ;  turns  to 
non-intercourse,  249. 

New  Hampshire,  declared  to  ap¬ 
prove  embargo,  76 ;  legislature 
tenders  approbation,  104;  goes 
over  to  Federalism,  105 ;  elec¬ 
tions  prove  surprise,  177. 

New  Jersey,  remains  Republican 
in  hard-fought  victory,  204. 

New  Orleans,  key  to  Western 
sovereignty,  18 ;  key  to  Amer¬ 
ican  policy,  25 ;  friendly  to 
embargo,  100;  flour  exports  to 
West  Indies,  132. 

New  York,  opposition  verges  on 
rebellion,  93,  94 ;  instances  of 
smuggling,  95 ;  Federalist, 
178;  conflicting  views  upon 
embargo,  198;  iron  and  tin 
mines,  199;  opposition  to  Vir¬ 
ginia  dynasty,  200 ;  Republi¬ 
cans  make  nation-wide  appeal 
for  loyalty,  201 ;  defended  for 
traffic  with  Canada,  202 ;  vote 
on  removal  of  embargo,  204. 

New  York  City,  evidences  of 
prosperity,  199. 

Nicholas,  Wilson  Cary,  describes 
shifting  sentiment  on  em¬ 
bargo,  97-98 ;  surveys  situ¬ 
ation,  116;  urges  frankness 
upon  Jefferson,  121 ;  turns 
pessimist,  130;  corresponds 
with  William  Patterson,  222. 

Non-importation,  would  survive 
embargo,  262. 

Non-intercourse,  proposed  by  J. 
Q.  Adams,  155;  inadequacy  of, 
194;  is  adopted,  195;  an  emas¬ 
culation  of  embargo,  226; 
passes  House,  250-251. 

North  Carolina,  upholds  em¬ 
bargo,  66 ;  citizens  violate 
embargo,  67 ;  special  condi¬ 
tions  as  to  coasting  trade,  85 ; 
embargo  felt  severely,  229- 
230;  some  opposition  to  em¬ 
bargo,  242,  244. 


336  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


Notes  on  Virginia,  Jefferson 
prefers  peace  to  war,  10. 

Nova  Scotia,  temptations  to  defy 
embargo,  281-282. 

Opposition,  British,  arguments, 
266 ;  achieves  considerable 
success,  272. 

Orders  in  Council,  certain  to  be 
upheld  by  Parliament,  70-71 ; 
expectation  of  repeal,  97 ; 
January  and  November,  1807, 
145 ;  known  at  Washington 
prior  to  Dec.  18,  1807,  155; 
knowledge  denied  by  Picker¬ 
ing,  18 7 ;  Napoleon  pictured 
as  world  victor,  188 ;  reprisal 
on  Napoleon,  255;  provisions, 
256 ;  debated,  257 ;  mere  inci¬ 
dent  in  war  against  Napoleon, 
260 ;  defended  by  James 
Stephen,  260 ;  issued  with  full 
knowledge  of  case  of  the  Ho¬ 
rizon,  261 ;  a  complement  to 
the  embargo,  262 ;  attacked  by 
Whigs,  265  ;  diplomatic  aspect, 
268;  executive  order,  debated 
later,  269 ;  accused  of  violat¬ 
ing  ancient  rights,  271 ;  senti¬ 
ment  for  withdrawal,  273 ; 
target  for  the  Opposition, 
274 ;  opposing  resolutions  are 
defeated,  275  ;  disastrous  tend¬ 
ency,  277 ;  petitions  against, 
278 ;  provisions  as  to  cotton, 
285 ;  approved  by  certain  mer¬ 
chants,  285 ;  ruinous  tendency, 
299;  call  forth  virtues,  301. 

Otis,  Harrison  Gray,  strong  Fed¬ 
eralist,  154;  receives  letter 
from  J.  Q.  Adams,  158. 

Oswego,  N.  Y.,  collector  re¬ 
quests  militia,  93 ;  rebellious 
condition,  94. 

Page,  John,  friend  of  Jefferson, 
advocates  embargo,  55-56. 

Paine,  Thomas,  correspondent  of 
Jefferson.  24. 


Passamaquoddy,  precautions 
against  exports,  82 ;  center  of 
smuggling,  90;  order  restored, 
95 ;  tempts  smugglers,  166- 
167. 

Patterson,  Wm.,  urges  manufac¬ 
tures,  221 ;  changes  views, 
222. 

Paupers,  increase  in  Great 
Britain,  280. 

Pawtucket,  R.  I.,  earliest  cotton 
mill,  164. 

Pennsylvania,  holds  balance  of 
decision,  106 ;  faithful  to  the 
end,  108;  remains  Republican, 
109,  219;  paper  mills  at  Har- 
riston,  135;  decisive  influence, 
209;  consistent  attitude,  220. 

Petersburg,  Va.,  company  pro¬ 
jected,  233. 

Philadelphia,  upholds  embargo, 
66 ;  merchants  oppose  em¬ 
bargo,  107 ;  loyalty  extolled, 
108;  boom  in  manufactures, 
108,  109;  gains  in  manufac¬ 
tures,  136;  resolution  favor¬ 
ing  embargo,  136;  poverty  ex¬ 
treme,  137  n. ;  prizes  to  manu¬ 
facturers,  166;  influence  de¬ 
cisive,  209;  merchants  im¬ 
poverished,  209;  seeks  loop¬ 
hole,  210;  evidences  of  pros¬ 
perity,  212 ;  lawyers  prosper, 
213;  develops  manufactures, 
214;  very  prosperous,  218;  re¬ 
mains  loyal  to  Republicans, 
220 ;  extensive  building  oper¬ 
ations,  221. 

Philadelphia  Price  Current,  com¬ 
mercial  newspaper,  109. 

Pickering,  Timothy,  called  se¬ 
ditious,  69 ;  his  pamphlet  much 
read,  96;  redoubtable  Feder¬ 
alist,  153;  leads  fight  on  em¬ 
bargo,  154;  incarnation  of 
sectionalism,  156;  prefers 
England  to  France,  157;  pre¬ 
dicts  embargo  failure,  157 ; 
letter  to  Governor  Sullivan, 


INDEX 


337 


158;  welcomed  home  in  tri¬ 
umph,  158;  accused  of  fo¬ 
menting  mob  violence,  180; 
sinister  influence,  184;  returns 
to  Senate,  187-188;  speeches, 
189. 

Pinckney,  Charles,  not  trusted  by 
Gallatin,  78;  informs  of  flour 
consumption  in  South  Caro¬ 
lina,  79-80;  letter  from  Jeffer¬ 
son,  99;  finds  minimum  of  op¬ 
position  even  among  Federal¬ 
ists,  133  n. ;  to  Jefferson  on 
losses  borne  courageously, 
240  n. 

Pinckney,  Thomas,  American 
minister  at  London,  41. 

Pinkney,  William,  at  London, 
1807,  52;  letter  to  James 
Madison,  56  n. ;  expects  re¬ 
sults  from  embargo,  70 ;  diffi¬ 
culties  with  Canning,  114;  in 
January,  1809,  still  hopeful  of 
results,  141  n. ;  regrets  repeal 
of  the  embargo,  142  n. ;  inter¬ 
course  with  Canning,  259  and 
n. ;  instructions  do  not  in¬ 
clude  removal  of  non-inter¬ 
course,  263 ;  opinions  on  de¬ 
velopments,  263  n.,  265  n. ;  re¬ 
ports  depression  in  Great 
Britain,  267  n. 

Pitt,  William,  death  in  1806, 
254. 

Pittsburgh,  manufacturing,  233. 

Plymouth,  Mass.,  ship-builders 
uphold  embargo,  103. 

Pope,  Senator  John  (Kentucky), 
agriculture  suffers  on  behalf 
of  commerce,  246-247. 

Porter,  David,  letter  from  cor¬ 
respondent  in  Kentucky,  235. 

Portugal,  affords  Great  Britain 
opportunities  for  trade,  299- 
300. 

Poughkeepsie,  N.  Y.,  woolen 
manufactures,  199. 

Proletariat,  no  influence  on  Brit¬ 
ish  policies,  257  and  n. ;  se¬ 


verely  injured  by  embargo, 
266-267. 

Providence,  R.  I.,  cotton  facto¬ 
ries,  164. 

Prussia,  treaty  sets  a  precedent, 
17;  treaty  recognizes  futility 
of  contraband,  20 ;  treaty 
cited,  41. 

Quakers,  many  oppose  Jefferson, 
106;  moderate  toward  Jeffer¬ 
son,  180. 

Quarterly  Review,  opposes  Or¬ 
ders  in  Council,  265. 

“Quids,”  nominate  Monroe,  239; 
strong  in  the  Blue  Ridge,  241. 

Quincy,  Josiah,  champion  of 
particularism,  153;  receives 
appeal  from  John  Quincy 
Adams,  156;  pities  dealers  in 
perishable  commodities,  159; 
leader  of  the  opposition,  160; 
condemns  embargo,  161-162; 
conscious  and  unconscious 
humor,  162-163;  cannot  credit 
the  victory,  190 ;  defended  for 
refusal  to  fight  duel,  201. 

Raleigh,  N.  C.,  paper  mill  estab¬ 
lished,  235. 

Randolph,  John,  opposes  em¬ 
bargo,  242;  proposals  ridi¬ 
culed,  245 ;  wants  no  substi¬ 
tutes  for  embargo,  249 ;  speci¬ 
men  of  satire,  250;  importance 
of  his  views  exaggerated,  267 ; 
his  opinions,  267-268. 

Randolph,  Thomas  Mann,  re¬ 
ceives  letter  from  Jefferson, 
63  and  n. ;  learns  embargo  is 
to  be  repealed,  140. 

Republicans,  misjudge  Feder¬ 
alists,  119. 

Rhode  Island,  courts  interfere 
with  the  embargo,  84 ;  goes 
Federalist,  178;  militia  defy 
officers,  191. 

Revolution,  French,  annoys  Fed¬ 
eralists,  146. 

Revolution,  hinted  at,  223. 


JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


338 

Richmond,  Va.,  enthusiasm  for 
manufactures,  233 ;  disappoint¬ 
ments,  234;  aristocracy  is 
Federalist,  239. 

Rodney,  Caesar,  receives  letter 
from  Jefferson,  71. 

Roman  Catholics,  especially  hos¬ 
tile  to  Jefferson,  180. 

Rowan,  John  (Kentucky), 
straddles  the  issue,  246. 

St.  Kitts  (West  Indies),  receives 
forbidden  shipments,  248. 

St.  Lawrence,  scene  of  smug¬ 
gling,  90. 

St.  Mary’s  River,  scene  of 
smuggling,  133;  available  for 
smuggling,  243  n. 

Salem,  Mass.,  head-quarters  of 
Federalism,  147  n. ;  new  organ 
installed,  199. 

Salem  Gazette,  accuses  Sullivan 
of  despotism,  175. 

Savannah,  Ga.,  a  commercial 
port,  238. 

Scotland,  alarming  scarcity  of 
grain,  291. 

Sea  power,  becomes  dear  to  Jeff¬ 
erson,  14,  15. 

Short,  William,  reports  embargo 
support  from  Philadelphia, 
108;  testifies  to  Philadelphia 
prosperity,  218-219. 

Sloan,  James,  representative  in 
Congress,  207 ;  quotes  Jeffer¬ 
son,  207-208. 

Smilie,  John,  (Pennsylvania), 
pro-administration  congress¬ 
man,  220. 

Smith,  Adam,  Wealth  of  Na¬ 
tions  admired  by  Jefferson,  36, 
37 ;  economic  man  unreal, 
126;  quoted  by  Thomas 
Cooper,  134;  views  are  popu¬ 
lar,  292. 

Smith,  John  Cotton,  Speaker  of 
Connecticut  House  of  Repre¬ 
sentatives,  186. 


Smith,  Senator  Samuel  (Md.), 
optimistic  as  to  embargo  inci¬ 
dence  on  Europe,  225. 

Smuggling,  on  Lake  Champlain, 
102  and  n. ;  supposed  benefits 
of,  133. 

Smyrna,  Del.,  hostile  to  em¬ 
bargo.  208. 

South,  the,  losses  greatest  and 
support  strongest,  126;  re¬ 
lieved  by  coast-wise  trade, 
132;  chief  sufferer  from  em¬ 
bargo,  228;  loyalty  to  Jeffer¬ 
son,  231 ;  expects  to  benefit 
from  manufactures,  232 ;  in¬ 
tensifies  home  manufactures, 
237 ;  not  an  economic  unit, 
238,  240;  offended  by  Garden- 
ier,  244 ;  Congressmen  well 
informed,  245 ;  ignores  strict- 
construction  theories,  245-246 ; 
facing  eventual  ruin,  247 ;  still 
loyal,  January,  1809,  249; 
splits  vote,  February,  1809, 
251;  hostility  to  tariffs,  252; 
much  opposition  to  commerce, 
305. 

South  America,  offers  Great 
Britain  fresh  opportunities  for 
trade,  192-193. 

South  Carolina,  upholds  em¬ 
bargo,  66 ;  enthusiastic  loyalty, 
98-99 ;  praised  for  obedience 
to  embargo,  132;  sees  eco¬ 
nomic  struggle  as  a  warfare, 
132-133;  violators  of  embargo, 
133;  bears  losses  bravely,  240- 
241. 

Southard,  Henry,  representative 
from  New  Jersey,  207; 
friendly  to  embargo  but  de¬ 
sires  repeal,  208. 

Spain,  encroachments  upon 
Georgia,  37;  determines  fate 
of  embargo,  115;  has  friends 
in  America,  117;  affords  op¬ 
portunities  for  British  trade, 
299-300. 


INDEX 


339 


Stephen,  James,  defends  Orders 
in  Council,  260-264. 

Story,  Joseph,  influential  in  re¬ 
peal  of  embargo,  140;  defeats 
embargo,  189. 

Stuart,  Archibald,  frank  words 
to  Jefferson,  131  n. 

Sullivan,  James,  dreads  embargo, 
57 ;  warns  of  trouble  in  en¬ 
forcement,  58 ;  procures  lauda¬ 
tory  resolutions,  63 ;  thanked 
by  Jefferson,  66;  very  pessi¬ 
mistic  on  embargo,  68-69 ;  not 
trusted  by  Gallatin,  78;  over 
issue  of  certificates,  80;  de¬ 
fends  his  course  to  Jefferson, 
81-82;  acrimonious  corre¬ 
spondence,  82-84;  renewal  of 
correspondence,  86;  his  li¬ 
censes  a  scandal,  89;  influ¬ 
ences  John  Quincy  Adams, 
155;  receives  letter  from  Pick¬ 
ering,  158;  licenses  for  coast¬ 
wise  trade,  175;  carries  State 
election,  176. 

Talleyrand,  hypocrisies,  261. 

Tammany,  upholds  embargo,  65. 

Tarleton,  cruel  enemy  in  war,  7. 

Tatham,  Col.  Wm.,  cheering 
word  from  North  Carolina, 
63 ;  pessimistic  as  to  commer¬ 
cial  men,  96-97. 

Taylor,  John,  correspondent  of 
Jefferson,  119;  turns  pessi¬ 
mist,  130  and  n. 

Thomson,  Charles,  describes 
manufactures  in  Pennsylvania, 
135. 

Tide-water,  loyal  to  embargo, 
241. 

Tompkins,  Governor  Daniel  D. 
(New  York),  refuses  to  call 
out  militia,  93-94. 

Troup,  George  M.  (Georgia), 
fears  smuggling,  243. 

Trumbull,  Johnathan,  Governor 
of  Connecticut,  186. 


Van  Dyke,  Nicholas  (Dela¬ 
ware),  bitter  toward  embargo, 
209. 

Varnum,  J.  B.  (Massachusetts) 
sees  movement  toward  revolt, 
183. 

Vattel,  expositor  of  international 
law,  32-33;  cited  by  Jefferson, 
1793,  35. 

Vermont,  agriculture  is  de¬ 
pressed,  101-102;  alarming  re¬ 
ports,  167 ;  revenue  officers 
are  active,  168;  goes  Feder¬ 
alist,  178,  179;  armed  resist¬ 
ance,  185. 

Virginia,  constitutions  drafted 
by  Jefferson,  9;  sentiment  re¬ 
ported  loyal,  97 ;  attitude  of 
one  family,  98 ;  described  by 
Henry  Adams,  126  n. ;  Repub¬ 
lican  machine  runs  smoothly, 
131 ;  endures  heavy  losses, 
229;  moratorium  is  legalized, 
230-231 ;  household  manufac¬ 
tures,  236-237 ;  exports  to  St. 
Kitts,  248. 

Virginia  Resolution,  cited,  223. 

Washington,  George,  Farewell 
to  Congress,  10;  urged  to  pro¬ 
mote  internal  improvements, 
12;  Fourth  Annual  Message, 
21. 

West  Indies,  smuggling  is  en¬ 
couraged,  70;  adversely  af- 
ected  by  embargo,  281 ;  con¬ 
cessions  to  embargo,  282;  rum 
trade  is  fostered,  291. 

Whig  Leaders,  Erskine,  Liver¬ 
pool,  Auckland,  Grey,  and 
Holland,  264;  observe  Amer¬ 
ican  conditions,  267 ;  consider 
views  of  John  Randolph,  268; 
hedge  on  their  positions,  272- 
273. 

White,  Senator  Samuel  (Dela¬ 
ware),  opposed  first  passage 
of  embargo,  209. 

Wilkinson,  General  James,  aids 
in  war  on  smuggling,  94. 


340  JEFFERSON  AND  THE  EMBARGO 


William  and  Mary  College,  en¬ 
joys  solicitude  of  Jefferson,  9. 

Williams,  David  R  (South  Caro¬ 
lina),  would  enforce  embargo, 
246 ;  reluctantly  abandons  it, 
249. 


Wilmington,  Del.,  loyal  to  em¬ 
bargo,  208. 

Woolsey,  General,  active  in  war 
on  smugglers,  95. 

Yazoo  Claims,  dividing  influence 
among  Republicans,  239. 


